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CHAPTER XIII

THE SYSTEM OF DEFENCE IN THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES

In the treatment of this subject, as of the others which have passed in review, the experience of Massachusetts will be brought chiefly into requisition, while that of the other New England colonies will be cited so far as to show that the measures adopted for defence were substantially the same in them all. The Narragansett plantations took a less prominent part in the expeditions and wars of the seventeenth century than did the neighboring colonies; but that in the beginning is to be attributed to the fact that they were excluded from the New England Confederacy and were forced by their situation to cultivate friendship with the Indians. At a later time the addition of a Quaker element to their population, together with the growth of commercial interests, increased the disinclination to war.

The charter of Massachusetts, in language very similar to that used in all the other royal charters, empowered the governor and company “for their speciall defence and safety, to incounter, expulse, repell, and resist by force of armes, as well by sea as by lande, . . . all such person or persons as shall at any tyme hereafter attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment or annoyance to the said plantation or inhabitants.” The exercise of this power gave rise to the militia system of Massachusetts and to its provisions for coast and frontier defence. In consequence of the removal of the governor and company into the colony, the power was exercised by them directly and not through the medium of appointees acting at a great distance from the centre of authority. As the other New England colonies, until they

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received royal charters, assumed the power, and used it in much the same way as did Massachusetts, the result was the development of a military system which in its main features was common to them all.

The Puritan belonged to the militant type of humanity, and considered the defence of his inheritance, by force of arms if necessary, as nothing less than a religious duty. “For,” said the general court of Massachusetts in the preamble to the militia law of 1643,¹ “as piety cannot bee maintained without church ordinances & officers, nor justice without lawes & magistracy, no more can our safety & peace be preserved without millitary orders & officers.” “Although,” says worthy Edward Johnson, “the chiefest work of these select bands of Christ was to mind their spiritual warfare yet they knew right well the Temple was surrounded with walls and bulworks, and the people of God in re-edifying the same did prepare to resist their enemies with weapons of war, even while they continued building.”² The Massachusetts company, before its governing body was removed from England, bought cannon, with military equipment for approximately one hundred men, sent them, together with a master gunner, to Salem, and ordered Endicott to have all planters and servants instructed in the use of arms, and to designate certain days³ for trainings.

But it should be borne in mind that in the American colonies the subordination of the military to the civil power was quite as much a cardinal principle as it was in England. Winthrop states that when, during the Antinomian excitement, certain gentlemen and others of Boston desired incorporation as an artillery company, the magistrates reflected on the example of the Pretorian band among the Romans and the Templars in Europe. They thought “how dangerous it might be to erect a standing authority of military men, which might easily in time overthrow the civil power,” and resolved to “stop it betimes.”⁴ The anxiety was

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unnecessary, for the industrial forces in colonial society so greatly outweighed the military as to effectually remove the peril that was feared. A few who had received training in European armies came to the colonies with the first settlers, but their successors and the great body of their contemporaries never gained any military experience save that which came from Indian fighting or from an occasional muster. Officers and privates alike were civilians; they were husbandmen, artisans or small traders, withdrawn from their homes and business for a brief scout, march, or campaign. In the colonies there was no opportunity for the development of the professional soldier. Indian warfare was not favorable to that. Time for training and service must be taken, at considerable cost, from occupations which, if they were to yield even a modest livelihood, demanded strenuous application and effort. Families were large, resources were small. Population was sparsely distributed. The home was often located in places where danger lurked, and where the presence of the grown men of the household was imperatively needed for protection. Fields must be planted and harvests gathered at the proper time, or the community would immediately suffer want. Under these conditions it was impossible for the colonists to do more than organize a militia system, which in a more or less crude way would meet the need for defence. Military law, like all other law, emanated directly or indirectly from the general court. The committees and administrative boards which controlled the equipment of soldiers and directed their movements consisted in most cases of the same men who guided the affairs of the colony in civil relations. The officers were in many cases elected by the men—their neighbors—whom they commanded, and in all cases they derived their authority from an elective body. Under these conditions training was imperfect and discipline a result of voluntary consent almost as much as of positive law. These conditions, combined with the limited resources both of the soldier and of the colonial treasury from which his wages were paid, and with the fact that the commissariat played a very subordinate part in the outfit of a force, explain why it was that

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the military arrangements of the colonies were crude, and their soldiery was unfit for long periods of active service. In all the colonies, as in England, the militia system was based on the principle of the assize of arms. This implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms, and, with certain exceptions, to coöperate in the work of defence. In this duty, as in the payment of taxes, the distinction between freemen and non-freemen to an extent disappeared. The possession of arms also implied the possession of ammunition, and the authorities paid quite as much attention to the latter as to the former. In Massachusetts the arms and ammunition which had been purchased by the company in England were doubtless distributed, and all were required to furnish themselves with a proper equipment. The court of assistants, in March, 1631,¹ ordered that within the next two weeks every town should see that all men, servants included, should be furnished with good and sufficient arms, such as were approved by the captain or other officers. Magistrates and ministers alone were excepted. Those who had no arms, and who were able to purchase them, should do so. Others should be supplied by the town, and return to it the sum expended as soon as they were able. A year later it was ordered that any single man who had not furnished himself with arms might be put out to service, and this became a permanent part of the legislation of the colony.² In 1634 more weapons were brought from England, and they were distributed among the towns, in order that they might have them ready at all times as a town stock. It was then provided that any one who was delinquent in the matter of furnishing himself with arms should be fined ten shillings.³ Supplies of ammunition were at various times procured from England or the continent. In 1653 a stock of arms, as well as ammunition, was procured through the Commissioners of the United Colonies, and it was distributed among the four Puritan commonwealths.⁴ In

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1667¹ Massachusetts began to increase its supply of powder by a tonnage duty. The manufacture of powder was also encouraged, and occasionally its exportation without special license was forbidden. Periodical inspections were ordered. Clauses intended to insure the possession of arms and ammunition by all who were subject to military service appear in all the important enactments concerning military affairs. Fines were the penalty for delinquency, whether of towns or individuals. According to the usage of the times, the infantry of Massachusetts consisted of pikemen and musketeers. The law,² as enacted in 1649 and thereafter, provided that each of the former should be armed with a pike, corselet, head-piece, sword, and knapsack. The musketeer should carry a “good fixed musket,” not under bastard musket bore, not less than three feet, nine inches, nor more than four feet three inches in length, a priming wire, scourer, and mould, a sword, rest, bandoleers, one pound of powder, twenty bullets, and two fathoms of match. The law also required that two-thirds of each company should be musketeers.

