375

CHAPTER XV

THE SYSTEM OF DEFENCE IN THE LATER PROPRIETARY PROVINCES

The statements which were made in a previous chapter concerning the equipment, organization, and general character of the militia of New England hold true also of the proprietary provinces. The same is true of forts and harbor defences. The general conditions affecting military service were much the same in all the colonies. Much, then, which has already been said need not be repeated, but may be borne in mind along with the additional fact, that in some of the provinces the crudities of New England military administration were intensified.

Of the provinces which fall within this group, South Carolina and New York were situated on the border. Upon them rested with special weight the obligations of defence. They were forced to act, not only on their own behalf, but for the protection of their neighbors. In the history of South Carolina this was an ever present fact. In her case not only was protection against the Indians necessary, but as well against the Spaniards of Florida and European assailants who might approach from the ocean. The development of the slave system, in her case as in that of the other southern provinces, also necessitated the maintenance of a semi-military patrol. New York was at first menaced by the Dutch. Her northern frontier was occasionally disturbed by the wars between the French and the Iroquois, but was not directly assailed until after the close of the brief proprietary period of her history. The great Indian war in New England only remotely affected her interests. Though at first she was not compelled to act so continuously on the defensive as did the New England colonies or

376

South Carolina, yet conditions were developing which, after 1680, were to thoroughly test her capacity for military activity and Indian negotiation. After that time it became clear that she lay in the strategic centre of the northern frontier.

It is true that North Carolina was forced to contend with the Tuscarora Indians in her own midst, and that this was one of the greatest local conflicts of the period. Moreover her western border, like that of the other southern colonies, was occasionally disturbed by the raids of the Five Nations and their conflicts with the southern Indians. But nature gave her a comparatively inaccessible coast, while on the south as well as on the north she was protected by adjacent provinces. Pennsylvania was exposed to Indian raids on the west and north, but was shielded on other sides by neighboring provinces. From the sea she could be approached through Delaware bay, but this exposure Philadelphia shared with the ports of southern New Jersey and of the Lower Counties. Maryland and New Jersey had a coast line, but one which was relatively destitute of ports or of attractive points of attack. To landward their borders were better protected than those of any other colonies. These were the general natural conditions which helped to determine the attitude of this group of provinces toward measures of defence.

Owing to the peaceful attitude of the natives, the middle and northern provinces of the group were not disturbed by Indian wars. The presence of Quakers in New Jersey and Pennsylvania indisposed those provinces to offensive operations of any kind, and increased their indifference even to ordinary provisions for defence. The necessity of harmonizing a number of somewhat incongruous elements among the population of New York made it difficult to utilize for military or any other purposes even the limited resources which were in existence. North Carolina was too weak in population, resources, and government to provide for the defence of her territory, and when her time of trial came she was forced, as we shall see, to depend on Virginia and South Carolina for rescue and protection. When this occurred, moreover, the intercolonial wars were already well advanced.

377

These references to special conditions which affected the proprietary provinces indicate the reasons why at least three among them failed to provide adequate means of defence, and also show that as a group they were not so active or so well organized in a military sense as were the Puritan colonies of New England.

In all these provinces the authority to organize a militia, to build forts or fortify towns, was derived from the king through the proprietors. The proprietor of Maryland made his governor commander of forces by land and sea, with the special titles of lieutenant-general, admiral, and chief captain. This, together with the general appointing power which was also bestowed upon the governor, gave him authority, with the advice of the council, to appoint and instruct all subordinate military officers in the province. In the first set of proprietary instructions the governor was ordered to cause the adult males of the province to be trained weekly or monthly.¹ Upon the reorganization of the government in 1658 a full set of instructions was given to the captains of the trained bands. In the commissions issued by the Carolina proprietors the military powers of the governor likewise stood in the forefront, he being authorized to resort to all measures which were necessary for defence.² The governors of New York were themselves military officers, and Nicolls and Andros each brought over under his command a small body of English troops. They exercised to the full extent the right of appointment, though they usually made selections of officers lower than the rank of major from the lists of nominees presented by the inhabitants of the localities.³ Various instances are on record of the exercise of the same power by the first governor of New Jersey,⁴ though in the scanty records which have been preserved of East Jersey and West Jersey only slight evidence of such activity appears.

