Being Property themselves, they can own no Property, nor make any Contract.

     MAN was created proprietor of the earth, with dominion over the beasts of the field. The humanity of the slave is denied, by denying to him any share in this original right of human nature or capability of its exercise. He is “not ranked among sentient beings, but among things.” A chattel cannot be the owner of a chattel. The slave “can possess nothing nor acquire any thing but what must belong to his master.” (Civil Code, Art. 35.) They “cannot take by purchase or descent.”

     “Slaves have no legal rights in things, real or personal; but whatever they may acquire, belongs, in pointof law, to their masters.” (Stroud, pp. 25, 45.)

     “Slaves can make no contract.” (Ib., 25, 61.)

     “Slaves are incapable of inheriting or transmitting property.” (Civil Code, Art. 945.)

     By the Roman law, the slave might possess what was called his peculium, or what his master might, by stipulation, accord to him, and which, having

thus stipulated, he could not afterwards take from him. By this law, slaves acquired property, sometimes embarked in commerce, redeemed themselves and amassed fortunes; or, in other cases, without an absolute purchase of themselves, paid their masters an annuity, as the price of their services, and attended to their own affairs. Not so in republican and Christian America! The “legal relation” here is another thing. The only exception, approximating the Roman code in this particular, so far as we know, is found in the Civil Code of LOUISIANA, as follows:

     “All that a slave possesses belongs to his master, he possesses nothing of his own except his peculium, that is to say, the sum of money or movable estate, which his master chooses he should possess.” (Art. 175; sec 1 Martin’s Digest, 616.)

     Yet, in the same Code stands the following:

     “Slaves cannot dispose of or receive by donation, inter vivos or mortis causa, unless they have been previously and expressly enfranchised conformably to law, or unless they are expressly enfranchised by the act by which the donation is made to them.” (Art. 1462.)

     “The earnings of slaves and the price of their service belong to their owners, who have their action to recover the amount of those who have employed them.” (Louisiana Code of Practice, Art. 103.)

     Except in the permission of a peculium, the laws of the other States on this subject are similar to those of Louisiana.

     SOUTH CAROLINA. —“Slaves cannot take by descent or purchase.” (4 Desaussure’s Chancery Reports, 266, Bynum vs. Bostwick.)

     NORTH CAROLINA.—“Slaves cannot take by sale, or devise, or descent.” “A devise of land to be rented out, for the maintenance of a slave, was adjudged to be void.” (1 Cameron and Norwood’s Reports, 353; same decision, 1 Taylor’s Reports, 209.)

     MARYLAND.—A gift, bequest, or devise, made to a slave, by any one not his owner, would be void, (see Dulany’s opinion, 1 Maryland Reports, 561,) though such a devise of real or personal estate, made by the owner of a slave, has been held to entitle him to freedom, as the implied intention of the owner. (Hall vs. Mullin, 5 Harris and Johnson’s Reports, 190.)

     In “Wheeler’s Law of Slavery” may be found ample evidence that this feature of the Slave Code (the incapacity of the slave to possess property) is not a dead letter, but recognized by the courts, and enforced whenever there is occasion, not only to the letter of the statute, but by an application of the principle and spirit of the enactment, in a contingency which legislative sagacity did not, probably, foresee.

     A slave, for instance, accidentally found a sum of money, in bank bills, which some one took from him and carried to the bank. The owner of the slave boy brought an action of trover against the bank for the sum, and recovered it by judgment of court.

     Judge Safford said:

     “Our slaves can do nothing in their own right,

can hold no property, can neither buy, sell, barter, nor dispose of any thing, without express permission from the master or overseer; so that every thing they can possess or do is, in legal contemplation, on authoritv of the master.”

