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CHAPTER X

INTERCOLONIAL RELATIONS. THE NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY

The process of growth which has been described in the preceding chapters gave rise to a group of colonies in New England which were similarly organized and whose inhabitants had kindred objects in view. But the boundaries between them were not definitely settled, while the expansion of trade and colonization sometimes brought them into conflict. In location, character, and institutions they were in the seventeenth century very distinct from the English colonies to the south, and they had few dealings with them. They had foreigners as neighbors on the north and west, while the presence of the Indians in their midst kept alive the feeling that at any time they might find coöperation in defence a necessity. There was no umpire or sovereign in Europe to whom they would willingly have submitted their controversies, and none whose sympathy could have been enlisted in the furtherance of their most cherished projects.

In 1634 an encounter took place between one Hocking,¹ from Cocheco, or Dover, on the Piscataqua, and some agents of Plymouth who were in charge of its trading post on the Kennebec river. The Plymouth people had a clear right there by patent, but Hocking forced his way past their trading house and anchored above them for the purpose of intercepting the Indian traders as they came down the river. In a collision which resulted from this, Hocking and one of the Plymouth men were slain. Though Massachusetts had not yet begun seriously to interfere in the affairs of the eastern settlements, this event seemed to her magistrates to be not only a cause of common reproach but likely to furnish

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the king with an excuse for sending over a general governor. Therefore they interfered and detained John Alden, who had been present at the Plymouth trading post when the shooting occurred. The Plymouth magistrates, surprised at this, sent Captain Standish to Boston to give correct information concerning the affair and to secure Alden’s release. This, however, was only conditionally granted. A conference was also called, and parties from Plymouth and Dover were asked to attend at Boston for the purpose of discussing the affair and arranging a settlement. But no representatives from Dover appeared. Winthrop, with two ministers, conferred with Bradford, Winslow, and Ralph Smith, the acting pastor at Plymouth. They, acting in a purely private capacity, exonerated Plymouth from any charge of criminal conduct, though Bradford and his associates admitted that their men had shown too great haste. When, soon after, Winslow was sent to England, he took letters from Governor Dudley and from Winthrop explaining the event and soliciting a mild judgment concerning it.

In 1635 a controversy arose between settlers from Plymouth who had been resident about two years on the Connecticut river and the emigrants who were then beginning to arrive in the same region from Massachusetts. Those from Plymouth, ignoring the protests of the Dutch, had bought a tract from the Indians in what later became the town of Windsor. There they built a trading post. But the Massachusetts men, coming in this instance from the towns of Dorchester and Newtown, coolly denominated the region the “Lord’s waste,” and settled upon it, as they thought, “without just offense to any man.” But a part of the tract of which they took possession was the same which the Plymouth people had bought. The latter protested through Jonathan Brewster, who was the agent in charge of the interests of Plymouth on the Connecticut. The colony also supported their contention. But the settlers from Massachusetts, in addition to the argument already cited, urged that their claim was justified by the strength of the movement with which they were connected. The Plymouth enterprise they called weak and temporary, and before this

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appeal to the right of the strongest Plymouth was forced to give way. The Plymouth settlers thought at one time of appealing to the Warwick patentees, but their opponents would not agree to this. Therefore, after securing from the Dorchester men a formal acknowledgment of their right to the tract which they had bought from the Indians, the Plymouth people ceded to them all of the land which they claimed, except one-sixteenth. Upon the part of the land which was reserved stood the Plymouth trading house. With the settlers from Newtown, who occupied Hartford, an agreement on fairer terms was reached. “Thus,” says Bradford, “was ye controversie ended, but the unkindness not so soone forgotten.”¹

In addition to frontier disputes concerning rights to land and trade such as those just cited, boundary controversies developed on a larger and more important scale. For a number of years after the grant of the Bradford patent to Plymouth uncertainty existed concerning the boundary between that colony and Massachusetts.² It originated in a dispute between the two border towns, Scituate and Hingham, over their right to the meadow which lay between them. Through those meadows ran the Cohassett river or brook, which was loosely designated in the Bradford patent as the northern boundary of Plymouth colony. Massachusetts had not determined where her line, three miles south of Massachusetts bay and the Charles river, would run, and was strongly inclined to claim everything drained by the southern tributaries of that river. As the controversy developed, Massachusetts claimed all of the town of Scituate and more, while Plymouth sought to balance this by claiming Hingham. Finally, the two colonies appointed commissioners, and in 1640, after much argument, the boundary throughout its eastern extent was fixed at the “bound brook” in the Cohassett meadows and at Accord³ pond.

A similar dispute arose between Massachusetts and the colony of the River Towns on the Connecticut respecting the possession of Agawam or Springfield. Though this settlement lay north of the Massachusetts boundary, it was

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much nearer to the Connecticut towns than to Boston, and was connected with them by the river and by the natural course of trade. A wilderness fifty miles in breadth separated it from the nearest town in eastern Massachusetts. For this reason, in 1639, the local executive and judicial powers of an assistant were bestowed by the inhabitants on William Pynchon, their magistrate, and because of the fewness of the settlers the number required for the jury was fixed at six instead of twelve.¹ Though towns were later founded north of Springfield in the Connecticut valley, it continued for more than a century to be the administrative and military centre of that region, and therefore held a position somewhat more independent than was the case with most New England towns. For a brief period after it was founded the Connecticut towns insisted that they were entitled to jurisdiction over it.² This both the magistrates of Boston and the inhabitants of Springfield itself refused to admit. But the trade of Springfield went down the river, and it was considered bound to join with the Connecticut towns in maintaining the fort at Saybrook. In this way intercolonial relations of a somewhat delicate nature arose, which might call for adjustment by some joint tribunal.

