BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765

The comparatively short period of time embraced within the dates of 1754 and 1765 was filled with events of momentous importance in the history of the British Empire. These few years witnessed both a vast extension of the Empire, and also the organized beginnings of a movement tending towards its disruption. In so far as any war can decide so fundamental an event apart from the underlying conditions predetermining its issue, the success of British arms in America decided that the civilization of North America was to be Anglo-Saxon, not Latin in character. In India a signal, though not a final check was given to French ambitions, and a firm foundation was laid for future British political supremacy. In West Africa also a policy of territorial acquisition was definitely adopted. It is not the purpose of this essay to describe these well-known events. The prospects of future imperial expansion, disclosed by the victories in India and in Africa, will be disregarded, and attention will be paid solely to the Empire in America.

On the other hand, it is not the intention to analyze the deeply seated causes that led to the secession of the North American colonies from the Empire. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. To acquire such a state of happiness would necessitate an exhaustive examination of the Empire’s development from its very origins. The tendency towards independence was present at the outset. It was in part due to the extreme individualism of the settlers, a characteristic which, while possessing

2

distinct advantages, is not conducive to the creation of large political entities. In part also this tendency was due to the fact that the movement of colonization was largely the result of private enterprise. The mother country sanctioned the movement, supervised and aided it, and thus incurred definite responsibilities. But the colonies were not incorporated as organic parts of the English body politic. They were expected to provide the funds for their own local public affairs, and, to a great extent with this object in view, large powers of self-government were granted to them. Under these conditions, each colony, whether in the Antilles or on the continent, had developed a vigorous political life of its own, in which the popular branch of the local legislature, through its control of the purse, had become the most important factor. Each colony had its own historical traditions and institutions, its own peculiar customs and usages, to which the home government adapted itself, thus giving to the British imperial administrative system a typically flexible character, though an unsymmetrical aspect. To a great extent, pride of race had disappeared in the colonies, and patriotism was bounded by the physical limits of each province. The colonist, in general, regarded himself not as an Englishman nor even as an American, but as a Barbadian, d Virginian, and so on throughout the entire list of British colonies. Thus the Empire was a loosely organized political structure, composed of a number of heterogeneous colonies with different economic institutions and with varying degrees of local self-government, all tending, however, toward virtual autonomy.

In an empire of this nature, one of the most difficult problems is to create an effective system of defence which shall neither bear inequitably on the taxpayer in the mother country nor offend the political principles of the colonists. It is a problem for which as yet no solution has been found, and which at the present day is one of the most serious of British imperial questions. Modern English statesmen have not solved the difficulty; they have merely cut the knot. Great Britain is to-day chafing at a decision which forces her to provide for virtually the entire naval defence of the Empire. Imperial defence was the rock upon which the old Empire shattered itself, and toward

3

which similar disruptive currents in the modern Empire again tend to draw the ship of state. The unfortunate experience in the past has, however, clearly located the point of danger, though other uncharted reefs may still be encountered. In the years 1754 to 1765 this question of defence became of supreme importance because of the struggle with France. Simultaneously, the looseness of the Empire’s organization was emphasized by the trade of the colonies with the enemy, which led to reforms tending to increase the efficiency of the imperial administrative system. These were the chief colonial questions of the time, and it is to them that British statesmen devoted their especial attention.

It is the purpose of this essay to describe the main features of English policy during this decade. At the outset, an attempt was made to solve the problem of defence by a voluntary union of the continental colonies for this purpose. This failed, and shortly thereafter war with France was formally declared. The chief question during the war was to secure the necessary support from the colonies in America, and also to force them to subordinate their local interests to those of the Empire as a whole by stopping their trade with the enemy. The universal success of British arms in all corners of the world, under the inspiring genius of Pitt, to a certain extent allowed Great Britain a choice as to the direction of the Empire’s future expansion in America. The discussions on this subject, and the final decision reached to retain Canada and not the tropical French islands in the West Indies, revealed the fact that a distinct change had taken place in the economic theory of colonization. This change resulted in some modifications of the laws of trade, while at the same time the return of the rich West Indian islands to France led to a counter movement intended to increase the importance of the British colonies in the same region. The old colonial system also required some readjustment in view of the territory acquired by the treaty of peace of 1763. At the same time, the successes of the war led to increased interest in England in colonial affairs generally, and to a desire to reform patent abuses in them: hence an attempt, based on the experience gained in breaking up the colonial trade with the enemy,

4

to stop all illegal trade; hence also in part the determination to reform the colonial system of defence and to impose parliamentary taxes for this purpose.

I. Theory and Practice of Imperial Defence, prior to 1754

The general formula which summed up the reciprocal duties of mother country and colony was that the former owed protection, the latter obedience.¹ Neither protection nor obedience were clearly defined terms, yet theory and custom had bestowed upon each a fairly distinct meaning. By obedience, in general, was meant submission to acts of Parliament affecting the Empire as a whole. As the aim of British statesmen had been directed more toward creating a commercial than a closely welded political Empire, obedience had come to mean, more specifically, conformity with the complex system of laws regulating the trade of the Empire. The duty of Great Britain as regards protection was also somewhat vague, yet there had developed a well defined theory of Imperial defence, and with it a general agreement as to the equitable apportionment of the burden thereof among the component parts of the Empire.

English statesmen fully understood the doctrine of “sea power,” and recognized that the safety of the Empire depended primarily upon British naval strength. Thus in 1764 the Earl of Halifax, when secretary of state, wrote; “It is upon the Superiority of the Fleets of Great Britain, that the Defence & Security of Her Colonies ever have, & ever must principally depend.”² In times of war, the fleet was used for the general purposes of naval strategy, for the protection of the coasts of

5

the colonies, and for the security of the trade between them and the mother country. In time of peace the navy was used to protect English and colonial commerce. The ocean in those days was not the peaceful highway of the twentieth century. British vessels trading to the West Indies were not infrequently in time of peace seized by the Spaniards and even by the French. The security of this trade depended on the strength of the royal navy. Then piracy was the great scourge of the eighteenth century, and it was only the naval power of Great Britain that forced upon the Barbary corsairs a series of treaties removing British and colonial ships from the range of their depredations. The important trade carried on from the American continental colonies to Madeira and to southern Europe in fish, lumber and grain depended on this immunity.¹ The entire burden of naval defence fell upon the British taxpayer. In the general formula expressing the reciprocal duties of colony and mother country, protection meant primarily naval defence.