     Judge Crenshaw said:

     “A slave is in absolute bondage; he has no civil right, and can hold no property, except at the will and pleasure of his master. A slave is a rational being, and endowed with understanding and volition, like the rest of mankind; and whatever he lawfully acquires, and gains possession of, by finding or otherwise, is the acquirement and possession of the master. A slave cannot take property by descent or purchase.” (Brandon et al. vs. Merchants’ and Planters’ Bank of Huntsville, 1 Stewart’s Ala. Report, 320; S. P. Bynum vs. Bostwick, 4 Desaussure, 266; Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, pp. 6, 7.)

     In the preceding decision, the manhood, the reason, the understanding, the volition of the slave are distinctly recognized, and for the express purpose of claiming all the acquirements of such a being as the property of his master—equivalent to the claim of absolute proprietorship in the human soul itself! The theory and the practice of slavery are here found to be in harmony, and the courts enforce the enactments of the legislatures.

     In a note to the preceding decision, Mr. Wheeler says, (p. 7:) “These principles prevail in all the States, and are taken from the civil law, and were adopted in all, except Connecticut, and perhaps Massachusetts.”

     “Hall vs. Mullin, 5 Har. and John’s Md. Report, 190. The Court held that no legal contract, whatever, could be made with a slave, without the consent of his master.” (Ib., p. 7.)

     “In Jackson ex. dem. the People vs. Lervey, 5 Cowen’s Rep., 397, the Court held that a slave at common law could not contract matrimony, nor could the child of a slave take by descent or inheritance.” (Ib., p. 7.)

     “Free Lucy and Frank, Fall Term, 1826, 4 Monroe’s Rep., 167; Emmerson vs. Howland, 1 Mason’s Rep., 45. The Court held that contracts made by negroes while in slavery, do not bind them when liberated; and consequently a plea by a free negro, that a writing sued on was delivered when he was a slave, is good.” (Ib., p. 190.)

     In a note on this topic, Mr. Wheeler says: “One general principle prevails in all the States, and in the British, Spanish, and Portuguese West Indies, and that is, that a slave cannot make a contract, not even the contract of matrimony.” And he cites numerous authorities for the statement. (Ib., p. 190.)

     The slave is thus taught that his promises and agreements are of no binding force! Even the free negro, as has been seen, is taught the same lesson in respect to his former condition! Yet those by whom these lessons are taught affect to marvel at the moral obtuseness of the negroes, and consider themselves as occupying a high moral eminence above them.

     A warrant for one thousand acres of land, issued to a slave in Tennessee, for military services as a

musician during the revolutionary war, was adjudged to be the property of his owner, in 1834. This decision was made against the claims of an heir of his former owner, Col. Patton, a revolutionary officer, who caused his slave to be enlisted. No claim appears to have been set up on behalf of the slave. (See Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 229.)

     Though “a slave can make no contract” on his own account, yet his master may constitute a slave his agent for the most important pecuniary transactions. We once knew of a prominent public man, whose personal credit in his market town was so low that his written order on his merchant for fifty dollars’ worth of goods was rejected; but when his managing slave stepped forward and promised that the next loads of produce should be delivered in payment, the answer was: “Very well, Cuffee, if you say so, I’ll deliver ten times the amount of goods.”

     “Chastain vs. Bowman et al., May Term, 1833, 1 Hill’s S. C. Reports, 276. The Court charged the jury that a slave might be the agent of his master, and if his agency was established, the master was bound. Verdict for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial.

     “Per Cur., Johnson J.—It is not questioned that a master may constitute his slave his agent, and I cannot conceive of any distinction between the circumstances which constitute a slave and a freeman an agent. They are both the creatures of the prin cipal, and act upon his authority. There is no condition,

however degraded, which deprives one of the right to act as a private agent. Motion dismissed.” (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 228.)

     It is certainly remarkable that a man should “have a right” to act as an agent for another who can have no right to act for himself. Equally remarkable is the plea that slaves cannot take care of themselves and must be benevolently superintended for their benefit, while they conduct the business of their masters. The slave is adjudged to be a mere thing, except where his master’s interests or convenience require that he should be regarded a man.