In addition to disputes over trade and boundaries which might arise between the colonies themselves, their relations with the Dutch and French easily occasioned controversies over similar points, and these might involve issues of a far wider and deeper importance. Along the course of the Connecticut the territorial claim of the Dutch extended far to the east of localities which by 1640 the English had settled. During the next decade the English, in obedience to a natural impulse, pushed on until their remotest outpost, Greenwich, lay within thirty miles of Manhattan. This was in accordance with the policy urged in 1642 upon the governor of Connecticut by Sir William Boswell, the representative of England at The Hague. “Doe not forbeare to put forward their plantations,” said he, “and crowd on, crowding

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the Dutch out of those places where they have occupied, but without hostility or any act of¹ violence.” This fitly describes the westward advance of the English from the time when their traders passed beyond Narragansett bay until the power of the Duke of York was established on the Hudson itself. The tendency revealed itself as clearly on Long Island as it did on the mainland. Three-fourths of that region was settled by Englishmen, and most of the towns which they founded there were exact reproductions of the New England model; the larger part of them were also independent of the Dutch. But until this process of westward expansion was more than half completed, the Dutch retained a post at Hartford on the Connecticut, while it was never possible to end the interminable boundary disputes by an agreement which the English would observe. A similar overlapping of claims existed on the north, but the English and French were not yet in such proximity as to occasion the difficulties which arose between the two rivals along the western border. The relations, however, with both the French and Dutch called for deliberation and action.

The Indians also confronted the English in nearly every relation of life. A visitation of disease, in which the Puritans could see with special clearness the hand of providence, had nearly destroyed the Massachusetts tribe a few years before the arrival of the English. But when the English had extended their settlements back from the coast a distance of twenty miles or more, they came in contact with the Penacooks, Nipmucks, Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and had to compete with them for the possession of the country. Those who settled along the southern shore and on Long Island sound found themselves in the presence of a relatively large Indian population. The remote settlements in the Connecticut valley were surrounded by the Pequots, the Mohegans, and the various tribes which occupied the highlands east and west of the valley. In 1637 a war with the Pequots called for the first armed cooperation of the colonies. It was possible that Indian alliances and enmities might at any time occasion war. Their alliances and enmities also

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extended beyond the borders, and were involved with the rivalries between the French, Dutch, and English. The sale of arms, ammunition, or liquor to the savages by colonists who belonged to any one of the three European nationalities might cause difficulties for the other two. The same result might follow from Indian trade of a more legitimate character. Internal policy, so far as it related to the savages, suggested also in other ways the advantages of joint management. This was especially true of efforts to convert and civilize the Indians. For these reasons the problems arising from Indian relations occupied a prominent place among the causes which were contributory to the union of the New England colonies.

The sense of a common mission, which was so strong among the New England Puritans, naturally promoted joint action. They had a common civil and ecclesiastical system to uphold and extend. With this a system of schools, with its centre in Harvard College, was closely connected. Synods, whose members came from all the New England colonies, were called to regulate ecclesiastical polity and to give common expression to the principles of the faith. The strengthening of the churches and the maintenance of their purity through an educated ministry were regarded as objects of the highest importance. The restraint of error and schism suggested only the negative side of the same problem. These were objects of the most general attention, and could hardly fail to occupy a prominent place among the purposes of those who sought a closer union of the Puritan colonies. It was indeed in connection with the Synod of 1637, when the magistrates and ministers of Connecticut were at Newtown, that the adoption of articles of confederation was first seriously¹ broached. Notice was given to the magistrates of Plymouth, but too late for them to come or to send delegates. Hence the matter was for that time dropped.

In the history of Puritan New England nothing is more evident than the leadership of Massachusetts. This of course is to be explained in part by her superiority to the other colonies in population and resources. But apart from

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that, a decision, a power of initiative, a certain rigor, not to say ruthlessness, appear in her conduct, which does not show itself so distinctly in other colonies of the group. The oligarchy which governed Massachusetts was ready, whenever opportunity offered, to annex all weak or disturbed communities which were adjacent to its boundaries, and to assume protectorates with undefined possibilities over neighboring Indians. The dealings of Massachusetts with the Narragansett towns and with the settlements on the Piscataqua and in Maine furnish conspicuous examples of this spirit. This conduct shows that in the relations with the neighboring colonies Massachusetts utilized to the full the advantages which came from her royal charter. It gave steadiness to the policy which she adopted for the advancement of the Puritan faith and for the repression of dissent. She could adopt measures, both administrative and judicial, to which the colonies that had no charters would hesitate to resort. The foes of the Puritan system, both in New and Old England, showed a correct appreciation of the facts when they directed against Massachusetts their heaviest assaults. It was therefore certain that any confederation which might be formed would be a union among unequals, and its character would depend very largely upon Massachusetts.

In 1638, while the boundary dispute between Massachusetts and Plymouth was still unsettled, and the controversy over the towns in the Connecticut valley was in progress, Massachusetts proposed that two or more commissioners from each of the colonies interested should meet,¹ with power to agree upon articles of union. Connecticut objected to the bestowment of power on these commissioners, and desired that the general courts should have the final decision. Connecticut also submitted certain propositions of her own. These the magistrates at Boston began to discuss and amend, one of their objects being to give “some preëminence” to Massachusetts. To the proposed amendments Connecticut objected. The conference failed of its immediate purpose, though it occasioned much discussion respecting claims to

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Springfield and to the Pequot country, and concerning the claims of Connecticut democracy as compared with Massachusetts aristocracy. Winthrop was of opinion that the motive for it all was “their shyness of coming under our government.”

In 1642, perhaps because she feared an Indian war, Connecticut proposed that a confederacy should be established. Plymouth was now willing to join. The proposals were read before the general court of Massachusetts and referred to a committee for consideration after the court rose. By this body some changes were made and articles added, and the whole was sent back to Connecticut, “to be considered upon against the Spring.”¹

In May, 1643, commissioners from the four colonies which were interested met at Boston.² All except those from Plymouth had authority to sign the articles. After two or three meetings the terms were settled. It was resolved that the settlements in Maine should be excluded, “because they ran a different course from us both in their ministry and civil administration.” We do not know whether or not the admission of the Narragansett settlements was discussed, but it is certain that when, in 1644, and again in 1648, those on Rhode Island applied for admission, it was refused unless they would consent to annexation by Massachusetts or Plymouth.³

In the preamble to the Articles of Confederation the reasons for the formation of the union were stated. They were, that the parties to it had come to America with the common purpose of extending the Christian religion and enjoying its liberties in purity; that by the providence of God in the process of settlement they had been scattered further along sea-coasts and rivers than was at first intended, so that they could not conveniently live under one government and jurisdiction; that they were surrounded by people of foreign nationality, and were exposed to attack by the Indians; and finally that, because of distractions in England,

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they could not appeal to her for help. For these reasons they entered into a “consociation.”