There was, however, also a military side to the scheme of imperial defence, and on this side the apportionment of the respective shares of the burden to be borne by mother country and colony was not so simple a matter. During war between Great Britain and a European power, the military forces of the colonies were often used in conjunction with those of Great Britain for operations outside the limits of the colonies. In 1710 and 1711, during the war of the Spanish Succession, the colonies cooperated with the British forces in the operations against Nova Scotia and Canada. In the following war, a considerable body of troops was raised in North America for the

6

unfortunate attack on the Spanish colonies in 1740-41;¹ and it was intended also to use colonial troops in the abortive Canada expedition toward the end of the war. In addition, the colonies embarked on their own account on military enterprises against the French. Such were the expeditions of New England against Nova Scotia and Canada at the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the following century. In this category also belongs the successful attack of the New England military forces, assisted by the royal navy, on the French fortress of Louisburg in 1745. The extent of this coöperation depended on the willingness of the colonies to assist and on the ability of the English government to recruit soldiers within them, for it was recognized that the Crown had no right to command the inhabitants of any British colony to march or sail on any expedition beyond their own limits.² Naturally, each colony was expected to do its utmost in resisting the attacks of a European power in time of war. But the earnest efforts of the English government to bring about systematic coöperation among the colonies for their joint defence, especially for the protection of the most exposed colony on whose security their common safety depended, had ended in complete failure.³

Thus there was no distinct theory nor any well defined practice regarding the military activities and duties of the colonies in time of war with a European power. On the other hand, it was a fundamental principle of English colonial administration that during peace in Europe the defence of each colony against any local enemy should devolve primarily on the colony itself, and that assistance should be given by the mother country only

7

if the situation were so serious as to endanger the Empire as a whole. Thus, while the brunt of the Indian wars had fallen on the colonies, Great Britain, in response to their insistent requests, frequently sent arms and ammunition to them. This was done despite the protests of the Ordnance Office, which objected to these extraordinary outlays for which Parliament had made no provision. Great Britain also spent annually large sums on presents for the Indians with the object of securing their friendship. In addition, the mother country supported garrisons in a number of the colonies. The largest forces were kept in the West Indian colonies which, on account of their position in the midst of Europe’s “cock-pit,” were exposed to sudden attacks.¹ Owing to the large numerical preponderance of the slave population in these colonies, their military strength was small; Jamaica unaided was not even able to cope with the negro insurrections. Similarly, small garrisons were kept in the Bahamas and the Bermudas, as their strategic value was important owing to their location on much frequented trade-routes. Then, mainly to protect the fisheries, both of old and new England, garrisons were placed in Newfoundland and in Nova Scotia. Finally; owing to the refusal of the continental colonies to cooperate for defence against the Indians, the mother country was forced also to keep small garrisons in the two most exposed colonies, New York and South Carolina.² It was recognized that this was a departure from the accepted theory of defence; for prior to the great wars in the middle of the century the Indian danger was considered primarily a matter of colonial interest, and one well within the limits of the military strength of the

8

continental colonies. In these cases the mother country assumed a burden which the colonies as a whole were unwilling to bear and which was deemed too heavy for either of the two colonies most directly concerned. After the establishment of Georgia, the South Carolina garrison was temporarily removed to the more exposed colony, and was subsequently considerably increased.¹ The charge on the British exchequer on account of these permanent forces in the colonies was not large. In 1737 it was only 453,000, and in 1743 it was about 475,000. But of these respective amounts, only a small part was spent in the continental colonies that ultimately seceded from the Empire. In 1737 only £10,000 was thus spent; in 1743 £25,000, the increase being due to the larger force established in Georgia.² In addition to this purely military expense, Parliament

9

appropriated also large sums for the settlement of Georgia, which was to a great extent a military enterprise designed for the protection of the Southern colonies. Prior to the outbreak of the war in 1739, the annual grants for this purpose averaged about 420,000.¹ After the restoration of peace in 1748, there was only a slight increase in the cost of the colonial garrisons, about £80,000 being expended yearly for this purpose.² The regiment in Georgia was disbanded at that time, the small force in South Carolina, being deemed sufficient for the protection of the Southern colonies.³ The annual outlay for these independent companies” in New York and South Carolina was in 1752, 1753 and 1754 only 413,000.⁴ On the other hand, large sums were spent on settling and fortifying Nova Scotia, the total parliamentary grants for this military colony aggregating £543,625 in the eight years from 1750 to 1757 inclusive.⁵ Reviewing these facts, it becomes apparent that Great Britain was willing to spend large sums upon the defence of the outlying frontiers of the Empire, and that she was likewise willing when necessary to establish garrisons in the most exposed colonies. In general, however, the colonies were expected to assume the burden of local defence in time of peace. Until the outbreak of hostilities with France in the sixth decade of the

10

century, the cost of the permanent garrisons in all the colonies was unimportant, and in the case of those that ultimately formed the United States it was trifling.

It was universely recognized at the time that the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was merely a truce, and that the conflict would soon be resumed. The phrase then current in Paris, “bête comme la paix,” expressed the dissatisfaction of the governing classes with a treaty gratifying no one of their ambitions. The fundamental questions at issue between France and England in America had not been settled. The boundary line of Nova Scotia, was still in dispute; and, in order to strengthen their position, the French erected forts in the disputed area and stirred up the Nova-Scotian Indians to attack the English. Similarly in the Southwest of North America, a definite boundary line had not been agreed upon. Moreover France was building a series of forts in the “hinterland” of the North American colonies, connecting Louisiana and Canada and thus confining the English to a narrow fringe of land along the coast.¹ Finally, in the West Indies, France on various pretexts delayed the evacuation and retained the possession of the four “neutral islands,” St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago, in direct violation of the agreement made shortly after the peace of 1748.² The prospect of an early renewal of hostilities directed the attention of the English government to the system of imperial defence, especially in North America, where France was forcing the issue.

II. Plans for a Union of the Continental Colonies in 1754

The English government was loath to renew the struggle. Great Britain was in one of her frequent pessimistic moods, belittling her own strength and magnifying that of the enemy. It was feared that France would acquire not only political but also complete commercial supremacy, and that Great Britain would be absolutely at the mercy of her rival. The aggressions

11

of the French in the Ohio valley, however, forced the government to take some action. On August 28, 1753, Holdernesse, the secretary of state in charge of colonial affairs, addressed a circular despatch to the governors authorizing them to repel, by force if necessary, any invasion of his Majesty’s unquestioned dominions, but cautioning them not to be the aggressors.¹ At the same time, in view of the great emergency, the home government sent £10,000 to Dinwiddie, the lieutenant-governor of Virginia, that colony being the one most affected by the French advance, and allowed him to draw £10,000 in addition for the defence of North America.² This departure from the regular practice was fully justified by the abnormal condition existing, for not only was an Indian war, aided and abetted by the French, in sight, but in addition a war with France was imminent.³ Then on September 18, 1753, the Board of Trade instructed the governors of New York, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Massachusetts to hold a joint meeting with the Iroquois Indians in order to secure their wavering friendship. According to these instructions, all the colonies were, if practicable, to be comprized in one general Treaty to be made in his Majesty’s name.”⁴ The idea of coöperation contained in these instructions was a most fertile one, and it rapidly gained ground with the ablest men in the colonies. Outnumbering the French in population approximately fifteen to one, the English colonies would, if united, have been fully able to cope with the French. But unfortunately for them, as Governor Glen said, they were but a Rope of Sand loose and inconnected.”⁵ France was encouraged in her aggressions by this lack of union among the English colonies.⁶ Thus Robert

12

Dinwiddie wrote to the secretary of state: “The French, too justly observe the want of Connection in the Colonies & from them conclude (as they declare without Reserve) that although we are vastly superior to them in Numbers, yet they can take & secure the Country before we can agree to hinder them.”¹ The problem was to overcome the jealousies of the various colonies and to get them to unite for purposes of defence. During the early months of 1754, such plans were being formulated in America by Shirley,² Franklin and others.

