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CHAPTER XIV

INDIAN RELATIONS, PHILIP’S WAR

The European colonists who settled on the American coast were confronted by a savage people, who were already occupiers of the soil and were alien to the whites in almost every respect. No clear precedents then existed or could exist for the guidance of the colonists in their relations with the natives. A system of relations between the two races had to be worked out upon the spot, and under the changing conditions which time and place presented. The development of an Indian policy was one of the most important problems of colonization, and it was so understood at the time, though historians have treated the subject, except on its picturesque side, in the most desultory manner. It is not necessary to look exclusively to the Orient, or to the history of colonization in recent times, in order to learn how Europeans have conducted themselves in the presence of inferior races. In this work we are concerned with the beginnings of an Indian policy among the English colonists on the North American continent. In this, as in other respects, the New England of that time naturally lends itself to separate treatment.

The natives of that section belonged wholly to the Algonkin branch of the American race. The most important tribes there located were the Narragansetts and their dependants, the Pequots of Connecticut, the Wampanoags of Plymouth and the adjacent country to the west, the Massachusetts about Massachusetts bay, the Nipmucks who lay west of the Massachusetts, the Penacooks of New Hampshire, and the Abenakis of Maine. Fortunately for the English the Massachusetts tribe was almost entirely destroyed by pestilence a few years before colonization began. The

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colonists about Massachusetts bay for that reason found the country in which they first settled almost unoccupied, and were practically secure against Indian attack. The plague had also extended into the region occupied by the Plymouth colonists, and had so weakened the natives as to facilitate colonization for the Pilgrims. Owing to conditions of climate and soil, the Indian population in central Massachusetts and northern New England was sparse. The natives of New Hampshire and Maine were chiefly hunters. The more prominent settlements and largest Indian population lay between Narragansett bay and the lower course of the Housatonic river. That region was the home of the Narragansetts and Pequots. Connected with the Narragansetts, possibly as fragments¹ of one great people, were the Nihantics, or Niantics, of eastern Connecticut and western Rhode Island, and a number of groups or clans which dwelt on the banks of the Connecticut river. The Pequots lay west of the main body of the Narragansetts, and occupied the territory extending along the Sound as far as the Niantic river and northward to a breadth of about twenty miles. The Mohegans of Connecticut were a clan of the Pequots, and occupied the northern part of their territory, the west bank of the Thames near the present city of Norwich. The entire Pequot people, not so very long before the arrival of the English, is supposed to have been driven eastward from the banks of the Hudson river, where they had originally lived as a part of the Mohegan people of that region. In the relations between the natives of southern New England and the whites centres the chief interest of the Indian history of that section during the seventeenth century. After 1689, when the French began to influence the Indians of New England, the centre of conflict and of interest moved northward to Maine, New Hampshire, northern and western Massachusetts.

The intercourse of the colonists with the Indians began with exploration, with the procurement of small supplies of corn and game from them, and with the so-called purchase of their lands. In New England the colonists were never so dependent as those at Jamestown upon the Indians for

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supplies of food, or for instruction in the raising of maize. Trade relations never assumed the extent and importance which they had where furs were the staple commodity. But the first important fact to notice is the system of regulation which was provided by law, and was intended to cover all forms of intercourse between the English and the natives. That it was executed in all its parts or without interruption would be far too much to claim. The frequent reënactment of some of the laws proves the difficulty which was found in enforcing them. But the passage of the laws indicates the purpose of the colonies, and corresponds in a fair degree with their achievement. The acts themselves stand out as a branch of colonial legislation distinct from the laws concerning whites, and from any laws or legal traditions which the colonists brought with them from England.

In all the New England colonies the purchase of land from the Indians by individuals or private parties, without license from the government of the colony or from local authority, was discouraged or absolutely forbidden. In Plymouth a stringent act of this character was passed,¹ and it was more than once reënacted at a later time. It prohibited the purchase or lease of land, herbage, wood, or timber. In 1633 Massachusetts began legislating on the same subject, but limited her enactments to the purchase of land.² The laws of New Haven and Connecticut on the subject differed³ slightly from those of the other colonies. They expressly provided for purchases, under authority from the general court, for the benefit of the whole colony. Connecticut did not pass her act until 1663. In 1651 Rhode Island forbade any one to purchase lands from the Indians without permission, unless it were to remove them from plantations which were already settled.⁴ But in 1658, because of the purchase of Conanicut and Dutch islands in the bay by Coddington and Benedict Arnold, such acts without the license of the

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court were prohibited for the future. The objects of these regulations were to prevent misunderstandings, disputes, and fraud in connection with the extinguishment of the Indian title to land, and also to prevent the undue dispersion of settlers. The New England colonies followed very consistently the principle that the Indian right of occupancy should be extinguished, and since it was done very largely with the knowledge and consent of the general courts, the land frauds which were later committed in some of the other colonies do not appear among them. The natives sold freely and for the customary array of trinkets; they were also irritated and finally driven to resistance by the steady advance of English settlement, but complaints of deception by purchasers or surveyors play little part among the protests of Indians in New England.

Trade with the natives, and especially traffic in arms, ammunition, and intoxicating spirits was also carefully regulated by law. In 1639 Plymouth forbade any individual to trade with them under penalty of the forfeiture of twenty to one,¹ and this continued to be the law of the colony throughout its separate existence. In 1656 the sale of boats or their rigging to the Indians was prohibited. In 1677 individuals from outside the colony were forbidden to trade with the natives, because they were driving away the means of payment which the Indians possessed, and were selling them arms and ammunition. During the later history of the colony, the sale of horses to them was expressly forbidden.²

The legislation of Massachusetts on this subject was to the same general effect as that of Plymouth,³ and in addition provision was made during a large part of the period for farming out the peltry trade. In 1636⁴ the standing council was empowered to farm out this trade for three years at an annual rent to be paid to the treasurer; after the contract had been concluded no one except the farmers should trade with the Indians in any of the specified commodities. In 1641 the trade was farmed to Lieutenant Simon Willard, of

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Concord, and others.¹ In 1644 the Commissioners of the United Colonies² proposed that for ten years the trade of each of the four colonies be managed in joint stock, and made several recommendations on the subject. Among these was one, that the profits, after the first year, should be so divided as the Commissioners of the United Colonies and the committees of the respective colonies having this trade in charge should think best. The general court of Massachusetts, from which colony it is almost certain that the proposition came, at once adopted the plan, and ordered that subscriptions to the joint stock should be received. But in the records of the general court no further reference to the subject under this form appears. We learn, however, from the same records that, in 1658 and 1668,³ the trade in furs was being farmed out. At the former date certain centres where this trade was carried on are mentioned,—on the Merrimac, at Springfield and Norwottock, at Concord, Cambridge, Sudbury, Nashua, and Groton. One or more individuals were designated to have charge of the business at each of the centres. In 1668 a committee of the general court leased this trade, as well as other privileges, for three years to Richard Way. Connecticut⁴ voted, in 1644, to adopt the recommendations of the commissioners in reference to the fur trade, if the other jurisdictions did so. But neither Plymouth nor New Haven established the joint stock, and therefore no further action was taken by Connecticut. In Rhode Island the usual regulations existed concerning the sale of arms and liquor to the Indians, but trade in other commodities does not seem to have been restricted. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island had orders prohibiting the Dutch and French trading with the natives.

Indians were not allowed to bear arms without special permission, and in some of the colonies smiths were forbidden to repair their weapons.⁵ Connecticut, being more exposed than any other New England colony, passed several

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acts prohibiting settlers from allowing Indians to enter their houses or fields, and particularly to touch or use their arms. In the last enactment of the series an exception was made of magistrates and traders.¹ Indians were not permitted to bring arms into the towns. Their services were very generally employed in killing wolves, and for this they were rewarded by bounties.

Plymouth and Massachusetts carefully provided by law for the keeping of bounds between the land of the Indians—especially that which they planted—and that of the English. Both colonies ordered that the corn lands of the Indians should be fenced, and that certain assistance might be rendered by the English in this work.² Connecticut sought the same object by a general order, forbidding any one to take away the corn or other estate of an Indian without his consent. For damages done by the Indians, they were held responsible before the courts of the colonies. This was expressly provided for by Plymouth, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. In Rhode Island, as elsewhere, drunkenness among the Indians and the disturbance and injuries which resulted therefrom, were frequent subjects of legislation.

The colonists also kept a watchful eye over the feuds between the Indian tribes or clans, and were alert to discover signs of approaching attacks on the English. The help of friendly Indians was utilized for this purpose. The experience³ of the Plymouth settlers with Corbitant, the Narragansett, and with the Indians of Wessagussett, furnish early instances in point. The doings and fate of Weston’s colony, of Thomas Morton at Merrymount, of Oldham and Stone in the Narragansett region and on the Connecticut, and of many of the fishermen and settlers in the eastern parts, revealed the necessity of regulating intercourse with the Indians so far as possible. In the laws to which reference has already been made, the New England colonies were

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developing the policy foreshadowed in the royal proclamation of 1622. Some of these events were among the occasions of Endicott’s expedition to Block island and of the conflict with the Pequot tribe. When that struggle approached, a conference was held¹ at Boston with Miantonomi, the Narragansett sachem, and others of the same people, and they agreed to keep the peace and to coöperate with the English against the Pequots. The Indians agreed, among other things, not to protect Pequots, but to deliver up those among them who had murdered Englishmen, and that during the war no Narragansett would come near the plantations of the colonists, unless he was accompanied by some Englishman or by an Indian who was known to the whites. The services of Roger Williams as virtually an agent of the English in negotiations, especially with the Narragansetts, at this time and during a long subsequent period, are well known. To the admission of Pumham and Sacononoco under the protection of Massachusetts as a consequence of the sale of some of their land by Miantonomi to Samuel Gorton and his associates, reference has already been made. While this was an incident in the history of the dealings of Massachusetts with Gorton, it also clearly illustrates the trend of Indian relations. It strengthened the growing prejudice of Massachusetts against the Narragansett sachem.