The name which was selected for the confederation was the United Colonies of New England. Though in the language of the articles it was an union between plantations which were under the government of the colonies concerned, it would be absurd to draw the inference that it was a confederation of towns. The nature of the union was stated in the articles to be “a firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity, for offence and defence, mutual advice and succor upon all just occasions, both for preserving and propagating the truths of the Gospel, and for their own mutual safety and welfare.” The territorial and governmental integrity of each of the confederating colonies was guarantied. No other colony should be admitted, nor should any two of the confederated colonies join in one, without the consent of the Union.

The only governmental machinery created by the Articles of Union was a board of eight commissioners, two from each colony and chosen annually by their respective general courts. This body was little else than a joint committee of the general courts. At each of its meetings it chose a president, who had only the powers of a moderator. One regular meeting was held annually in September, and others on extraordinary occasions. Meetings should be held in succession in each of the contracting colonies, though two sessions in each cycle must be held in Boston. All the commissioners must be “in church fellowship.”

The most important powers which were intrusted to the commissioners were those relating to defence. The language of the articles implied that they should have full power to decide upon offensive, as well as defensive, war, also on peace, leagues, aids, charges, and numbers of men for war, and division of all the gains of war. If in the case of attack on any of the colonies the danger should be slight, the nearest colony might give aid alone. If the attack should be serious, on the appeal of three of the magistrates of the imperilled colony the entire force of the Confederacy should be called out. At such times Massachusetts should equip one hundred men and the other colonies forty-five men each.

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With the consent of the commissioners this proportion might be changed. No charge should be laid on the confederates for a defensive war, unless it was levied by order of the commissioners, and after they had decided the war to be just. The expenses of war should be borne by the colonies in proportion to the number of their male inhabitants between the ages of sixteen and sixty. The assessment and collection of revenue was left under the control of the respective colonies. The booty and other gains of war should be distributed in proportion to the burden sustained.

In addition to their war powers, the commissioners were authorized to take measures for the prevention of quarrels between the colonies; to see that escaped servants, prisoners, and fugitives from justice, fleeing from one colony to another, should be returned; that the administration of justice should be speedy and sure; that Indian affairs should be justly regulated, and that migration from one colony to another should be unhindered.

If unanimity could not be reached by the commissioners as the result of their discussion of any subject, the vote of six should be decisive. If so many as six votes could not be obtained, the question might be referred to the general courts. If they all approved, the proposal should become a law of the confederation. Room was left for the amendment of the articles by the provision that, if any article was found by one of the colonies to have an injurious effect, it should be considered by the commissioners of the other jurisdictions, “that both peace and the present confederation may be entirely preserved without violation.”

The signers of the articles were Winthrop and Dudley of Massachusetts, Fenwick and Hopkins of Connecticut, Eaton and Greyson of New Haven, Winslow and Collier of Plymouth. They were chosen commissioners for the first year, and Winthrop was their first president. Bradford, Prince, Endicott, Bradstreet, John Winthrop, Jr., and Leete were afterwards prominent among the members. The articles provided for a very crude and simple form of union. The powers bestowed upon it were very limited, and the contrivance devised for executing the powers was of the

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simplest description. The commissioners could not execute their own orders or provide the revenue necessary thereto. It was possible that their projects might at any time be checked by the opposition of two members. Their orders must therefore take the form of advice, and were in many, if not most, cases couched in that form. Still by periodical meetings many common interests were advanced and a steadiness was given to New England policy which might otherwise have been unattainable.

Though members of the confederation were equally represented on the board of commissioners, they shared unequally in burdens and rewards. Massachusetts was the leading colony in population, wealth, and influence. The question of her precedence therefore naturally arose. At the third meeting¹ of the commissioners she claimed as her right the first place in the subscription of acts and orders. The other colonies denied that any such privilege had been proposed or granted, but to prevent further trouble they agreed that the commissioners of Massachusetts should continue to subscribe the acts first after the president, as had thus far been the practice. This concession was repeated in 1648, but in neither case was it based on the claim of right. All of the extraordinary sessions—five in number—which were held by the commissioners during the continuance of the union were called at the instance of Massachusetts. In nearly all cases the occasion of the call was the supposed necessity for measures of immediate defence.

In 1647, 1649, and twice in 1653, extraordinary sessions were called for this reason. In each case the fear of conflict with the Indians of southern New England, or with them as the allies of the Dutch, furnished the occasion for the sessions.

Annual sessions were regularly held until 1664, the year of the royal commission and of the submission of New Haven to government under the newly granted charter of Connecticut. As the confederation was wholly extra-legal and its formation was one of the acts of the New England colonies which might irritate the king, the Restoration

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necessarily terminated the more active period of its life. In England in the person of the king an umpire now existed who was ready to decide intercolonial controversies. The disappearance of New Haven, thus reducing the number of confederated colonies to three, was followed by an order that the commissioners would henceforth meet triennially. The changes in the Articles of Confederation which were necessitated by the disappearance of New Haven as a separate colony were not adopted until 1670.¹ A few unimportant meetings were held between that time and the opening of Philip’s war. During the period of that conflict the commissioners held several meetings.² After that their activity practically ceased, and the recall of the charter of Massachusetts in 1684 put an end forever to their existence.

The right to interpret the Articles of Confederation rested by implication, and in the first instance, with the commissioners, but finally with the general courts of the colonies themselves. If such questions became involved with political issues a single colony might decide the case for the confederation. This was done by Massachusetts in one notable instance. From this fact it appears—and the inference is justified by the entire history of the Confederacy—that the power of the commissioners was only advisory. Against the resolve of one colony, or in any case against that of two colonies, they were powerless to act. The function which they performed was that of a joint advisory board for the colonies, with certain designated spheres of action and subject to annual renewal.

To certain questions which Massachusetts submitted in 1648,³ involving interpretation of the articles, the commissioners replied that, though they should issue orders on all matters within their powers, as treaties, sending messengers, designation of men, provisions and charges for common enterprises, censuring offenders, and the like, yet the execution of these measures belonged to the jurisdiction where the commissioners

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sat or the colony where the offenders might be found. If the colony in question, however, should refuse or delay action in such case, it would be guilty of breach of covenant. The same would be true if it should change its religion. But what remedy could be applied in such cases the commissioners confessed themselves unable to state. Several of the questions which were then raised were referred to the general courts for final decision.