The Albany Congress of 1754 assembled as a result of the Board of Trade’s instructions³ of September 18, 1753, which contemplated only a joint treaty with the Indians. The course of events had, however, demonstrated that some more or less comprehensive scheme of defence was necessary, and hence the subject for deliberation was enlarged.⁴ Of the colonies instructed to send representatives, two—Virginia and New Jersey—failed to comply, though Virginia was represented by DeLancey, the lieutenant-governor of New York. On the other hand, the two charter colonies Rhode Island and Connecticut —though not named in the instructions, sent representatives.⁵ At the meeting of these commissioners, held on June 24, 1754, a motion to the effect that a union of all the colonies was absolutely necessary for their security and defence was unanimously adopted, and a committee was appointed to prepare such a

13

plan.¹ The reasons that led the congress to reach this decision are embodied in a document evidently drawn up by Franklin. It describes in a comprehensive manner the disheartening particularism of the colonies.

The commissioners from a number of the northern colonies, being met at Albany, and considering the difficulties that have always attended the most necessary general measures for the common defence, or for the annoyance of the enemy, when they were to be carried through the several particular Assemblies of all the colonies; some Assemblies being before at variance with their governors or councils, and the several branches of the government not on terms of doing business with each other; others taking the opportunity, when their concurrence is wanted, to push for favorite laws, powers or points, that they think would not at other times be obtained, and so creating disputes and quarrels; one Assembly waiting to see what another will do, being afraid of doing more than its share, or desirous of doing less, or refusing to do anything because its country is not at present so much exposed as others, or because another will reap more immediate advantage; from one or other of which causes, the Assemblies of six out of seven colonies applied to, had granted no assistance to Virginia, when lately invaded by the French, though purposely convened, and the importance of the occasion earnestly urged upon them;—considering moreover, that one principal encouragement to the French, in invading and insulting the British American dominions, was their knowledge of our disunited state, and of our weakness arising from such want of union; . . .

for these reasons the commissioners unanimously decided that a union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation.”² These difficulties had existed throughout the entire history of the colonies,³ but at no previous time was the situation so dangerous.⁴

14

The committee appointed by the colonial commissioners accordingly drafted a plan of union, and this plan, chiefly the work of Franklin, was subsequently unanimously adopted. It provided for an executive and a legislature; the former the president-general—to be appointed and supported by the Crown, the latter the Grand Council to be elected by the various assemblies in the eleven¹ colonies. This legislature was to consist of forty-eight members, the colonies being represented roughly according to population and wealth. To this Grand Council was given jurisdiction over Indian affairs, both political and commercial. It was to raise and pay soldiers, to build forts for the defence of the colonies, and to “Equip Vessels of Force to Guard the Coasts and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes or Great Rivers.” In order to raise the requisite funds for these purposes, the Grand Council was given power to make laws and to impose general duties and taxes. All acts of the Grand Council, however, required the consent of the president-general and, in addition, all laws were to be submitted to the king in council for approbation.² This plan, it is apparent, implies an assumption by the colonies of a far greater share of the cost of defence than had hitherto been customary.

This proposal for a political union of the colonies under one general government in America was ultimately to be brought into effect by an act of the Parliament of Great Britain. The colonial commissioners did not, however, have full powers, and accordingly the plan was first submitted to the colonies. With the same unanimity with which their representatives had adopted the plan, the colonial assemblies rejected it.³ The reasons for this rejection were, on the one hand, the particularism of the colonies, and on the other, their underlying conviction that Great Britain, if left no other choice, would itself ultimately assume the task of defending them. According to Shirley, the commissioners at Albany “had no expectation” that the colonies

15

would adopt the plan; and he added, “nor could any proper plan be form’d, as I apprehend, in w^ch the several Gov^ts would unite.”¹ Franklin was not more sanguine. On December 29, 1754, he wrote to Collinson:

All the Assemblies in the Colonies have, I suppose, had the Union Plan laid before them, but it is not likely, in my Opinion, that any of them will act upon it so as to agree to it, or to propose any Amendments to it. Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary, but when they come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly distracted.²

The action of the colonies in rejecting the Albany plan was decisive, for it was the understanding of the English government that the plan should be submitted to Parliament only after its consideration and adoption by the colonial legislatures.³ However,

in the due course of administrative routine a full account of the proceedings of the Albany Congress was forwarded to England, and on October 29, 1754, the Board of Trade sent to Sir Thomas Robinson, the secretary of state, a detailed report thereon.⁴

The Albany Congress had not succeeded in conciliating the Indians, nor had it provided for the joint management of Indian affairs nor for the strengthening of the frontiers, which were the chief objects desired by the English government when the meeting had been originally ordered. The Board of Trade severely criticized the failure to regulate these matters, pointing out that the situation was a critical one owing to the present mismanagement of Indian affairs, and that the commissioners at Albany had themselves unanimously agreed that Indian affairs “should be under one General Administration directed to the general Interest and supported at the general Expence” of all the colonies. As to the Albany articles of federation, the Board of Trade refrained from expressing any opinion, evidently awaiting the further action of the colonies.

16

While the failure of this plan rests primarily on the colonies, it is exceedingly doubtful if the English government would have ratified it, even if the colonies by their previous confirmation had allowed it to come to the consideration of Parliament. The home authorities desired a union of the colonies for military purposes, not a political federation; their aim was military efficiency, which unquestionably would have been impaired by the liberal powers bestowed on the Grand Council. This will become apparent from a consideration of the scheme of union as elaborated by the Board of Trade.

