Dinsmore Documentation presents
Classics of American Colonial History
Of all the communities in colonial America none exerted a larger influence upon matters of general concern than the fur-trading post of Albany. Few though such matters were, they were none the less important. With the rise of the French power in America all the colonies were confronted with questions of French expansion, Indian relations, and the extension of English influence into the west. The well-known congress held at Albany in 1754 to consider these very questions was but the last of a series of intercolonial conferences held for the same purpose and at the same place. Situated as it was on the remote frontier of the province of New York, its very existence bound up with a single interest, that of the fur trade, a Dutch community in the midst of a province ruled by England but already cosmopolitan, Albany seemed to possess all the characteristics making for provincialism and isolation; and yet this village of a few hundred souls on the banks of the Hudson was for three quarters of a century the diplomatic center of British North America. That it was so was due partly to its unique geographical position, partly to the character of its political relationships. Albany was situated at the intersection of two of the most important lines of communication on the continent. Northward ran the route through the upper Hudson and Lake Champlain to Canada, the inevitable path of invasion in either direction. Westward through the Mohawk valley stretched the route to the lakes and the Mississippi basin, the easiest natural route to the interior between the St. Lawrence waterway and the southern end of the Appalachian mountain chain. Quite as important in determining the policy and the interests of Albany was its long-standing alliance with the Iroquois confederacy or Five nations. Through the power derived from its organization, the genius of its leaders, and above all because of the arms purchased at Albany, that confederation had imposed its hegemony upon the Indian tribes of half the continent, and its war parties roamed the Indian trails eastward into Maine, westward to the Mississippi, southward to the Carolinas, and northward far into Canada. Though claimed by the English governors of New York as subjects, the Iroquois were in reality during the last half of the seventeenth century what they proudly asserted themselves to be, the subjects of no master, but an independent power in America, equal in fighting strength to either the French or the English, and able to incline the balance of power in one direction or the other.1 But since the continuance and extension of their power depended upon their securing a ready supply of arms and ammunition, they maintained a firm alliance with the Dutch traders of Albany, and in turn the traders of Albany became the sponsors for the good behavior of the Iroquois toward other English communities, and to some extent the aiders and abettors of their designs against their enemies, whether Indian or French. The later policy of the Albany traders was largely influenced by trade methods developed during the period of Dutch rule. From the first the center of the Indian trade was at Fort Orange, built where Albany now stands, whither the tribes of the upper Hudson and above all the Iroquois brought their furs. Here for a time the situation was complicated by the conflicting claims of the West India company and the proprietors of the colony of Rensselaerswyck; but through the vigorous action of Stuyvesant, the last Dutch governor, a modus vivendi was concluded, by which the company held the fort and the settlement immediately about it, which. Stuyvesant organized as the village of Beverwyck, while the rest of the settlement, which was practically coterminous, was left under the jurisdiction of the Rensselaers and their agents. From this time, the former rivalry largely ceased, and in important matters the two communities acted together in their dealings with the Indians and the development of a trade policy.2 The trade methods of the settlement, as developed in the last years of Dutch rule, continued substantially unaltered well into the eighteenth century. The most noteworthy feature was the tendency to restrict trade to the settlement and to discourage the development of a class of wandering traders like the coureurs de bois. Among the numerous laws of New Netherland governing the fur trade, one only, and that dating from 1652, prohibited going to the Mohawk and Seneca country with goods.3 Other and later regulations speak of “runners” and “brokers,” and from the laws and other documents it is clear that the practice of the traders at Fort Orange was to hire brokers, usually Indians, to go into the woods about the settlement and waylay the Indians coming in with their furs. Once a broker had secured possession of an Indian, the Indian was conducted to the house of the broker’s employer and there was forced to sell his furs for what the trader would pay.4 The abuses of this system resulted in an attempt, apparently not wholly successful, to restrict the trade to the confines of the settlement. Posts were set up beyond which traders were forbidden to go, and it even became necessary to forbid lounging about these posts to waylay the Indians.5 Nothing appears in these later ordinances about going to the Indian country to trade, whence it may be inferred that the practice was at least uncommon, and that already it was the policy of the traders not to go out after the trade, but to take what came to them. As a corollary of this policy the Albany traders vigorously opposed the establishment of any settlements that might intercept the trade coming to Albany. When a settlement was projected at Schenectady, the protests of Albany were so successful that the settlement was permitted only on condition that the settlers would pledge themselves not to engage in the Indian trade; and when, shortly after this, the English took Fort Orange, one of the terms of the agreement made on that occasion was “that the former order forbidding the Inhabitants of Schonectade to trade with the Indians for Beaver . . . be strictly observed.”6 The matter continued to give trouble, for the order was renewed by Andros as late as 1687.7 In fact this opposition to the establishment of any settlement that might interfere with Albany’s monopoly of the fur trade was not overcome until the building of Oswego in 1727. Perhaps the most important reason for this restrictive trade policy was the absence of serious competition. To the English, who were the chief rivals of the Dutch, the trade of the upper Hudson was inaccessible. The assertion by Massachusetts Bay in 1659 of a claim to the region north of Fort Orange as preliminary to the development of the Indian trade there, though it alarmed the Dutch, did not result in action.8 The French were more favorably situated, and as early as 1635 had traded with the Onondaga; but the persistent enmity of the Iroquois and frequent wars between them and the French prevented the French from being dangerous competitors.9 Thus until 1664 the Fort Orange community was free to devote itself to trade and was singularly untroubled by political problems. In the wars of the French and the Iroquois the Dutch assumed a position of neutrality, continuing to furnish the Indians with arms, but ransoming French prisoners who fell into their hands. The odds seemed altogether in favor of the Iroquois, so that it was the opinion of Stuyvesant that unless the French government gave Canada more vigorous support it was in great danger of destruction.10 The good understanding of the Dutch with the Iroquois was largely confined to the Mohawk tribe, the easternmost of the Five nations. Intercourse with the other tribes of the confederacy was intermittent and knowledge of their political relations was fragmentary. Governor Stuyvesant, on one occasion, in presenting the Seneca with a keg of powder, actually admonished them not to use it against the Mohawk.11 This indifference to political questions coupled with an intense absorption in the maintenance of trade monopoly long continued to be characteristic of a majority of the traders of Albany. The year 1664 brought a vast change in the complexion of affairs, ending the isolation of Albany and inaugurating a period of greater competition. Fort Orange with the rest of New Netherland passed into the possession of the English and received an English garrison. In that same year the French crown assumed a far larger measure of control over Canada, which now felt the revivifying effects of the genius of Colbert. As a result the Albany community soon became involved, not of choice but of necessity, in an intricate diplomatic struggle in which the destinies of a continent were at stake. The chief parties to the struggle were the French, the English, and the Five nations. Albany was the point where these conflicting interests focused; it became the center of negotiation, plot, and intrigue. To the English Albany became an all-important outwork against the French, the bulwark and frontier of all the colonies. To the French it stood as a rival for control of the fur trade, for English influence over the Iroquois, and for English control of a desired ice-free outlet down the Hudson to the sea. To the Iroquois Albany was an economic necessity, the source of supply of firearms which enabled them to achieve and maintain mastery over all the Indian nations east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio. It is questionable whether the Albanians themselves, with a few exceptions, ever grasped the importance of their position. To them the chief question continued to be the prosperity of the fur trade, but their policy, played upon as it was by so many divergent and conflicting interests, could not but have an important bearing upon the future of the continent. Seemingly the situation was a very complex one, but in reality it can be reduced to very simple terms. The decisive factor was the control of the west, by which is meant primarily the country around the Great lakes; for the interest common to all parties was the fur trade, and the lake country was the chief source of supply. Here lay hunting grounds of the western tribes, who took their furs to Montreal or sold them at Michilimackinac and other French posts in the region; here also the Iroquois killed the beaver which they sold at Albany for clothing, ornaments, rum, but above all for firearms with which to prosecute their designs.12 The western tribes who supplied the French could not without French support stand against the Iroquois, and subjugation of those tribes by the Iroquois, or an alliance between the two, meant the diverting of their trade to Albany; hence the strenuous efforts of the clearest headed among the rulers of Canada, men like Talon, Frontenac, and Callières, to subjugate or destroy the Iroquois and to build up and maintain the influence of France in the interior; hence also the opportunity of Albany, by supporting the Iroquois in their wars with the western tribes, or in negotiations for a friendly understanding, to turn the stream of furs from the western country from Montreal to Albany and to supplant French influence by English throughout the whole interior. That the Albany traders failed to make the most of their opportunities is the opinion of not a few contemporary writers. “To their Scandalous & Unpatriot Conduct,” wrote Peter Wraxall in 1754, “has in a great measure been owing that Progress of the French on this Continent, wch I fear is now come to so formidable a heigth as not to be repeled.”13 In considering this failure two facts must be kept in mind. In the first place, the community remained Dutch. “They are all Dutch at Albany,” wrote Governor Clinton as late as 1745.14 Being Dutch, Albany did not share the rising national enmity of the English for the French or the ambitions of English governors of the province to advance the interests of the British empire in America. The most striking feature of Albany policy was