The law in Plymouth concerning the size of the musket, when used for military purposes, was much the same as that of Massachusetts.³ Provisions concerning the equipment in general were substantially the same as those of Massachusetts. In March, 1638, just before the expedition against the Pequots, the purchase of fifty corselets for the towns along the Connecticut river⁴ was ordered. All were commanded to keep in readiness powder and bullets,—and match if the piece was a matchlock. In the Connecticut Code of 1650,⁵ and in the New Haven Code of 1656, appear explicit provisions relating to equipment which might well have been suggested, not merely by the existing law of those colonies, but by that of Massachusetts and by earlier practice in England.

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Following European traditions, the law of Massachusetts in the early time required that two-thirds of each trained band should be musketeers and one-third pikemen.¹ Whether or not this proportion was maintained among the infantry of the other colonies we are not informed. The staff of the half-pike which was carried was not far from ten feet long.² As a weapon it was found practically useless in Indian warfare; but, as New Englanders had no prolonged or very serious conflicts with the natives till Philip’s war, the pike kept its place in the general equipment.³ But that war banished it from Massachusetts, and probably from New England as a whole. By an order⁴ of October, 1675, all pikemen from Massachusetts were commanded to furnish themselves with muskets and the ammunition required therewith. When, in the following year, Edward Randolph transmitted to the home government an account, among other things, of the militia system of Massachusetts, he stated that pikemen formed no part of it, for they were found to be useless in wars with the Indians.⁵ With the pike we may suppose that the use of armor also disappeared.

Previous to the time of Philip’s war, the musket which was in common use was the matchlock.⁶ In this the powder was fired by a slow-burning match-cord, prepared by being soaked in saltpetre. So heavy was the gun that the soldier had to carry a “fourquette,” or forked stick, on which to rest the weapon when he fired it. Around his left side, hanging under his right arm, was his bandoleer. This was a belt two inches wide, to which were attached twelve small cylindrical boxes, each holding one charge of powder. From the belt likewise hung a priming wire, a bullet bag,

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and a case containing several yards of match. The musketeer also carried a short sword. The “postures of the musket,” or movements to prepare, aim, and fire this weapon, were no less than fifty-seven. The matchlock was thus not only most clumsy, but very crude, being apt to fail at the critical moment, while the heavy equipment necessitated by it proved a serious obstacle to the mobility of the troops.

But from the earliest days of the colonies flint-locks or firelocks, carbines, and pistols had been to an extent in use. As the century advanced¹ they became more common. Therefore, with the opening of Philip’s war the matchlock disappeared almost as quickly as did the pike. In November, 1675, Massachusetts ordered that every town should provide six flints for every listed² soldier of the town. The previous month it enacted that every trooper should provide himself with a carbine.³ In November, Connecticut ordered a “stock of flints”⁴ to be sent to New London for the expedition against the Narragansetts. In February, 1676, the Massachusetts committee of war estimated that two thousand flints were necessary for an expedition of five hundred men.⁵ By order of July, 1677, Plymouth banished the matchlock, and ordered that all should supply themselves with firelock muskets.⁶ Thus by the close of the war the matchlock, as well as the pike, had been practically discarded, and by a law of 1693 it was provided that Massachusetts infantry should be furnished with firelock muskets and the troopers with carbines and pistols.

The men who were procured for service, armed and furnished with ammunition in the way indicated, were first organized into trained bands, in imitation of the trained bands of London and of the English counties.⁷ In Massachusetts, soon after Winthrop’s arrival, two veterans, Underhill and Patrick, were employed for a year to train the companies,⁸ their wages for the first half year being specified.

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As towns were formed, the number of trained bands was increased, each town being required to form one.

These became the militia companies of the colony. In 1652 the general court ordered that the number of men in a company should not be less than sixty-four, nor more than two hundred.¹ When the number of soldiers exceeded the maximum, the company was divided; in cases when it was less than the minimum, the soldiers of one or more towns were joined to form a company. As the companies were organized, the duty of training them devolved immediately on locally elected military officers,—captains, lieutenants, sergeants, ensigns.

One of the most important officers connected with the militia company, and one who appears in all the colonies, with the possible exception of Rhode Island, was the clerk of the band. His powers appear with the greatest clearness in the laws of Massachusetts and Connecticut.² He kept the list of the company, and hence of all residents of the town who were liable to military service. He, therefore, it was who, in Massachusetts and Connecticut, was chiefly active in taking the assize of arms, though in some of the colonies the captain, or other strictly military officer, seems to have borne a more prominent part in it than he did. According to Massachusetts law, the view of the arms and ammunition of the company was taken in the towns twice every year. Once yearly the arms of all other inhabitants were surveyed. On training days the clerk attended, called the lists of those who should be present, and noted the names of absentees. The arms of the company must then be submitted to the inspection of the captain. All fines which were imposed for failure to attend trainings, or to keep the required weapons, or to keep them in proper condition, were collected by the clerk of the band. To this end he was given the right to levy by distress. The fund thus collected he might, with the advice of the chief officers, expend for ensigns, drums, or other supplies needed by the company.