In the early months of 1754, it came to be recognized in England, as in America, that a union of the colonies was necessary. On January 7, 1754, Shirley wrote to the secretary of state that the old requisition system of relying on each colony to furnish men for the defence of all was impracticable unless the Crown could find some method of obliging the colonies to contribute their quotas.¹ On June 14, 1754, some days before the meeting of the colonial commissioners at Albany, the secretary of state, Sir Thomas Robinson, directed the Board of Trade to prepare and lay before the king “a plan of general concert to be entered into by the American colonies for their mutual defence, and to prevent and remove any encroachments on the British dominions.”² Accordingly, on August 9, 1754, the Board of Trade sent .its plan of union to Sir Thomas Robinson.³ Herein it was suggested that circular letters be sent to the governors in the continental colonies, pointing out the danger to which they were exposed from the encroachments of France, and stating “the urgent necessity there is of an immediate union of the several Colonies” in order to maintain forts, to raise soldiers, to defray the expense of presents for the Indians and to place “Indian affairs under one general direction.” The colonial assemblies were each to appoint a commissioner, subject to the approval of the governor, and these commissioners were to meet and agree upon the necessary military establishment

17

of the colonies in time of peace, and to apportion the expense thereof among the various colonies according to their population, trade, wealth and revenue. Provision was also made for reconvening this inter-colonial assembly whenever a sudden emergency, such as actual invasion, should require greater military exertions. The Crown was to appoint a commander-in-chief¹ of all the colonial forces, and of all troops sent to the colonies from Great Britain “upon any emergency.” This officer was also to act as commissary general for Indian affairs. He was to be empowered to draw upon the proper officer in each colony for such an amount of money as had been previously determined upon as the colony’s share of the whole. The convention drawn up on these lines by the colonial commissioners was to be sent to England for approbation, and in order to enable a convention to be agreed upon, it was provided that any seven colonies were to constitute a quorum, and that the decision of a majority was to be binding on all the colonies. The object of this plan was to increase their military strength and to make them provide for the additional forts on the frontier and presents to the Indians, which the threatening condition of affairs rendered necessary. It was not intended that the Crown should lessen its former expenditures for these purposes, nor that it should refuse to aid the colonies in extraordinary emergencies, such as the actual outbreak of war with France. It was distinctly stated that

His Majesty does not intend to withdraw that part of the expence which the Crown has been usually at, for the Security and Protection of the Colonies, but that he will be graciously pleased to continue to maintain & subsist such a number of his Troops as shall appear to be necessary to be stationed in America, & does also consent that whatever sums of money have been usually given by His Majesty for Indian services, shall be deducted from the general Estimate as the share His Majesty is willing to bear of the ordinary Establishment for this service, & that upon any great Emergency they shall receive such support from His Majesty, as shall be thought reasonable upon a due Consideration of

18

the Nature of the Case, & of what the circumstances & conditions of the Colonies shall seem to require.¹

This plan of the Board of Trade differed radically from that devised at Albany; it contemplated only a military union, while Franklin and his associates planned a political union as well. Both the Board of Trade and the Albany Congress, however, started from the premise that the colonies should in equity provide for their own regularly established military system.

The failure of the colonies to adopt a plan of union in 1754 forced the English to take some action for their defence. In transmitting its plan in 1754, the Board of Trade remarked “that from the delay which must necessarily attend the execution of any new Plan for an Union of the Colonies, it cannot be made to answer the purpose of a present exigency,” and that whatever danger exists at present must be guarded against “by an Application of such means of strength & force, as can be procured in the most expeditious & most effectual manner.” The Board therefore suggested the appointment of a commander-in-chief over all colonial and British forces in America, and likewise the appointment of a commissary general for Indian affairs.² In its report on the Albany plan, the Board of Trade also proposed that untill a Plan of Union can be settled, by which a proper provision may be made for those Services at the general Expence of the Colonies,” William Johnson should be appointed colonel of the Six Nations, and be given the management of Indian affairs in the same manner and with the same allowance as when the expedition against Canada was intended during the last war.³ Virginia was clamoring for assistance, and the other colonies showed little or no disposition to assist her. Consequently, the English government adopted the suggestion of the Board of Trade and sent Edward Braddock as commander-in-chief to America and with him two regiments. Parliament provided funds for this force and, in addition, for two regiments to be raised in America for service in 1755.⁴ The English government, however, was loath to defray the entire cost of the

19

regiments sent out under Braddock,¹ and accordingly the colonies were instructed to provide victuals and quarters for them.² In conformity with the suggestion of the Board of Trade, Braddock placed William Johnson in charge of Indian affairs.

Meanwhile the plans for union were not abandoned either in England or in America. In fact, the inadequate support given by some of the colonies to Braddock emphasized the necessity of such a union, unless the mother country were willing to assume a disproportionate share of the burden of imperial defence. The unanimity of the colonies in rejecting the Albany plan showed conclusively that of their own accord they would never form a union. It meant that the Board of Trade’s plan, which was to be brought into effect by a colonial convention, had absolutely no chance of success. Hence it was inevitably suggested that recourse be taken to the sovereign legislature of the Empire, and that Parliament create such a union. In submitting its plan in 1754, the Board of Trade had pointed out that, in case one or more of the colonies refused to concur in the union, either by failing to send representatives, or, after its enactment, by refusing to raise the required money, then ’no other method can be taken, but that of an application for an interposition of the Authority of Parliament.’ ³ In America the two great champions of such a parliamentary union were Benjamin Franklin and William Shirley.⁴ “Till it is done,” the former wrote, “never expect to see an American war carried on as it ought to be, nor Indian affairs properly managed.”⁵ The imposition of such a union by act of Parliament was legally within its powers,⁶ but as such a step was in direct opposition

20

to the expressed wish of all the colonies, it would have defeated its own purpose,¹ which was to secure the hearty cooperation of the colonies in the impending conflict with France. The suggestion of a parliamentary union of the colonies, especially one of a purely military nature, contained within it the idea of parliamentary taxation of the colonies.² To many in 1754 and 1755 this seemed the only way to make the colonies provide for their own defence in an adequate manner.

III. Proposed Taxation of the Colonies, 1754-1756

The failures of the schemes for union in 1754, and the disinclination of the colonies not only to assist one another, but even to provide each for its own defence in an adequate manner, brought up the question of parliamentary taxation. Legally, Parliament could impose such a tax, though hitherto it had, in general, refrained from so doing. It had, however, passed several statutes regulating colonial matters, which were in the form of revenue bills.

In 1673,³ Parliament had imposed small duties on a number of colonial products, chiefly tobacco, sugar, cotton and ginger, when exported from one English colony to another. The chief purpose of this act was to prevent the evasion of the “enumeration” provision of a previous act prohibiting the direct exportation of these products to foreign countries, but it was intended also to raise some revenue.⁴ A small revenue was, in fact, derived

21

from this law.¹ As far as the continental colonies were concerned, they were chiefly affected by this act in so far as it imposed duties on tobacco exported from Maryland or from Virginia to another English settlement. But toward the end of the seventeenth century, the revenue derived from this source was granted to William and Mary College in Virginia, and was not thereafter remitted to England. In other words, virtually the entire small revenue accruing to Great Britain from this statute came from the West Indian colonies.