     Another curiosity of slave jurisprudence deserves notice here. Although it is adjudged an offense against the State for a free white citizen to hold honest commerce with a slave, for the beneficial and useful purposes of life, to employ a slave to labor and to pay him just wages—an offense, likewise, for the master of a slave to permit and authorize such transactions, (as will be shown presently,) yet, according to Wheeler, “It is not an offense, either at common law or by statute, to gamble with slaves.” This statement is his marginal title to the law case of “The State vs. Pemberton and Smith, Dec. Term, 1829, 2 Devereaux’s N. Carolina Rep., 281,” in which, “after verdict for the State, his Honor Judge Strange arrested the judgment, being of opinion” as before stated. “From this judgment the solicitor for the State appealed,” but the judgment of the Court below was affirmed. (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 441.)

     With exception of Louisiana, as already mentioned, our American slave States have signalized themselves by special enactments to prohibit the possession of the smallest amount of property by the slave, even with the consent of the master! The Greeks, the Romans, the ancient Germans, the Poles, with the Portuguese, the Spanish and the French of our own times, had provided, both by law and by custom, for the possession of property by the slave, which could, not be seized by his master. In the British West Indies, though no written law had sanctioned the custom, a public sentiment had indulged the slave in the enjoyment of some petty possessions, and had forbidden the master to interfere with them.

     But this lenity was manifestly inconsistent with the absolute and unlimited chattelhood of the slave. A principle was seen to be involved, which, if tolerated in an age of inquiry, would undermine the whole system. If the slave could possess property, he could dispose of it; he could make contracts; he might contract marriage; he might become a man, and, becoming such, cease to be a slave. The safety of the entire fabric required that not one stone in the edifice should be missing. And besides, the idea that a slave can possess property, however trifling the amount, is the idea that the slave has rights, an idea that must by no means be permitted to enter the mind of the slave, or be entertained by the community around him. Especially must this not be done in a land wherein human rights have been

discussed and proclaimed. The jealousy, the vigilance, the sagacity, the appliances of a grim despotism are never so severely tasked as in the presence of the spirit and the doctrines of freedom. This single thought solves the enigma, and repels the opprobrium, of an unprecedented tyranny in a land wherein are taught the principles of liberty. A despotism, in such a country, must be doubly despotic or die instantly. The reader has, in these suggestions, our philosophy of the remarkable enactments that follow.

     SOUTH CAROLINA.—“It shall not be lawful for any slave to buy, sell, trade, &c., for any goods, &c., without a license from the owner, &c. Nor shall any slave be permitted to keep any boat, periauger, or canoe, or raise and breed for the benefit of such slave any horses, mares, cattle, sheep, or hogs, under pain of forfeiting all the goods, &c., and all the boats, periaugers or canoes, horses, mares, cattle, sheep, or hogs. And it shall be lawful for any person whatsoever to seize and take away from any slave, all such goods, &c., boats, &c., &c., and to deliver the same into the hands of any justice of the peace, nearest to the place where the seizure shall be made, and such justice shall take the oath of the person making such seizure, concerning the manner thereof; and if the said justice shall be satisfied that such seizure has been made according to law, he shall pronounce and declare the goods so seized to be forfeited, and order the same to be sold at public outcry; one half of the moneys arising from such sale to go to the State,

and the other half to him or them that sue far the same.” (James’s Digest, 385-6; Act of 1740.)

     GEORGIA.—The statute is nearly the same as in South Carolina, with this additional prohibition: Lest the master should sometimes permit the slave to hire himself to another for his own benefit; the State imposes a penalty of thirty dollars “for every weekly offense on the part of the master, unless the labor be done on his own premises.” (Prince’s Digest, 453, 457.)

     KENTUCKY.—The same, with a slight modification. (2 Litt. & Sui. Digest, 1159-60.)