378

As Pennsylvania developed no military system until she was compelled to do so by the ravages of the enemy during the last intercolonial war, for the period under review she may in this connection be safely left out of account.

In Maryland and New York the system of defence was pretty fully developed before the legislature prescribed rules for its management. In Maryland a militia bill was before the assemblies in 1638 and again in 1639.¹ The one which was considered in the latter year, and which passed the second reading, provided for a monthly assize of arms to be taken by the captain of the band at Saint Mary’s and by the commander at Kent island. It also provided that on the giving of an alarm the householders of every hundred should send to the place of rendezvous one man in every three of their families or two men in every five, and that they should be completely armed. But this measure did not become law. In its stead an act was passed giving to the respective captain and commander, under the direction of the governor, full authority for the defence of the province.

Not until 1654, when the authority of the proprietor had been temporarily suspended and government was being administered by an appointee of the Puritan commissioners, was the next militia law passed.² This was brief, providing simply that the age limits for service should be sixteen and sixty years, that all who were liable to service should be provided with arms, and that the captain and other officers of the county should view the arms and train the militia. The first detailed act on this subject in Maryland was passed in 1661.³ Until that time military affairs in Lord Baltimore’s province remained under the control of the executive, who acted under a series of commissions from the proprietor, supplemented by the briefest possible legislative enactment. The expeditions which during this period were sent against Ingle and Claiborne, or against the Puritans who later attempted to overthrow the proprietor’s authority, were under the command of the governor in person or of some councillor, like Thomas Cornwallis, who was specially

379

appointed for the purpose. Similar arrangements were made when it was necessary to proceed against the Indians.¹ In 1643 Cornwallis was ordered to take, as a quota from every county or hundred, every third man who was able to bear arms, together with all who would volunteer, and proceed against the Indians. The localities from which the men came were required to provide them with arms and all other necessaries for the expedition. The subordinate officers through whom the governor regularly acted in early times were the captain of the band of Saint Mary’s, the captain of the band of Kent island, a muster-master general, who had general supervision of the training and mustering of the militia of the whole province, together with the lower officers who served under them. The captains must be regarded as essentially county officers, and they sometimes went by the title of commander.

In 1658, by order of the governor and council, captains were appointed to command and train the militia in various specified sections of the province.² They were instructed to take the assize of arms, to organize trained bands from those who were of military age, to train them once a month, and to impose fines for failure to appear. In April, 1661, by act of assembly,³ authority was given to draft quotas of militia from each of four counties for an expedition against the Indians. The wages of officers and soldiers were prescribed, and a tax was ordered to be levied to meet the expense. By another act, passed⁴ the same session, full legislative sanction was given to the organization of the militia and to the system of training which had been developed. A comparison of this act with the instructions of 1658 will show that the requirements of the two differ only in details relating to penalties and to the frequency of trainings.

When, after 1660, raids of the Five Nations against the southern Indians became frequent, expeditions had several times to be organized by the Maryland government to restore quiet in the northern parts of the province. The orders for these reveal the fact that soon after the date just mentioned

380

the militia had been organized by counties, though the levies were not yet regimented. The soldiers who were needed for service on any expedition were raised by draft from those in the counties who were liable to military service.¹ A magazine of ammunition and arms was kept by the province. Commissioners were appointed and ordered to impress supplies from the various counties, and boats or other means with which to transport them. The authority to impress soldiers was given directly by warrant to the colonels of the counties. Early in 1668 every tenth man was ordered to be held in readiness to march, and from among those a force of 287 was raised and provisioned for actual service. If servants or hired persons were drafted who were unable to provide their own arms, their masters were required to furnish the arms or instead to serve in person. Every soldier was required to bring a gun, a sword, two pounds of powder, six pounds of shot, and four flints. Every sixth man should bring an axe for felling trees.