During the course of the war of the Spanish Succession, the question came up whether or no European and other goods seized from the enemy and condemned as lawful prize in the colonies were subject to duties. A statute of 1707 provided that such goods should pay the same duties in the colonies as they would have paid in England if first imported there and then reëxported.² In other words, the duties made payable in the colonies were equal to the English duties less the drawback. Though somewhat modified subsequently, owing to the strenuous opposition of Jamaica,³ this law imposed an import duty payable in the colonies. During the war, this act produced some revenue,⁴ mainly in the West Indies, although a little was

22

collected in the continental colonies.¹ In and about 1730. during the troubles with Spain, a very small sum was collected on account of these prize duties, but in the subsequent war, 1739-1748, nothing was paid on this account into the British exchequer.²

In 1733, another act in the form of a revenue bill was passed.³ This was the famous “Molasses Act” which imposed customs duties on foreign rum, sugar and molasses imported into the English colonies. The object of this law was not to raise a revenue, but to hamper the development of the French colonies, and to prevent the importation of their produce into the English possessions. Hence the duties were made so high as to be virtually prohibitive.⁴ About £800 yearly was collected under this law.⁵

The establishment by Parliament of a colonial postal system early in the eighteenth century⁶ cannot be considered a measure of taxation, although at the outset it was objected to on this ground, and although it was incidentally designed to produce some revenue.⁷

23

There was, however, another method by means of which Great Britain derived a revenue from parliamentary statutes affecting the colonies. In accordance with two fundamental principles of the old colonial system, the colonies could import European goods, with some noteworthy exceptions, from Great Britain only, and were prohibited from exporting some specifically enumerated products direct to any European country but Great Britain. Thus, non-British goods consumed in the colonies and colonial products shipped via Great Britain to European markets same within the reach of the English fiscal system. This system was, however, so arranged that but small duties were paid on these products,¹ it being generally estimated that the duties thus collected about equalled the cost of managing and controlling the trade.² It is evident that this system was one designed more for the regulation of trade than for purposes of revenue; but it is equally evident that the revenue would be the main consideration if an enumerated commodity were allowed to be exported direct from the colony to a foreign market on payment of a sum equivalent to the duties that would have been paid had it first been shipped to Great Britain and reêxported thence. This happened in the case of rice. Shortly after the introduction of rice as a staple in South Carolina, Parliament placed it among the list of enumerated commodities.³ As the quantity of rice produced rapidly increased, the colony sought a broader market, especially direct access to that of Portugal. In this, the colony was supported by the English merchants trading to Portugal. These in 1715 suggested that it be permitted to ship rice direct from America to Portugal on payment in the colonies of the English duties.⁴ In 1721 the agent

24

for South Carolina made the same proposal to the English government, suggesting that the equivalent of the English duties¹ be levied in the colony, in that case as an export duty.² Similar suggestions were made by the colony in subsequent years;³ and accordingly, a few years thereafter, Parliament passed a law allowing the direct exportation of Carolina rice to those parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, subject to the payment in Great Britain of an amount equivalent to the English duties less the drawback on the rice thus exported.⁴ Though this duty was made payable in Great Britain, it was in its essence a colonial export tax imposed by Parliament; and it furnishes a unique and remarkable instance of colonial taxation by the mother country at the suggestion of the colony itself. This tax produced some revenue, about £1200 yearly for the first seven years,⁵ increasing gradually until in 1763 it yielded somewhat more than double this amount.⁶

Though these various measures were from a legal standpoint revenue bills, still (with the exception of the rice act, which was an isolated instance) they were, in general, designed to regulate trade, not to yield a revenue. Even the prize-duty act was intended mainly to place merchandise imported from Great Britain on the same footing as prize goods condemned in the colonies.

These acts produced but a trifling revenue. At various times, however, during the eighteenth century, it was suggested that Parliament should create a colonial revenue to pay the salaries of the officials appointed by the Crown and to defray the cost of a permanent military establishment in the colonies. Thus, in the course of a serious controversy with the legislature,

25

which refused to pass a revenue bill in the desired form, Robert Hunter, the able and public-spirited governor of New York, suggested that his salary should be defrayed from import and export duties in New York and from an excise on alcoholic liquors to be imposed by an act of the British Parliament.¹ This proposition was approved of in England; and in 1711 the Board of Trade was instructed to prepare a bill to be laid before Parliament for creating such a standing revenue in New York.² As Parliament “rose” before this bill could be perfected,³ nothing was done at this time. Later in the year,⁴ and again in 1713,⁵ the Board of Trade recommended that Parliament pass such a measure; the latter recommendation was likewise approved of by an order in council.⁶ Meanwhile the New York Assembly, fearing the remedy proposed in England, passed a fairly satisfactory revenue act;⁷ but two years later, in 1715, Hunter complained bitterly to the Board of Trade of the inadequate supplies granted from year to year by the Assembly, and again proposed an act of Parliament as the only possible solution of the difficulty.⁸ Shortly after this, the controversy between the governor and the legislature was settled by a compromise measure,⁹ and nothing further was done toward creating a revenue by act of Parliament. This episode is not important in itself, except in so far as it clearly shows that Parliament was deemed fully competent to pass such a measure.¹⁰

26

In 1716, Archibald Cumings,¹ one of the custom-house officials at Boston, wrote to the Board of Trade suggesting the imposition of a duty on foreign rum, sugar and molasses imported into the British colonies.² In the following year he proposed a more extensive scheme of colonial taxation. He gave the Board of Trade detailed statistics of the importations into the colonies both of West Indian products³ and of Fayal, Madeira and Canary wines, all of which, he said,

might bear a Duty as a Revenue for the Crown to defray the Expences that the Plantations are Annually to Great Britain for Governors & Officers Salarys, Support of Garrisons, the Expence of the Station Men of War; and by settling a Stamp office in all the Islands and on the Continent for this Service, for as the Plantations can bear this Charge, being chargeable with little or no Duties, so it is not reasonable they should be a burden to Great Britain.⁴

These suggestions were not adopted by the home authorities, but neither were they abandoned by Cumings. In 1722 he wrote to the Board of Trade giving the details of an Indian raid instigated by the French, and stating his opinion that the colonies would not be adequately protected unless the Crown undertook their defence. He added that he could propose a scheme for raising a fund in the colonies which, while not burdensome to them, would be sufficient to defray the expense of maintaining five to six thousand regular troops there, and also sufficient to pay the salaries of the governors and other colonial officials appointed by the Crown.⁵ Naturally, the Board of Trade⁶ was ready to hear the details of so promising a scheme, and accordingly Cumings sent to England an elaborate and detailed plan of colonial taxation.⁷ A large colonial

27

revenue was to be raised by a variety of taxes: by stamp duties, by import duties on West Indian products and wine, by an excise tax on rum distilled in the colonies and by a tax on unimproved land.¹ In addition, Cumings suggested that in the future no part of the British duties be refunded on foreign European goods shipped from Great Britain to the colonies.²

A few years after this proposal of Cumings, Sir William Keith, who had been deputy-governor of Pennsylvania, suggested that the stamp duties be extended to the colonies, in order to provide a fund for a standing army and for the salaries of governors, judges and other officials.³

All of these recommendations failed of acceptance. Thus the colonists insensibly drifted into the idea that Parliament could not legally tax them. The British government never raised the issue, seemingly preferring the administrative inefficiency involved in the continuous quarrels between the legislatures and the royal governors to so radical a departure from the customary practice. English character is normally conservative, and this was the age dominated by Sir Robert Walpole, whose maxim, according to his son, was quieta non movere.”⁴ It was impossible to predict the consequences of a parliamentary tax, which though a remedy for the patent evils would create a large amount of friction. The British government was not unaware of colonial sentiment in regard to parliamentary taxation. Richard Partridge, who represented the interests of the continental colonies in the prolonged struggle over the Molasses Act of 1733,⁵ wrote to the Duke of New