its prevailingly economic character and the small extent to which it was governed by political considerations. Wraxall’s opinion “that the Dutch of Albany & the adjacent Country have ever made an imediate temporary Interest their only rule,” while harsh, is not unjust.15 That the policy of Albany in most instances was to the immediate pecuniary advantage of the traders cannot be gainsaid. Whether a more farsighted policy would not in the long run have been more profitable financially, as argued by Colden, is incapable of proof either way. In any case, from a political standpoint, the policy of Albany was frequently detrimental to the best interests of the British empire, of the neighboring English colonies, and even of the rest of the province of New York. The other factor of supreme importance in determining the policy of Albany was its relations with the Five nations. Trade with them was the basis of Albany’s prosperity, and the very existence of Albany depended upon preserving friendship with them. Hence Albany policy could not at any time diverge widely from that of its Indian allies. Thus it was difficult for the Albany traders to favor a policy of sending out traders into the west as long as the Iroquois preferred to play the part of middlemen, themselves carrying English rum and blankets to the western tribes. Hence also the fact that so often the French — naturally, but probably incorrectly — attributed to Albany instigation the various attempts of the Iroquois either to subjugate the western tribes or to make peace with them for the sake of getting their trade. So also, the much-condemned policy of neutrality between Albany and Canada was primarily an Iroquois policy which Albany adopted. Before the English conquest the Dutch traders of Fort Orange had been content with a trade policy, paying little or no attention to the political problems which were connected with trade. Such a policy could not be maintained, and from the time when Albany passed under English control to the beginning of the last French war Albany policy passed through three distinct phases. In the twenty years following the conquest, without making any essential changes in their trade policy, the Albanians learned the necessity of considering the political situation also and acquired a wider horizon of knowledge. Following this comes a period of intense rivalry with the French, when the traders of Albany reached out for control of the western fur trade and joined the New England colonies in an attempt to conquer Canada. After the failure of this ambitious program Albany adopted the policy of neutrality and trade with Canada which writers like Colden and Wraxall thought of as the typical Albany policy and so bitterly condemned. In this last period, however, especially in the long period of peace following Queen Anne’s war, Albany ceased to have a single policy and lost some of its importance as a trade and political center. Some traders sought the lakes, where they competed with the French for the trade of the western tribes, while others continued the trade with Canada. The interests of these two groups were not the same, and Albany policy lost its former unity. Before a sketch of the main features of these periods is attempted, it is necessary to explain the exact nature and extent of Albany influence and the machinery by which it was exercised and maintained. In the days of Dutch rule control over the fur trade and Indian relations was normally exercised by the local board of magistrates, known collectively as commissaries, although matters of special importance were referred to the governor and the council at New Amsterdam. These commissaries were appointed by the governor from a list submitted by the outgoing board.16 This system was continued, at least in outline, until Albany was made a city in 1686. Under the new city charter control of these matters was vested in the common council of mayor, aldermen, and assistants. As aldermen and assistants were elected by the inhabitants of Albany possessing the franchise, nearly all of whom were Indian traders, control over matters of concern not merely to Albany and the province of New York, but to all the English colonies on the continent, centered in a small group of men possessing special knowledge, it is true, but possessing also a vested interest in the trade and traditions of a self-regarding policy.17 While there were at least three instances of governors naming certain men to control Indian relations in order better to insure the carrying out of their own ideas, in every case until Clinton’s appointment of William Johnson Indian relations were under the care of Albany men.18 It was the board of Indian commissioners which conducted negotiations with the Indians and looked after Indian relations generally; it reported to the governor of the province, who was officially charged with the oversight of such matters. The dependence of the governor upon the board and its secretary, who was also town clerk of Albany, was great. He was dependent always for information, which was given in a form colored by Albany interests and prejudices; dependent often for a policy, since many of the governors had no policy of their own and left the management of Indian affairs almost wholly in the hands of the commissioners; and dependent also for aid in carrying out any policy of his own. In case the policy of the governor was not favored by the commissioners, the chances of its success were small, for the governor seldom had any trustworthy means of communicating with the Indians except through them. While the governor occasionally distributed presents to the Indians, trade relations were all with the traders, some of the most influential of whom were sure to be on the board. Governors came and went, reflecting temporarily the policy or lack of policy of the British government, or developing one of their own; but the one constant factor in British Indian policy was the policy of Albany. The outstanding feature of the years following the English conquest was the rise of French hostility and French competition in the fur trade. The program of Colbert and Talon included not only the effective occupation of the west for France, but also the extermination of the Iroquois and the acquisition, by purchase or otherwise, of an ice-free outlet down the Hudson to the sea.19 Success in such a program would have given France a monopoly of the fur trade and the importance of Albany would have declined. The Albanians were first made aware of their peril when in February, 1666, a force of several hundred French and Indians, sent to chastise the Mohawk, appeared near Schenectady.20 Later in that same year war broke out between France and England, and the English government urged upon the northern colonies an attack upon Canada. After failing to secure the coöperation of the New England colonies in such an attack, Governor Nicolls of New York fell in with the Albany policy of arranging peace between the French and the Mohawk “such as may bring in beaver to Albany,” at the same time laboring to convince the Dutch traders that the French were grasping at the whole fur trade. Peace was accordingly arranged, but the effect of the whole episode upon the traders of Albany was to change their attitude toward the French from one of friendly neutrality to one of hostility.21 Thus at the time of the Dutch reconquest in 1673 we find the magistrates of Albany complaining of “the designs and undertakings of our enemies the French,” a complaint they certainly would not have made ten years before.22 From this time the situation in its broad outlines did not change. The French extended their occupation of the west, but they failed to subdue the Iroquois, then at the zenith of their power, and they could not persuade the Stuart kings, so complaisant in other respects, to cede them the province of New York. Henceforth the western fur trade was divided between Albany and Montreal in varying proportions, but only at rare intervals did the traders of Albany challenge the French for the political control of the west. In their competition for the fur trade the Albany traders had one advantage which never ceased to embarrass the French. That was the greater cheapness of English goods. The staples of the trade were guns and powder, rum or brandy, and various kinds of woolens used by the Indians for blankets and clothing. According to all accounts the advantage in favor of English goods at all times was very great. A table of relative prices compiled about 1689 shows that the English were paying from two to four times as much for furs as were the French. Colden’s monumental report on the fur trade of 1724 bears witness to the same general fact. The only notable exception throughout the whole period of French competition was that in the years following Queen Anne’s war French powder was cheaper and better.23 We have here perhaps the principal reason why England outdistanced its competitors in the race for commercial supremacy despite the superior political position which they often enjoyed. Another advantage of the Albany traders resulted from the conflict of policies in Canada. Men like La Salle and Frontenac desired the largest extension of French influence regardless of the means, and therefore favored the coureurs de bois, who undoubtedly did much to gain for France the trade of the western tribes. But there was another party, to which, because of its objection to the sale of brandy to the Indians and to the disorderly lives of the coureurs, the strong clerical interests of Canada lent their support; this party favored confining the trade to Montreal, where it could be more effectively regulated, thereby leaving the missionaries as the only representatives of France among the western tribes. As this party frequently secured the ear of the French government, a vacillating policy resulted, which would have given the traders of Albany, had they availed themselves of it, no little advantage over their French rivals.24 In the twenty years succeeding the English conquest, however, it continued to be the policy of the Albany traders to restrict trade to the settlement and, what is more, to enforce a monopoly of the trade in favor of Albany. The exact date when this monopoly was obtained is uncertain, but it was legally recognized as early as 1676 and was reaffirmed in the most complete manner in the charter of 1686.25 Documents of the period show that trade methods were unchanged. Danckaerts, who visited Albany in 1680, describes it as a small, palisaded village of eighty or ninety houses lying against the hill which rises sharply from the river and on which the capitol now stands. At the entrance of the town were built trading houses in which the Indians lodged when in the midsummer months they brought in their furs for sale.26 Thus it appears that trade was still carried on mainly, if not wholly, in the settlement. Nowhere do we hear of wandering traders like the coureurs de bois, nowhere the suggestion of a trade policy different from that of the period of Dutch control. With their trade monopoly and the advantages of cheaper goods and a more settled policy, the traders of Albany were in a position to challenge the French for control of the western fur trade, to strike for a monopoly of the trade not merely of a province but of a continent. Success in such a policy would carry with it almost inevitably the destruction of French power in America and the consequent extension of English power over all the northern part of the continent. Such a policy demanded imagination, boldness, insight, and it involved no inconsiderable risks. The stolid Dutch burghers of Albany possessed neither the capacity for imagination nor the gambler’s propensity for taking large risks, which would have enabled them to initiate and carry out such a policy.27 Nevertheless, in the years following the English conquest the competition of Albany began to alarm the French. Some of the trade of the western tribes began to find its way to Albany, partly through the Iroquois, partly