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The oath of the clerk of the military company in Plymouth required him to keep a list of the men, to attend all their trainings, to note all violations of the laws of the company, to collect all fines and duly to account for the same.¹ In Connecticut his duties were expressed in much the same terms, with the addition that he should take the assize of arms twice every year.² According to New Haven law the clerk of the band acted in conjunction with the other officers of the company in taking the assize of arms, and it was his particular duty to present the names of the delinquents before the plantation court or the proper officer for punishment.³

The first act providing for troopers, or cavalry, in Massachusetts was passed in 1648.⁴ This authorized the listing within each regiment of such as would willingly serve on horseback; they were to be organized as troops, each to contain not less than thirty nor, until 1663, more than seventy⁵ men. Each trooper must be furnished with a horse, bridle and saddle, a sword belt, a case of pistols with holsters, or a carbine in a belt, one pound of powder, and twenty bullets. The cost of furnishing a horse, with its equipment, was such as to exclude all but the well-to-do from this branch of the service. In 1663 it was enacted that none should be listed as troopers except those whose parents, or who themselves, possessed a taxable estate of the value of £100. As special inducements to encourage the enlistment of troopers, they were granted exemption from training in all foot companies and from constable’s watches, freedom from rates for person and horse, free commonage for their horses, a wage of five shillings yearly, liberty to choose lieutenants and other inferior officers, free ferriage to and from their places of training or service, the exemption of their horses from being impressed for any other service. The officers of the troop were the same as those of an infantry company, with the addition of a cornet and quartermaster. The importance of this arm of the service steadily increased during the century, troops being formed in many of the towns. During Philip’s

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war many of them were converted into dragoons, or mounted infantry, and did good service in winter as well as summer. The first troop of horse in Plymouth was organized in 1658.¹ It consisted of thirty-three men, who were drawn in small quotas from all the towns of the colony. They were exempted from watch and ward and from service on foot. Their horses were no longer to be counted among taxable property. Later, authority was given to increase the number through volunteers to forty-eight, commissioned officers excepted. When, in 1675, these troopers were required to procure carbines and serve as dragoons, they declined to do so. Therefore the general court ordered that they should be disbanded and return to their foot companies, to serve there subject to the usual regulations for infantry. The jurisdiction of New Haven had, after 1657, one small troop of horse, raised chiefly in the towns of New Haven and Milford. It seems to have been disbanded when the separate existence of that colony came to an end.² Among the River Towns troopers appear in 1658, and then first presented the officers they had chosen to the general court for confirmation.³

Not until 1667, when England was at war with the Dutch, did the assembly of Rhode Island recommend⁴ to the towns the taking of steps preliminary to the formation of a troop of horse. Before the end of that year such a troop was organized on the Island, and officers were appointed by the governor and council. In 1682, on petition of certain persons of the towns of Providence and Warwick, permission was given for the organization of a troop there, its number not to exceed thirty-six.

The raw material of New England soldiery was subjected to not infrequent trainings. The attention of the magistrates and lawmakers was directed quite as much to this subject as to the necessity of procuring a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition. At first it was ordered in Massachusetts that captains should train their companies every

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Saturday.¹ The next year, 1632, it was provided that trainings should be held once a month.² But experience soon convinced the court that this number imposed too heavy a burden, and accordingly trainings were omitted during July and August.³ In 1637 the number was reduced⁴ to eight per year, and later to six days, where it remained till 1679. Then the number of general compulsory trainings was reduced to four, though the officers of the companies were given authority to train their men two additional days in the year if they so wished.⁵

With a few exceptions, all males of military age,—sixteen to sixty years,—whether freemen, free residents, or servants, were compelled to train. According to the Massachusetts law of 1647⁶ the exempted classes included all members of the general court, officers, fellows and students of Harvard College, elders and deacons, schoolmasters, physicians and surgeons, the treasurer and surveyor general, public notaries, masters of vessels of above twenty tons burden, fishermen who were employed at all fishing seasons, millers, constant herdsmen, and all others who, from bodily infirmity or other just cause, should be excused by any county court or the court of assistants. According to a law of 1642⁷ all who were exempt from trainings, save magistrates, clergymen, physicians, scholars, and surgeons, should appear fully armed before the military officers twice a year to be trained. In 1652 it was enacted⁸ that all Scotchmen, negroes, and Indians, inhabiting with or servants to the English, should attend trainings; but this law was subsequently repealed. Farmers who lived at too great a distance from the training grounds of their companies were excused from attendance a part of the time,⁹ but provision was made that, where as many as twelve could be brought together, an officer should be specially detailed to drill them. For a time after 1645 the law required that youths from ten to sixteen years of age should be trained.¹⁰

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In 1675, as Philip’s war was beginning, it was ordered that only such masters of vessels as traded in foreign countries should be exempt from trainings.¹

When the militia was regimented, regimental trainings of both horse and foot, under command of the sergeant-major, were provided for. At first these occurred yearly;² but in 1648 this requirement, because it was “found by experience burdensome to the country,” was repealed. Thenceforth the regiments were trained in turn, no one of them being required to meet for the purpose oftener than once in three years.³ Absences from trainings, as well as other minor military offences, were punished by fine, the usual amount being five shillings.⁴ Disorders and contempt of authority while on duty were punishable with the stocks, pillory, and other customary military punishments, or by a fine of not more than twenty shillings.¹ The determination of the kind and degree of the penalty was apparently left to the military officers in charge; they were perhaps being guided by articles of war. As an alternative course, the offender might be delivered to a constable who would carry him before a magistrate, by whom he might, if the case required, be bound over to the next court of assistants. The disorders on training-days to which the laws refer were drunkenness and firing at random or at marks after dismissal, when the soldiers should have been in quarters.⁶ These offences were forbidden and threatened with the usual penalties.