     TENNESSEE.—Similar. (Act of October 23, 1813, chap. 135.)

     VIRGINIA.—If the master shall permit his slave to hire himself out, it is made lawful for any person, and the duty of the Sheriff, &c., to apprehend such slave, &c., and the master shall be fined not less than ten dollars, nor more than twenty, &c. (1 Revised Code, A. D. 1819, 374-5.)

     MISSISSIPPI.—Same as in Georgia and Kentucky, before stated. (Revised Code, 375.)

     A slave, in Mississippi, is forbidden to raise cotton for his own use; and should the master permit him to do so, he incurs a fine of fifty dollars. (Revised Code, 379.)

     Further: “If any master, &c., .of a slave, license such slave to go at large and trade as a freeman, he shall forfeit the sum of fifty dollars for each and every offense.” (Revised Code, 374. See also North Carolina.)

     An equal fine is imposed upon any master convicted, of permitting his slave to keep “stock of any description.” (Act of Jan. 29, 1825; Pamph. Laws of Mississippi, of 1825.)

     MISSOURI—Same as Virginia, before stated. (2 Missouri Laws, 743; Hayward’s Manual, 534.) Also, same as Mississippi, third specification, just stated. (2 Missouri Laws, 743.)

     NORTH CAROLINA.—Act of 1779: “All horses, cattle, hogs, or sheep, that, one month after the passage of this act, shall belong to any slave, or be of any slave’s mark, in this State, shall be seized and sold by the County Wardens, and applied, one half to the support of the poor of the county, and the other half to the informer!” (Hayward’s Manual, 526.) Same or similar law also in Mississippi. (Revised Code, 378.) Same also in Maryland. (Act of 1723, chap. 15, sect. 6; Kilty’s Laws of Maryland.)

     And so the white poor are to be fed by plundering the colored poor!

     MARYLAND.—See last preceding item. Also Mississippi; third item there stated. See Kilty’s Laws of Maryland, Act of April, 1787, chap. 33.

     By act of April sessions, 1787, any person who shall permit and authorize any slave belonging to him or herself, &c., to go at large himself or herself within this State, shall incur the penalty of five pounds ($13.33) current money per month, except ten days at harvest. The penalty was increased to twenty dollars, excepting, however, an additional ten days at harvest. (Act of December Sessions, 1817.

chap. 104, sect. 1.) By both acts, a slave being a pilot is not included in the prohibition.

     “No person shall trade, barter, commerce, or in any way deal with any servant or slave, &c., &c., without leave or license first had from such servant or slave’s master, dame, or overseer, for his or her so doing, under penalty of two thousand pounds of tobacco,” &c. (Laws of Maryland, 1715, chap. 44, sect. 11, 12, 13.)

     DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.—“Under exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.” Same as in Maryland.

     It may easily be conceived that this law would be inconvenient and disadvantageous to many owners of slaves in or near maritime towns, where job labor, or labor by the day or the hour, might be picked up by the laborers themselves, better than by their owners. In such localities the strict letter of the law could not always be rigidly enforced. The public convenience, the wants of every body who must needs employ transient laborers, would interpose obstacles. It is known that in Wilmington, N. C., a port from which much lumber used to be shipped, which needed much cooper’s labor in the preparing, the work was often or commonly carried on by slaves, who paid a large monthly stipend to their owners. Stevedores, (who stow away cargoes,) caulkers, riggers, and perhaps ship-blacksmiths, and even sail-makers, being slaves, were allowed the same privilege. The custom had an elevating effect on the slaves, and was therefore looked upon with jealousy by masters not interested in such arrangements.

This was thirty years ago. The present usages are unknown to the writer, who gladly presents this one brighter spot in the picture. But it must not be forgotten that all the surplus earnings of these slaves, if any, over and above their support, (after having paid ten or fifteen dollars monthly to their masters for their time,) is nevertheless, in the eye of the law, the property of their masters, and they can take away, if they please, whatever they find in their possession.