through renegade coureurs de bois, who, fearing to return to Montreal, carried their furs thither. Practically all our evidence on this point comes from French sources, for the records of the New York Indian commissioners do not begin until 1679, and the English governors in their scanty correspondence make no mention of it.28 The first French complaint of English competition in the west dates from 1670, when, according to the French account, the Iroquois sent a mission to make peace with the Ottawa, which told the latter of the low prices of goods at Albany and offered to accompany them thither the following spring. The intrigue was thwarted by means well known to the French and was one of the principal incentives to the building, in 1673, of Fort Frontenac, which was intended not only to prevent intercourse between the western tribes and Albany, but also to hinder the passage of the Iroquois across the lakes to their hunting grounds.29 A renewal of this intrigue two or three years later was ascribed both by Frontenac and by the Jesuit missionaries among the Ottawa to Albany instigation.30 No evidence either way has come to light from Albany sources, but the presumption is against the very natural supposition of the French. That the traders of Albany would welcome additional trade is unquestioned, but that they knew enough about the situation west of the lakes to start such an intrigue is very doubtful. On the other hand, it was a settled policy of the Iroquois, and one that greatly embarrassed the Albanians later in their attempts to draw the western tribes to Albany, to play the part of middle men between Albany and the west, and no one familiar with Iroquois policy will question that they needed no instigation to conduct an intrigue of this kind.31 In the absence of other evidence of Albany enterprise in the west at this period the most that can be said with certainty is that the Albanians would approve of this move. The building of Fort Frontenac immensely strengthened the position of the French in the west and served for a time to overawe the Iroquois, who promised to give up the attempt to divert the Ottawa trade to Albany.32 In. the years immediately following, it was the coureurs de bois who gave the most trouble to the French authorities. According to Frontenac, these lawless traders began as early as 1671 to carry their furs to Albany, and the evil greatly increased, especially in the time of La Barre, Frontenac’s incompetent successor, who was himself accused of having a share in the profits of the trade.33 Frontenac charged Governor Andros with intending to use one of these renegades named Péré to divert the western trade to Albany. The evidence does not bear out the accusation. Indeed, it appears that Péré was arrested and sent to London, where he was kept in prison for eighteen months.34 In 1679 the New York council passed an order that French coming into the colony without passes should be arrested and sent to the West Indies.35 This was perhaps due to a mistaken belief in a rumor of war between England and France, but even after the coming of Dongan, in 1683, the council ordered that Canadians trading at Albany bring a pass from their governor. Here, too, the relations of the home governments played a part, for when Dongan asked the advice of his master, the Duke of York, he was told to “weigh well whether ye French Governr in those parts may not take offence at it, soe as may cause some misintelligence betweene our Nations.”36 It is not to be inferred that the trade between Albany and Canada was broken up, for in the time of La Barre, if we may trust the reports of his enemies, English and Dutch traders were even allowed to come to Montreal and Quebec to trade.37 On the other hand, it is clear that the authorities of Albany and the province of New York did not, in their handling of this situation, make the best use of their opportunity to attract still more of the western trade to Albany. Clearly, in the case of the coureurs de bois, the initiative lay with them and not with the Albanians. What drew them to Albany was the cheapness of English goods and the stern edicts of their own government, not any scheme of the Albany traders to use them to develop a western trade. Indeed, a great opportunity to use them in that way was allowed to slip, and the Albany traders were content with that portion of the western trade which found its way into their hands by the illicit trade with Montreal. Of the presence of traders from Albany in the west in these years there is no satisfactory evidence. True, the Iroquois admitted to La Barre in 1684 that they had brought the English to the lakes,38 though we have no evidence beyond this bare statement, and the number of English who penetrated that far into the interior cannot have been large. Dongan, who was much impressed by the lack of enterprise on the part of the English, made the definite assertion that before his arrival, in 1683, no man from his government had been beyond the Seneca country.39 There is certainly no evidence of any change in the general trade policy of Albany or of any attempt at active penetration of the west. The French, however, were genuinely alarmed at the amount of trade that found its way to Albany, and especially by the fact that the Indians had learned that higher prices were to be obtained there. This alarm is reflected in the memoir of La Chesnaye, himself an important trader, who pointed out that by trading at Albany the western tribes had the opportunity not only of getting cheaper goods in exchange for their furs, but also of making peace with their enemies, the Iroquois; he concluded, “If we once lose them [the western tribes], we lose them forever. Thus will be lost not only the fur trade, but the colony.”40 Similarly La Salle’s plans for the discovery and settlement of the west were influenced in part by the fear that the English would make the most of their opportunity to cut off the fur trade and by the hope of preventing such a catastrophe.41 But the noteworthy thing is that these men were influenced rather by fear of what the English might do than by what they had already done. The years from 1664 to 1680 were years of unstable equilibrium in America. The French were struggling under difficulties to perfect their control over the western tribes and the western fur trade on which the life of Canada depended. The Iroquois were nominally at peace with the French and their western allies, but victories over the Susquehanna and other Indian tribes had increased their insolence. The Albany traders were doing a profitable business by taking the trade which flowed in to them, even from Canada itself, and must at least have become aware of the possibility of diverting all the western trade to Albany. This equilibrium was roughly upset in 1680 by a savage attack of the Iroquois upon the Illinois, among whom La Salle and his lieutenant Tonty had been establishing French influence. The alarm of the French and their western allies was extreme. Frontenac hinted, and the Intendant Duchesnau definitely charged, that the English had instigated the attack.42 The Jesuit priests living among the Iroquois reported that these Indians were extending their raids in all directions, destroying or incorporating with themselves tribes allied to the French, and were ready to fling themselves upon Canada.43 At a conference of officials and leading citizens held at Quebec in October, 1682, to consider the situation, it was agreed by the whole assembly that in the last four years the English had left nothing undone to animate the Iroquois against the French.44 Evidence of English complicity, aside from these assertions, is wanting. As a later French governor pointed out, at a time when relations between the Iroquois and the French were far more strained than they were in 1680, war between the Iroquois and the French was not welcome to the Albany traders, because it prevented the Iroquois from hunting. The French themselves recognized that the Iroquois had reasons of their own for the attack, in that they had just subdued the Susquehanna and were looking for new conquests. They also hoped to overawe the western tribes and get control of their trade, which they would divert to Albany, themselves acting as middlemen.45 The Iroquois explanation was that their enemies had hunted upon their lands and had killed all the beaver, both male and female, contrary to Indian custom.46 These reasons of themselves are sufficient to explain the action of the Iroquois. It must be repeated that satisfactory evidence of English complicity is lacking and that the best reason for believing that the English had no hand in the attack lies in the general policy of Albany, which was not to reach out actively after trade or to mix in the political relations of remote tribes with such an end in view. That the French should suspect the Albanians was quite natural, for the attack upon the Illinois was the sort of policy they would have adopted under similar circumstances, but in the absence of confirmatory evidence French suspicions cannot be accepted as positive proof. At this juncture Frontenac was succeeded by the incompetent La Barre, and Thomas Dongan, an Irish Catholic who had seen service in the French army, came to govern the province of New York. By general agreement his advent marks the appearance of a new spirit in English dealings with the French and Indian problem. It marks also the beginning of a new period in Albany policy. At the very beginning of his term of office Dongan’s attention was called to the importance of Albany and the fur trade by the attempt of representatives of William Penn to purchase of the Iroquois lands on the upper Susquehanna, a move which, if successful, would have diverted much of the fur trade from Albany to Philadelphia.47 From that moment Dongan gave almost his whole attention to the fur trade and the problem of French and Indian relations. In an interview with some Mohawk sachems who came to New York at this time Dongan outlined his policy. He requested them not to trade with the French nor even to go to Canada without his permission, to persuade their brethren whom the French had enticed to Canada to return, and to make peace with the western tribes and open for them a path to Albany.48 The corner stone of his policy was the maintenance of the Iroquois alliance. “They are now fast to us,” he wrote, “and we must keep them soe, for if they were otherwise, they are able to ruin all ye Kings Collonys in those parts of America.” To that end he suggested on a later occasion the expulsion of the Jesuits then laboring among them and the sending of English missionaries in their place, as well as the building of a chain of forts connecting Albany with the lakes.49 At the time of La Barre’s expedition against the Iroquois in 1684 he was able to persuade them to acknowledge English sovereignty by permitting the erection of the arms of the Duke of York in their villages.50 He also insisted that “noe Christians . . . converse with them anywhere but at Albany and that not without my licence.”51 But Dongan’s greatest claim to distinction lies in his comprehensive view of the situation in America. Primarily he conceived of it as a struggle between the French and the English for control of the fur trade. The question of boundaries was in comparison a minor one to be settled by the home governments.52