28

castle that the duties imposed by that act were worse than the prohibition of all trade with the foreign West Indies proposed the previous year, for in addition to the economic injury inflicted on the continental colonies, it is divesting them of their Rights & privilidges as ye Kings Natural born Subjects and Englishmen in levying Subsidies upon them against their Consent when they are annexed to no County in Great Britain, have no Representatives in parliam^t nor are any part of ye Legislature of this Kingdom.”¹ Similarly, in 1744, George Clinton, then governor of New York, strongly advised against imposing a stamp tax on the colonies, as the people were averse to any taxes unless raised by themselves.²

After the renewal of the world-wide struggle between Great Britain and France, these suggestions of colonial taxation became more frequent. Thus in 1750, Governor Clinton, in spite of his previous advice, proposed the parliamentary imposition of import duties in the colonies to provide a fund for fortifying the frontiers.³ In the following year, Cadwallader Colden prepared a detailed memorial on Indian affairs,⁴ contrasting the success of the French policy with the failure of the English. This failure, he pointed out, was due to the fact that each of the English colonies pursued its own interests, which often clashed with those of another colony, and that the interest of the colonies as a whole was entirely disregarded. It followed therefore that Indian affairs ought to be managed jointly, and put in charge of one man as superintendent. Furthermore Colden pointed out that forts ought to be built on the frontiers. To provide a fund for these purposes, he advised that taxes be imposed on spirituous liquors imported into or made in the

29

North American colonies. But “as this Duty is proposed to be general over all the Colonies, it must be imposed by Act of Parliament, because it would be a most vain imagination to expect, that all the Colonies would severally agree to impose it.” These suggestions contemplated parliamentary taxation for supporting a regular military establishment. in America and for the management of Indian affairs. As already pointed out, the British government in 1754 favored a union of the continental colonies for these purposes. But to many in America it was apparent, even before the issue of the attempt, that a union of the colonies could not be consummated by their own action. Thus at the very time that the colonial commissioners were sitting at Albany, the clear-sighted lieutenant-governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, in a forcible despatch to the secretary of state, bitterly commented on the particularism of the separate colonies and on their lack of a spirit of coöperation

Now what, Sir, [he wrote] must be the result of this? Virginia alone is not able to support the whole Burthen; & if some Method is not found to take away these destructive Denials of Assistance from the other Colonies, when it is judged proper to be demanded by his Majesty for the common Good, as now; The Consequence must be, the present Loss of one of the finest & most fertile Countries in America; & the future destruction of all the British Dominions on this Continent.¹

As a remedy for this distressing state of affairs Dinwiddie proposed an Act of Parliament to oblige each Colony to raise by a Pole Tax of one Shilling Sterling or otherways a proportional Quota of a general Sum to be applied to the present Exigency, & paid as the Legislature in Great Britain shall think fit to appoint.” Later in the same year, when Washington was on the frontier striving to check the French advance, Dinwiddie was trying to arouse the Virginia Assembly to a consciousness of the seriousness of the situation and of the necessity of granting supplies adequate to meet it. The result of this discussion was that on September 23, 1754, Dinwiddie wrote to the Board of Trade:

I cannot but observe, that I think it impossible to conduct any Expedition

30

in these parts with a Dependence of a Supply from the Assemblies, without a British Act of Parliament to lay a Poll Tax on the whole Subjects in these Provinces to bring them to a Sense of their Duty to the King, to awaken them from their Indolence to take Care of their Lives & Fortunes.¹

The attitude of the Southern colonies (including therein Pennsylvania) in failing to coöperate heartily with the forces sent over from Great Britain under Braddock, served to strengthen Dinwiddie in his opinion that parliamentary taxation was essential. On February 12, 1755, he wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson, then secretary of state: “Indeed I fear the Colonies will not be persuaded to grant mutual Supplies, but by a British Act of Parliament laying a general Tax on the Whole.”² Two months later, Dinwiddie again wrote to Robinson,³ expressing his doubts as to getting the necessary supplies from the Virginia Assembly, as Maryland and Pennsylvania have been as monstrously backward,”⁴ and adding: but really, without a British Act of Parliament to oblidge all the Colonies to a mutual Supply, I dread the Governours will hardly be able to perswade them.” Early in the following year, Dinwiddie again wrote to the Board of Trade on the same subject,⁵ pointing out that it would be precarious to rely on the colonial assemblies for the funds necessary to carry on the approaching war, and suggesting parliamentary taxation⁶ of the colonies on the ground that “the Affairs here offered are entirely for the protection of their Estates, Lives, and every Thing else dear to Mankind.” Dinwiddie added frankly that such a tax would arouse opposition

31

in the colonies.¹ Dinwiddie’s suggestion was not an isolated one;² in fact, to many this seemed the easiest, quickest and consequently most effective way to secure colonial coöperation. It was generally recognized that part of the burden of the approaching war in America should in equity be borne by the colonies. No one questioned this. It was also recognized that the colonies would not voluntarily form a union and thus bear their proportionate share. Though Franklin favored the creation of such a federation by act of Parliament, regardless of the wishes of the colonies, he opposed their taxation by the same body where they (the colonies) have no representatives.” Such a course, he said, would create extreme dissatisfaction,” because it was supposed to be an undoubted right of Englishmen, not to be taxed but by their consent given through their representatives.”³ The ablest colonial governor of the time, William Shirley of Massachusetts, was, however, strongly in favor of a parliamentary union coupled with parliamentary taxation of the colonies. On February 4, 1755, he wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson,⁴ commenting on the unpatriotic action and petty spirit of the various colonial legislatures in face of the French danger. The Pennsylvania legislature, after an absurd obstinate Dispute w^th Gov^r Morris ab^t Instructions have adjourned themselves, whilst the Enemy is at their Doors, to the beginning of May, without doing anything for the preservation of their Country.” The Maryland Assembly has likewise “risen” without doing anything further than providing for a Company of fifty men, w^ch was done before.” South Carolina was not active in the common cause, and Virginia was not doing as much as she should.⁵

32

This behaviour [Shirley concluded] seems to shew the necessity not only of a parliamentary Union but Taxation for the preservation of his Majestys Dominions upon this Continent, w^ch the several Assemblies have, in so great a measure abandon’d the Defence of, and thereby layd his Majestys Governm^t at home under a necessity of taking care of it for the State by suitable assessm^ts upon the Colonies.

Shirley’s plan was to convene an assembly of all the governors and some members of the various colonial councils, which should have power to draw on the British exchequer for funds needed for the defence of the colonies, Great Britain being in turn reimbursed for this expenditure by a tax imposed on the colonies by act of Parliament.¹ This plan was considered by the home authorities, but further information was desired. Accordingly, in 1755, the Board of Trade wrote to Shirley for his opinion on three points. First, the best general system for the defence of the frontiers against all future encroachments and invasions, with a plan of the forts that should be erected and an estimate of the number of regular troops that would have to be kept in the colonies. Second, a plan for managing Indian affairs under one head; and third, “what will be a proper Fund to be established for making a constant, and permanent Provision for these Services, with the least Burthen and Inconvenience to his Majesty’s Subjects.”² The Board, it should be noted, was considering a permanent military organization in the colonies.