Consequences of importance in the development of relations with the Indians naturally followed the conflict with the Pequots. It was at that time that Uncas, the Mohegan, broke away from his own tribe and became an ally of the English. That relation, with an increasing element of dependence, he maintained toward Connecticut until his death nearly fifty years later. Upon it, as the doings of the Commissioners of the United Colonies have shown, hinged much in the relations between all the four colonies and the Narragansett tribe until about 1660. Uncas, in his intense rivalry with Miantonomi, and in his conflicts with the Narragansetts and Niantics after the death of Miantonomi, could always count on the moral support of the English. By means of that, as a skilful diplomatist, he maintained himself against

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foes who were much stronger than himself. But as the numbers of the English increased and their settlements came to encompass his own, his condition of alliance was changed into that of a dependant living under English protection. He came, in other words, to be protected as Pumham and his associate had been by Massachusetts. At Hartford, in October, 1638, a tripartite agreement was reached between the English, the Narragansetts, and the Mohegans, that perpetual peace should be maintained.¹ By the provision that, in case a quarrel should arise between the two Indian parties to the agreement, the aggrieved party should appeal to the English, and their decision should be held binding, the English assumed the position of arbitrators. The English also reserved the right, if their decisions were rejected or violated, to enforce obedience to them by arms. That position, both as distinct and united colonies, they maintained, so far as possible, until the opening of Philip’s war.

The agreement of 1638, at Hartford, also provided that the Mohegans and Narragansetts should destroy the Pequots who had shed English blood, and that the two hundred that remained should be divided between Miantonomi, Ninigret, and Uncas. The first named received eighty, the second twenty, the third one hundred. For these captives the chiefs were to pay an annual tribute of a fathom of wampum for every man, half a fathom for every youth, and a hand for every male child. The Pequots were not to live in their ancient country or to be called by their former name, but to become Narragansetts and Mohegans. The Pequot country should be considered the possession of Connecticut. By this arrangement Uncas secured temporary possession of the northern part of the Pequot country, and nearly doubled the number of his tribesmen. But the English also, by a right of preëmption which they claim to have gained in 1640,² and by the influence which they maintained over the Mohegans, made use of them in order to strengthen their hold upon the Pequot country. Uncas they also utilized as their agent for keeping the Pequots quiet and collecting

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from them the tribute which was due the English. The Pequots, on the other hand, tried to get free from his control, appealed to the English, and finally asked to be taken directly under their government. Uncas craftily made use of the influence which he had with the English to outwit or destroy his enemies and to maintain his control over the Pequots. The tribute fell permanently into arrears, and the difficulties met with in its collection helped to keep the affairs of the Connecticut Indians constantly before the Commissioners of the United Colonies and the government of Connecticut itself. In 1650 complaints on the part of the Indians drew from the commissioners the statement that the payment of the tribute would be demanded for only ten years longer. Its collection actually ceased in 1663, when the last sum was accepted in lieu of all arrears.

But in 1655, eight years before the tribute disappeared, two bodies of Pequots, because of their complaints against Uncas and the other Indians under whose control they had been left, were placed directly under the government of the English. They were settled chiefly at Paucatuck and New London. Herman Garret, a Niantic, and Cassasinamon, a Pequot, who had been their leaders in protest against the rule of Uncas and the Niantics, were now made their governors.¹ Each of the governors received a commission from the United Colonies. Special regulations were also issued for the government of these Indians, which prohibited the ordinary crimes, as well as plotting against the English and making war without their permission. Submission to the Indian governors who had been placed over them was also required. The governors were annually appointed, and each had one or two Indian assistants. In 1661 two Englishmen were appointed under the title of overseers to assist the governors, and officials under this title continued thereafter to be annually reappointed. They were to advise them in their administration and see that the Indians were not deprived of any rights by their English neighbors. They might hear and decide all but capital cases among the Indians, and hear appeals from the decisions of the governors.

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Both the governors and overseers were ordered to promote the civilizing of the Indians, and the former were to encourage them to listen to Christian teachers and to seize all spirituous liquors which were brought among them.

The only step which remained to be taken in order that a protectorate in all its features might be established over these Pequot communities, was the settling of them on reservations. This, in the case of Cassasinamon’s people, was done in 1667.¹ About two thousand acres were then reserved for them in that part of the town of New London which later was set off as Groton and still later as Ledyard. The other body was settled,² in 1683, in what is now the town of North Stonington. Already, in 1659,³ the Golden Hill reservation had been set off for the Poquanock Indians on land which now lies within the limits of the city of Bridgeport, but which then lay on the boundary between Fairfield and Stratford. To this reservation an addition was made,⁴ in 1680, for the benefit of the Indians of Milford, whose lands had in part been bought by the settlers of Stratford. Permission was also given these Indians to hunt and fish within the bounds of Stratford, Milford, and Derby. While the system of reservations was thus developing, the government of Connecticut was continually issuing orders respecting the bounds of Indian lands, the relations between Indian groups and tribes, their encouragement, protection, or restraint in various ways.

In Massachusetts the course of events which led to Indian reservations and to the beginning of a protectorate was somewhat different. Owing to the destruction by pestilence of the Massachusetts tribe, the Boston government was not led into this policy by pressure and by courses so purely secular as those which prevailed in Connecticut. The decisive impulse in the Bay colony came from the efforts of Rev. John Eliot and his associates to convert the Indians to Christianity, and by that means to civilize them. Before this work was undertaken in earnest the general court expressed its sympathy by ordering that the county

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courts should exert themselves for the civilizing of the Indians^l within their jurisdictions, and should have them instructed in the true worship of God. Early in 1644 five chiefs with their dependants, who afterward settled at Natick, voluntarily submitted to the government of Massachusetts and put themselves under its protection.² In 1645 the clergy were called upon to suggest a comprehensive plan for civilizing the natives. The following year they were ordered annually to choose two ministers who, with the aid of an interpreter and others who might join in the work, should preach the gospel among the Indians. Indian pow-wows and the worship of false gods were at the same time forbidden.

At the very time when these last orders were being passed, Eliot began preaching in the Indian tongue at Nonantum, near Watertown. At once the initial step was taken toward the establishment of the first Indian reservation. A committee, including the surveyor-general, was appointed by the general court to purchase land, with the advice of certain of the ministers, “for the encouragement of the Indians to live in an orderly way amongst us.”³ The elders were ordered by the court to annually choose two ministers to work among the natives. A gratuity was voted to Mr. Eliot. In May, 1647, the magistrates were ordered to establish a court for hearing small causes once every quarter at the place or places where the Indians usually assembled for worship, while once a month the Indians might hold a court themselves. The synod, also, which met in 1646, gave the work its approval and encouragement. Somewhat earlier than this Thomas Mayhew, a merchant, and his son of the same name, who was a clergyman, had begun a similar work on Martha’s Vineyard.⁴ The work of Eliot extended until it resulted in the collection of settlements of Christian or praying

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Indians at Natick, Marlborough, Stoughton, Littleton, Grafton, Hopkinton, Chelmsford, and a number of places in the Nipmuck country near the northeastern border¹ of Connecticut. In 1652 it was enacted by the general court that allotments of land might be made to those Indians who adopted civilized customs, and that they should be protected in their rights to planting grounds and fishing places. A plantation was surveyed for them at Natick, and on the request of Mr. Eliot the court authorized the formation of other Indian towns, with the land which was necessary thereto, provided former grants were not injured and that they should not dispose of the land without the previous consent of the court.² At first Humphrey Atherton, and afterward Daniel Gookin,³ was appointed to hold courts among the Christian Indians. The latter became a lay superintendent over them, showing much intelligence and zeal in their care until after the crisis of Philip’s war. In 1665 there were six towns of praying Indians within Massachusetts, each of which was located on a reservation, and had resident agents to govern and instruct them in civility and religion, and to decide controversies among them. Of curious, rather than practical, interest is the fact that, out of the theories in vogue at the time concerning the origin of the Indians, Eliot and the Puritans generally selected that which identified them with the ten lost tribes of Israel. Viewed from this standpoint, there was a peculiar fitness in the selection by Eliot for the government of the plantation at Natick of the arrangement into tens, hundreds, and thousands which appeared among the Hebrews during their wilderness journeyings. In August, 1651, through elections by the Indians held under Eliot’s superintendence, the native officials were chosen. But the scheme proved a failure and was soon abandoned.⁴ It is also interesting to note that the

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barbarities of Philip’s war materially weakened the belief of New Englanders in any theory of Indian origin save this, that they were the offspring of the devil and were themselves devils incarnate.

The colony of Plymouth followed the same line of policy in general as did Massachusetts. In 1674 Richard Bourne of Sandwich, who had been prominently concerned in missionary work among the natives of that colony, wrote¹ to Captain Gookin that there were at that time about seven groups or communities of praying Indians in Plymouth. These were located in Sandwich, Eastham, Harwich, Yarmouth, Barnstable, Marshfield, Middleborough, and Wareham. Land was reserved for the Indians in all or nearly all of these places, the reservation at Sandwich being about ten miles in length and five in breadth. It was reserved “for them and theirs forever under hand and seal.” The governor and magistrates, wrote Bourne, were “always very careful to preserve lands for them, so far as is in their power to do it.” It was at Mashpee that at a later time the remnant of the Indians of Plymouth colony were gathered.² In 1675³ Thomas Hinkley was appointed to hold courts among the praying Indians of the colony, and in coöperation with the heads of those communities to issue orders respecting their government. The courts which he held had authority to hear and punish all except capital crimes, and to settle all civil controversies subject to the right of appeal on the part of the Indians to the court of assistants. This was as far as the system of control over the natives in Plymouth colony was carried prior to Philip’s war.