It was to get a better grip on the fur trade that he suggested the erection of forts on the lakes, especially at Niagara, to be connected with Albany by a chain of forts through the Iroquois country.53 It was for this purpose also that he attempted to open a trade with the western tribes. The disgraceful failure of La Barre’s attack on the Iroquois in 1684 paved the way for such an attempt, for it strengthened the alliance of the Iroquois and the English, caused them to despise the French, and shook French influence in the west. In 1685 Dongan began issuing passes to parties to go out to hunt and trade among the Indians.54 One of the parties sent out by him in that year reached Michilimackinac and had such success that in the winter of 1686-1687 he dispatched two large parties to the same place; but the French, now thoroughly aroused, captured both and broke up this promising attempt to challenge their control of the west.55 Here was something quite new in the trade policy of Albany, as Dongan himself distinctly states. Not only does he make the statement already quoted that before his time no one from his government had been beyond the Seneca country, but in the same letter he says, “It will be very necessary for us to encourage our young Men to goe a Beaver hunting as the French doe.” And in another letter he writes: “the Kings subjects here living plentifully have not regarded making discoveries into the country until of late being encouraged by me.”56 What was the origin of Dongan’s policy? Was it the natural outgrowth of the growing interest at Albany in the western trade, inspired perhaps by the Albany traders, or was it his own? The French, who had long suspected their Albany rivals of hostile intrigues, adopted the former explanation. “The whole,” writes Denonville, La Barre’s successor, “is an intrigue of the Orange merchants who make presents to the Colonel [Dongan]”; and on another occasion he speaks of “the policy of M. Dongan and his merchants.” Still later he represents Dongan as no longer master of the merchants “with whose interests, in order to extract money from them, he must identify himself.”57 The ascription of low personal motives to Dongan was certainly beside the mark, especially in view of the fact that in 1692 he was still in debt for money spent in the defense of New York.58 Against such a view must be set the fact, significant in itself, that the coming of Dongan changed the whole situation. A new element had been added producing powerful reactions. Before his coming there is no satisfactory evidence of any change from the traditional policy of Albany; after his arrival we see a new and definite policy adopted and put in operation. The letters of Dongan show a largeness of conception, a grasp of the situation in all its details coupled with the ability to fix upon the essentials, which betoken a superior intelligence at work. While Dongan unquestionably sanctioned former practices, such as the Albany monopoly of trade and the right of the Albany magistrates to manage Indian affairs, and while he worked with them and showed them many favors, the whole trend of Albany policy, not only in the years that preceded his rule but in the years that followed, bears witness against the view that the impulse to trade expansion came from Albany and not from him. From the standpoint of Albany policy the notable thing is that the traders supported Dongan. If they did not initiate the new policy, neither did they oppose it, as they did the policy of some later governors. Perhaps, indeed, they did not regard it as wholly new. Dongan’s first mention of the western trade was to suggest that the Iroquois open a road over which western tribes could come to Albany. Such also was his advice to the Iroquois at the great conference of 1684, and again in 1687.59 With such a policy the traders of Albany could have no quarrel; it was merely an expansion of their previous policy. But the idea of going after the trade, of encouraging the development of an English counterpart of the coureurs de bois, of building forts on the lakes as centers of English influence and trade — these were foreign to Albany policy both before and after Dongan’s time. The impulse to trade expansion given by Dongan was not immediately lost, but conditions in the years just following the capture of Dongan’s trading parties did not favor success. Undisguised warfare broke out between the Iroquois on the one hand and the French and their western allies on the other. Trade languished. Nicholas Bayard wrote from Albany in 1689 that there had been little trade for three years.60 The war at first went in favor of the Iroquois, whose terrible massacre at La Chine in the summer of 1689 nearly paralyzed Canada and led to the abandonment of Fort Frontenac.61 French influence in the west sank to a low ebb and the western tribes sought peace with the Iroquois. Unfortunately Albany was in no position to take advantage of this turn of events, for 1689 was the year of the revolution. At New York Leisler overthrew Nicholson, the lieutenant of Andros, but Albany refused to recognize Leisler’s authority and continued under its own charter government, which took the name of “the convention.” At Albany discontent was rampant. Some wished to renew the attempt to trade with the west, others favored an attack on Canada by way of reprisal.62 So great was the depression that it was necessary for the convention in August, 1689, to forbid the departure from the city of all persons able to bear arms.63 While matters were still unsettled the terrible Schenectady massacre occurred in February, 1690. Frontenac had returned to Canada and this was his method of restoring the morale and the prestige of the French with their Indian allies. The effect was instant. Albany was in “extream agony”;64 most of the women were sent to New York for safety. The very existence of the city was imperiled. Appeals were sent to the New England colonies for assistance and for aid in an attack upon Canada. “If Albany be destroyed,” the Albany agents wrote, “wch is the principal land Bulwark in America against the French then there is not only an open road for [the] French and Indians to make incursions in yor Honors Territoryes but the 5 Nations who are now for us will be forced to turn their ax the other way.”65 Nothing was said about the fur trade; it was now a question of self-preservation. The resulting ambitious attempt of the northern colonies to conquer Canada without English assistance failed and the years that followed were lean years for Albany. Again and again we hear of the poverty of the people, the lack of trade, the loss of population.66 According to the census taken in 1698, the city lost a quarter of its population during the preceding decade. Even as late as 1700 complaint was made to Governor Bellomont that the Indian trade had “wholy gone to decay.”67 The experience of these years had a profound effect upon Albany policy and was the direct cause of its passing into another phase. Not only did all attempts to secure cooperation in another attack upon Canada fail, but the other northern colonies refused to obey even a royal order to furnish their quotas for the defense of the New York frontier.68 The Iroquois, who also suffered heavy losses, became incensed at the failure of the colonies to aid them and, feeling that the whole burden of the war rested on them, began in 1693 negotiations for peace.69 Though the negotiations were inconclusive, Governor Fletcher reported that many people in the province favored the making of peace providing the French and their allies would spare New York.70 Thus was foreshadowed that policy of neutrality which Albany successfully maintained in the earlier part of the next war. From this time on it was the firm conviction of Albany that success against the French depended upon concerted action by all the colonies backed by English assistance. Failing that, the traders of Albany preferred to maintain a neutrality which enabled them to continue their trade and spared them both loss of life and the cost of defensive measures. In view of the desperate plight of Albany in these years it is not surprising that efforts to open a western trade were few. With a view to trade the Iroquois were encouraged to make peace with the western tribes, but the French were able to prevent the success of their efforts.71 The ambitious attempt in the years 1692-1694 to open a trade with the Shawnee and the tribes living south of Lake Erie, although it carried a party of Albany traders far into the Indian country and alarmed the French, was a failure.72 English goods occasionally found their way into the hands of the western tribes through the Iroquois or wandering Mohegan, but not in large quantities.73 That the Albanians would have been glad to open a trade with the west we cannot doubt, but the political situation was such that success was all but impossible. Thus ended the period when Albany policy was most aggressive and, from the standpoint of the interests of the empire and the other colonies, most commendable. If the initial impulse to trade expansion came from Dongan, at least the Albany traders for a time accepted his forward-looking program without reservations. It should also be said that failure was due largely to a combination of circumstances over which Albany had no control, and especially to that fatal inability to coöperate which beset all colonial operations against the French. The result was to leave Albany weakened, embittered, determined for the future to play a safe game. It was the coming of peace which ushered in the last phase of Albany policy, the one which Wraxall, Colden, and others have so bitterly condemned. The period from 1697 to 1754 is too long and too full of incidents to treat in detail; only the outlines of Albany policy can be given. One of the first results of peace was the reopening of trade with Canada.74 Made desperate by many years of poor trade, the Albanians were glad to find an opening anywhere. In part this trade was carried on by some of the prominent men of Albany, who journeyed in person to Montreal, in part by the Christian Iroquois domiciled at Caughnawaga, near Montreal, who went and came with little hindrance from either government.75 “This same Trade from Albany to Canada is at this day carried on — (The 19 Febry 1754,” is the laconic note of Wraxall.76 There is no evidence that in the intervening years it suffered interruption, war or no war. During Queen Anne’s war the Caughnawaga came and went as before, even with the consent of Governor Cornbury77 His successor, Hunter, did attempt to stop it, probably with no great success, for his attempt came at the very close of the war.78 After the war it went on with redoubled vigor, and in the next intercolonial war, that of 1744-1748, Governor Clinton had the same question to deal with and met the same opposition in Albany that his predecessors had had to face whenever they attempted to touch this traffic.79 Closely connected with this trade was the policy of neutrality, toward which events had tended during King William’s war. That policy was in part due to the experiences of Albany during the war, but in larger measure to the policy of the Iroquois, who had made peace with the French and the western tribes in 1701. Henceforth the confederacy resorted to the policy of maintaining the balance between the French and the English, and in the later intercolonial wars it played but a minor part.80 Having just made peace, the Iroquois determined not to resume hostilities when in 1702 war broke out between England and France. The French were only too glad to escape from their raids but, in order to secure neutrality, had to agree to spare the New York frontier.81 This policy of neutrality was very acceptable to the Albanians, who were thus able to carry on trade both with the Iroquois and with Canada.82 The result of this policy was that the burden of the war fell wholly upon New England, whose frontier was mercilessly ravaged and desolated by French and Indian war parties from Canada. Albany policy during this war was well known to Clinton, who accused the Albanians of attempting to pursue the same policy in his time for the sake of security and trade with Canada.83 There can be no better example of the fact, not always recognized, that the colonies fought the French or not as their own interests demanded, with little or no regard for the interests and wishes of the home government. The province of New York also benefited by the policy of neutrality, whereby it was spared the cost of defense, and as long as Cornbury was governor this policy was acceptable to the representative of the British government.84 Cornbury did urge upon the home