In Plymouth the inhabitants of every town who were able to bear arms were required to train at least six times every year.⁷ In the Plymouth Records several interesting orders or rules of discipline have been preserved, and those enacted in 1643 for the company of Plymouth, Duxbury, and Marshfield, of which Miles Standish was then captain, are worthy of special mentions Those were also extended to Sandwich, Barnstable, and Yarmouth. They provided that

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the exercise at each training should begin and end with prayer, and once a year at the election of its officers a sermon should be preached before the company. None should be received into the company but freemen of honest and good report—not servants,—and they must be approved by the officers and the majority of the company. They must also take the oath of fidelity, if they had not previously taken it. During the time of exercise, talking, jeering, quarrelling, fighting, and other misdemeanors should be forbidden and punished. All minor offences should be punished by the officers of the company, but no attempt appears to have been made to expressly limit their discretion, save in the amount of fines imposed on those who appeared without arms or with defective arms. Every time a soldier appeared without a musket or a sword, a rest, or bandoleers, he was, in the case of each weapon, to be fined six shillings. Six months were allowed him in which to procure the weapon he lacked, and if at the end of that time he failed to do so, his name should be struck off the list. Each member must pay six shillings per quarter for the use of the company. “That all postures of pike and muskett, motions, ranks and files, etc., messengers, skirmishes, sieges, batteries, watches, sentinells, etc.,” say the orders, “bee always performed according to true military discipline!”

Trainings in Connecticut and New Haven were held during six days in the year, and present¹ no features to indicate any essential difference from the practice in Massachusetts. Among the few rules of discipline which have come down from that time, one issued by the council of Connecticut in 1676² will be found interesting, not only in comparison with that of an earlier date just cited from the records of Plymouth, but as a statement of the strict moral code which the Puritan ever desired to see enforced among soldiers when on the march or in camp. During the later provincial wars many a diarist was forced to note with sorrow how far both discipline and morals among the soldiers fell short of the ideal which is clearly set forth in these articles.

Though in the records of some of the towns of Rhode

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Island abundant references to trainings and to the organization of militia companies appear, slight mention of the subject appears in the records of the colony. In the early legislation of 1647, however, provision was made, not only that the inhabitants of the several towns should choose their military officers, but that the companies should be trained¹ eight times annually. The limits of military age, the requirements as to arms and taking of the assize, the functions of the clerk of the band, were in all essential respects the same as in the other New England colonies. As was natural, the town council shared prominently in these functions among the Narragansett plantations, while in the other colonies little mention is made of them in this connection. Though it is certain that a colonial militia system existed from and after 1647, yet the first clear evidence afforded by the records that officers of the town companies were commissioned by authority from the general assembly appears in 1667.² One captain at that time refused for a time to accept his commission because the word “chosen” did not appear in it.

Through the constable’s watches in the towns the provisions for local defence shaded off into ordinary police functions, to the performance of which all adult males, with certain special exceptions, were liable. But in Massachusetts, at least in times of peril, military watches were set. These were first provided for in 1640, and were placed first under the charge of the militia officers of the respective towns, but later under the local committees of militia.³ These continued from half an hour after sunset to a half hour after sunrise. It was their duty to arrest all suspicious persons, and in case they were resisted, to discharge their muskets and raise an alarm.

In all the New England colonies provision was made for

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giving a general, as well as local, alarm.¹ The former was given by discharging a musket three times, and, in the night, beating a drum continuously, firing a beacon, or discharging a piece of ordnance. It was taken up and spread as rapidly as possible from town to town. The local alarm was given by firing a musket once. On the approach of vessels suspected to be hostile a special alarm was given from the castle in Boston harbor. When a general alarm was given, every trained soldier must repair to his colors, on penalty for failure of a fine of £5. It is said that on the night of Sept. 23, 1675, during Philip’s war, as the result of giving a false alarm at Mendon, a town thirty miles southwest of Boston, and its spread from town to town, within an hour twelve hundred militiamen were brought under arms.² But, though the alarm was resorted to in emergencies, it played no regular part in the preparation for expeditions.

The years 1634 and 1636, while Massachusetts still possessed only an infantry force, witnessed the organization of trained bands into regiments. In December, 1636, an act was passed which definitely accomplished this result.³ One of these included the companies of Boston, Roxbury, Dorchester, Weymouth, and Hingham, with John Winthrop as colonel and Thomas Dudley as lieutenant-colonel. The second regiment included the companies of Charlestown, Newtown, Watertown, Concord, and Dedham, and of this John Haynes was colonel and Roger Harlakenden lieutenant-colonel. The third regiment consisted of the companies of Saugus, Salem, Ipswich, and Newbury, with John Endicott as colonel and John Winthrop, Jr., as lieutenant-colonel. The governor for the time being was general. For each regiment a muster-master was appointed. It was also provided that for the future colonels and lieutenant-colonels should be chosen by the members of their regiments and presented to the general court for confirmation. When the

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counties of Massachusetts were formed, these earliest organizations became known respectively as the regiments of Suffolk, Middlesex, and Essex counties. As settlement extended and other counties were formed, new regiments were added.