In Connecticut,⁴ after the founding of the Society for Propagating the Gospel in New England, some missionary work was undertaken; in that colony, however, it did not originate the system of protection, but slightly furthered it without seriously modifying its character. The Reverends Abraham Pierson, of Brandford, and Thomas Fitch, of Norwich,

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were the leaders in this work. The efforts of Pierson resulted in little, and were cut short by his removal, soon after 1660, with a part of his congregation, to Newark in New Jersey. Mr. Fitch labored among the Mohegans after about 1671 with some success, and was partly supported by funds of the society. In order to encourage the converts to settle in a fixed community, he gave them about three hundred acres of land, which should continue to be theirs as long as they remained true to their professions of Christianity. No other community of praying Indians appears to have been formed in Connecticut, and at the beginning of Philip’s war this is said to have contained only forty members. In Rhode Island neither communities of praying Indians nor Indian reservations appear. It is estimated that at the opening of Philip’s war the Christian Indians of New England numbered more than four thousand, and to all of them the system of reservations was fully applied.

After the death, in 1660, of Massasoit, the aged sachem of the Pokanoket or Wampanoag Indians, the relations between them and the English rapidly changed from those of friendly alliance to those of dependence and increasing jealousy. This became clearly apparent after the death of Alexander and the accession of his brother, Philip, to the dignity of chief sachem, in 1662. As Mount Hope peninsula, the chief possession which then remained to the tribe, lay within what was supposed to be the territory of Plymouth colony, the dealings of Philip were principally with the magistrates of that jurisdiction. However just might have been the intentions of the English, their steady encroachment upon the lands of the Indians—all of which they had long claimed as their own—could have no other result than to provoke the savage to hate, intrigue, and war. Philip, and the Narragansett chiefs as well, were clear sighted enough to perceive that they must fight or presently acknowledge themselves as really subjects of the English. The negotiations of Philip with Plymouth furnish an added illustration of the growth of the protectorate till it merged itself in sovereign control.

As soon as his brother, Alexander, had died, Philip was summoned to Plymouth and there found it necessary to sign

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an instrument by which he acknowledged himself a subject of the king of England and promised to observe the treaties which his predecessors had concluded with the English. Mutual pledges of friendship were exchanged, and the English promised to aid the Indians thereafter with advice, or in such ways as might be possible. In 1667, while the Dutch war was in progress in Europe, Philip was reported to have expressed his readiness to join with the French or the Dutch against the English, and so not only to recover lands which had been sold to the whites, but to make spoil of their goods. For this a party of horse was sent into his country, and he was called before the court of Plymouth. Though he declared the report to be a fabrication of Ninigret, the sachem of Niantic, he was ordered to contribute £40 toward the expense of the expedition which had been sent to summon him, and was told that he must come thereafter when sent for by letter or messenger. Four years later, in 1671, renewed alarms caused another meeting with Philip at Taunton, where, in the presence of Massachusetts men, he promised to surrender to the government of Plymouth all his English arms, to be kept by them as long as they saw cause. Several of the guns, however, he kept back, while he was reported to have spread false reports about Plymouth. For these reasons the arms were confiscated, and the council of war which Plymouth now called into activity summoned Philip to another interview and also sought the assistance of Rhode Island and Massachusetts. At the instance of Philip, Massachusetts caused the appointment of a joint commission, in which Connecticut, but not Rhode Island, was represented. They conferred with Philip at length, and secured from him another acknowledgment of subjugation to the king of England. This was accompanied by an agreement to pay a yearly tribute to the English, to make the governor of Plymouth the arbitrator of any difference between him and the English, and not to make war or part with lands without the approval of said governor.¹

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Had these promises been kept, the protection of the English over the Wampanoags would have been complete, Their subjection would have surely followed. But the murder of Sausamon and the later doings of Philip showed that he preferred war to the peaceful acceptance of these conditions.

The encounters with the Pequot tribe and the alarms which were later occasioned by the Narragansetts and Niantics were preliminary skirmishes. They occasioned in each case a single expedition. The decisive conflict between the colonists and the natives of southern New England came in the years 1675 and 1676, when Philip of Pokanoket attacked the settlements of Plymouth and Massachusetts, and the Nipmuck and Narragansett tribes came to his assistance. That was a genuine Indian war, with its accompanying barbarities and sufferings on both sides,—the first and last experience of the kind which southern New England was forced to undergo. In the end it broke the hold of the natives on the Narragansett country and on central Massachusetts, and thus gave to the English reasonably free and peaceful possession of their own territory before the more prolonged conflict with the Indians and French of the north began. Like the war between the Dutch and the tribes of southern New Netherland in 1642, the conflict of the French with the Iroquois in the seventeenth century, and that of the English of North Carolina with the Tuscarora tribe at a later time, it was a conflict of Europeans with natives who were unassisted by civilized leaders. None of the later Indian wars until just before the Revolution were of this character. When this struggle occurred, the frontier of eastern New England south of the Merrimac river was an irregular line extending through the towns of Chelmsford, Groton, Lancaster, Marlborough, Mendon, and thence southward a short distance west of Narragansett bay. This frontier lay chiefly in the modern Worcester county, and along its course lay many of the communities of praying Indians.

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At no point was it much more than thirty miles distant from the eastern coast. To the north of Massachusetts the frontier line quickly approached the coast, and in Maine¹ followed its course very closely. Between the frontier to which reference has been made and the Connecticut river lay a stretch of country fifty miles wide in which no white settlement existed save Quaboag, or Brookfield, which was situated near the middle of the region. Along the course of the Connecticut itself were a few towns, lying between Springfield and Northfield, and including among their number Northampton, Hadley, Hatfield, and Deerfield. These towns, instead of being a part or extension of the frontier of eastern New England, can be more properly regarded as the northern frontier of Connecticut. This they distinctly became in the later wars with the French and the Indians of the north. In Philip’s war the Connecticut settlements were menaced directly from the east as well as from the north.

Altogether in New England at this time there were 110 towns and plantations, of which Massachusetts contained 64. The white population is estimated to have numbered 80,000, which according to the usual basis of calculation would have included 16,000 males of military age. The Indians of this region numbered about 10,500. Among the tribes the Narragansetts of western Rhode Island and eastern Connecticut were the strongest, numbering perhaps 4000. The Nipmucks of central Massachusetts came next, with a possible 2400. The Massachusetts and Pawtucket tribes, living about Massachusetts bay and extending northwest to the territory of the Abenakis in Maine, were about equal in strength to the Nipmucks. The Wampanoags and Pokanokets of Plymouth and eastern Rhode Island numbered less than 1000.² All of these tribes, though unconnected in government, spoke dialects of the same language, and were of related origin.

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When the struggle began, the New England Confederacy was still in existence. Since the Restoration the commissioners had rarely met, but nothing had occurred to necessitate the express dissolution of the union. On the other hand, the need of joint action on the part of the Puritan colonies was as great as ever. In the past, as we have seen, the commissioners had concerned themselves most seriously with Indian affairs and with the outfit of such expeditions as it had been necessary to send into the Indian country. Naturally their activity was now revived and a few important meetings were held.

But the commissioners did not take a prominent share in events until it became necessary to fit out the joint expedition which marched against the Narragansetts in December, 1675. The general orders for that expedition they issued, as well as those for one or two later operations. With the disbursements occasioned by the war and the accounting connected therewith, they also concerned themselves. To an extent, by affording a medium of consultation, the commissioners facilitated joint action at this crisis. But the task of securing coöperation rested essentially with the councils of war in the respective colonies. Though the Narragansett plantations were in part the seat of war, they took no share in its general operations. Those were planned and executed wholly by the colonies which were members of the Confederation. The isolation of Rhode Island, even in this great crisis, was as complete as at any time in its previous history. The way in fact to its coöperation with the rest of New England in the work of defence was not opened until the Confederation had wholly ceased to exist, and defence had become a matter of imperial, as well as colonial, interest.

When viewed from the standpoint of administration, the chief interest of Philip’s war is found in the light which it throws on the problem of securing the joint action against a common enemy of three or more colonies, each containing a considerable number of towns, scattered through a large area of mostly unsettled and uncleared country. Boston was the chief centre whence the movements of the English were controlled. Plymouth, though it took the

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initiative, and later contributed the general of the Narragansett expedition, was a centre of far less importance than Boston, even among the settlements of the eastern coast. The council of war at Hartford directed or greatly influenced all the operations in the Connecticut valley, and a part of those in central Massachusetts and in the Narragansett country. The two subordinate centres in the west were Springfield and New London. The administrative problem of the war was not only to fit out and direct the successive expeditions which were organized by the individual colonies, but to maintain harmonious relations within the group.

As was to be expected, the war took the colonies by surprise. They had made no special preparation for it, and were forced to rely on militia organizations as they had been developed in time of peace. Means of communication were exceedingly poor. Officials, whether at home or in the field, must rely on Indian runners or scouts, some on horseback and others on foot, to convey information. If possible, no section should be left without adequate protection. Only gradually was the extent of defection among the Indians revealed. So secret and hidden were their movements, that their central encampments were not always known, while the presence of their armed bands was usually revealed by an ambuscade or the surprise of a village and the massacre of its inhabitants. The people of New England were shocked and terrorized by a long series of events of this kind, each of which was followed by renewed efforts, on the part of the councils of war and other officials concerned, to discover and exterminate the enemy who had wrought the destruction. Much correspondence passed, men were drafted from one or more of the near-by regiments; they were furnished with provisions and ammunition enough for a few days, or, at most, a few weeks, and were sent upon a raid in pursuit of the enemy. The most important of these raids were undertaken by the colonies jointly. At the same time more stringent regulations for scouting were usually issued, and special scouting parties might be organized. The watches in the frontier towns were kept alert. The system of spreading alarms

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was perfected. Garrison houses and stockades were made as strong as possible. Where possible, cattle and movable crops were brought within protected enclosures; but much movable property must needs be left to destruction, and many houses also, except in the few stockaded villages.

War, when carried on under these conditions, resolves itself into a series of raids, each of short duration, each extending over a limited territory and participated in, as the case might be, by a score or by a few hundreds of men. In the most of these raids the Indians took the initiative, and the blows which they inflicted elicited counter-strokes from the English. The Indian went more lightly armed and with a smaller supply of food than did the colonist; but the colonist quite successfully imitated him in both these respects. He also made use of horses more than the Indian, in that region, was able to do. War such as this furnished no opportunity for strategy, though it did require skill and promptness in a multitude of details and minor operations. Its encounters were skirmishes and mêlées rather than battles. In tactics and equipment its requirements differed most widely from European warfare. It was such a variety of warfare as frontier conditions necessitated. It involved the only method of fighting to which the colonists of that generation were accustomed or for which their conditions in any way prepared them. Its processes and results, therefore, should be judged not wholly by European standards, but by those standards which are applicable to the frontier.