government the conquest of Canada,85 but he appears to have felt that in the absence of aid from England and in view of the failure of all previous attempts to secure coöperation from the other colonies, it was better for New York to remain quiet. When in 1709 the British government set on foot an expedition against Canada, the province, largely through the efforts of Lovelace (Cornbury had been recalled), did its share, but the policy of Albany was unchanged. We have the significant statement that “at Albany where they trade with the French at Canada, the Handlers, i.e. Traders are against it, the Farmers for it.”86 When after the failure of the expedition of 1711 the New England governors, smarting under the sense of failure and their continued losses, sent Hunter, the successor of Lovelace, a joint remonstrance against the policy of neutrality in the hope of engaging the Five nations in the war as a defense for their own frontiers, a committee of the New York council, to which it was referred, submitted a disingenuous report to the effect that “We are not Conscious that there has beene during this Warr any Neutrality betweene ye people of Albany or any other people of this province and ye ffrench and their Indians.”87 But earlier in the same year, 1712, Secretary Clarke had written, “The country seem generally averse to a Rupture between them [the French and the Iroquois], and rather than be at the expense of supplying them with Ammunition in such a Case and defending their Frontiers . . . choose, to sit contented under this precarious security.”88 The year following the peace of Ryswick saw also an increase of English influence among the western tribes. Here we see two conflicting sets of ideas at work. What may be termed the typical Albany policy was to attract the western tribes to Albany, but there was at least one Albanian, Robert Livingston, who believed that the true way to extend English influence, in the west was to go out after trade and to establish English posts in the west after the French manner. The significance of Livingston lies in the fact that he was chiefly responsible for the policy of the two most vigorous exponents of western advance after the time of Dongan, Bellomont and Burnet, and forms a link between their policy and Dongan’s. Livingston was a Scotchman who had married into the influential Schuyler family of Albany and had been town clerk of Albany, and secretary for Indian affairs since 1675. His knowledge of Indian affairs was unsurpassed, but his influence over the Indians never equaled that of his Dutch brother-in-law, Peter Schuyler. Though he was interested in the Indian trade, as was practically everyone at Albany, his principal ambition was to acquire a great landed estate, an ambition he was able to gratify.89 If the accusation of lack of enterprise on the part of the traders of Albany needs further confirmation, it is to be found in the memorial and reports of Livingston to Bellomont, whose chief adviser on Indian affairs he was. Livingston specifically accuses the Albanians of “sloth and negligence” in allowing the French to get the advantage of them in the western trade. His plan of redressing the balance was to make peace between the western tribes and the Five nations, to build a fort where the French shortly built Detroit to be the center of English influence in the west and another among the Five nations as a halfway station, and, finally, to encourage “bushloping,” or going after the trade. “We shall never be able to rancounter the French,” he remarks, “except we have a nursery of Bushlopers as well as they.”90 The plan outlined in these documents was substantially adopted by Bellomont as his own, although he was content to urge the erection of a fort in the Onondaga country as a means of attracting the western tribes to trade and apparently he did not project a fort on the lakes.91 In attempting to carry out this policy he encountered the hostility of the Five nations, who, as he said, preferred to knock the western Indians on the head and take their furs rather than to see them go to Albany to trade, as well as the opposition of a strong party at Albany, headed by Peter Schuyler. In part this Albany opposition was due to the fact that Schuyler had been the friend of Fletcher, Bellomont’s predecessor, and had profited by his friendship to get large grants of land, which Bellomont worked hard to vacate.92 But this Albany opposition must also be attributed to the disfavor with which the traders viewed a proposed change from their traditional policy. This was recognized by Livingston, whose statement of the fundamentals of that policy is altogether admirable: “The City of Albany always practis’d to hinder such settlements, because they have ingrossed the Indian trade in this Province, and having built large houses and made good farms and settlements near to Albany care not to leave them to go further into the Country and will not suffer others to goe beyond them to intercept the trade.”93 Bellomont’s projects came to nought owing to his death and to the outbreak of a fresh war with France which speedily followed. Twenty years later his work was resumed by Burnet, but meantime the policy of drawing the western tribes to Albany, to which no one could take exception, was meeting with a considerable measure of success. The chief reason for this lay in the inadequacy of French policy rather than in the efforts of the Albany traders. The lure of cheap goods and English ruin was irresistible; only the uncertain attitude of the Iroquois, despite the fact that peace had officially been made, and the efforts of Frontenac and his successor, Callières, kept the western tribes from resorting to Albany in still larger numbers. With the death of Frontenac and Callières the constructive era of French Canada virtually ended. They represented all that was most vigorous in French expansion, all that was most determined in its resistance to English influence in the west. Under Vaudreuil, the successor of Callières, the party of contraction gained the ascendancy, the party which favored the abandonment of the western posts, the canceling of the licenses to trade, and the turning over of French interests in the west to the Jesuits.94 At his first conference with the Indians, in 1702, Lord Cornbury, Bellomont’s successor, acting doubtless under the advice of the Albany Indian commissioners, for he had but lately come to the province, outlined a policy of bringing the western tribes to Albany to trade. At Albany he found five Indians belonging to the tribes assembled about the new French post of Detroit inquiring the price of goods, and he not only invited them to come again but urged them to settle at Niagara or some other place nearer Albany.95 Similarly Hunter urged the Five nations, to let the far Indians come to Albany to trade.96 Evidence that these efforts met with a. partial success comes from both French and English sources. Cornbury wrote in 1708 that after five years he had succeeded in getting some of the western tribes to come to Albany to trade, and entries in Wraxall’s Abridgment of the Indian affairs show the presence of western Indians at Albany from time to time.97 From the French side we have the reports of Vaudreuil of extensive trade between Albany and the tribes about Detroit. These reports were confirmed by a special agent sent by the French government in 1707 to investigate conditions in the west; he reported that the amount of trade was considerable, especially from Detroit. In 1711 Vaudreuil wrote that the Indians of Lake Superior went every year to Albany to trade and that if care were not taken the English would soon be masters of all the upper tribes.98 But the only way of permanently maintaining English influence in the west, especially as long as the French held posts there, was likewise to establish trading posts and to develop a class of itinerant traders, like the coureurs de bois. This was repugnant to traditional Albany policy, and there is no evidence that, it was adopted in these years. A little effort on the part of the French, and the long journey to Albany could be prevented, as indeed it was prevented or hindered in many cases.99 Albany was getting a fraction only of the western trade, when a more vigorous policy would have given it a far larger share. At the same time it must be recognized that there was always to be considered the hostility of the Five nations to any plan which would deprive them of their place as middlemen and the presumption that any was being made to establish an English post in the west and to build up a large political influence there would have so stirred the French that neutrality must have ceased. Neutrality, trade with Canada, trade at Albany —these were all parts of a consistent whole. A more vigorous policy for higher stakes would have entailed greater risks, and the Albanians never believed in taking great risks for larger ends as long as trade was fairly satisfactory. After the war trade both with the west and with Canada increased by leaps and bounds. Primarily this was due, in both cases, to the economic advantages possessed by the English, especially in the manufacture of strouds, a coarse woolen blanketing which was one of the staples of the Indian trade. So great was this advantage that the French government was compelled to permit the company which had a monopoly of the Canadian fur trade to buy strouds in England for export to Canada, and in addition it fostered the establishment of a manufactory of woolens at Montpellier, which, however, functioned only imperfectly.1 But the easiest way to get strouds was to buy them at Albany. For some time no attempt was made in New York to prohibit this trade, but Canadian policy varied. In general it was prohibited, but on extraordinary occasions it might be legalized.2 But whether technically legal or illegal it continued, being regarded as mutually advantageous. As before, it was carried on chiefly by the Christian Iroquois of Caughnawaga. Thus the French secured goods necessary for the Indian trade, and Albany with little or no effort on its part got a share of the western fur trade via Montreal. Hunter wrote in 1720 that the value of this trade was from ten to twelve thousand pounds a year.3 Two reasons may be assigned for the weakness of French influence in the west in these years. One was the policy of restriction which was still in the ascendancy in Canada. During the war the system of issuing licenses to trade had been abandoned, the post at Michilimackinac had been given up, and the sale of brandy had been forbidden. At the close of the war the post at Michilimackinac was reëstablished, the system of licenses was partially restored, and in 1717 the sale of brandy in limited amounts was permitted. But in 1720 both were discontinued, only to be restored in 1726. In each case the policy of restriction was relaxed on representation from Canada that such action was absolutely necessary if the trade of the western tribes was to be preserved.4 The second reason for French weakness in the west was the war with the Fox Indians, which broke out in 1712 and lasted until 1731.5 This, however, affected chiefly the position of the French in the far west. They still held Detroit and Fort Frontenac, and through the efforts of Joncaire and other agents were able to gain considerable influence among some of the Five nations, notably the Seneca and the Onondaga.6 As early as 1716 Joncaire had a trading house in the Seneca country, which he later located at Niagara, where in 1726 the trading house was turned into a fort.7 Despite French influence in the region of the lakes various western tribes continued to come to Albany to trade, where they were of course welcomed. In 1719 the Albany commissioners made to them the significant statement that goods could be obtained more cheaply at Albany than from the French because the French themselves had no goods but what they got at Albany.8 In 1714 and again in 1717 laws were passed by the assembly to encourage the western tribes to come to Albany. By 