The most important controversy that ever occurred respecting the nature of the union was occasioned in 1653 by rumors that the Dutch were plotting with the Indians for a massacre of the English in¹ the Connecticut settlements. Color was given to these reports by the fact that war was then in progress between the parent states in Europe. However, special inquiries by agents of the commissioners among the Indians and in New Netherland revealed no evidence of plots or intended hostilities.² Still New Haven and the River Towns seemed very much alarmed and insisted on immediate war with the Dutch. Two extraordinary sessions were held by the commissioners, and the general court of Massachusetts, after consultation with the clergy, took decisive action. The clergy, after hearing the charges which could be urged against the Dutch, reported that they did not consider these a sufficient cause for war, and recommended that clearer evidence be procured before resort was had to arms. The deputies of the general court of Massachusetts expressed the same view, and urged that messengers should be sent to the Dutch to demand satisfaction and security for the future. When, however, at a later meeting the colonies on the Connecticut became more urgent for war, the general court of Massachusetts propounded the question, whether the commissioners had authority under the articles to commit the colonies to an offensive war. The language of the sixth article, though far from precise, seemed to imply that they had the power. But a committee of magistrates, to which the question was referred, reported that the commissioners were judges of defensive, but not of offensive war, and that

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they could begin an offensive war only under express authority from the colonies involved. It could not have been the intention of colonies which were so jealous of their independence to divest themselves of power in such weighty matters.¹ It would be a “bondage hardly to bee borne by the most Subjective people; and cannot bee conceived soe free a people as the Colonies should submite unto.” With this the deputies in the Massachusetts general court concurred, and insisted that any other conclusion was inconsistent not only with the right of self-government enjoyed by each colony, but with the higher rights of conscience.²

The regular meeting of the commissioners at Boston, in September, 1653, was mainly occupied with the controversy over this subject. The commissioners from the smaller colonies came resolved to insist on the literal interpretation of the sixth article. But the general court of Massachusetts, which was again in session, reaffirmed its position, that the Commissioners have not power to determine the Justice of an offensive war so as to oblige the severall Colonies to acte accordingly.”³ As execution must ultimately devolve on the general courts, Massachusetts was confident that they would agree in authoritatively interpreting the acts in harmony with her view. But the six commissioners remained firm, and declared that Massachusetts desired to break up the league. This, of course, Massachusetts denied, and claimed that she was reserving only what was necessary to her independence. Bradstreet and Hathorne, her two commissioners, then proposed that the board should proceed to the regular business of the session. But soon after, a petition came from New Haven submitting the question whether, since England and the Dutch were at war in Europe and affairs were so unsettled in the colonies, war should not be

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declared. The six commissioners voted unanimously in favor of this proposition, and Hathorne finally gave his vote with the majority.

Massachusetts appealed to Plymouth on the point at issue, but received a reply unfavorable to her view. But still the Bay colony held out, and the session closed without any conclusion being reached. Before the commissioners met again peace had been concluded in Europe, and the imagined peril had passed away. By thus opposing action, the impulse to which originated in panic, Massachusetts rendered a valuable service to all New England, and to the Dutch as well.

The following year Massachusetts coolly announced that she abandoned the interpretation on which she had so strongly insisted. She now acknowledged that the colonies were bound to execute the resolves of the commissioners according to the literal sense of the articles. This the commissioners accepted, provided the general court of Massachusetts at its meeting would certify to the other general courts its consent and agree to act accordingly.¹ We have no evidence to show whether or not this was done. Among the changes, however, which were made in the articles in 1667 and 1670 was the introduction of a clause providing that neither the colonies nor the confederation should be involved “in any war” without the consent of the several general courts.²

Additional light will be thrown on the nature of this confederacy by reference to the influence actually exerted by the commissioners upon the questions which grew out of relations with the Dutch, French, and Indians. Relations with the Dutch enlisted the interests of all the New England colonies, and, because they were generally sure of the united support of the English, the commissioners were able to act toward them with more than their usual decision and effect. In 1646 the commissioners began corresponding with Director Kieft concerning alleged injuries inflicted on the English by the Dutch at Good Hope, the destruction by them of the settlement planted by the New Haven people on the Delaware river, and the sale by Dutch traders of arms and

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ammunition to the Indians at Fort Orange, on Long Island, at Narragansett bay, and elsewhere. The seizure in New Haven harbor by order of the government at Manhattan of the Dutch ship of a trader named Westerhouse, who was about to sail for Virginia without paying the required duties, also attracted much attention. Its significance arose from the fact that this was an assertion by the Dutch of jurisdiction in New Haven harbor. Relations between the Dutch and English on Long Island demanded some attention, as did the duties and fees collected at Manhattan from those who were engaged in trade with New Netherland. Behind the whole lay the question of boundary.¹

During the administration of William Kieft at Manhattan the claims and counter claims of the two parties were asserted, but no progress was made toward an adjustment.² By the time Peter Stuyvesant was well installed in office the points at issue had increased in number, while the westward advance of the English made the establishment of some boundary line a necessity to the Dutch. Stuyvesant took up the question in a statesmanlike way and with an earnest desire for settlement. In 1650 he came to Hartford to meet the commissioners, while in session there, and to treat with them.³ The Dutch had complaints to offer of a nature much more serious than those of the English, for they concerned the very existence of New Netherland itself. The discoveries of the Dutch had extended as far east as Narragansett bay and as far south as Delaware bay. They had taught the Plymouth settlers the value of trade about the Narragansett coast. They were the explorers of the lower course of the Connecticut river and of Long Island sound. They were the first to establish a temporary settlement

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on Delaware bay, which was later followed by the permanent occupation of that region. Of their prior occupation of the valley of the Hudson and of Delaware bay and the Connecticut river there could be little doubt. In the Delaware region they had not yet been seriously disturbed by the English. But their claims in the Connecticut valley and along the sound were wholly ignored. Since English colonies had been founded both north and south of the Dutch settlements, and since all the territory which the Dutch occupied had repeatedly been included in grants from the English crown, prior occupation in their case was likely to avail little more than original discovery, unless it was supported by vigorous colonization. At that point the Dutch failed, and an important landmark in the history of their withdrawal before the advance of the English on the north is the boundary treaty which was concluded between Stuyvesant and the Commissioners of the United Colonies at Hartford, in 1650.