On January 5, 1756, Shirley sent a detailed reply to the Board of Trade’s request for his opinion on these matters.³ He said that 6480 regular soldiers would be required to garrison the necessary forts in time of peace, but he added that the expense of defending America would be less if the French were removed from Canada. In order to cover the cost of this military

33

system, he advised the establishment of a general fund in all the colonies, each colony contributing to it according to its ability. But he added that, as the colonies would not be able to come to an agreement as to such a fund, the only effectual way to establish it would be by an act of Parliament, assessing each colony according to its white population of the male sex. Shirley was, however, more cautious now than he had been the preceding year and he added: “For the general Satisfaction of the People in each Colony it would be advisable to leave it to their Choice to raise the Sum assessed upon them according to their own discretion.” In case any colony refused to pay the assessment, then the home government should raise it by a poll-tax imposed on the white and black population of the recalcitrant colony.¹

The British government did not adopt these suggestions, though they came from men of conspicuous ability who, from long and faithful service in the colonies, were seemingly in the best position to advise wisely. The interests of both Dinwiddie and Shirley were colonial rather than English in the narrow sense; both, especially Shirley, were ardent imperialists. Nor on the other hand, did the British government definitely reject these suggestions. The lack of union among the colonies in face of a great danger was a severe strain on its patience. It is characteristic of the particularistic spirit prevailing in the colonies that in 1755, at a time when their very existence was threatened by the French, Massachusetts and New York engaged in a bitter boundary controversy leading to riot and bloodshed. This episode called forth a caustic rebuke from the lords of trade, who wrote to Shirley: “It is very much to be lamented, that the internal peace of Government should be disturbed by trivial Disputes of this kind, at a time when the Colonys are so loudly called upon to exert with the greatest unanimity

34

their utmost Strength in their own defence, and in vindication of His Majesty’s Right.”¹ This attitude of the colonies forced the British government to the conclusion that a large force of soldiers must be permanently kept in America even in time of peace.² According to the established theory of defence, the expense incurred thereby should be defrayed by the colonies; but in order to make them assume it, no other way suggested itself as feasible but a tax laid by Parliament. Such a tax was, however, a distinct innovation, and its effect on the colonies could not be accurately gauged. The French general, Montcalm, who had a keen insight into conditions in the British colonies, thought it a grievous blunder that they had not been taxed from the outset,³ but he added: “I have certain Advice, that all the Colonies would take Fire at being taxed now.”⁴

Though all these plans, whether of colonial union or of parliamentary taxation, were intended for a permanent military establishment in the colonies in time of peace, their ultimate object was to effect the security of the colonies in the event of war. A war with France was imminent, and in it Great Britain desired the colonies to exert themselves to the utmost. The adoption at such a crisis of a scheme of parliamentary taxation would have aroused some opposition in the colonies, though

35

not to the same extent that it did later, after the French danger had been removed by the conquest of Canada. Thus, instead of strengthening the Empire in the impending struggle with France, the carrying out of Dinwiddie’s and Shirley’s suggestions would have had the opposite effect. Hence, these various plans were not adopted. In 1756, on the outbreak of formal hostilities, they were laid aside, to be taken up again on the restoration of peace.

IV. The Requisition System during the War, 1756-1763

Owing to the failure of the plan of union of 1754 and the hesitation of the British government to adopt a policy of colonial taxation, coupled with a union imposed by act of Parliament, nothing had been accomplished at the outbreak of formal war with France toward creating in the colonies a regular military establishment, which in time of peace would be adequate to protect them against the Indians and to prevent the aggressions of either the French or the Spaniards, and which in war time would serve as a basis for effective cooperation with the British forces. Thus the mother country was forced to rely on the old requisition system, which had never worked successfully, as it had left the ultimate decision as to the extent of military support to the colonies themselves. From such a decentralized system as was this, in which each colony could refuse the requisition for soldiers or only partially comply with it, the best results could be obtained only if the colonies were encouraged to exert their utmost efforts. Accordingly, the plans for colonial taxation were laid aside and the British government adopted measures calculated to arouse the colonies to energetic action.

In addition to the disastrous Braddock expedition of 1755, in which support was afforded by the colonies, three other military enterprises were undertaken that year. These were the successful campaign in Nova Scotia and the unsuccessful expeditions against Crown Point and Niagara, the two latter being purely colonial undertakings. On December 3, 1755, the Board of Trade had a hearing on the contributions of the various colonies to these military enterprises.¹ The total expense of the colonies

36

was estimated at £70,000,¹ and the Board recommended that Parliament be asked to grant the colonies £120,000 “as an Encouragement to exert themselves for the future in their mutual and common Defence.” The Board specifically said that the money proposed to be given to the Colonies is meant as a Bounty and Encouragement “to them in consideration of their past services.² Parliament adopted this suggestion, and in 1756 voted £115,000 for distribution among the Northern colonies, and £5000 to Sir William Johnson,³ whose partial success in the Crown Point expedition, together with that obtained in Nova Scotia, relieved the otherwise dismal military record of the preceding year. This money was distributed among the Northern colonies which had undertaken the attacks on Crown Point and Niagara, and it practically covered their entire expenses therein.⁴ Nothing was voted to the Southern

37

colonies for their support to Braddock, because their help was considered inadequate. This, however, led to some ill-feeling; and in 1756 Virginia and North Carolina applied to the mother country for financial aid.¹ Accordingly, in 1757, Parliament granted £50,000 to Virginia and the Carolinas as a recompense for what they had done, both in defending themselves and in acting against the enemy.² Nothing was voted for Pennsylvania and Maryland, whose support was insignificant. These parliamentary grants of 1756 and 1757 formed the basis of a system elaborated by Pitt in order to secure a large body of colonial troops. Toward the end of the year 1757, he addressed circular letters to the colonial governors, urging the colonies to raise a large force. All that was expected from the colonies was the levying, clothing and paying of the provincial soldiers as in the previous campaigns,³ the Crown agreeing to furnish these soldiers with arms, ammunition, tents, provisions and artillery. In addition, Pitt said that strong Recommendations will be made to Parliament, in their Session next year, to grant a proper Compensation for such Expences as above, according as the active Vigor, and strenuous Efforts of the respective Provinces shall justly appear to merit.”⁴ A large force was raised

38

in the colonies for the campaign of 1758, and in accordance with Pitt’s recommendation, Parliament in 1759 voted £200,000 as compensation to the colonies for their military services.¹ This system was followed in subsequent years throughout the entire war. Each year the secretary of state addressed circular letters to the colonial governors, urging them to raise troops and promising to recommend to Parliament the granting of a proper compensation for these services.² Each year, Parliament in turn granted large sums to the colonies.³ These grants were partly in the nature of a reimbursement, due to the colonies in pursuance of a promise made by the secretary of state, partly in the nature of free gifts to encourage them to energetic action.⁴ The object of the system was to raise in the colonies as large a force as was possible. This was an important point, as great difficulty was encountered in raising troops in England. By this means also the heavy cost of transporting from Europe