The war passed through several phases, and before its course was run nearly all parts of New England had felt its devastating effects. At the beginning it was a local struggle, confined to Mount Hope peninsula and the adjacent towns. The combatants on one side were the Wampanoags and a few neighboring Indians who were the immediate allies or dependants of Philip, and on the other side the few companies of foot and horse which were first sent to the scene of action by Plymouth and the authorities¹ at Boston.

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It was the attacks made by the Indians upon the town of Swansey, between June 20 and 24, 1675, which roused Plymouth and Boston to action. Plymouth sent out two companies of foot under Major Cudworth and Captain Fuller; Massachusetts, in response to the appeal of Plymouth, sent a company of one hundred foot soldiers, drafted from the militia of Boston and the surrounding towns, and a troop of fifty horsemen from the three counties, Suffolk, Middlesex, and Essex. These were under the command respectively of Captain Daniel Henchman and Captain Thomas Prentice. Henchman’s company was also furnished with horses.¹ They were accompanied by Moseley with about one hundred volunteers, among whom are said to have been several youths who were too young to be enrolled in the militia. A few days later Captain Thomas Savage followed, with Paige’s troop of about forty horsemen, and additional men sufficient to bring the Massachusetts contingent to the total of four hundred.² Among them were a few friendly Indians. Of the Massachusetts troops Savage was appointed commander. But since the war was now being waged in Plymouth colony, Major Cudworth, the senior officer from Plymouth, according to the custom of the United Colonies, became commander-in-chief of the joint levies.

The troops from Massachusetts were followed by several carts laden with supplies of food and ammunition. Two vessels—a sloop and a brigantine—were also loaded with supplies and despatched round by sea to the scene of the conflict.³ The Massachusetts troops were accompanied by two commissaries and a surgeon, while Constant Southworth is credited with the dignified title of commissary-general of the Plymouth force.⁴ When the general court of Massachusetts met in July, it voted three country rates to defray the expense of this expedition and to supply the further needs of the treasury.⁵

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By the joint efforts of the troops on this expedition protection for a time was brought to the terrified people who had crowded into the three garrison houses of Swansey and Rehoboth. Moseley’s volunteers raided the peninsula of Mount Hope for a distance beyond Swansey bridge, and so frightened Philip and his Indians as to compel them to remove to the eastern shore of Narragansett bay, to the region then known as Pocasset, but which is now a part of the town of Tiverton, Rhode Island. There Philip and his men took refuge in a swamp which proved inaccessible to the English. While the Plymouth men were left to skirmish with various parties of Indians and to watch Philip’s retreat, the entire Massachusetts force for a period of ten days—July 5th to July 15th—was withdrawn into the Narragansett country. This move was made under direct orders from the council at Boston, and was in the nature of an armed demonstration for the purpose of extorting from the Narragansetts a treaty of peace.

An estimate of the wisdom of this measure can be found from the following considerations. It seems quite probable that, if the Massachusetts troops had continued to act vigorously with those of Plymouth at Pocasset, Philip’s men would have been trapped then and there, and the war would not have extended beyond that locality. But in that case the power of the Narragansetts, as well as that of the tribes of central Massachusetts, would have remained unbroken, and the English would have found them a constant source of peril when at a later time the struggle with the French began. At the time when Massachusetts took the step in question, it was by no means certain that the Narragansetts were inclined to break peace with the English. It is true that many of the women and children of Philip’s tribe had taken refuge among them. Individual tribesmen here and there were ready to take up against the English, and actually did so a few weeks later. Such events, however, were always an incident resulting from the loose control which the councils of sachems held over their young warriors, and did not necessitate hostile action on the part of the tribe as a whole. Unless the English were consciously prepared to precipitate

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a conflict with all the nations of southern New England and to decide the race question in that section once for all, prudence would seem to have demanded that nothing should be done to offend the Narragansetts. Yet at the very beginning of the struggle the entire Massachusetts force was sent into the Narragansett country to make an armed demonstration in support of a so-called embassy of peace. The English, indeed, said that they “should go to make peace with a sword in their hands.” The sachems and young men would not meet them, and the pretended treaty at Pettiquamscutt was concluded with a few irresponsible old men. It was even more worthless than Indian treaties usually were. So little confidence did the Massachusetts authorities themselves have in the binding force of the agreement upon the tribe as a whole, that soon after Canonchet was called to Boston, and there, in order to escape arrest, was forced to promise to fight against the Indians. This promise served only to increase his irritation and to make it certain that Narragansett warriors would not be hindered by their fellow tribesmen from actively helping the enemies of the English.

But other more immediate consequences of Massachusetts policy at once became apparent. While her force was in the Narragansett country, the towns of Middleborough and Dartmouth in Plymouth colony were visited by the enemy, and many houses with their inhabitants were destroyed. When the Massachusetts men returned, a brief effort was made to penetrate the recesses of the swamp at Pocasset. It was believed that the force which had taken refuge there was small and must have nearly exhausted its provisions; and therefore, if they were watched for a few days, they would be starved into surrender. For this reason all the Massachusetts men, except about one hundred under Henchman, were recalled, and Henchman, with the Plymouth force, was left to watch Philip. The crafty savage took advantage of this to transport his men across Taunton river and to escape up the valley of the Blackstone into central Massachusetts. Captain Henchman pursued him, men from Rehoboth and Providence, together with a company of Mohegan

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Indians from Connecticut, coöperating. But whether, as some said, it was due to Henchman’s tardiness or not, Philip and his small force effected their escape. This insured the extension of the war to central Massachusetts.

Already, in June, the suspicions of Massachusetts concerning the fidelity of the Nipmucks had been aroused and an embassy had been sent among them. Though favorable replies had been made by a part of them, evidence continued to accumulate that their leaders were preparing for war.¹ The reports of Ephraim Curtis, of Sudbury, who, with an escort, was twice sent among them, confirmed the rumors which had been previously circulated. About the middle of July a party of Nipmucks attacked the town of Mendon. Still the Massachusetts authorities, not fully conscious of the extent of the disaffection, sent Captains Hutchinson and Wheeler, with a mounted force of twenty men and Curtis as a guide, to secure information, if possible, concerning the doings of Narragansetts in the region of Quaboag, to ascertain whether or not the Nipmucks intended to keep their promises, and to secure the surrender by them of those who were guilty of the recent outrage at Mendon.² After reaching Brookfield, or Quaboag, they arranged a place of meeting at Wenimeset, a point about three miles north of Brookfield Church, whither the Quaboags had retired to form an alliance with the Nepnets and Nashaways. Philip had arrived in the region by this time, and his agents had preceded him by some days or weeks. But, on arriving at the appointed place, the English were fired on by those with whom they were expecting to treat. Eight were killed outright, and both Wheeler and Hutchinson were wounded, the latter mortally. The survivors fled back to the village of Brookfield. There, with a large party of the inhabitants, they took refuge in a garrison house. In this, with great heroism and good fortune, they succeeded in defending themselves against the persistent attacks of a large

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body of Indians for three days. Then they were relieved by Major Simon Willard, with a force of forty-seven troopers from Lancaster. Willard was about starting westward with orders from the council of Massachusetts, when news came to him from Marlborough of the straits to which Brookfield was reduced. His forced march of thirty miles for its relief, with the brave defence of its garrison, rank among the notable events of the war. This occurred in the early days of August, and in consequence of it Brookfield was abandoned for a time. These events opened the second and more important stage of the war, which continued during the late summer and autumn of 1675. The uprising of the Nipmuck people broadened the scene of conflict till it covered all of central Massachusetts, extended throughout the Connecticut valley, and drew the authorities at Hartford into active coöperation with the other colonies. In discussing the measures which were then adopted, the operations in the valley of the Connecticut first demand attention. Because of the location of the towns in that region, Connecticut was more directly interested in them than were the settlements of eastern Massachusetts. Major John Pynchon was then the leading resident of Springfield, and had charge of preparations for defence among the valley towns themselves. In this capacity he served as an intermediary between the upper towns and the magistrates both at Hartford and Boston. At Hartford the standing council of war, which met very frequently except during the winter months, naturally directed its attention first to the defence of Stonington and New London, the towns that were adjacent to the Narragansett country. But, as Governor Andros of New York was seeking to establish his jurisdiction over western Connecticut, Captain Bull was also instructed to protect its rights at Saybrook. As soon as intelligence was received of the conclusion of the treaty with the Narragansett Indians, to which reference has already been made, the disbanding of the troops at Saybrook, with the exception of about twenty men, was ordered.¹ Bull was commanded at the beginning of August to limit himself to the defence of Saybrook.

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But the intelligence, a few days later, of the attack on Quaboag, which came in a letter from Major Pynchon, and was accompanied by a request for relief at Springfield, aroused the council to activity. Forty men were raised in the three River Towns and sent to Springfield, where they were to join in the defence of the upper valley towns, or march to Quaboag, if there was need of that service. Major Pynchon was requested to furnish the company suitably with provisions. Immediately orders were issued that one hundred dragoons should be impressed in Hartford county, sixty in New Haven county, and seventy in Fairfield county, and held ready to march on an hour’s warning. All persons who by law were required to be supplied with arms and ammunition were commanded to meet on the next Monday morning, an hour after sunrise, at the meeting-houses in the respective plantations and await such directions as should be given them by their officers. Several bands of Pequot and Mohegan Indians were also set in motion, and a chief named Joshua, a son of Uncas the Mohegan, was sent with about thirty men to Springfield, to be employed there as circumstances might dictate.