The first letter which Stuyvesant sent to the commissioners after his arrival at Hartford contained the words “New Netherland” as a part of its caption. He was informed by the English that that expression must be dropped, or the negotiation could not proceed. The word “Connecticut” was then substituted by the Dutch governor. After some further correspondence Stuyvesant suggested that two persons be appointed by each party and fully empowered to settle minor differences, to agree upon a provisional boundary subject to final determination in Europe, to agree upon the treatment of fugitives and, so far as possible, upon conditions of peaceful intercourse between the people of the two nationalities in America. This proposal was accepted by the English. They appointed Simon Bradstreet and Thomas Prince; Stuyvesant appointed Thomas Willett and George Baxter, both English residents of New Netherland. They drew up the following agreement,¹ which was accepted by both parties. Reference to its terms will show how inconclusive it was.

The question of reparation for the wrongs which the

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English alleged that they had suffered while Kieft was director, was deferred until they could be investigated and passed upon by the States General and the West India company. The controversy between the Dutch and English on the Delaware was disposed of in the same way. Stuyvesant explained that in seizing Westerhouse’s ship he had not intended to lay claim to New Haven, but was executing an order to seize any Dutch ship found trading in the English colonies without a license. New Haven accepted this explanation. In regard to the boundary, it was agreed that the provisional line should run across Long Island from the west side of Oyster bay directly south to the sea. From the sound into the mainland the line should run from the west side of Greenwich bay twenty miles due north. Northward of that point its course should be determined by agreement between the Dutch and the colony of New Haven, provided the line, ran through no point within ten miles of Hudson river. The Dutch should not build any house within six miles of the boundary. For the present Greenwich should be regarded as lying within Dutch territory. The Dutch should retain the land they possessed at Good Hope, but all the rest of the Connecticut valley should belong to the English. It was agreed that this boundary should be maintained and respected until the states of England and Holland should approve or modify the agreement. In due time it was ratified by the States General, but the English government never gave it the slightest notice. Had it done so, it would have recognized the validity of the territorial claims of the Dutch, a step which it consistently refused to take. When, a decade later, the advance of English colonization had gained increased momentum, it swept across this paper barrier and English control was extended almost to Manhattan itself.

When the Confederacy was formed Massachusetts was deeply involved in a controversy growing out of a recent privateering expedition from Boston against certain French settlements near the mouth of the Penobscot river and eastward of that point. This expedition was occasioned by the appeals of Charles de la Tour, who occupied a post on the

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St. John river, for aid¹ against his rival D’Aunay Charnisay, who held possession of Port Royal, and who in 1635 captured the trading post which had been established by Plymouth near the mouth of the Penobscot. When, in 1632, by the treaty of St. Germains, Canada and Acadia, after the exploits of the Kirks and the Canada company, were restored by England to France, Claude Razilly had been made governor. He brought over D’Aunay, who in the name of the governor took possession of the settlements in Acadia. In 1635 Razilly died and left to D’Aunay his authority in these parts, the latter taking up his residence at Port Royal. The territorial claims of the French extended indefinitely toward the west and southwest. The two easternmost trading posts of Plymouth were regarded as clearly within their bounds. The one at Machias had been seized in 1632, and now D’Aunay took possession of the other. A vessel was sent under the authority of Plymouth to recover it, but the attempt did not succeed, while an application by the Plymouth colonists to Massachusetts for aid in the enterprise proved unavailing.

The interests of the family of La Tour in Acadia dated from the first French occupation of that region, and had been strengthened by grants from Sir William Alexander during the period of his proprietorship. As soon as D’Aunay appeared Charles de la Tour went to Paris, got his grants confirmed, and secured from the company of New France the title of lieutenant general at Fort Lomeron and commander at Cape Sable. Later he secured from the same source a grant of land on the St. John river, where he built the fort to which reference has already been made. La Tour was intensely jealous of D’Aunay, and as soon as the latter assumed office as the successor of Razilly a bitter rivalry began. D’Aunay derived his authority immediately from the crown, while La Tour exhibited a letter from the company of New France and a commission from the vice-admiral of France. Whether or not those documents were genuine it was difficult to tell. After the rivalry between

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the two had developed into an open conflict and La Tour had been once captured and imprisoned, he came to Boston, and appealed for help, June, 1643.

At intervals during the two previous years Massachusetts had had dealings with La Tour. In 1641, through a Protestant emissary, he had asked for help and also for freedom of trade with the English. The former request was refused, but the latter was granted. In 1642 Catholic emissaries were sent to Boston and trade with La Tour was actually begun. The merchants of Boston found the trade to the eastern parts especially profitable and attractive. The Massachusetts people, however, were at this time informed by D’Aunay that he had an order from the French government for the arrest of La Tour. France was a friendly power. The authorities at Boston were therefore aware of the delicate and uncertain relations in which they were tempted to interfere. But the chances of profit from a filibustering expedition to the eastern parts operated as a strong attraction on the minds of the merchants. Though Winthrop was governor, yet with the approval of such magistrates and deputies as could be consulted at Boston, and without calling a session of the general court, permission was given La Tour to hire vessels for his purpose in Massachusetts. They promised also not to hinder such persons as would volunteer for the expedition. La Tour secured four vessels and about seventy men. Captain Edward Gibbons¹ and Thomas Hawkins were deeply interested in the enterprise, and the latter was the English commander of the expedition. He took with him a letter from the magistrates stating that the men who had been allowed to go were instructed not to “do or attempt anything against the rules of justice or good neighborhood.” This letter he delivered to D’Aunay at Port Royal, and from the reply which he received, was convinced of the rightfulness of D’Aunay’s claim, and refused to attack him. But some of his men joined La Tour in an attack, which resulted in the killing of three of D’Aunay’s men and the burning of a mill. A pinnace loaded with furs belonging to D’Aunay was also

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captured, and the plunder divided between La Tour, the shipowners, and the men. The expedition then returned, having given D’Aunay sufficient cause for complaint, without seriously crippling him.