1726 we find the Indian commissioners speaking of the coming of the Western tribes as a usual thing.9 Not only did the western tribes resort in increasing numbers to Albany, but there appeared now at that place for the first time since the impulse given by Dongan was lost a movement on the part of some of the traders to go out after trade. In 1716 a party of six traders got permission to open a trade at Irondequoit on Lake Ontario, and in 1720 Vaudreuil reported that the English had had a trading post at Niagara for several years, giving that as his chief reason for establishing a French post there.10 Thus, as Wraxall points out, there developed at Albany two groups of traders, one trading with Canada, the other with the Five nations and the western tribes. According to his estimate the Canadian trade was the one which gave the largest returns. In 1725 the commissioners attempted to give an estimate of the quantity of furs obtained from these two sources this at a time when trade with Canada was illegal. Fifty-two canoes and nearly one hundred persons had engaged in the western trade, going to the newly established trading post at Oswego, whence they had brought 788 bundles of furs. Forty-three canoes of western Indians had come to Albany and Schenectady, bringing 200 bundles. One hundred and seventy-six bundles of beaver and door skills had come from Canada.11 Two conflicting principles were here at work. Trade with Canada was easy, profitable, without risk. By it the furs of the west came to Albany via Montreal. Such a policy, however, ignored the political factors underlying trade. If the French sold goods to the western tribes, they would maintain their influence among them. If the western tribes came to Albany or bought goods of Albany traders on the lakes, the political influence of the English was thereby increased. Furthermore, the trade with Canada tended to lesson English influence among the Five nations, for when reproached for permitting French influence among them, they cleverly called attention to the fact that the French got their goods for trade at Albany.12 Governor Hunter, one of the best of New York’s governors, was hostile to this trade and promised to try to stop it, but he appears to have accomplished nothing by the end of his term.13 Fortunately his successor, Burnet, was also his friend, relied on the same advisers, and continued Hunter’s policy. Again Robert Livingston comes to the front as an advocate of expansion. During the brief interregnum between Hunter and Burnet, while Peter Schuyler as senior member of the council was in charge of the province, Livingston suggested the suspension of the trade with Canada for a period of three months, this to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to build up a direct trade with the west by sending men to Niagara and the Seneca country.14 Apparently this suggestion did not meet with the approval of Schuyler, for nothing was done until Burnet arrived, and one of the first acts of Burnet was to drop Schuyler from the council and appoint a new board of Indian commissioners.15 The way was now open for the initiation of a new policy comprehending the prohibition of trade with Canada and a vigorous extension of English enterprise into the west. Livingston was made speaker of the assembly and put through an act forbidding trade with Canada;16 but this was only the beginning of trouble. The trade with Montreal was too profitable to many influential Albany traders to permit of the enforcement of the act. The following year it was felt necessary to enact a law which provided that any suspected of trading with Canada might be tendered in oath and all who refused to take it were to be considered ipso facto guilty.17 Despite the fact that the trade between Albany mid Canada could not be entirely broken up, Burnet considered his policy successful, judged by the increasing trade with the western tribes.18 The opposition at Albany was bitter and violation of the act against trade with Canada was persistent, even on the part of some of the leading traders.19 But in this case it appears that the attitude of Albany was determined not so much by fear of the consequences of opening a direct trade with the west as by the fact that Burnet was seriously disturbing a vested interest. Nevertheless, this opposition is but one more proof of the indifference of the Albany traders to the extension of English influence among the western tribes. But one prominent Albanian, Livingston, seems to have supported the Burnet policy, and the task of defending that policy was undertaken by no Albanian, but by Cadwallader Colden, whose memorial on the fur trade remains the ablest statement of the reasons for its adoption.20 Prohibition of trade with Canada was only half of Burnet’s program. The other half was the establishment of a fortified post near Niagara as a center of English trade and influence among the western tribes. Beginning in 1721 Burnet sent out each year a party of traders to trade with the western tribes and to counteract the influence of Joncaire among the Seneca.21 No permanent establishment was made until 1725, when a trading post was set up at the mouth of the Onondaga river, later known as Oswego, and here in 1727 a fort was built.22 There was opposition at Albany also to this part of Burnet’s scheme, for we find him accusing the traders of trying to arouse the Iroquois against it. The Iroquois also opposed it, at least covertly, for it endangered their position as middlemen, and it is not unlikely that their protests against the sale of rum at Oswego were due in part to the fear of loss of trade.23 As far as the attitude of Albany is concerned, McIlwain is probably correct in saying that there was a conflict between retailers and wholesalers, between the New York merchants and their Albany connections, who profited by the easy trade with Canada, and the small traders who were now ready to reach out for a direct trade with the west.24 Apparently there had grown up at Albany since the peace of Utrecht a class of small traders akin to the French coureurs de bois, who made one or more trips yearly to Oswego to buy furs. Once this method of trade was fairly started it became more popular. The commissioners reported in 1726 that “People encourage that Trade now to emulation even those who were at first against it.”25 Very likely the profits of a direct trade with the Indians free from the restrictions which were thrown about that at Albany made this trade very attractive, nor should the fact be passed over that it was possible to trade with the French also at Oswego.26 The trade with Canada, on the other hand, had become largely a wholesale trade. According to James Alexander, a friend of Burnet and Colden, at the time when Burnet initiated his policy the Indian trade was largely in the hands of a certain New York merchant, conjectured by McIlwain to have been Stephen de Lancey.27 What the relation was between him and those traders at Albany who persistently violated the acts against trade with Canada is not clear, but all those who profited by the Canada trade naturally opposed the policy of Burnet. So strong was the opposition that in 1726 the act prohibiting trade with Canada was repealed and in its place an act was passed imposing a double duty on goods shipped northward, that is to Canada.28 Meantime the opponents of Burnet had submitted their case to the board of trade and the privy council, seeking the disallowance of the acts. The remonstrance was signed by London merchants engaged in the trade with New York and alleged that the effect of the act prohibiting trade with Canada had been to decrease the quantity of Indian goods exported to New York and the amount of furs imported, “in consequence wherof the Price of Furs is raised Five and Twenty and Thirty per Cent, to the great prejudice of several British manufactures.” Arguments concerning the political effect of the acts were added, but these show so little comprehension of the true situation that they do not deserve notice. While the grounds of opposition were almost purely economic, the defense of Burnet’s policy, which was largely the work of Colden, was based on the political advantages which would flow from it, the gaining for the English of the trade and the friendship of the tribes of the west and the consequent diminution of French influence among them. It was admitted that temporary dislocation of trade would result.29 The question before the privy council, therefore, was whether the immediate economic interests of English merchants and their New York correspondents should be allowed to outweigh the probable advantages, both economic and political, of the extension of English trade and influence among the tribes of the interior, and it was quite in keeping with the general trend of British policy in the age of Walpole that economic considerations triumphed over political. In 1729 the acts were disallowed.30 Ultimately the New York assembly found a solution of the difficulty in the imposition of an equal duty on Indian goods shipped to Canada or Oswego, the proceeds to be used for the support of the fort and garrison at Oswego.31 It is apparent that in this contest of policies the Albany traders played but a small part. The chief opponents of the Burnet policy were London and New York merchants, its chief defender a member of the New York council with no strong Albany affiliations. That the English had economic advantages which promised to enable them to displace the French in the fur trade, Colden amply demonstrated. What the political repercussions of such a policy, if honestly attempted, would have been it is impossible to say. That the French would have opposed it by every means at their disposal is certain. But the attempt was never made. Colden put the case clearly when he wrote: “Our merchants were fond of the Canada Trade, because they sold large Quantities of Goods without any Trouble, the French taking them from their Doors; whereas the Trade with the Indians is carried on with a great deal of Toil and Fatigue, and as to the Interest of the Country, they either never thought any thing about it, or if they did, had no regard to it.”32 So the chance of securing a monopoly of the western fur trade was allowed to pass. Nevertheless the results of the establishment of Oswego were not negligible. When the merchants of Montreal first heard of it they were so incensed that they persuaded the governor to set on foot an expedition to raze the fort. On second thought, however, the governor abandoned this idea, and the question was left for the home governments to settle by the leisurely processes of diplomacy.33 Oswego therefore remained the only tangible result of a half century of effort to extend English influence into the region of the Great lakes. As to the commercial results of the establishment of Oswego, James Alexander, a member of the New York council and a friend of the Burnet policy, estimated the trade of New York in 1740 at five times what it had been before Burnet put his policy into execution.34 During the war of 1744-1748 trade was interrupted, but after the war it was vigorously resumed. An official report upon the trade at Oswego in 1749 sets its value for the preceding year at £21,406.35 The political results were not commensurate with the commercial, but Oswego did offset the strong influence of Joncaire among the western Iroquois and was described by Lieutenant Governor Clarke as “the only Barrier against the French to all the Provinces from this to Georgia.”36 The establishment of Oswego tended to lessen the importance of Albany. While the Canada trade remained and doubtless some trade with the Iroquois, much of the Indian trade was now carried on at Oswego by Albany traders who resorted thither. Furthermore, owing partly to the presence of an English fort on the lakes, but more to the long period of peace, settlement spread far up the Mohawk valley. Some of the settlers, notably William Johnson, carried on a trade with the Indians. Johnson, in fact, won for himself in a very