39

all the needed soldiers was avoided.¹ This system of parliamentary grants tended to induce the colonies to raise comparatively large forces, for the less a colony did, the smaller was the proportionate compensation received from the home authorities.² It also tended to induce the colonies to grant yearly the necessary money for the military service; for a colony which withheld its supply for any year was not likely to receive any compensation for the grant of the preceding year. The total amount voted by Parliament for the colonies as compensation for levying, clothing and paying the soldiers was a large proportion of their outlay for military purposes, about two-fifths of the whole.³

The greatest difficulty in securing adequate coöperation from the colonies was encountered in the years 1756 and 1757, before this system was fully established. Loudoun, the commander-in-chief during these years, had great trouble with the colonies, and though he showed little tact in handling them, his feelings of annoyance were justifiable. Not only was much difficulty experienced in obtaining the levies themselves, but there were also interminable disputes and discussions about pay, food, transport[at]ion, conditions of service and other matters of similar nature.⁴ As a result of his experiences, Loudoun reached the not surprising conclusion that every Man in this Country would, if possible, throw the whole Expence on the Publick, and save the Province from being at one Shilling Expence for the Common Cause,” and that it is the constant study of every Province here, to throw every Expence on the Crown, and bear no part of the Expence of this War

40

themselves.”¹ On August 16, 1757,² he wrote in detail to Holdernesse, one of the two British secretaries of state, regarding the aid that could be expected from the colonies. The only satisfactory response to his call for troops had come from Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, the three colonies which throughout the entire war showed the most public spirit. The failure of the other colonies to comply with his demands was due to various reasons. Georgia was too poor to give any aid or even to provide for her own defence. North Carolina, though fairly populous, was poor, and so was New Hampshire; thus, little could be expected from them. Rhode Island, Loudoun claimed, was unwilling to afford the required aid, and Virginia,³ he said, had never furnished her quota. South Carolina proposed raising a regiment. By act of the legislature, Maryland had taken her troops from under the king’s commands.⁴ From New Jersey, on account of the strong Quaker influence, little could be expected.⁵ The system was inherently bad; each colony, fearing to do more than its neighbor, did less than it could. Thus in 1757 Dinwiddie wrote to Pitt that the tardiness of Pennsylvania and Maryland ’loaded him with many difficulties to raise our people in Virginia to a just sense of their duty.’⁶

After Pitt was in full charge of affairs, and the system of parliamentary grants had been definitely established, less difficulty was encountered in securing large levies in the colonies. For the American campaign of 1758, as planned by Pitt, about fifty-one thousand soldiers were required, of which one-half

41

was to be raised in the colonies.¹ Pitt instructed the Northern colonies to raise twenty thousand men,² and the Southern colonies as many men as possible,³ promising that he would recommend to Parliament that some compensation be granted them for these services. The levies of the Northern colonies were to be used by Abercromby in his attack on Crown Point, those of the Southern colonies in the expedition against Du Quesne under Forbes. The response of the Northern colonies was, on the whole, satisfactory, though not completely so. The total number of soldiers provided for by these colonies was about twenty-five hundred short of the number asked.⁴ Massachusetts and Connecticut were particularly energetic, and the former colony deserved all the praise that its governor Pownall claimed for it.⁵ Though New York also provided what seems

42

to have been its full quota of soldiers, the action of this colony in not doing more was criticized, because the increased demand for its agricultural products during the war had made it very prosperous.¹ Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New jersey did not evince the same public spirit.² The latter colony made provision for only one thousand men—a number which, according to Abercromby, the commander-in-chief, was “far short of their Abilities.” He feared that this action of New Jersey might slacken the Ardour of the other Colonies, who are but too apt to seize upon every Precedent that may Countenance their burthening the Mother Country, and exempting themselves.”³

The action of the Southern colonies was far less satisfactory. Virginia proposed raising two thousand men;⁴ but in the two rich proprietary colonies, local political disputes interfered with the granting of effective support.⁵ The Maryland Assembly “broke up without providing any one thing for the present Service.”⁶ As Forbes was in great need of soldiers, he was forced to take into the Crown’s pay a small body of Maryland troops that would otherwise have been disbanded.⁷ In Pennsylvania, the dispute with the proprietors delayed the levying of the troops provided for by the Assembly.⁸ Nothing was expected

43

from the Carolinas,¹ but thanks to the efforts of Governor Dobbs, a small force was sent from North Carolina.² Not only was the support deficient in quantity, but, according to Forbes, it was also sadly lacking in quality.³ Furthermore the colonial levies were so late in arriving that military operations were seriously delayed. As late as May 19, 1758, Forbes wrote that he was still in hopes of getting a fair proportion of the Pennsylvania troops by June 1, and that he would be well pleased if he got “a few more than half” of the Virginia forces by the same date.⁴ In addition to the difficulty in securing the colonial troops, the commander-in-chief was beset by other troubles arising from the very nature of this decentralized system. Thus the words in Pitt’s circular despatch—“the whole, therefore that His majesty expects and requires from the several

44

Provinces, is the Levying, Cloathing and Pay of the Men”—were construed by some of the colonies to mean that they were exempt from furnishing their men with camp necessaries and utensils as they had formerly done. “But this,” Abercromby wrote, I have got the better on.”¹

The high mark of colonial cooperation was reached in the campaign of 1758. In 1759 there was a slight falling-off, and in general the same difficulties were encountered as in 1758, especially in the Southern colonies.² Massachusetts,³ Connecticut,⁴ and New York again showed the most public spirit.⁵ For 1760 the same number of provincial soldiers was desired as in the two preceding campaigns. Amherst, the commander-in-chief, did not anticipate that there would be any difficulty in raising the required number of men,⁶ but some talk of a probable peace with France delayed the levying of troops.⁷ This in turn interfered with the military operations. Amherst wrote: “The Sloth of the Colonies in raising their Troops, and sending them to their Rendez-vous, made it impracticable for me to move the Troops on, so soon as I could have wished.”⁸ In general, the various colonies again afforded about the same relative support as in the preceding campaigns.⁹ The Southern

45

colonies were again backward,¹ and their attitude caused Pitt to send them a stinging rebuke for the Want of Zeal, they have shown on former Occasions for the King’s Service.”² Of these Maryland ‘had failed in its Duty’ and North Carolina was ‘extremely wanting.’

In 1760 Montreal fell, and with it Canada became virtually a British possession. Hence there was not the same need for colonial troops, and the Northern colonies were asked to raise only two-thirds of their previous levies, while the delinquent Southern colonies were asked to raise as many men as was possible.³ The removal of the danger of a French invasion, however, lessened the ardor of the colonies, and their respo