D’Aunay at once went to France, and secured there a grant of authority which beyond question put him legally in the right as against his rival. The next summer, 1644, La Tour again appeared in Boston with an appeal for aid, and now stated that his adversary had prevailed against him in France. At this time the Plymouth partners who had been interested in trade on the Penobscot made over their claims against D’Aunay for the destruction of their settlement to John Winthrop, Jr., Gibbons, and Hawkins. They were empowered by force of arms or otherwise to recover possession. This would indicate that another expedition was planning. About the same time Warnerton of Piscataqua, with about twenty men, at the solicitation of La Tour, attacked D’Aunay’s settlement on the Penobscot. Warnerton was killed, but his men destroyed the house and cattle and took the guard prisoners. Thus D’Aunay was furnished with an additional cause of complaint.

But months before events had reached this point of development a storm of protest against the conduct of the Boston merchants in this affair, and the apparent indifference of the magistrates toward their proceedings, had arisen in the colony. It first manifested itself when the nature of Hawkins’s expedition in 1643 became known. The feeling was strongest in Salem and vicinity, and it certainly proceeded in part from the jealousy with which Boston was regarded by the people of that section. Saltonstall, Bradstreet, Symonds, and four of the ministers sent a remonstrance¹ to the governor and magistrates concerned, insisting that La Tour had not made out his case and that the course which was being pursued would bring down upon the colony the anger of France. The fact that La Tour was a papist alarmed many, for an alliance with such was regarded as a league with idolaters. At a meeting² of magistrates and a part of the deputies, which was called to discuss the arguments

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raised by the opposition, the larger part of the time seems to have been spent in the consideration of the question, whether it was lawful for Christians to aid idolaters or to hold communion with them. Those who supported the negative ransacked the histories of the kings of Judah and Israel—Jehoshaphat, Josiah, Amaziah, and others—for precedents, while their opponents resorted to the good Samaritan argument drawn from the New Testament. Finally, coming to genuine historic precedents, the magistrates urged that European states frequently allowed aid to be hired among their subjects to be used against countries with which their governments were at peace. This was true, and precedents were cited from the relations between England and Holland and Spain to prove it. Emphasis was also laid on the unfriendly attitude of D’Aunay as a justification of the policy of Massachusetts.

Before La Tour made his second application for assistance Endicott had succeeded Winthrop in the governorship. Now, while trade relations were kept up with La Tour, a message was sent to D’Aunay stating that, if he could prove that he had suffered wrong, justice should be done him. Further decisive action was postponed till the general court should meet, and the substance of the letter which had been sent to D’Aunay was laid before the commissioners of the United Colonies¹ at their second meeting. The opinion which they expressed on this specific question was that, unless D’Aunay should abandon his offensive conduct, war with him might be risked in defence of La Tour, though it should be undertaken with the advice of the Confederacy. But at the same meeting, though in another connection, the commissioners adopted the rule, “that no Jurisdiction within this Confederation shall permitt any voluntaries to go forth in a warlike way against any people whatsoever, without order & direction from the Commissioners of the several Jurisdictions.” When the event occurred, the machinery of the league was scarcely in operation, and such rule as the above did not exist.

During the interval before the next meeting of the commissioners,

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in response to satisfactory proof from D’Aunay that he was the legal representative of the French government, Massachusetts abandoned her defence of La Tour. A vessel from Massachusetts was however captured while carrying supplies to La Tour’s fort. The fort was besieged by D’Aunay and captured, and all the men found in it were put to death. La Tour himself escaped. An agreement of peace was concluded between Massachusetts and D’Aunay. This was approved by the commissioners at their meeting in 1645.¹ Several opinions were also expressed by them at that time which by implication condemned the course pursued by the magistrates of Massachusetts in attempting to pass on the merits of the quarrel between the two French rivals. The following year, through negotiations with the envoys sent by D’Aunay to Boston, an agreement was² signed concerning the damages which he claimed, and the end of this troublesome affair was reached. It however helped to intensify the struggle between the deputies and magistrates in Massachusetts, which was in progress at that time.

The commissioners exercised supervision over relations between the Indians and the colonies in general. Indian relations occupied their attention more continuously than did any other subject. The tribes of northern New England, of Plymouth, of Massachusetts itself, gave little trouble. The attention of the commissioners was occupied almost wholly by the Narragansetts and their dependants, by the Mohegans and the remnant of the Pequots. These all were resident within the territory over which Connecticut was extending her authority, or which was adjacent thereto. The colonies continued to deal separately with the smaller or more peaceful bodies of Indians within their own limits. The principles of their policy in reference to trade and intercourse in general were occasionally approved or confirmed by the commissioners, but their time was not seriously occupied with this.

The commissioners interested themselves chiefly in keeping the peace among the Indian tribes of southern New

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England, or between them and the English. Collisions also between these tribes and the less warlike natives of Long Island were, so far as possible, prevented. When the Confederacy was established, the feud between the Mohegans and the Narragansetts was at its height. Uncas and Miantonomi were the leaders of the two hostile tribes. The former was under the protection of the United Colonies, while the latter had the sympathy of the exiles in the Narragansett settlements. Some of the aversion with which Massachusetts regarded Gorton was transferred to the sachem from whom Warwick was bought and who had befriended Williams. The first question which came before the commissioners was one growing out of hostilities between these chiefs and their followers. When Miantonomi hazarded a battle and was captured, the English unhesitatingly supported the Mohegan chief, and under their order the Narragansett sachem was put to death.

For ten years after this event the English were never free from the dread of an Indian war. The Narragansetts and their dependants were enraged at the death of their chief and threatened revenge. They declared that the Mohegans had agreed to accept a ransom for Miantonomi, and that it had been paid before his death. But the statements of Uncas that this was false were accepted as satisfactory by the English. The commissioners in the first interview with the hostile chiefs, in 1644, were able only to secure from the Narragansetts a promise not to attack Uncas before the end of the next planting season. Occasional outrages, however, could not be prevented. In 1645, under the threat of an expedition into their country and through the mediation of Williams, the Narragansetts were induced to meet the commissioners at Hartford. There a treaty¹ was arranged, according to which the Narragansetts, because they had broken the agreement of 1638, promised to restore all they had taken from Uncas and pay the English two thousand fathom of white wampum. Resort was no longer to be had to war until the questions in dispute had been submitted to the English. Neither were the Narragansetts or Niantics

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to dispose of any land without the consent of the commissioners. Hostages were given by the Indians for the due observance of the treaty.