Eighty Indians were sent in company with a body of troops from Norwich directly toward Quaboag. Great care was taken to preserve the good-will of the Indian allies. Meantime Captain Henchman’s pursuit of Philip had brought him into the region south of Brookfield. Captain Moseley was sent again from Boston¹ with sixty men and supplies. In Massachusetts the first draft of soldiers had just been made from the Essex regiment, and the news of the disaster at Brookfield caused a company from Salem under Captain Lathrop, and one from Watertown under Captain Beers, to be sent out. They, with Moseley, the men under Watts from Connecticut, and the Springfield men, ranged the country west and north of Brookfield in all directions, going as far west as Hadley, but without discovering the enemy. The Springfield men then returned home, taking the Connecticut force thus far with them. Lathrop and Beers, under orders so to do, marched for extended service into the

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Connecticut valley. There is evidence that already the plan¹ of Philip to retire toward the Mohawk country for the purpose of securing aid was suspected, and decisive steps were taken, with the aid of Governor Andros of New York, to insure the continued fidelity of the Mohawks to the English.

On August 24th, in consequence of an attempt on the part of Lathrop to disarm the Pocumtucks, who lived near Deerfield, and of whose treachery the English were well assured, the first conflict in the Connecticut valley occurred, near Sugar Loaf Hill.² This made it clear that the valley Indians were committed to war. Hadley had by this time been selected as the English headquarters, whence Pynchon, as major of the Hampshire county regiment, and his officers, with those from eastern Massachusetts and from Connecticut, directed operations. A small guard was left in Northfield and another at Deerfield, but these might at any time be recalled, if there was prospect of quiet along the frontier.

At the close of August, influenced by reports from the north, the dragoons and other available forces from Connecticut, constituting what was familiarly known as the “army,” was sent northward under the command of Major Robert Treat, of Milford. During the remainder of the war he was intrusted with the chief command among Connecticut men. His control over his troops, however, was limited, as was the rule in those times, by the necessity of consulting his officers as a council of war. He was also ordered to take counsel and coöperate with the Massachusetts officers. Treat was commanded to march through Westfield to Northampton, and thence to pass farther northward, if necessary. James Steele was appointed commissary for the expedition, and one or more officers with that function appear, thenceforward, as a feature of the Connecticut establishment.

The uncertainty of military operations and the limited resources of each colony for defence is well illustrated by

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what occurred two days after Treat was ordered to begin his march. Because of the appearance of certain Indians skulking near Hartford, he was summarily ordered to return and search for the enemy on both sides of the Connecticut river as far south as Wethersfield. But on September 1, the very day on which the order for the return of the soldiers was issued, occurred an attack on Deerfield, in which the inhabitants were saved by taking refuge in three stockaded houses. The consequence of this was that, on September 2, Major Treat was commanded to return northward, with the forces from New Haven and Fairfield counties and certain picked men from the towns of Hartford county.¹ This was followed by an order for the strict maintenance of the night watch in the towns of the colony, and that work should be carried on in the fields in companies, with arms at hand ready for use. Special patrols also were ordered to keep the roads in each town clear for travellers. On the day when Treat received his command to march northward Northfield was attacked and eight persons, caught outside the stockade, were killed. Captain Beers was already on the march from Hadley to bring off the inhabitants from Northfield, when, not being aware of the attack two days before on that place, he fell into an ambush near the town, and, with twenty-one of his men, was slain.² As soon as the fugitives reached Hadley, Captain Treat was sent to Northfield and brought away all its inhabitants. Thus the second frontier town was abandoned.

The lesson drawn by the council of war at Hadley from the fate of Beers and his men was, that operations in the field should be given up and attention paid solely to garrisoning the towns. This Major Treat reported³ at Hartford, and the council there resolved that all its men, except those who were needed for that purpose, should be recalled. They were especially desirous that Westfield should be garrisoned, because the Indians, if they passed that point, might easily approach the towns of the lower

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valley by the way of the Farmington river. But this policy of inaction was not satisfactory, and, at the instance of the Connecticut council, the Commissioners of the United Colonies voted, on September 16, that one thousand men, inclusive of those already in service, should be organized, and that the contingents from Massachusetts and Connecticut should operate among the valley towns of Massachusetts. Of the total number in service, according to the proportion specified in the Articles, Massachusetts should contribute 527, Connecticut 315, and Plymouth 158. It was ordered by the commissioners, in concurrence with the council of Massachusetts, that for the present Major Pynchon should command the troops in service in the west, and Connecticut was asked to designate the second in command. Major Treat was duly appointed to the place. The commissioners confessed that they did not know how many soldiers were then in service in that region or what was the strength of the natives; therefore the duty of deciding upon numbers and operations must be left to officers who were serving in the locality. “And considering,” they wrote, “the great trust and dependence that is upon Major Pynchon for the constant management of the public affairs in those parts, we do not expect that he should be personally present in every expedition against the enemy, further than himself and his council of officers should see a necessity of.”¹ The council of Massachusetts wrote to Pynchon personally to the same general effect, and Connecticut fell in with the arrangement. Thus the system under which affairs in the west were already being conducted received formal confirmation.

But it did not avail to prevent one of the most serious disasters of the war, the slaughter of Captain Lathrop and more than sixty men² at Bloody Brook, a short distance south of Deerfield. This occurred on September 18, while Lathrop was convoying teams loaded with wheat, which was being carried to headquarters. The fatal result was largely due to the failure of the commander to throw out scouts in advance, while only the opportune arrival of Moseley and Treat, with

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vigorous fighting on their part, forced the enemy to retire. This event caused the abandonment of Deerfield and a still further contraction of the frontier. The effect of these disasters now began to be felt throughout the entire colony. Men began to avoid impressment and to desert after they had been impressed. So great was the danger of scouting that many were loath to undertake it. A feeling of terror pervaded all the exposed settlements.

Still it was the plan of the commissioners that a large expedition should be sent out to clear the valley of Indians, and that soldiers in garrison should be utilized in part for the purpose. To this the instinct of residents in the threatened localities—among them Pynchon—was opposed. But in obedience to orders, on October 4, Pynchon took all the garrison from Springfield to Hadley to join the force which was preparing to march from that point. The next day Springfield was attacked by Indians of the neighborhood, with allies, and more than thirty houses were destroyed. Treat attempted to relieve the place, but was unable to effect a crossing from the west bank of the river. Pynchon and Appleton moved rapidly down from Hadley, but arrived too late to be of service.¹ The inhabitants, as usual, were saved by taking refuge in garrison houses. Pynchon, who had long been pleading his unfitness for command, and who now saw a large part of his property destroyed and his family distressed, was allowed to retire, and Appleton was appointed in his place. He assumed command on the twelfth of October.²

The Connecticut towns now seemed more than ever exposed to attack. Indians were discovered at Glastonbury, and Rev. Thomas Fitch of Norwich found that Philip, with a large body of Narragansetts, was about to invade Connecticut. It was rumored that a general uprising of the Indians of Connecticut was imminent. Governor Andros wrote that five or six thousand Indians were planning a descent on western Connecticut. To meet this peril, on October 7, two days after the attack on Springfield, Treat was ordered

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to return to Hartford with sixty men. Massachusetts was urged to send more men into the valley, as a condition of beginning active operations with a strong force in the field. An order was issued by the council of war at Hartford that local officials should prepare fortified places into which the women and children might be brought on any alarm. Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield should gather their maize into secure places, and all should coöperate in this work, “this being a time for all private interests to be laid aside to preserve the public good.” A few days later flankers were ordered to be built near the houses on the outskirts of Hartford, and in such position that the spaces between them could be commanded and the town thus protected. Orders were also issued for watches and for improvement in the defence of the other towns; and, on November 22, because of the negligence of some, the town committees were instructed, if the defects were not remedied, to hire the work done, and levy by distraint on the property of the delinquents to meet the expense.¹

The correspondence² of Major Appleton at this juncture—October and November, 1675—reveals with great clearness the difficulties which he had to meet. In the first place, he, like Pynchon, was convinced that it would not do to leave the towns unprotected in order that troops might be procured for scouting or for large expeditions. The fate of Springfield filled some of its inhabitants with a desire to abandon the place, though sixty houses in all, on both sides of the river, were still standing. If the policy of neglecting garrisons was persisted in, a clamor for the abandonment of towns might become general. Therefore Appleton urged the council of Massachusetts to revise this part of its orders. On the other hand, Connecticut claimed that it was not intended that her troops should be kept simply to garrison Massachusetts towns, but that, as a part of a confederate army, they should vigorously pursue the

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enemy. They considered it the duty of each colony to garrison its own towns.

In reply to Appleton the council of Massachusetts stated that its order about garrisons originated in the fact that five hundred men had been raised at the expense of the colony as a whole, and that they were needed at many points. Hence it was thought that the towns might provide their own garrisons. But this order was subject to the exigencies of the conflict, and might be modified in the interest of the general welfare. Thus the council yielded to the representations of the officers who were acquainted with local conditions and an order was at once issued permitting the garrisoning of Springfield.

Throughout the period of his command Major Appleton and the men associated with him continued active scouting and raiding throughout the valley. But garrisons were not neglected, as was shown by the fact that the attacks on Hatfield and Northampton, both of which occurred in October, were successfully repelled by the aid of garrisons and stockades. Aid was at the same time given by the scouting bands outside. In this way the various methods of defence were brought into successful coöperation. When the time came for closing the campaign, the Massachusetts council ordered Appleton to leave sufficient garrisons in the valley towns and return home with the rest of his troops. The garrisons should be put under the command of the chief officers in their respective towns. A council of war should be left in charge for the winter of the affairs of the upper valley. It should consist of the chief officers of Hadley, Hatfield, and Northampton, together with some of the principal inhabitants, and should report its doings for confirmation to the council at Boston. These orders were duly obeyed by the commander, twenty-six men being left at Northampton and thirty each at Hadley and Hatfield.