short space of time a position of influence among the Indians comparable to that exerted half a century before by Peter Schuyler.37 The Albany magnates themselves speculated more and more in land, buying tracts of the Indians in the region north and west of Albany.38 As the Indians saw the whites steadily encroaching upon their lands, too often as a result of purchases tainted by fraud, they became incensed, and the good understanding which had existed between them and the Albanians began to give place to scarcely concealed hostility. Encroachment on their lands and shameless cheating by the traders had by the time of the outbreak of the third French war in 1744 brought matters to such a pass that, according to Colden, “The Indians . . . will on no occasion trust an Albany man,” and in 1745 some of the Five nations told Conrad Weiser, “We could see Albany Burned to the ground or Every Soul taken away by the great King and other people planted there.”39 When after thirty years of peace war again broke out between England and France, it was natural for the Albany commissioners to use such influence as they still possessed in favor of that Policy of neutrality which had served Albany so well during Queen Anne’s war.40 Only through such a policy would the frontier be safe from Indian attacks and only so could the trade with Canada continue. Oswego also, the defenseless condition of which was well known, would be safe.41 But Clinton, the new governor, was determined to bring his province into the war against the French and a bitter quarrel ensued, which resulted in the resignation of the Indian commissioners and Clinton’s appointment of William Johnson to have military command of the Iroquois.42 Although Johnson resigned in 1750 and for a brief period there were again Albany Indian commissioners, this resignation of the old board virtually marks the end of Albany control of Indian affairs and consequently of Albany policy.43 The policy of local control of the fur trade and Indian relations had broken down. The time had come when the management of what was of interest to all the colonies and to the home government could no longer be intrusted to a small group of Albany traders. The imperial authorities had come to a realization of the necessity of some other system for the regulation of Indian affairs, and with the definite appointment of Johnson in 1755 as Indian superintendent Albany ceased to exert any large influence upon the conduct of Indian relations. The meeting of the Albany congress in 1754 to consider the Indian problem in all its ramifications was but a parting testimony to the place Albany had held for three quarters of a century. Judged by an ideal standard, judged also in the light of opportunity, the policy of Albany was narrow, shortsighted, selfish. A great chance to extend English influence in the west, to cripple Canada by sapping its economic foundations, and to place the English colonies definitely beyond the reach of French power was neglected. The overwhelming victory of England in the last intercolonial war was by no means inevitable. Wraxall in 1754 spoke of “that Progress of the French on this Continent, wch I fear is now come, to so formidable a heigth as not to be repeled,” and he was not alone in this fear.44 But judged by the standards of that time Albany policy need not be so severely condemned as it has been by its New York and New England opponents. In stubborn devotion to their own local interests and disregard of the general welfare the Albany traders were not, perhaps, sinners above others. The whole period was one when the sense of any community of interest had scarcely developed. It was the misfortune of Albany that its immediate economic interests caused the adoption of a policy which was peculiarly detrimental to the interests of the neighboring colonies and of the empire. Nor can it be affirmed beyond the peradventure of a doubt, when one considers the multiplicity of factors entering into the problem of the extension of English influence into the west that a bolder and more vigorous policy would have brought earlier or more favorable results. WILLIAMS COLLEGE
Author: Buffinton, Arthur H. Title: “The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion” Citation: Mississippi Valley Historical Review 4 (March 1922): 327-366 HTML by Dinsmore Documentation * Added June 30, 2002
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1 Cadwallader Colden, The history of the five Indian nations of Canada which are dependent on the province of New York in America, and are a barrier between the English and the French in that part of the world (New York, 1904), 1: 69; Louis Armand de Lom d’Arce, baron de Lahontan, New voyages to North-America (London, 1735), 1:24.
2 Herbert L. Osgood, The American colonies in the seventeenth century (New [footnote continues on p. 329] York, 1904-1907), 2:115-117; John R. Brodhead, History of the state of New York (New York, 1853), 1:140 ff., passim. The documents will be found in Documents relative to the colonial history of the state of New-York edited by Edmund B. O’Callaghan (Albany, 1853-1887), 14:89 ff., passim.
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3 Laws and ordinances of New Netherland, 1638-1678, edited by Edmund B. O’Callaghan (Albany, 1868), 137.
4 Ibid., 190, 366, 378, 381, 383-384, 394; Documents relative to the colonial history of New York (O’Callaghan, ed), 13:39, 185-186; 14:92.
5 Laws of New Netherland (O’Callaghan, ed.), 425-427; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.) 13: 175.
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6 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 131:215, 219, 244, 253; 14:559; Laws of New Netherland (O’Callaghan, ed.), 442-443.
7 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 13:533.
8 Brodhead, History of the state of New York, 1:654-653, 671-672; Arthur H. Buffinton, “New England and the western fur-trade, 1629-1675,” in Publications of the Colonial society of Massachusetts, 18:176 ff.
9 Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664, edited by J. Franklin Jameson (Original narratives of early American history — New York, 1909), 149.
10 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 13:205.
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11 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 13:185, The Dutch called all the four western tribes of the Five nations Seneca. See Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico, edited by Frederick W. Hodge (Smithsonian institution, Bureau of American ethnology, Bulletin 30 — Washington, 1907), part 2, p. 503.
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12 On the lake country as the principal source of supply for the fur trade, see Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:65, 80.
13 Peter Wraxall, An abridgment of the Indian affairs contained in four folio volumes, transacted in the colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751, edited by Charles H. McIlwain (Harvard historical studies, volume 21 —New York, 1915), 132, note 1.
14 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 6:286.
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15 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 152, note 1. See also The letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742 (Collections of the New York historical society for the year 1918 — New York, 1919), 260.
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16 See Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, 48, note 1, and McIlwain, Introduction to ibid., liv ff; also Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742, p. 260.
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17 Colonial laws of New York from the year 1664 to the revolution (Albany, 1894-1896), 1:195 ff.
18 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:363, 365; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 132; see also ibid., 212, for an instance of the appointment of an entire new board of Indian commissioners in 1738.
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19 Thomas Chapais, Jean Talon intendant de la Nouvelle-France (Quebec, 1904), 116 ff., 345 ff.; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:25, 30, 57, 60, 66, 72.
20 Ibid., 3:118.
21 Ibid., 120, 121, 137, 138-142, 146-148.
22 Ibid., 2:594.
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23 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:633, 728; 9:84, 408. See also The documentary history of the state of New-York, edited by Edmund B. O’Callaghan (Albany, 1849), 1:444. A statement of Charlevoix will be found in McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, xliv, note 1. See also the valuable article of Benjamin Sulte, “Le commerce de France avec le Canada avant 1760,” in Proceedings and transactions of the Royal society of Canada, second series, volume 12, section 1, p. 45 ff.
24 Ida A. Johnson, The Michigan fur trade (Lansing, 1919), 4-6, 25-29; Jesuit relations and allied documents. Travels and explorations of the Jesuit missionaries in New France, 1610-1701, edited by Reuben G. Thwaites (Cleveland, 1896-1901), 65: 272, note 37.
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25 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 13:532; New York colonial manuscripts, in the New York state library at Albany, 27:144, 175; Colonial laws of New York, 1:210-211.
26 Journal of Jasper Danckaerts, 1679-1680, edited by Bartlett B. James and J. Franklin Jameson (Original narratives of early American history —New York, (Albany, 1910), 1:146, 386.
27 See William Cunningham, An essay on western civilization in its economic aspects (Mediaeval and modern times —Cambridge, 1898-1900), 212, 217, for a similar criticism upon Dutch colonial policy in general.
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28 McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, lxxxvi-xc.
29 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:80, 84-85.
30 Ibid., 95; Jesuit relations (Thwaites, ed.), 57:21-25.
31 On the Iroquois as middlemen, see McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, xlii-xliv and notes.
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32 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:117-119.
33 Ibid., 91, 146, 159, 203, 206, 211-212, 215, 230, 278.
34 Frank H. Severance, An old frontier of France; the Niagara region and adjacent lakes under French control (New York, 1879), 1:29; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:479; 9:129, 132.
35 New York colonial manuscripts, 28:123, 124; 29:149; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:137-139, 200; 14:769.
36 Ibid., 3:341, 474; 14:771.
37 Ibid., 9:212, 230, 278.
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38 Helen Broshar, “The first push westward of the Albany traders,” in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 7:233; Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 1:68.
39 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:395.
40 Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques [footnote continues on p. 342] relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, recueilles aux archives de la province de Québec, ou copiés à l’étranger; mis en ordre et édité sous les auspices de La législature de Québec (Collection de documents relatifs à l’histoire de la Nouvelle-France — Quebec, 1883-1885), 1:255. This valuable and apparently little-known collection of sources for the history of Canada was printed by the government of the province of Quebec from transcripts secured for the Massachusetts archives. See Narrative and critical history of America, edited by Justin Winsor (New York, 1884-1889), 4:366.
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41 Francis Parkman, La Salle and the discovery of the great west (Frontenac edition — Boston, 1910), 346; Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l’ouest et dans le sud de l’Amerique septentrionale, 1614-1754, mémoires et documents originaux, edited by Pierre Magry (Paris, 1881), 1:332.