     The convenience and interest of the planter might permit or even direct the slaves to cultivate small patches of vegetables near their cabins, for food, by Sunday labor, for the most part. In Spanish Florida this was a custom. It may obtain to a small extent in other States, without serious violation of the letter or spirit of the statutes quoted. Such small and transient supplies would hardly be accounted possessions or property.

     That the statutes quoted are not commonly regarded a dead letter, may be seen by reports of judicial decisions, as compiled by Mr. Wheeler, who expressly refers to the statutes as the ground of the decisions. And in a note he adverts to some of their provisions which we have not yet mentioned:

     “By the Revised Code of Virginia, (A. D. 1819,) vol. I., p. 442, sect. 81, it is declared that a slave going at large, or hiring himself out, may be committed by a magistrate, who may fine the owner, and may order the slave to be sold.” “Also, by the Revised Code of Mississippi, 374, sect. 25”—“in certain cases, the slave may be sold. And by sect. 20, any citizen may

seize a slave offering articles for sale, and take him before a justice of the peace, and the justice shall order the slave to be whipped, and forfeit the article TO THE PERSON APPREHENDING THE SLAVE”! (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 153.)

     It is preposterous to suppose that such modern enactments, holding out such inducements to informers and prosecutors, should remain a dead letter. Mr. Wheeler adds:

     “Similar provisions are to be found in the statute books of those States where this species of property is recognized.” (Ib.)

     In the same note he had before said:

     “The statutes of the States contain a prohibition with a penalty against the slave going at large, or hiring himself out.” (p. 152.)

     He cites the law of Alabama, in particular; and Judge Hitchcock, of Alabama, says of his book “I have no doubt it will be a valuable work for the use of the members particularly of the Southern bar of the United States.” He understands, of course, that these laws are to be enforced, as in the following instance recorded in the same “valuable” auxiliary of “the Southern bar”:

     “Jarrett vs. Higbee, 5 Monroe’s Ky. Report, 546. Jarrett brought trespass against Higbee for taking and imprisoning his slave.” “Defendant admitted that when he took the slave up he produced a pass from his master” which gave him permission “to bargain and trade for himself until the first day of May-next; and also for to pass and repass from Livingston

county, Kentucky, to Monongahela county, State of Virginia,” &c., dated 26th Sept., 1822. The following is from the judicial decision:

     “Per Cur., Bibb Ch. J. That the master shall not let loose his slave, with a permit for him to violate the established order and economy prescribed by law in relation to slaves, is due to society.” “Without abridging the lawful powers of the master to use his property in the slave, it may safely be declared that this paper, given by the master in (to) the slave, violated that duty which he, as owner, owed to the laws of society.” “These permissions, and such acts of the slave, are violations by master and slave of the policy, spirit, and letter of the statute of 16th Dec., 1802, against permitting the slaves to go at large and hire themselves.” “Such licenses would tend to beget idle and dissolute habits in the particular slaves so indulged, as well as in others, and to lead to depredations upon the property of others, and to crimes and insubordination. To such licenses and indulgences society are not bound to submit; the master has no right to give such.” “It was not a lawful pass or permit. It was a species of temporary and unlawful manumission,” &c. (Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, pp. 269-70.)

     In other language, the statute and its enforcement are deemed necessary to the security and the perpetuity of slavery.

     It deserves especial notice that this decision was made in Kentucky, where slavery is said to be exhibited in its mildest form, and where the privileges

of slaves are greater than in most of the other States.

     It is not known that in any other nation, ancient or modern, the robbery of the poor has been carried, by system, to such a pitch as to prohibit the mass of the laboring people from holding the smallest article of property as their own, or from making any bargain or contract.

     And it ought to be noticed and remembered that this condition of things has resulted from an extreme solicitude to protect from danger the so-called “legal relation” of owner and owned, of master and slave.