During the years between 1675 and 1681 the peace of Maryland was much disturbed by Indian raids and by the murder of white settlers in various parts of the province. The causes of disturbance, as we have seen, were to an extent identical with those which at that time occasioned Bacon’s rebellion in Virginia. The peace within Maryland was imperilled by the reflex influence of that uprising itself. These events occasioned more military activity in the province than anything else which occurred between the defeat of Governor Stone in 1655 and the revolt in 1689. The efforts of those years helped still further to develop the militia system and to give it the characteristics which it had at the close of the first period of proprietary government. The activity of the Indians in the upper part of Anne Arundel county, as well as an appeal from Virginia, led the governor and council, early in September, 1675, to begin² ordering out

381

the militia. Troopers and rangers were largely relied on, and to their activity we find many references. The force which, under the command of Major Truman, was sent to aid the Virginians consisted of mounted men. The order for the expedition called for a regiment of five troops of fifty men each.

The assembly which met in the following May was much occupied with military affairs. The upper house impeached Major Truman on the charge of violating orders by consenting to the death of the five Susquehanna chiefs, but owing to disagreement with the lower house over the penalty to be inflicted, he escaped with simply removal from the council. Both houses discussed the advisability of continuing rangers longer in active service. The mode of raising supplies was also considered, as well as the pay of the soldiers.¹ An act for the defence of the province was passed² at this session, which not only made provision for troopers but also for a system of pensions. The payments were to be made annually to those who were permanently disabled in service and to the families of the slain. The governor and council were empowered to fix the amount of the payments, and claimants were required to bring as proof of their claims a certificate from the justices of the county in which they lived. Authority was also given by this act for the appointment of officers to impress provisions in each hundred and county whenever an expedition was fitted out.

At this juncture, also, an unusually elaborate series of articles of war, fifty-three in number, were put into force throughout the province by the governor and council.³ From these a much more complete idea can be formed of the discipline which officers were under obligation to maintain than from the penalties which are briefly expressed in the statutes. Provision was made for a court-martial, before which body all serious offences were to be brought for trial.

382

Profanity, blasphemy, sacrilege, violations of safe-conduct, giving of false alarms, sleeping at post, disobedience, disrespectful behavior, plundering of non-combatants, desertion, treason, and a long list of other military offences were specified. The list was sufficiently detailed to include all the important violations of good order which might arise in a large army. The penalties, however, were not definitely prescribed, but were left to the discretion of the court-martial. Mention is made of regimental courts-martial, as well as a tribunal for the whole province; but apparently at this period no force larger than about four hundred men was ever called into service at one time, and they served in detached bodies of a score or two each. There is evidence that additions were sometimes made to the articles by order of the council. But, however detailed it might be, it was necessarily administered by men who possessed little military training. Though the officers in Maryland were appointed and were in no sense dependent on the privates for their rank, those whom they commanded were neighbors and friends. From this it follows that, though military law was formally more systematic in Maryland than in some of the other colonies, conditions did not essentially differ from those which existed in the colonies where the militia was best organized.

In July, 1676, a special council of war met at Saint Mary’s.¹ This consisted of the governor and the council, with the addition of the colonels, majors, and captains from a number of the counties. No other instance of such a meeting appears on record. Among the orders to which it apparently gave rise was one providing that within the five counties on the west shore the inhabitants, on report of an Indian invasion, should take refuge within garrison houses or palisades. The houses in each hundred which should be used for this purpose it was made the duty of the county justices, with the aid of the local militia captains, to select. In no house should more than ten men able to bear arms be placed for refuge. Thus an effort was made to develop a system such as grew up in New England towns. But the danger soon passed away. Affairs both in Virginia and Maryland became

383

more quiet. After 1676 Maryland was disturbed only by occasional murders by the savages, the work either of the Susquehanna tribe or of the raiders from the remoter north. In 1678¹ provision was made by law for a company of horse in each county, the system of impressment and of pensions was confirmed, and it was made incumbent on the proprietor to provide a magazine of arms and ammunition from which the soldiers could in part be supplied. Under the head of small charges, the governor and council were permitted to levy and expend annually a sum not in excess of fifty thousand pounds of tobacco for purposes of defence. With this the militia system of Maryland reached the fullest development which it attained before the revolution of 1689.