42 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:147, 162.
43 Jesuit relations (Thwaites, ed.), 62:54 ff., 153.
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44 Jesuit relations (Thwaites, ed.), 62: 156 ff. Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:194.
45 Ibid., 162, 198.
46 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 1:69.
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47 Brodhead, History of the state of New York, 2:375; Documentary history of the state of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 1:393 ff.
48 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan. ed.), 14:771-773.
49 Ibid., 3:363, 394-395, 429, 477, 510, 511; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian off airs (McIlwain, ed.), 14.
50 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 1:44, 45.
51 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:393.
52 Ibid., 395, 455, 460.
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53 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3: 477, 511.
54 Ibid., 9:309, 320; New York colonial manuscripts, 34, part 1, pp. 67, 69, 117.
55 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:395, 436-437, 476, 487-489.
56 Ibid., 396, 476.
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57 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:298, 810, 337. Broshar, “The first push westward of the Albany traders,” in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 7:228-241, seems to hint at such an interpretation of Dongan’s policy.
58 Acts of the privy council of England, edited by Almeric W. Fitzroy (Hereford, 1908), colonial series, 2: xxxv-xxxvi, 236, 252.
59 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:439: 14:773: Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.). 13.
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60 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:599.
61 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 1:96-97.
62 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:593, 599.
63 Documentary history of the state of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 2:84.
64 Report of Captain Bull, in Massachusetts archives, 35:236; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3:717.
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65 Documents relative to the colonial history of New York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 3: 692-698. The quotation will be found on page 694.
66 Ibid., 3:817; 4:13, 53, 245.
67 Ibid., 4:337, 753.
68 Ibid., 84, 101 ff., passim.
69 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 1:191 ff., 214.
70 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 4:84.
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71 Ibid., 3:842; 4:45; Charles A. Hanna, The wilderness trail, or the ventures and adventures of the Pennsylvania traders on the Allegheny path, with some new annals of the old west, and the records of some strong men and some bad ones (New York, 1911), 1:136.
72 The best accounts of this episode, both partially documented, are Hanna, The wilderness trail, 1:137-143, and George W. Schuyler, Colonial New York. Philip Schuyler and his family (New York, 1885), 2:182 ff. See also Broshar, “The first push westward of the Albany traders,” in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 7:238-240.
73 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:569-570, 586, 646.
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74 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 4:556, 569, 571, 574, 690, 792.
75 Ibid., 574, 662, 690, 692, 747.
76 Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 119, note 1.
77 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 4:978, 984; 9:811, 813.
78 New York colonial manuscripts, 58:5, 7.
79 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, 119; McIlwain, Introduction to ibid., lxxxiv; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 6:371, 399, 413, 416; Correspondence of William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts and military commander in America, 1731-1760, edited by Charles H. Lincoln. (New York, 1912), 1:452-453.
80 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Roman affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 219, note 1; Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix, History and general description of New France, translated by John G. Shea (New York, 1781), 5:221; Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1711-1775, p. 129.
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81 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York, (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:736, 738, 747, 766, 769, 815.
82 Joel Munsell, Annals of Albany, 1609-1868 (Albany, 1850-1859), 4:129, 1:10; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:745.
83 Ibid., 6:371. See also ante, note 79.
84 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 4:983.
85 Ibid., 977; 5:32.
86 Ibid., 81.
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87 The protest is in Massachusetts archives, 2:448; the report of the council committee is in New York colonial manuscripts, 57:2. See also Journal of the legislative council of the colony of New York, 1691-1775 (Albany, 1861), 1:331.
88 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5: 231 7.
89 Schuyler, Colonial New York, 1:243-286.
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90 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York, (O’Callaghan, ed.), 4:500, 648-652. The quotation is on page 650.
91 Ibid., 717, 782, 784.
92 Ibid., 717, 725, 782-784.
93 Ibid., 874.
354
94 Francis Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV (Frontenac edition, Boston, 1907), 439-442; William Kingsford, History of Canada (Toronto, 1887-1898), 2:415.
95 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.). 4:979-981, 990.
96 Ibid., 5:221.
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97 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan ed.), 5; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 48, 55, 66, 67, 68, 87, 90.
98 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:763, 807, 819-824; Wisconsin historical collections, 16:251-260; Michigan pioneer and historical collections, 33:532.
99 For examples, see Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 44-45, 48, 56, 64-65, 68, 78.
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1 Edouard Richard, Supplement to Dr. Brymner’s report on Canadian archives, 1899 (Ottawa, 1901), 520, 543; Report concerning Canadian archives for the year 1904 (Ottawa, 1905), appendix K, 35, 39.
2 Richard, Supplement to Dr. Brymner’s report on. Canadian archives, 1899 pp. 126, 545; Report concerning Canadian archives for 1904, appendix K, 73, 108; Collection de manuscrits relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, 3:2, 12, 17, 23, 24, 42.
3 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:552. On the importance of this trade, see also the monumental report of Colden on the fur trade (1724), ibid., 726 ff.
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4 Richard, Supplement to Dr. Brymner’s report on Canadian archives, 1899, pp. 119, 520, 543; Report concerning Canadian archives for the year 1904, appendix K, 73; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:870, 949, 953, 957.
5 For the Fox war, see Louise P. Kellogg, “The Fox Indians during the French regime,” in Wisconsin historical society, Proceedings, 1907, pp. 173 ff., and Francis Parkman, A half-century of conflict (Frontenac edition — Boston, 1906), 1: chapter 14.
6 Kingsford, History of Canada, 2:415; Severance, An old frontier of France, 1: chapters 11, 13.
7 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 112 ff., passim, 117, 118, 124 ff.
8 Ibid., 112, 117, 122-123, 135.
9 New York colonial manuscripts, 62:80; Colonial laws of New York, 1: 828, 917.
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10 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 112, 113, 133; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:897
11 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 140-141, 159-160.
12 Ibid., 119, 126. For later instances see also ibid., 193, 195, 195 note 1.
13 Ibid., 120; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:876.
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14 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:559-560.
15 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 132; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:578.
16 Ibid., 580; Colonial laws of New York, 2:8-12.
17 Ibid., 2:98; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:682.
18 Ibid. 709, 739. See also Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 135, 139, 141, 144, 145 note 1, 151.
19 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5: 740-742; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, 156; McIlwain, Introduction to ibid., lxxiv, note 1.
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20 Printed in Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:726-732.
21 Ibid., 632, 641, 666, 715, 719.
22 Ibid., 712, 734; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 152, 156, 158, 159, 161; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9:952.
23 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 160, 161, 173-174.
24 McIlwain, Introduction to ibid., lxxiv. See also Documents relative to the Colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:710.
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25 Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 163.
26 Ibid., 159, 161.
27 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 2:58; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, lxvii, note 4.
28 Colonial laws of New York, 2:281.
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29 The principal documents in the case are printed in Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 2:1-57. See also Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:726-732, 740 ff., passim.
30 Acts of the privy council of England (Fitzroy, ed.), colonial series, 3:209-214; 6:204-208; Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 5:897-899.
31 Colonial laws of New York, 2:705.
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32 Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 2:53-54.
33 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 9-968, 996 ff.
34 Letter of J. A. Esq., in Colden, History of the five Indian nations, 2:58. See also Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 198.
35 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 6:538. See also Frederick W. Barnes, “The fur traders of early Oswego,” in Proceedings of the New York state historical association, 13:128-137.
36 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 6:227.
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37 William L. Stone, The life and times of Sir William Johnson, bart. (Albany, 1865), 1:56 ff., 81, 187, 378. According to Anne M. Grant, Memoirs of an American lady; with, sketches of manners and scenery in America, as they existed previous to the revolution (Boston, 1809), 217 ff., Johnson’s influence was due to his fair dealing.
38 On the rage for land speculation at this time, see Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 246; also a letter from Johnson to his uncle, Peter Warren, dated May 6, 1739: “people here are mad Everry day purchasing land & Surveying.” The original of this letter was in the Johnson papers, at Albany, part of which were destroyed in the disastrous fire of 1911. At some date before the fire, work was begun on the publication of the Johnson papers and considerable page proof had been collected. It is from page 7 of this proof that the above quotation is taken. See also Calendar of council minutes, 1668-1783 (New York state library, Bulletin 58—Albany, 1903), 320-333.
39 Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742, p. 260; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, lxxxiii
40 Ibid., 223, 230, 233, 235, 237, 241, 242.
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41 Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York (O’Callaghan, ed.), 6:225, 227; 9:1106.
42 Ibid., 6:286, 302, 371-372, 399, 408, 411, 413, 416, 439; Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 246, 248 note 2; Correspondence of William Shirley, 1:452.
43 Stone, Life and times of Sir William Johnson, 1:385, 395, 414; Johnson papers, 23: 110, 131, 138, 139, 167; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, Abridgment of the Indian affairs, xcvii-xcviii.
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WILLIAMSTOWN, MASSACHUSETTS
44 Abridgment of the Indian affairs (McIlwain, ed.), 132 note 1. For other evidences of feeling in America at this time see Arthur H. Buffinton, “British and French imperialism in North America,” in the Historical outlook, 10:495.
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