At the opening of Philip’s war the regiments of Suffolk and Middlesex¹ each contained one company of horse and fifteen companies of foot. The Essex regiment consisted of one mounted company and thirteen companies of foot. The regiments of other counties were smaller. In Massachusetts there were seventy-three organized companies, and an independent cavalry company, called the “three county troop,” made up in Suffolk, Middlesex, and Essex. In 1680, because of the increase in their numbers, the organizations of these three counties were in each case divided into two regiments.² Expeditions were regularly organized by drafting or impressing quotas from the companies and regiments. Occasionally, as in Philip’s war, volunteer companies were also formed. A famous body of this kind, consisting of strangers, adventurers, apprentices, men who were released from prison that they might win freedom by fighting the Indians, served at that time under Captain Samuel Mosely.³

By an act of September, 1643,⁴ a council, of which the governor should always be one, was given authority in cases of danger to call out the entire force of the colony and distribute it at its pleasure, yet the command of the forces in action should be intrusted to a sergeant-major general. Instead, also, of colonels and lieutenant-colonels each regiment should be commanded by a sergeant-major. He was the chief military officer⁵ of the shire, and was required to hold annually a regimental training. Twice⁶ a year he conferred with the chief officers of the trained bands in his regiment respecting points of discipline and training in which the companies were concerned. At these meetings, with the consent of the officers mentioned, he was empowered to impose fines

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for defective arms, ammunition, appearance, watches, and other offences. The regulation of the militia of the smaller towns and the duty of uniting them into companies of at least sixty-four men each, devolved on the sergeant-majors.¹ During most of the colonial² period it was their duty to raise the force of their shires, and, in case of alarm, to send any part of it to the assistance of the place imperilled, and to give constant and speedy intelligence respecting the situation to the governor, council, and major-general. During Philip’s war majors occasionally raised, equipped, and conducted expeditions.³ In deciding upon military operations the commanders always took the advice of councils of war. The office of shire lieutenant was also created in 1643. Though it continued in existence for only a short time, we may suppose that it was suggested by the lord-lieutenancy of the English shire. The duty of its incumbent was to levy the force of the shire in sudden emergencies and to retain control of it till orders came from the governor and council, or the sergeant-major took command. Provision was also made that the higher officers, as well as the lower, should meet together from time to time to discuss military affairs, and take such action to promote efficiency as might be needed.

The office of sergeant-major general was successively held by such men as Dudley, Endicott, Atherton, Leverett, and Denison. Its powers and duties, as shown by the commissions,⁴ were those of a commander in active service or in preparation for such. But he was hampered to an indefinite extent by the necessity of consulting a council of war composed of his subordinate officers, and of receiving directions from the civilians who formed the council of the colony and even from the general court itself. It should be remembered that, though his commission was for a short period of time, the incumbent was usually reappointed as long as he was able or willing to serve. The men who were appointed to the position also came as near being trained soldiers as any among the colonists. The duties of the sergeant-major general

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were to see that inferior officers did their duty, in time of special danger to appoint military watches, raise troops by levy from regiments, and use them till directions came from the council or general court, to command in the expeditions which might follow, with authority to impress all supplies and aids to transportation which he might need. In the council of war which he must consult he had the casting vote, and in the actual conduct of battles he was to be left unhindered. Until the general court should prescribe rules, he, with the coöperation of his council of war, was empowered to prepare orders for the maintenance of discipline, and to execute them even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty. Many special duties¹ were also imposed on the sergeant-major general, both in time of peace and of war, while it was customary for him to be sergeant-major of one of the regiments.

In the Massachusetts system the germ of the modern staff appears chiefly in the office originally designated as that of surveyor of ordnance, or later as general surveyor of arms. Early in 1631 Jost Willust was chosen by the general court to be surveyor of ordnance, and was allowed £10 per year.² But in 1632 he returned to Europe, and the office does not reappear under its former designation. In 1634³ a reference appears to the overseer of the arms, but from the records one would infer that, until 1642, the business of the office was mainly transacted through committees.⁴ In 1642, owing to fear of an Indian attack and the desire that the colony might be well supplied with powder, John Johnson was appointed surveyor-general of the arms.⁵ From that time until the downfall of the colony government the many references to the office indicate its importance. Captain Edward Johnson⁶ of Woburn was one of its incumbents, while in 1660 it was for a time put into commission.⁷ The surveyor-general of arms was a custodian of the colony’s supply s of ordnance, arms, and ammunition. Under authority

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from the general court he delivered powder to the towns, and received back from them any excessive supplies which might have been issued. He could also sell ammunition. He was empowered to recover arms belonging to the colony from individuals or towns that had them in their possession, to either preserve them pending an order of the general court, or to sell them at a fair price and procure others in their place. Purchases of ammunition were usually made through the surveyor-general, though in coöperation with the treasurer.¹ Orders of the general court that he should loan munitions to individuals are common. When, in 1643, arms and stores were brought from Castle island, an invoice of the whole was given to the surveyor-general, and the arms were delivered into his custody.² Though orders for the delivery of ordnance to towns for use in forts, and the return of the same, were issued through the surveyor-general, it was not the policy of the general court to permit him to sell this without special authority.³ The towns were ordered⁴ by the legislature to make returns to the surveyor-general of the amount of powder they had in stock. In May, 1656, it was ordered that the surveyor-general should annually lay before the council an account of the common stock of powder, that the general court might be guided by this information in supplying the colony’s need.⁵ Committees were frequently appointed to examine the accounts of the office.⁶

In a fully developed military system a commissary-general would have occupied a position relative to supplies of food and necessities for camp life and transportation analogous to that borne by the surveyor-general to munitions of war. But Massachusetts had no permanently organized commissariat, and this characteristic she shared with all the other colonies.⁷ Their troops, being militia, were disbanded

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as soon as an expedition or brief campaign was ended. Only a few men were kept under arms for garrison purposes. Hence the need of provisions disappeared almost as quickly as it arose. They had no uniforms. Of tents they made little, if any, use, and their companies were followed by small baggage trains, or none at all. With their arms, blankets, and small supplies of food, cooked or uncooked, they forced their way through the forests as best they could. When an expedition or campaign became necessary, the general court appointed one or more commissaries for the time being, though the word “commissary” does not appear in the records till 1645. Richard Collicott was appointed to collect provisions for the expedition against the Pequots.¹ In 1645 Edward Tyng and Frank Norton were appointed commissaries for the force of two hundred men who were sent to the aid of Uncas,² and a schedule of the provisions needed for the expedition has been preserved. It included bread, salted beef, fish, pease, oatmeal, flour, butter, oil, vinegar, sugar, rum, and beer. Jacob Greene of Charlestown was appointed commissary of the force which was raised to march against the Dutch in 1664.³ Commissaries were more or less active during Philip’s war, though there is evidence that supplies did not always pass through their hands.⁴ Chaplains and surgeons were appointed to accompany the expeditions.