During the next five years the commissioners strove to secure the execution¹ of this treaty, but with very imperfect results. Only a part of the wampum was delivered, and that after persistent coaxing and threats. Occasionally the Indians were restless, while the fears of the English were kept alive by the tales and incitements of Uncas. Finally, after hope that the tribute would be paid had nearly vanished, the anxieties of the colonists culminated in the panic of 1653 over rumors of the conspiracy between the Dutch and Indians for the destruction of the English.

Considerable attention was also paid by the commissioners to the settlement of the remnant of the Pequots in Connecticut, and to the collection of tribute from them.² In this work the services of Uncas as chief Indian agent and governor were in constant requisition. In this connection the labors of the commissioners had chiefly to do with the after results of the conflict with the Pequots. Their work forms in a way the connecting link between that conflict and the much larger struggle, at a later time, with the Narragansetts and the other allies of Philip. But though their activity was extended and touched the natives at many points, it by no means comprised the whole of Indian relations in New England. As that subject is of importance sufficient to deserve special treatment, the Indian policy of the commissioners in some of its other features will be reserved for reference under the general subject of Indian relations.

Apart from the question of the war with the Dutch and Indians in 1653, the most serious controversy which arose during the existence of the confederacy was that between Massachusetts and the River Towns, over the attempt of the latter to levy a tribute on the trade of Springfield which went up and down the Connecticut river. The purpose of the River Towns in this policy was to maintain the fort at Saybrook, and fulfil their contract with George Fenwick

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for its purchase. This provided, among other things, that he should receive for ten years the duties collected from all vessels which passed in and out of the river.¹ While Springfield was claimed by the River Towns, but after they had ceased to exercise jurisdiction there, they ordered in 1645 the collection of two pence per bushel on corn, and twenty shillings per hogshead on beaver, together with levies on biscuit, horses, and cows, which should be sent down the river from Springfield. Clearances were to be issued at Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield, and officers at the fort were ordered to stop vessels which did not produce a certificate that they had been duly cleared. The payment of this duty was refused by the traders of Springfield, on the ground that they belonged to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. The penalty of confiscation, which the order provided for such cases, was not immediately enforced by the River Towns, but was postponed until the opinion of the commissioners of the United Colonies could be obtained.

In 1647, though the fort at Saybrook had been destroyed by fire, the question was presented in due form before the commissioners.² The Massachusetts commissioners brought a declaration from her general court, to the effect that one colony had no authority to force the inhabitants of another colony to purchase a fort or lands outside its jurisdiction. It was also considered unfair to demand custom on Springfield trade, and not on that of the Dutch. Massachusetts also claimed that the port of Saybrook afforded no protection to Springfield, that the insistence on the imposition had long hindered the formation of the confederacy, and that it tended to oppress the inhabitants at a time when their resources were spent in building. The statement closed with the suggestion that, if Hartford insisted on its claim, reprisals on the part of Massachusetts might be expected.

The commissioners from Connecticut could of course show no legal right for what they were doing, and simply attempted to justify it on the ground of equity. They claimed that the fort was useful to Springfield, and that on river traffic in Europe similar levies were imposed and for a

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like purpose. In their contention they had the support of the commissioners from Plymouth and New Haven, with whom the decision of the board rested. It was therefore decided that for the ensuing year the toll should be collected. It was also held by the commissioners that the levy of the tax for the defence of the mouth of the river or for dredging it, was not an infringement of the liberty of traders along its banks, even though they lived in another jurisdiction. The rate of duty, however, should not be increased without the consent of the colonies, and it should be continued only so long as the fort was maintained and right of passage thereby secured.

When the question came up again, in 1648,¹ Massachusetts suggested some changes in the articles, which indicated, either that she desired an increase in her representation on the board, or that she was ready to free herself in part from even the weak restraints which the confederation seemed to impose upon her. Since there were more poor laborers and artisans in Massachusetts than in the other colonies, she considered the rule unfair that burdens should be distributed among members of the Confederacy strictly in proportion to numbers. She suggested that it would be sufficient if the commissioners met triennially. She was suspicious that the commissioners might appoint some officers to execute their orders, and thus take that work from the officials of the colonies. “Forasmuch,” its delegates concluded, “as orders by way of advice are in some cases introductions to orders of power, where the advice is not followed, it is to be propounded if it were not seasonable to be declared that in such Caces, if any of the colonies shall not thinke fitt to Folow such advice, the same not to be accounted any offence or breach of any article of the Confederation or to give power or occasion to the commissioners to prosede to any act of authority in such Cace.” To these propositions the commissioners from the other colonies naturally refused to consent.

After urging some rather theoretical arguments in support of their contention the commissioners from Massachusetts demanded that the River Towns should produce the patent by

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which they claimed Saybrook, and the order of their court levying the impost.¹ The former was produced, but the latter they had not brought with them to the meeting. Then the delegates from New Haven interposed and asked that the matter be postponed until the next year, and in the meantime that Massachusetts should have her southern boundary ascertained, so that it might be positively known to which jurisdiction Springfield belonged. With this the discussion of the subject at that meeting closed.

In 1642 Massachusetts, at her own expense, had surveyed² a line from Wrentham to Windsor, which lay twelve miles or more south of what was later ascertained to be the correct boundary. To this, at the meeting of the commissioners in 1649, she referred Connecticut,³ and continued to maintain for seventy years that it was her southern boundary. But the rival colony refused to be satisfied with this decision. Massachusetts had also in the meantime laid countervailing⁴ duties on goods of Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, which were imported or exported through Boston harbor. To this Connecticut replied by confirming its previous order levying the toll on the river trade of Springfield and sent a copy of the same to the commissioners. The commissioners from the colonies immediately affected⁵ protested against the conduct of Massachusetts as an injury to those who had no share in the dispute, and a violation of the spirit of the articles. In 1650 Massachusetts, on condition that Connecticut would no longer levy toll at Saybrook, repealed the duty. Though no act of repeal appears, the disappearance of reference to the controversy from the records shows that at least the order was no longer enforced against Springfield.