The other question which for a time perplexed Appleton, was that of the relations which should exist between him and the commander of the Connecticut troops. The sudden recall of Treat, just as Appleton took command and was organizing a force for a considerable move against the

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enemy, was irritating. Appleton now summoned Lieutenant Seely to appear. Seely had been left at the head of the Connecticut men who remained behind in Massachusetts. He appeared, but without his men, stating that by his commission he was ordered to obey the instructions of his chief commander and the orders which he should receive from Connecticut authority. His chief commander he understood to be Treat. Of this Appleton naturally complained to the Massachusetts government, and also wrote letters of protest to Hartford. He fell back upon the principles followed by the Commissioners of the United Colonies, that the chief command over any force should rest with the officer of highest rank who was a resident of the colony in which the troops were serving. In this contention the council at Boston supported him, holding that Treat should not have departed without the consent of Appleton, and that if Connecticut continued to withhold her troops, Massachusetts would consider it a breach of the Articles of Confederation. Sharp letters were exchanged between Appleton and the authorities at Hartford, in which the course of each party was defended. Connecticut accused Massachusetts of long delays, and Appleton of trying to act separately. This Appleton denied.¹

As soon, however, as the rumors of peril to Connecticut disappeared, Major Treat was sent back and performed much good service among the upper towns of the valley before the close of the campaign. On November 12, Appleton issued a proclamation, addressed not only to the three towns which he afterwards garrisoned, but to Westfield and Springfield, where some Connecticut men were stationed, forbidding soldiers to withdraw from the colony without orders from the Commissioners of the United Colonies, or from the joint council of war, or without the consent of the commander-in-chief. Conduct in violation of this proclamation would be considered a breach of the Articles. In this form Appleton asserted his claim to the end, though his reference to the Articles of Confederation could have practically amounted to no more than an appeal to the spirit

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of coöperation. The question was not reopened during the later stages of the conflict.

While the Connecticut valley was the scene of chief interest, the government at Boston was occupied also with measures for the protection of the frontier from Marlborough northward, and with the beginnings of the struggle among the eastern settlements. Minor expeditions were sent out in many directions, the energies of the colony being all the while fully tested. The war had now developed so far as to involve the final decision of the rivalry between the white man and the Indian in southern New England. The pressure which from the outset the English had put upon the Narragansetts implied this as a final result. The English were now so fully aroused as to be ready for the final struggle, even with this tribe. And in the end it proved fortunate for civilization that it came at once, for it removed the peril which must have threatened the English if the Narragansetts had retained their strength unimpaired until the outbreak of the French wars fifteen years later.

When it was found that Canonchet had not surrendered the hostile Indians as he had promised to do, that the Narragansetts were systematically harboring foes of the English, and that members of the tribe had been concerned in minor outrages, action was resolved on.

When, on November 2, the commissioners met again at Boston,¹ it was resolved to raise a thousand more men, and, if the Narragansetts did not perform their covenants, to proceed against them as enemies. It was also voted that Governor Josiah Winslow of Plymouth should command this force, and that the second in command should be appointed by the general court of Connecticut, and should exercise his powers while the force might be in that colony. The troops from Connecticut should rendezvous at Norwich, Stonington, and New London, and those from the other two colonies at Rehoboth, Providence, and Warwick. No effort was made to secure the coöperation of Rhode Island. It was urged that strong and active men should be selected for the service, and that they should take food in their knapsacks

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for a week’s march. Each colony should furnish its own soldiers with provisions and ammunition. They should be ready to start from the places of rendezvous by the tenth of December. The expedition was to be preceded by a solemn fast.

Appropriate orders for the execution of this design were issued by the general court of Massachusetts and by the councils of war of Plymouth and Connecticut.¹ The executive records of the last-named colony reveal all the important steps which were taken. Robert Treat, with the title of major, was appointed commander of the Connecticut troops, and ordered to act as such until they should reach the place of rendezvous for the entire expedition. Contingents were levied from the towns within each county by the resident assistants under orders from the council of war. The weekly wages of officers and men were specified by the council. The assistance of friendly Indians was also invoked. A commissary, Stephen Barrett, was appointed for the “army,” and was empowered to grant tickets for the quartering of men and horses, and also by his warrants, under authority from the major or other officers, to impress whatever might be needed by the soldiers. Three hundred bushels of wheat were ordered to be procured from the counties and taken to New London to be ground and baked. The colony treasurer was intrusted with this duty in Hartford county, and designated committees were ordered to perform the same task in the other counties. The export of provisions from New London county during the space of two months was forbidden, except under license from the council of war. In Connecticut, after the troops had marched, a special guard was called out for the protection of Norwich, while in Plymouth daily trainings in each town of the men who were left behind were ordered.

The expedition consisted of six companies and one troop—540 men—from Massachusetts, under Major Samuel Appleton; two companies—158 men—from Plymouth under Major Bradford and Captain Gorham; and five companies

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—315 men with 150 Mohegan Indians—from Connecticut.¹ Governor Josiah Winslow of Plymouth was commander of the expedition. The place appointed for the rendezvous of the forces was the garrison house of Jerry Bull at Pettiquamscutt, a short distance west of Narragansett bay. But shortly before the arrival of the troops Bull’s garrison was entirely destroyed by the Indians. Therefore no shelter was left for the soldiers, and they were forced to lie out of doors in the snow during the night of December eighteenth. In the morning they advanced toward the Indian position, which they reached about one o’clock on the same day. The Indian fort was built upon a tract of upland four or five acres in extent and entirely surrounded by swamp. It was situated in what is now the town of North Kingston, and, as the army marched, was about sixteen miles northwest from Pettiquamscutt. The location, which was well-nigh inaccessible, except over the snow and ice of winter, was such as the Indians had chosen for their permanent camps in central Massachusetts. The enclosure was much like that in which the Pequots had taken refuge forty years before. It was surrounded by palisades, within which was an embankment of earth, while outside of both was an abattis of trees. At the corners and exposed parts were rude flankers, or blockhouses. Near one corner of the fort the structure was still incomplete, and, though galled by a destructive fire from a neighboring blockhouse, it was at this point that the English made their attack. Within the stronghold about 3500 Indians are supposed to have gathered. The attacking force numbered not far from 1000 men, with an Indian contingent from Connecticut. A part of the Indians were supplied with firearms, and for these they had a limited amount of ammunition. The English were all armed in this fashion and were well supplied with ammunition.

The assault upon the Indian position was begun as soon as the English troops arrived. They did not wait even to form, but rushed upon the enemy as they found him, seeking to force their way past the blockhouse and through the open space in the defences of the enclosure. The Massachusetts

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men led and the Connecticut men followed, and the Plymouth men were probably brought into the action last of all. The fighting was entirely done by the foot-soldiers, the troopers being held in reserve. At first, and until their ammunition began to give out, the fire of the Indians was very galling. Several of the officers were slain as they led the assault, and the loss was heavy among the privates. But the English persisted, fell upon their stomachs till the fury of the Indian fire had somewhat spent itself, and then pushed their way past the blockhouse and stormed the palisaded enclosure itself. Though the natives made an obstinate resistance, the English gradually overmastered them, inflicting terrible slaughter. But, as in the Pequot fight, fire was at last applied to the wigwams inside the palisade, and its terror and destruction made the triumph of the English complete. This step was taken contrary to the advice of Captain Church, who was present, he thinking that they should be preserved as a shelter for the troops during the winter, or at least for some weeks to come, and that the stores of grain which the Indians had accumulated should be seized by the English for food. But the Indian citadel was totally destroyed, and those who were unable to escape to remoter parts of the swamp perished miserably amid the flames or at the hands of the English.

The English loss was about 70 men killed and 150¹ wounded. Connecticut lost 40 men, who were killed on the spot or afterward died of their wounds. The Indian loss it would be impossible to estimate, but it was numbered by hundreds.

After a toilsome night march through the snow, which was necessitated by the lack of shelter or any conveniences for the wounded at the scene of conflict, the English reached Richard Smith’s plantation at Wickford. Several of the wounded died before morning; others expired later. The force was compelled by the severity of winter to remain at Wickford for some weeks. The fortunate arrival of a vessel laden with provisions from Massachusetts saved the men from hunger; though they were again brought to low

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rations before the time came for leaving the camp. After a time the Connecticut men were withdrawn to Stonington, while many of the wounded were taken for better nursing to Rhode Island.

By the “swamp fight” the first severe blow was inflicted upon the Narragansett nation. By that event, however, its power was only shattered, not destroyed. The immediate effect of the battle was to transform the Narragansetts into the active allies of the Nipmucks, and to make them leaders in the devastation of many towns along the Massachusetts frontier and in the colonies of Plymouth and Rhode Island. War to the knife was now definitely begun between the English and the Narragansetts, and the sufferings attendant upon it must be endured until the strength of the Indian was exhausted, and his land was left free for settlement by the whites. During this process the tide of war flowed back to its starting-point, and the struggle became fiercer than it had been at any previous time.

The Commissioners of the United Colonies at once called for one thousand more men,¹ and the colonies concerned were urged to send money to Boston and have provisions and other supplies collected and distributed from that point. Vessels could be utilized for that purpose.

In response to this call Plymouth ordered out 122 men. In Connecticut active steps were taken to supply fresh levies. The hardships of their recent experience had caused some of the Connecticut men to return home without leave. While the authorities reproved them severely for this conduct, they were inclined to lenient treatment of the offenders in view of their inexperience, and of possible difficulties which severe measures might cause in the raising of future levies.² Supplies were again collected at New London, while the council of war urged that the Connecticut men might henceforth be permitted to remain near their own borders and not be required to march to remote points. “The truth is,” they wrote to the commissioners, “our souldyers have beene so much drawne off from our borders already whenas the enemy

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was above, . . . & againe for this engagement very neare to us . . . when he seems to be seated even at our doores, within 15 miles of our townes & in our Colony. Now for us to march 40 or 50 miles with all our accomodations, in a desolate country, to engage him in conjunction with the other forces, doth seeme intollerable & too disgusting to all our souldyery to be drove upon them.” They thought that, especially as the war had not begun within Connecticut, Massachusetts was as much bound to seek the convenience of its western neighbor as Connecticut was to march to the relief of the eastern settlements. But no disposition was shown to stand out against what seemed best to the commissioners and to the colonies generally. A Connecticut force of about five hundred men was soon ready to march, and the embargo was raised sufficiently to allow Captain Belcher, the commissary of Massachusetts, and others to export from Connecticut a quantity of provisions for the Massachusetts troops.