In none of the New England colonies except Massachusetts, in the period now under consideration, were the forces distinctly regimented. Plymouth, in 1658,⁵ permitted the companies of any two or four of its towns to train together if they chose. The highest military officer in that colony was a major, and a copy of his instructions and the names of the council with whom he should act in 1658 has been preserved.⁶ Similar statements apply of course to New Haven, and to Rhode Island as well. Counties were organized in Connecticut, in 1666; but not until the peace of the

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colony seemed to be imperilled through the reoccupation of New York by the Dutch, does the organization of the militia by counties come clearly into view. A major was then appointed for each county, and his command in each case was a regiment in all except name. This continued to be the situation throughout Philip’s war.¹ Prior to the French wars the title of general does not appear in any of the New England colonies except Massachusetts. The same is true of the office of surveyor-general of arms. All the colonies had commissaries in some form or other. Though Connecticut had during Philip’s war an official with that title, the treasurer, being a resident of Hartford county, was often ordered to procure and deliver food as well as ammunition.² He thus performed the functions both of a surveyor-general and of a commissary.

The description of the system of defence in colonial New England would be left incomplete if some reference were not made to forts and garrison houses. The forts of the early time were located chiefly at the port towns,—Boston, Salem, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Newport, New London, Saybrook, New Haven. The fact that, especially in Massachusetts, the general court sometimes ordered that great guns should be delivered or lent to certain towns, would indicate that the towns in question had small redoubts. Dorchester and Charlestown had each a fort from early times, but they formed a part of the system of defence of Boston harbor. The towns of the interior, unless with here and there an exception, possessed no defences except stockades and garrison houses. When Massachusetts, in 1667, under fear of Dutch attack, and Connecticut, in 1675, at the opening of Philip’s war, ordered every town to provide itself with defences where women and children and others who sought protection might take refuge, blockhouses or garrison houses were meant.³ The limited supply of artillery which the colonists possessed, they kept almost wholly in the coast towns.

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Salem had Darby Fort, so called, located at Naugus Head, where Marblehead was later built,¹ and a fort on Winter island. The former was built not far from 1630, while the latter, begun as early as 1643, was in the usual process of construction, decay, and repair during the remainder of the century. When, in 1673, the arrival of a hostile Dutch fleet was feared, the “great artillery,” we are told, was got ready for use, and all else was done as the juncture required.

The defences of Boston were the most important of any in New England, and consisted of the North Battery, situated at Merry’s Point, at the north end of the great cove of the town; the Sconce, or South Battery, which was at the south end of the same cove and was an outwork of the earliest of Boston’s defences, that on Fort Hill. Fort Hill was one of the three eminences of the peninsula on which Boston was built. During the years between 1632 and 1636, by the labor of the people of the towns near the bay and the contributions of the remote towns to the north, the fort on this hill was built.² It was the earliest fortification in Boston, and the famous Lyon Gardiner, who built the fort at Saybrook, was the engineer in charge during a part of the time of its construction.

In 1634 a plan was formed to build a “moving fort,” or floating battery, forty feet long and twenty feet wide.³ It was to be built by the contributions of the promoters—who had recently arrived from England—and of others, who, it was thought by the court, had not borne their share in the expense of founding the colony. A considerable subscription was taken, but the structure was never built.

In 1672, when an attack from the Dutch was expected, a “barricado,” or wall, probably of stone and earth faced with wood, was built. It faced the water, and extended from one side of the great cove or basin in front of Boston to the other, being twenty-two hundred feet in length, fifteen

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feet in height, and twenty feet in breadth at the top. At intervals there were openings for the entrance of vessels. The undertaking, being too expensive for the town to bear, was prosecuted at the expense of private citizens, they receiving from the town certain valuable grants of land in return.¹

But the chief feature in the Boston system of defences was the fort on Castle island, which commanded the channel by which vessels approached the town. The records throughout the entire colonial period abound with references to this fortification; and its history, if worked out in detail, would illustrate the progress of military engineering in the colonies for a century and a half. The defensive works on that island were begun during the years 1634 to 1636, when the colonists were apprehensive of forcible interference by the home government. A committee of military men was appointed by the general court to locate and lay out the works .² At first it was ordered that a platform should be built on the northeast side of the island and a blockhouse on the top of the adjacent hill. An earthwork was actually constructed, men and carts being impressed for the purpose. This, however, soon decayed, and the remoter towns of the colony were unwilling to bear the expense of repairing and maintaining it. Accordingly the general court, in March, 1638, appointed a committee to bring the ammunition from Castle island and dispose of it. But at the instance of private parties it was resolved to complete and maintain the works by private subscription, the general court giving aid. The court voted £100 per annum for maintaining the fort, and a year later granted £250 in addition. But this impulse soon died out, and in May, 1643, it again ordered that all

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arms, ammunition, and ordnance be brought from Castle island.¹