Arms, powder, and other ammunition of war, costing nearly £400, with gunners’ stores in addition, were sent to Carolina with West’s expedition, in 1669. Provisions for the defence of the colony after its settlement² at Albemarle Point in southern Carolina first clearly appear in connection with the expedition against the Kussoes, a neighboring tribe of Indians, in the fall of 1671. Then the grand council ordered trainings to be held. The council itself and the officers who attended it were the only men who were excused from training.³ It appears from this order that the men of the colony were already armed and were formed into companies, with proper officers. The officers were required to return to the council the names of all who absented themselves from trainings, that they might be severely fined or otherwise punished. They were also to impress the labor of smiths for the purpose of repairing firearms. Provision had already been made for a town watch under the charge of the marshal, but it was made more detailed and stringent by this ordinance. The obligation to serve on the watch was as general as that of militia service, and the ordinance in question is the earliest of a long series of acts which had as their purpose the protection by night of the inhabitants, first of Charlestown on Albemarle Point and later of Charlestown on Oyster Point. By the beginning of 1671 Governor West

384

was able to report that the settlement was well enough fortified to withstand attack by Indians.¹

In June and July, 1672,² still more comprehensive orders were issued, which related to the defence of the entire colony. They provided for the mounting of two cannon on the palisades at Newtown, a settlement which had recently been founded on. James island. They also established a system of alarms which should be followed by the retirement of the inhabitants of the remote plantations to certain specified points. Among the equipments of the men the substitution of cartouche boxes for bandoleers was ordered. The entire militia force of the colony was organized into six companies, besides a guard for the governor. Commissions were issued to the officers from captain to lieutenant-colonel, while the inferior places were filled by persons who were nominated by the commissioned officers. In 1675 the number of companies was reduced to three, the governor commanding one of them in person.³

The evidence is clear that, when the chief settlement of the province was removed to Oyster Point, the vigorous system of defence which had already been established was continued. Though a number of the early militia laws have been lost, enough remains to enable us to see that much attention was paid to training and arming the inhabitants. It may be said that at no time between 1680 and the close of the second intercolonial war were Charlestown and the adjacent coast free from danger of attack. During that time conditions in the West Indies were always disturbed. Spanish pirates might at any time descend on the inhabitants. In 1685 provision was made for the building and garrisoning of a watch-house on Sullivan island, of another on or near James island, and a third at Port Royal, where Lord Cardross’s colony was then being settled. The language of this act would indicate that the militia of the province

385

was regimented, though there is no other evidence on that point. Care was being taken to keep the lists full and all companies in good military order. Authority was also given by law to the grand council to impress men, arms, supplies, boats, and all else that was necessary for organizing an expedition.¹ But though special reference was made in these acts to defence against the Spaniards, they did not suffice to prevent the destruction by them of the colony at Port Royal.

During the years subsequent to 1707, in the second intercolonial war, six or eight lookouts or watch-houses were maintained at as many points along the coast of the province.² One duty of the armed watchmen at these posts was to look out for slaves who were trying to escape by sea. The influence of slavery in developing the military spirit and institutions of the province is further evidenced by the creation of the patrol system. The earliest act on this subject was passed in 1704. It provided that, from such militia companies as the governor should designate, ten men each should be selected, mounted, fully armed, and placed as patrolmen under special officers. The province was divided into precincts, and on alarm or at other times when it was considered necessary, each troop was required to ride through its precinct and seize all slaves who were found off their master’s plantation without a pass or permit.³ At the time of which we are speaking the captain of each militia company was required to enroll one slave for every white man. The negroes were separately trained, and armed with guns or lances.