The labors of the commissioners in the interest of schools, of the church, and of missionary work among the Indians were continuous during the entire period of the existence of the confederacy. At their second meeting, in the year 1644, they recommended⁶ to the general courts that those who

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refused voluntarily to contribute the due proportion toward church expenses should be rated by authority and compelled to pay. At the same meeting a communication was received from Rev. Thomas Shepard of Cambridge soliciting support for Harvard College, “that school of the prophets that now is.” He urged the commissioners to recommend that families which felt themselves able so to do, should give one quarter of a bushel of corn per annum, or its equivalent, and that ministers be urged to stir up the hearts of the people once a year on this subject. This was approved and the suggestion recommended to the general courts as worthy of their consideration. In response to this Massachusetts and Connecticut took the desired action.¹ The disposal of these gifts was left to the president, and he administered the trust subject to advice² on the part of the commissioners. Occasionally the college applied to the commissioners for aid in repairing or enlarging buildings, seeking funds raised by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England as well as contributions from residents of the colonies³ themselves.

In 1644 a letter was received⁴ from the governor of Massachusetts on the spread of error among the churches and the way in which it might be checked and the truth fully established. The meeting that year being at Hartford, the elders who were present were asked whether some confession of doctrine and discipline should not be prepared and published for the strengthening of the weak and stopping the mouths of adversaries. The ministers agreed that this was the proper course, and said that they would acquaint the rest of their brethren with it, and endeavor to satisfy the desires of the commissioners in this as soon as possible. Thus the project for the synod of 1646 originated.

At the meeting in New Haven, in 1646, the spread of error was again considered⁵ with apparent reference to the Narragansett settlements, and it was observed how “licentious liberty” was granted in some parts of New England,

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“whereby many, casting off the rule of the Word, profess and practice what is good in their own eyes.” A reference to the recent efforts of the Presbyterians in Massachusetts may be seen in the statement that petitions against “the good and straight waies of Christ” had been presented in some of the colonies. Though the delegates from Plymouth desired to consider the matter further, the commissioners advised the several general courts to keep “a due watch” at the doors of God’s house, that none be admitted as members but such as had an effectual calling and had entered by an express covenant; that baptism should be administered only to such members and to their immediate seed, and that all errors which undermined or slighted the Scripture, the Sabbath, and other ordinances, or which favored unwarrantable revelations or inventions of men, or any carnal liberty “under the deceitful color of liberty of conscience,” might be suppressed. This was one of the earliest declarations against the rising notion of the halfway covenant, and we may suppose that it contained the sentiments, if not the words, of John Davenport.

At the same meeting the commissioners from Massachusetts were urged to consult with the general court and elders there in order to devise a way by which ministerial graduates of, Harvard College, especially those who had been helped through their course by contributions, might be induced not to remove into other colonies or countries, but to enter on the service of the churches of New England. Another most interesting and characteristic resolution of this meeting provided that all the colonies should be urged to interest themselves in making a collection of special providences, for the purpose of showing in how special a manner God had dealt with New England. This proposal was reported in 1656.¹

When the Quakers began to appear in 1656, Massachusetts called loudly and repeatedly on the commissioners to support an united policy of exclusion against them and to uphold the orthodox ministry.² To these appeals a ready response was given. Strong resolutions on the justice of the claim

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of the ministry both to financial and moral support were adopted. In 1656 the commissioners urged the general courts to prohibit Quakers entering the colonies, and to expel those who had come in. In 1658 they then went to the full length with Massachusetts in recommending that convicted Quakers should be banished under pain of death, and, if they afterwards returned, they should publicly renounce Quakerism or be executed.

The activity of the colonies in missionary work among the Indians occupied much of the attention of the commissioners after 1649. In that year, partly through the efforts of Edward Winslow, who had then returned finally to England, and in accordance with a plan which was proposed by the Commissioners of Plantations, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England was created, by an ordinance of the Council of State.¹ Its officers were a president, treasurer, and fourteen assistants, and it was empowered to hold land in England or Wales not exceeding £2000 per annum, and any goods and sums of money whatever. A general collection should be made through England and Wales for the foundation of the charity, and the Commissioners of the United Colonies, or such as they should appoint, were designated to receive and expend the funds in such a way as would best promote the extension of the Gospel among the natives and the education of their children.

By this act some recognition was given to the colonial union, as was also done by the express continuance of this relation when, after the Restoration, the society was again chartered with Robert Boyle as its president.

During the entire existence of the Confederacy, an active correspondence was maintained between the commissioners and the officers of the society. Besides Winslow, William Steele, the president of the society while it existed under an ordinance of the Council of State, and Robert Boyle, who was the first president after it had been chartered by the crown, were their chief correspondents in England. In New England John Eliot, the Mayhews, Pearson, Thomas Stanton and others, as missionaries, interpreters, Indian

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workers or patrons of the enterprise, labored to an extent under the advice and direction of the commissioners. The commissioners from England ordered supplies of clothing, tools, and other articles for the praying Indians. These were purchased by the society from its fund or from funds available through contributions in New England. They were sent over to the commissioners and distributed through their agents. Edward Rawson, the secretary of Massachusetts, acted, for a considerable time after 1651, in this capacity.¹ Hezekiah Usher began in 1657 to act as foreign exchange banker for the commissioners, and drew bills of exchange for their convenience in transactions with the society.² He seems also to have kept some of their³ funds. An account of expenditures in this service was kept by the commissioners and annually submitted to the society in England. It contained the salaries of the missionaries and schoolmasters, of the Indian helpers and interpreters, the fees of agents and others who were appointed to administer justice among the Indians or to care for their health, the expenditures for clothes, books, and other supplies for the Indians, the payments for printing catechisms and other text-books, and finally for Eliot’s Indian Bible.⁴ Payments were also made in this account for the board and other charges of Indian youths who were being educated in private families or at Harvard College. The permanence and success of the work of course depended largely on the number and ultimate usefulness of the young men. With a tone of discouragement the commissioners were forced repeatedly to note the high mortality which prevailed among them, and how few survived the period of training. But the joint efforts of the society in England and of the commissioners in New England continued until Philip’s war caused its collapse and ruin.

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