But the arrival, a month later, of La Tour with a ship of one hundred and forty tons clearly revealed the defenceless condition of the town,² for in consequence of the recent order of the court no one remained on the island to challenge his right to enter. The result was that Boston and four other adjacent towns offered to repair and support the castle at their own expense. This³ proposal was accepted, the court offering to contribute £100 when the work was finished, and to appropriate £100 annually for its maintenance. The castle was then rebuilt. The garrison now consisted for a time of a captain, a gunner, twenty men from the first of March till the first of October, and ten men during the rest of the year. But this number was not maintained, the court stating in 1648 that “the Castle hath seldom or never been supplied with the full number, . . . and many times with unmeete and unserviceable men.” Therefore the garrison was reduced to ten men from April to October, and six men during the other months.⁴ The towns failed to bear their part of the burden, and the court during the succeeding years repeatedly complains of the neglected state of the castle; the pay of the garrison was in arrears, and the batteries seem never to have been kept in repair. It required danger from a foreign enemy—the expected arrival of De Ruyter, in 1665—to bring about the repair of the works and the establishment there of a garrison of sixty-four men. The castle, which was still of wood and earth, was burned in 1673. Then, by the combined efforts of the adjacent towns and the general court, it was rebuilt of brick and with larger dimensions than before.⁵ In this condition it was when Philip’s war began, and Edward Randolph reported that it was in relatively good repair, mounting thirty-eight guns, but was without a permanent garrison.

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It has seemed wise to dwell thus at length on the castle in Boston harbor, because such extended references to it have been preserved, and also for the reason that its history is typical of all other forts in the colonies. They were built or repaired only to fall quickly into decay. The ordnance with which they were furnished was small and ineffective. The expense of repairs and the garrison exceeded the feeble resources of the colonial exchequers and could with great difficulty be met. Hence coast defence, though the weak garrisons were intended to be reënforced in time of danger by the local militia, was perhaps the least satisfactory feature of the entire system. Fortunately the ocean, during the seventeenth century and much of the eighteenth, proved of itself a sufficient protection, and the colonist was left free to contend as he could with the enemies who came upon him from the forest. Against them the garrison house and the stockade were his only defence.

Dwelling-houses, when built with thick walls perforated with loopholes, and, when the house had two stories, the upper, if possible, projecting over the lower story, were used as garrisons. Flankers at the corners were considered very useful as outlooks. Sometimes houses were specially built for the purpose; often common dwelling-houses were used in this way in an emergency. When in danger of attack, as many as possible of the inhabitants of a settlement took refuge in the garrisons, and there with firearms and by means of sorties defended themselves as best they could. The number of garrison houses rapidly increased during Philip’s war, and their number was fully maintained during the French and Indian wars which were to follow. A report of a committee¹ which had been appointed by the council of Massachusetts early in 1676 shows that the following garrison houses were then standing in Essex county: there were twelve in Andover, three at Bedford, three at Rowley village, four at Topsfield, several remote fortified houses at Newbury. At Rowley there were sufficient garrisons to shelter all the inhabitants. At Beverly there were three garrisons, at Cape Ann there were two; but at Marblehead there were none, and the inhabitants

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considered them unnecessary. At Lynn there were several garrisons, and the residents had been assigned to them. This report may probably be taken as fairly indicative of the distribution of garrison houses in the other exposed towns of the New England colonies.

But exclusive reliance on garrison houses involved the abandonment, in case of attack, of all the other buildings in the village, with domestic animals and crops, to destruction. For this reason the imitation of the Indian stockade recommended itself to many as a superior form of defence. Newbury, we are told, had a general defensive work. So had Ipswich and Salem, while garrison houses had been erected to protect those who lived on the outlying farms. When, early in 1676, Major Savage was commander in the Connecticut valley, the council advised that the inhabitants be concentrated in two defensible towns, as Hadley and Springfield, and that all the rest be abandoned. But the inhabitants of the towns which were likely to be left to pillage would not listen to the proposal, and it never passed beyond the stage of discussion. Hadley, Northampton, and Hatfield had built stockades, and found them a sufficient protection. The building of a stockade about twelve miles in length from the head of navigation on the Charles river to the Merrimac river was proposed, but was voted down by the towns concerned as too expensive. The opinion generally expressed in town meetings was that the accustomed system of watching and scouting was the only feasible one. The conservatism of the farmers was shown in their adherence to the comparatively inexpensive methods of defence to which they had been accustomed and which they had found sufficient in peaceful times.

The varied activities which have now been outlined were regulated by acts and orders of the general court, and controlled by the governor and assistants or by special councils and committees which were appointed by the general court. Committees were frequently created by the court, consisting, it might be, wholly of civilians, or wholly of military officers, or sometimes of a combination of the two, whose duty it was to share in the task of military administration. Among the

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duties intrusted to such committees were the inspection of ordnance, arms, and military supplies; hearing complaints of soldiers; overseeing the location, building, repairing, equipment, and garrisoning of fortifications, appointing their quotas of troops among towns, drawing up commissions for military officers, putting the country in a posture of defence, equipping and sending out expeditions, treating with commissioners from other colonies respecting joint military operations.

But regularly in the New England colonies the control of military administration was vested either in the governor and assistants, or in a council of war which consisted of the magistrates with the addition of certain military officers. In 1635 Massachusetts created a special council of war,¹ consisting of eleven members, two of whom were the governor and deputy governor and nearly all the rest were assistants. Large powers were given to this body. It could execute all military laws, appoint and remove military officers, command and discipline the entire militia, even make offensive or defensive war. But this council owed its existence to a panic, and powers dangerous in extent were bestowed upon it. It therefore was short-lived. The following year its powers were transferred² to the standing council, which was given authority to commission military officers. The origin and the ineffective career of this body have already been described. Its establishment did not for any long time, or to any great degree, remove the control of military administration from the hands of the governor and assistants. Though only fragmentary records have been preserved, yet enough exist to furnish evidence of their prominent concern with all phases of the work.