When, on January 23, Major Treat was ready again to march eastward from New London, he wrote¹ to the council at Hartford, “The trouble and difficultys, with such commanders, to prepare for my service is almost too hard & heavie for me; and if you had appointed me a victualler of your army, I hope I might have done something at it.” He apparently had at this time only a steward, Benjamin Curtis of Stratford. Major Treat’s excuse for the brevity of his letter was, that he had neither clerk, commissary, or others who seemed immediately helpful to him in preparing for the march.

The midwinter raid into the Nipmuck country in which these preparations resulted, began on January 28, and continued about five days. The united force of fourteen hundred men, including some Indians from Connecticut, started from Smith’s garrison in the Narragansett country and dispersed after they had seen the Indians retire into the wilderness beyond Brookfield. Notwithstanding the efforts which were made to collect provisions, not enough could be brought together and transported to supply the soldiers for

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a longer time. Indeed, their privations during the short time occupied by the raid were such that it was popularly known as the “hungry march.” No appreciable injury was inflicted on the Indians by this laborious and costly effort.

Philip was now on the Hudson, hoping to enlist the aid of the Mohawks. The Narragansetts, led by Canonchet, who was now the soul of the Indian revolt, were everywhere active. On February 10 Lancaster was destroyed. This exploit was followed, during the spring and early summer of 1676, by attacks on nearly a score of towns in eastern Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Plymouth. Prominent among the places which suffered were Sudbury, Groton, Marlborough, Medfield, Chelmsford, Andover, Wrentham, Bridgewater, Scituate, Rehoboth, Providence, and Warwick. In the Connecticut valley, Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield were attacked, while a decisive victory was won by the English at Turner’s Falls. At Sudbury Captain Wadsworth, of Milton, who was marching to the relief of the place, fell into an ambush, and he and nearly all his command of seventy men were slain. From their retreats or strongholds, several of which lay between Mount Wachusett—north of Worcester—and the region of Northfield,¹ the Indians spread terror throughout the English settlements. Under its influence many became averse to leaving their houses for service of any kind. To meet this evil the general court of Massachusetts, in May, ordered that very heavy fines should be imposed on all who sought to avoid military service.²

From the beginning of March until about the 7th of April, Major Thomas Savage was again in command of the Massachusetts troops. At this time he was pursuing the enemy through the region between Mount Wachusett and the Connecticut river, and was attempting, though with little success, to protect the border settlements. At the last named date Savage was recalled, leaving Captain William Turner to garrison certain of the towns. It was during this interval, on April 20, that the disaster occurred at Sudbury.

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That, however, was more than offset by the exploit of a body of Connecticut volunteers under captains Denison and Avery. They surprised and captured Canonchet near Patuxet river, and he was at once executed. Thus the Indians lost their ablest chief and leading spirit. About a month later—on May 19—Captain Turner won his notable success at the “Falls,” inflicting heavy loss on the Indians. This, however, was to an extent offset by the death of Turner himself and the loss of many of his command during their march back to Hatfield.

As the peril increased, the efforts of the colony governments were redoubled. In May Massachusetts defined its inner frontier as a line passing through Medfield, Sudbury, Concord, Chelmsford, Andover, Haverhill, and Exeter. A committee of militia was appointed and instructed to organize a system of scouts for the protection of these towns and of the country which lay to the east of them. To this end the soldiers from the frontier towns who were abroad on general service were ordered home, and joined with others of their townsmen in squads which, under suitable officers, should patrol the frontier and be ready to give immediate aid to any neighboring town that should be attacked.¹ Trade with the natives was absolutely prohibited. So great was the terror which now prevailed along the frontier, that many were ready to flee thence to places of safety. But the general court passed an act strictly forbidding any who could render military service, or serve on the watch, thus withdrawing under penalty of £20.

Quaboag was maintained as an outpost and a garrison was kept there. By this court also a general draft from the county regiments was ordered and from their troops, as well as from the “three county troop.” The commissioners, of whom there now were three, were ordered to contract for provisions for five hundred men during one month. Friendly Indians were also employed. A part at least of these soldiers were sent into the Connecticut valley. Captain Moseley again offered to raise volunteers, with a body of fifty or sixty Indians,

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if he might be reasonably free from the control of the regular commander, might have the privilege of acting to an extent on his own initiative, and if his men might have the captives and plunder which they took. On the advice of the military committee, Moseley’s proposals were accepted, and subscriptions were ordered for supplies for the expedition. So reduced, in fact, were the resources of the colony, that the court at its previous session had declared its readiness to pledge the public domain of the colony as security for loans. As we have seen in another connection, garrison houses were multiplied in all the towns, and a plan even was broached to build a stockade from the Charles river to the Merrimac.

The colony of Plymouth was also the seat of active war, and had problems to face of the same nature in general as those of Massachusetts. On February 29, 1676, the Plymouth council of war ordered that the inhabitants should abide in their towns, and not depart therefrom without the permission of the government, on penalty of the forfeiture of all their personal estate.¹ At the same time a special council of three was appointed for each town within the jurisdiction, and empowered, with the commissioned officers of the colony, to order the watches and garrisons in their respective towns and to care in all respects for their defence. An armed watch should be on duty perpetually in each town, and any who neglected to serve thereon were threatened with heavy fine. Youths under sixteen years of age were summoned to perform this duty. Special assessments were authorized both on the towns and on the colony to meet expenses. People were repeatedly ordered to take refuge within garrison houses or other protected enclosures; but in many instances it was found impossible to secure obedience to the order.

Plymouth was greatly hampered by the refusal of men to serve under arms. When, in April, the attack on Rehoboth occasioned the issue of an order for the levy of a force for an expedition, it was found that many of the soldiers who had been drafted, especially in Scituate and Sandwich, had

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refused to serve. They would not go even to the relief of Rehoboth, much less on more distant service. A few only of the soldiers from the southern towns of the colony went as far as Middleborough and then returned home. Sandwich had been delinquent before, and we may attribute that in part to the strength of the Quaker element there. But generally the cause of inertia was fear of leaving their homes, lest during their absence these too might be destroyed. As it was, the efforts of the government were temporarily frustrated, and all that could be done was to continue watch and ward in the localities. In June the general court took up the case, and ordered that 150 English¹ and 50 Indians should be sent out, while power was given to the deputy governor and two assistants, in the absence of others, to levy and despatch troops. Persons who refused to obey the draft, or to procure substitutes, should be fined £5, or be compelled to run the gantlet, or suffer both punishments. The commissioned officers and town councils were also ordered to institute a system of scouts, and men who should refuse, when levied, to perform this service, should forfeit five shillings per day. But, notwithstanding its abundant legislation, Plymouth was not able to assist in the offensive operations which Massachusetts and Connecticut were undertaking against the enemy.

At that time the Connecticut valley and the region surrounding Mount Wachusett were the chief points of attack. In May a Massachusetts force under Captain Henchman was ordered to advance² through the Wachusett country on their way to Hadley in the Connecticut valley. The authorities at Boston also asked Connecticut to send a force of English and Indians to the upper towns in the valley, that a joint movement might be directed against the natives about Deerfield and Northfield.³ As soon as sufficient preparations could be made, Major John Talcott marched from Norwich for Wachusett, with the intention of going thence by the way of Brookfield to Hadley and the other valley towns. He arrived at Brookfield on June 7, and passed thence by a

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forced march the next day to Hadley. Finding that the Massachusetts force had not yet arrived there, he quartered his soldiers and awaited further orders from the council at Hartford. During his march his force had killed and captured fifty-two of the enemy. From Northampton, on the night of the 8th, Talcott wrote to the council for more bread, for a barrel of powder and three hundred pounds of bullets. The bread which they had with them, though kept dry, was already “full of blue mould,” and that which might in the future be sent he thought should be well dried. Orders were at once issued by the council to the commissioners to provide the supplies for which Talcott wrote. Captain Henchman, the Massachusetts commander, was detained at Marlborough¹ by the presence of the enemy in that region. About the middle of June, however, Henchman, with his force, arrived in the valley, and together the two commanders marched some distance up the river above Hadley.² But finding no important trace of the enemy, their commands were soon after withdrawn from the valley.

Talcott, after recruiting at Hartford, was ordered to march out again, the council leaving it wholly to him, when on the march, to decide as to the details of his operations and the directions in which he should proceed. Since the service had been hard and little plunder had been gained, a coat was given to every Indian who had shared in the expedition. It was decided that the raid on this occasion should be directed eastward,³ and it proved to be one of the most successful in the whole war. Talcott and his men, with their Indians, crossed the Narragansett country, taking 171 prisoners at the first onset; then, advancing through Warwick neck, they increased the number captured and slain to 238. The Connecticut men then traversed the entire western shore of Narragansett bay, clearing the country of Indians as they passed, and, had their Indian allies been willing, would have sought out Philip himself, who, they heard, had returned to

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Mount Hope. Raids of this nature, which were repeated by the Massachusetts troops a little farther north and east, revealed the fact that the power of the Indians was at last broken.

The cause which, in this case as in many others, ultimately decided the fate of the savages, was the exhaustion of their food supply. The store of corn which had been laid by the previous year was now consumed. They had been driven from many of their hunting and fishing grounds as well as from their corn-fields, and were now unable to return. The journal of Mrs. Rowlandson shows that through the spring of 1676 they had been compelled to subsist largely on groundnuts. They could plant nothing for their support during the coming fall and winter. Under these conditions, their captives became a burden, and they were ready to restore or exchange them. The efforts of Philip to secure the aid of the Mohawks had failed, and, with the collapse of the power of the Narragansetts, he found himself unable longer to hold out. Parties of Indians came in from all directions and surrendered themselves. The rest became fugitives. The pursuit of Philip and his death, August 12, at the hands of one of Captain Church’s Indians, was only the dramatic close of a struggle which was already decided. Though the conflict will always continue to bear his name, it is not probable that, after the first encounter, he ever exerted influence over it other than that of a diplomatist. His immediate followers were always few in number. When he fled into the Nipmuck country, he is believed to have been accompanied by no more than fifty warriors. One writer of high authority says: “We have no proof that Philip was ever in a single action in the colony (Massachusetts), or that he was the leader of more than a small clan. He never held rank as commander-in-chief of the allied forces.”¹ He never persuaded a single tribe in Rhode Island, Connecticut, or New Hampshire to join him,² though Indians from two of

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those colonies aided the general cause which he was engaged in.