In 1645 the general court declared³ that, when it was not in session, the assistants or council of the commonwealth had authority to impress and send forth soldiers, to “presse all manner of victualls, vessells, carriages & all other necessaries & to send warrants to the Treasurer to pay for them.” In March, 1653, the council ordered arms, flints, and other supplies to be sold to the colonists, forbade the export of

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provisions, and ordered the constables to collect supplies of food. These things were done because of danger that the colonies might become involved in war with the Dutch.

In April, 1653, this body fully discussed the question, whether or not the colonies should go to war with the Dutch and Indians. In May the troops were ordered to be in readiness, and in October, 1654, all the necessary orders were issued by the council for the levy of troops. In July, 1669, because the wheat crop had been ruined, it ordered the training of the Essex regiment to be omitted for that year. When, in August, 1673, news came that the Dutch had reoccupied New York, the council issued ten or more orders for placing Massachusetts in a condition to meet the expected crisis.¹ Throughout Philip’s war the activity of the council was incessant; commissioning officers, corresponding with the neighboring colonies and with officers and agents of all sorts who were in active service, receiving and answering petitions, preparing for expeditions, sending them out, watching or directing their movements, ordering their recall and the dismissal of troops. The administrative history of the war as a whole can be studied only by beginning with the activities of the councils of the various colonies involved.

In October, 1643, a council of war was created in Plymouth colony, consisting of the governor and four other members, all of whom, except Standish, were assistants.² This was a part of the preparation then made for a joint expedition against the Narragansett Indians. It was not dissolved at the end of that effort, but was continued as a part of the colony government as long as Plymouth enjoyed separate existence.³ It was given authority to commission officers from the major down, to issue warrants for impressing men and provisions, to hear and punish all offences committed during service, to instruct officers. Among its duties for the expedition then immediately in hand were the appointment of a treasurer to keep the account of

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receipts and payments, to value and keep a record of all arms used, and to keep a list of the soldiers.

As Philip’s war approached, its work again became more important. In June, 1671, eight men were associated with the magistrates to constitute the council of war, the new members being put under a special oath. Throughout the war the activities of this body were similar to those of the Massachusetts council.¹

In Connecticut a distinct council of war was first created in November, 1673.² The occasion of its appointment was the recovery of New York by the Dutch. The body, as then organized, consisted of the governor, deputy governor, assistants, and in addition to them five prominent military officers of the colony. It could be called together by the governor, deputy governor, or secretary, and could then commission officers, issue laws of war, impress men and all necessary supplies, and do all else for the expedition that was being planned which otherwise the general court might do. This was a temporary act and expired in a few months. But in July, 1675, in anticipation of the struggle with Philip, the council of war³ was revived. Its composition was practically the same as before, and its powers and discretion were made as large as was possible under the charter. It was to continue in session during intermissions of the general court. Under orders from the general court and subject to its approval, this body administered the affairs of Connecticut which related to Philip’s war. As late as October, 1677, an order appears continuing its existence, but some time later it was allowed to disappear, and was not revived till the beginning of the wars with the French in 1690.⁴ In New Haven no similar body appears. In Rhode Island we hear only of special councils of war in the towns, and that in 1676. The same year special commissioners were appointed to order the watches on the island.⁵

The efficiency of the militia system depended to a considerable

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extent on the method of filling military offices and the permanence of their tenure. In the corporate colonies military offices, like all others, were filled by election or through appointment by the general court. In Massachusetts, during its earliest¹ years, officers were appointed by the general court. But when, in 1636, the militia was organized into regiments, a change was made. It was then provided² that each regiment should choose fit persons to be its colonel and lieutenant-colonel, and through their deputies present their names before the general court for approval. In the companies nominations should be made in the same way for the offices of captains and lieutenants, and their names should be presented before the standing council for approval. In 1647 a law was passed requiring nominations for company officers to be submitted to the county courts for approval. It would appear, however, that in practice the general court passed on nominations for company, as well as regimental, officers.³ By a law of 1637 it was provided that residents who had taken the oath, as well as freemen, should vote for company officers, but only freemen should be chosen.⁴ According to the law of 1643 sergeant-majors were elected by the freemen of their respective shires, but, in 1645, non-freemen who had taken the oath were also permitted⁵ to vote for them. The sergeant-major general was annually chosen, together with the magistrates and other leading officials, in the court of election.

In 1668 the method of electing lower officers was abandoned.⁶ By an act of that year all commissioned officers, except the sergeant-major general, became appointive by the general court. To the council, or board of assistants, was given the power to appoint in cases of emergency. Non-commissioned officers were appointed by the commissioned officers of their companies, or in cases where there were none,

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by the major of the regiment. In 1675, however, the law was again changed,¹ giving the town committees of militia the right to present to the general court two or three names of persons proper to fill vacancies among local military officers.

Since no record appears of successive nominations and confirmations, it is probable that, prior to 1668, military officers were chosen for an indefinite term. After that time it is clear that their appointments were permanent. The incumbent of the office of major-general, when satisfactory, was reëlected year after year. This was notably true in the cases of John Leverett and Daniel Denison. In the case of military officials, as well as others, the elective system, thus modified, insured a considerable permanence of tenure.

The other New England colonies chose their militia officers in much the same way as did Massachusetts. An order² of the Plymouth general court of September, 1642, provided that the towns should have power to nominate to the court for its approval two or three persons as candidates for military offices above the rank of sergeants. These officers, when duly approved, might appoint under officers, with the consent of their companies. When vacancies occurred, the same procedure should be repeated. In 1683 it was enacted that, in cases where towns and militia companies neglected to choose officers, the council of war should appoint them.³ In 1690, when the expedition against Quebec was fitting out, we find the council of war approving the action of towns in electing officers, and interposing to settle a dispute over such a matter in Taunton. This proves that in that colony the general court and commissioned officers never assumed the power of appointment, as was the case in Massachusetts. Everything indicates that in Plymouth, as in the Bay colony, militia officers were elected for indefinite terms.