Nearly a month before Philip’s death, the succession of fasts, which had been continued since the outbreak of the war, was broken by thanksgivings.¹ These were testimonies to the general feeling that the successful close of the war was already assured. The vigorous efforts, which were continued during the last weeks of the struggle by all the colonies concerned, were inspired by the confidence which this knowledge awakened. “Thus did God,” wrote Increase Mather, “break the head of that Leviathan and gave it to be meat to the people inhabiting the wilderness.”²

Among the settlements of New Hampshire and Maine, still dependencies of Massachusetts on the northeast, conflicts with the Indians had begun almost as early as September, 1675.³ Some of the frontiersmen of that region were charged with cruelty toward the natives and gross breaches of faith toward them. Squando, a sachem of the Saco Indians, had been specially offended in this way. This chief, together with Modockawando, the sagamore of the Tarratines on the Penobscot, and his ally, Mugg, were the leaders in organizing attacks on the English from Piscataqua to Pemaquid. Wannalanset, however, chief of the Penacook tribe and successor of the famous Passaconaway, followed the opposite policy. Not only did the Penacooks avoid conflicts with the English, but they refused as far as possible to entertain any of the enemies of the English. But the Abenakis generally, from the borders of Maine eastward, broke out into the fiercest hostilities against the English, using for the purpose the arms and ammunition which they were already obtaining from French traders. So remote and weak were the English settlements in that region, that the savages massacred and burned without serious opposition. During the fall of 1675 most of the settlements south of Falmouth had been visited. Berwick, Saco, and Scarborough had suffered severely.

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Major Richard Waldron of Dover was placed by Massachusetts in charge of the defences of the region. Under his orders the inhabitants, as far as possible, were brought within the protection of the garrison houses and stockades at Wells and other points. Small bodies of soldiers rendered what aid they could, by marches along the coast and into the interior. But it was all to little purpose, for the Indians, from their lurking-places in the woods, struck down individuals and families and destroyed settlements on all sides. Those who were not slain were hurried away into captivity. The bewildered troops and settlers knew not where to strike or in what direction to turn. When the tide began to turn against the Narragansetts and their allies in the south, they fled in considerable numbers to the north and added to the bitterness of the conflict.

By an agreement which was reached with some of the hostile sachems at Dover in July, 1676, they were to cease from hostilities and were not to entertain any of the enemies of the English; if any of said enemies should appear among them, they should aid in forcing their surrender. Early in the following September captains Sill and Hathorne, with two companies, were commissioned by Massachusetts to go to the east and “kill and destroy” all hostile Indians, wherever found. When they arrived at Dover, they found four hundred Indians assembled at Captain Waldron’s house. Among them was Wannalanset and many of his Penacook tribe, as well as many others who had probably come in to testify their fidelity to the treaty of the previous July and to accept terms of amnesty.¹ But among the number were some hostile Indians and some who had recently been concerned, either in southern New England or elsewhere, in outrages on the English. Their presence was detected. Whether by stratagem or not, two hundred Indians out of the total of four hundred were seized by Major Waldron and the Massachusetts men and sent by sea to Boston. The rest were allowed to go free. Of those who were sent to Boston, a few were executed, but many were sold into slavery. The natives charged Waldron with gross treachery

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in this affair, and cherished the memory of it till, at the opening of the French wars, they were able to make him atone with his life.

The war now flamed up anew. Hathorne and his men made a fruitless expedition to the eastward. The settlements east of Falmouth were almost or quite abandoned. No cessation, save that which was caused by the severities of winter, came in the dreary list of hostilities until the summer of 1678. Then a treaty was concluded at Casco with the hostile chiefs who still survived. It provided that the prisoners held by the Indians should be surrendered and that the settlers should be permitted to return to their homes; but, by each family a peck of corn should be annually paid to the Indians as a recognition of their claim to the soil. With this event the long and bloody Indian war came to an end.

In all the colonies the outbreak of the war, as well as its results, greatly strengthened the control which the colonists exercised over the Indians. Existing laws concerning intercourse and trade with them, especially in arms and ammunition, were at once made more stringent and were more vigorously executed. In 1682 Plymouth passed a very comprehensive¹ law, which provided that for every town in the colony where Indians lived an able and discreet man should be appointed by the court of assistants to have the oversight of them. He, with the assistance of the tithing-men, should exercise the judicial powers which were formerly bestowed on the overseer of the praying Indians. They should also appoint constables, while a system of frank-pledge was to be put in operation among the Indians themselves, and once a year they were to be assembled and listen to the reading of the criminal laws of the colony. They were also to be subject to taxation, and were prohibited removing from one place to another in the colony without written permits from their overseers. Indians from other colonies were not to be allowed to hunt within the jurisdiction unless they obtained permits from the overseer of the towns where they desired to seek for game.

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In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, at the beginning of the war praying Indians and other friendly natives were called into the service on the side of the English. Some¹ of the former were sent into the Mount Hope country, and were employed later as scouts when Philip was retiring toward the northwest. These are said to have been faithful and to have rendered good service. But some of their brethren among the reservations escaped to Philip and soon appeared among those who were burning towns and massacring their inhabitants. This at once provoked a clamor throughout Massachusetts against all the Christian Indians, and a passionate denial of their fidelity. The outcry was accompanied by the demand that the Indians should be removed from the reservations and placed under guard in some locality whence it would be impossible for them to escape to the enemy. This seemed to involve the ruin of the enterprise which Eliot had started, and the removal of a body of men who could render most valuable service in the defence of the frontier. But nothing that Gookin or other friends of the praying Indians could say weighed at all against the popular frenzy. The officers and soldiers supported the clamor, Captain Moseley and his men being very active against the praying Indians.

The first step was taken on August 30, 1675, by the issue of an order from the council that all natives who desired to show themselves faithful to the English should be confined within six of the Indian towns, and not go thence except in the company of Englishmen. About a month later the proposal to remove them all to points nearer Boston and some to an island in the harbor were discussed. Before the close of October the Indians of Natick were removed to Deer island and Long island in Boston harbor, and thither soon after were brought all the rest of the praying Indians who had not been driven into the woods by the attacks and threats of the whites. There they were kept, poorly fed and housed, during the rest of the war. Some proposed to remove them entirely from the colony, or even to destroy them. Their defenders found themselves for the time the object of popular hate. But as the war approached

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its later stages, this feeling wore off. Some of the Christian Indians were employed as messengers and scouts and even participated in the encounters which followed Sudbury fight.

At the close of the war the Indians were removed from the islands and found their way back to the principal reservations. In May, 1677,¹ an order was passed by the general court that all the Indians who were permitted to live within the settled parts of the colony, whether christianized or not, should be confined to four towns,—Natick, Stoughton, Grafton, and Chelmsford. The Indians about Piscataqua should be settled near Dover. In these places they should be subject to inspection, should be governed by such as the court or council should appoint, and a census of them should be taken once a year. Indian servants or slaves should remain in the families with which they were already connected. The privilege of Indians to carry guns in the woods was restricted, and they were to entertain no Indians from outside the colony without permission. Large Indian claims in the Nipmuck country were soon after bought for the colony,² William Stoughton and Joseph Dudley receiving each a grant of one thousand acres as a reward for their services in the transaction. One of these purchases resulted in a considerable addition to the reservations in Natick and Grafton.

Some important steps were taken by Connecticut for the final disposition of Indian prisoners and of the “surrenderers,” or those who had made submission. The general court, in October, 1676, enacted³ that Indians who should surrender themselves before the following January, unless they were proved to have murdered Englishmen, should not be sold as slaves. But they should be put to service among the English for ten years, and after that time they should remain as sojourners in their respective towns, working for themselves and observing English laws and customs. Those who were under sixteen years of age should serve till they were twenty-six. The terms of service for older people might be shortened by the council, if it saw cause.

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By means of a committee, named in the act, the Indians were to be distributed among the counties and later among the towns in each county.

The natives who surrendered themselves either came in with the Mohegan chief Uncas, or passed temporarily¹ under his control; but he was early informed that, as the war chiefly concerned the English, they would dispose of the captives. To this he assented, but at the same time persisted quietly in retaining and exercising such influence over the Indians as was possible. As the services of Rev. James Fitch of Norwich had been valuable during the war as a chaplain and in securing the fidelity of the Indian allies, so use was made of his knowledge and influence in the somewhat delicate task of settling relations with the natives at the close of the war. A meeting was called by the council of war, to be held at Norwich in December, 1676, at which it was proposed, through commissioners appointed for the purpose, to make known to the Indians, both allies and captives, the will of the general court concerning them.² The commissioners were instructed to associate Mr. Fitch with themselves in this task. They were ordered to select a fit place of residence, or reservation, for the adult captives and those who had families, and to appoint English rulers and teachers for them, and require the submission of the Indians to the counsel and directions which these should give, as well as to the orders which from time to time should be issued concerning them by the council or the general court. Indian constables were to be appointed, who should serve warrants, publish orders, collect tribute, and perform other duties among their fellow-tribesmen. A yearly tribute of five shillings per head was imposed on the adult Indians as an acknowledgment of subjection to the government of Connecticut.

All young and single persons, as pledges of the fidelity of the whole body of the Indian wards, were to be put out as apprentices for ten years among English families. At the end of that time, if both children and parents were faithful, the children should be returned to their parents, but if not,

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they should be sold into slavery. The general committee should deliver those who were designated for apprenticeship to the persons in each county who were empowered to dispose of them in suitable families. Uncas was later paid for the corn which he contributed to the “surrenderers” before they were removed from his care. But such were the wily arts of Uncas that Mr. Fitch had little confidence in the honesty of his intentions and warned the general court concerning him.¹

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