In 1708, according to a report of Governor Johnson,⁴ the main body of the militia of the province consisted of 950 white men who were able to bear arms. These were organized into two regiments of foot, consisting together of sixteen companies having about fifty men each. In addition to this force the governor’s guards formed a special company of about forty men; the French Protestants of the Santee had a company of forty-five men; and, in case of a general levy

386

to resist invasion, a reserve of about one hundred men was left to guard the houses and families of the colonists.

In 1708, as a defence against expected attacks by the French, a small fort was built on James island, and the defence of the harbor at large was thus begun. It was named Fort Johnson.

The militia force of New Netherland consisted of the regular troops, the rural militia, and the burgher guard of New Amsterdam. English auxiliaries were occasionally employed against the Indians.¹ Because of the presence of regular troops, the garrison was a more important feature of the system of defence in New Netherland and New York than elsewhere. Small stockades and earthworks of the ordinary colonial type were early built at New Amsterdam, Fort Orange, Esopus, at various points on the South river, and in the Dutch towns as they were settled throughout the province. Several of these posts were garrisoned either permanently or temporarily by soldiers of the company who were under the command of its director and his subordinates. The garrison of Fort Amsterdam consisted of recruits from the Netherlands, of soldiers transferred from Curaçoa, and of recruits from the province itself. Some were sent from Europe for short terms of service, and after their discharge remained in the province as colonists; but the larger part were professional soldiers serving on annual enlistments. They were in the pay of the West India company, from which, wholly or in part, they also received their clothing, equipments, and food. They served as a guard at the fort, as an armed police in the town, and as a bodyguard of the director.

The garrison troops first appeared in New Amsterdam in 1633, with the advent of Wouter van Twiller as director. Then and for a number of years thereafter they numbered about fifty. In July, 1644, in the midst of the first Indian war, 130 men arrived from Curaçoa. Fifty men came from the same place the following year. But when the war closed, the decisive victories of which were won chiefly by English

387

auxiliaries under Baxter and Underhill, the garrison was again reduced to about fifty men. Early in Stuyvesant’s administration it was still further reduced. In 1655 it served in the expedition against the Swedes on the South river, though the force at that time consisted mainly of 200 soldiers from Europe, and volunteers from New Netherland in number sufficient to bring the total up to 600. An armed vessel of thirty-six guns was also sent from Holland to aid in the enterprise. After the return of this expedition garrisons were established at Esopus and other outlying settlements, and in 1660 the total number in this service at Fort Amsterdam and elsewhere was 250, but, under pressure from the company, which alleged that the expense was too great, the total was considerably reduced.

The militia, as distinguished from the troops of the company, consisted of the levies of the rural towns and the burgher guard of the capital. They did not originate from an institution of such general application as the assize of arms among the English colonies. In 1640¹ an order was issued by the director and council that the inhabitants near Fort Amsterdam should provide themselves with arms and be ready to appear when the signal was given of the approach of danger. The founding of settlements in the outlying districts necessitated some such regulations for their defence, but these were made in orders relating to particular towns or in special injunctions from the director and council. The company also, in the Freedoms and Exemptions, made itself responsible for the protection of outlying settlements. It encouraged the arming of the colonists. At times when attack by the Indians or by some expedition from Europe was threatened, special activity was manifested. In 1654, when attacks by the English were expected, the Dutch towns on Long Island organized a local militia² and imposed a general obligation of service. Stuyvesant favored such measures, and in 1659 attempted to supplement these levies by a troop of cavalry. Local militia companies existed at Beverwyck, Esopus, Bergen, Haerlem, and on the South river. Under the pressure of repeated Indian attacks the obligation of self-defence

388

was imposed on these and the other villages by repeated orders of the director and council.

The burgher guard was the local militia of New Amsterdam. It was first mustered under Jochem Pietersen Kuyter as captain, during the Indian war of 1644. In the spring of 1648¹ the citizens were ordered by Director Stuyvesant to appear at muster armed with muskets. When it was found that there were not enough muskets in town to arm the citizens, a supply was furnished from the company’s magazine. A guard-house was also built for the use of the company. But after a second training, probably in consequence of the development of the controversy over municipal rights, the guard was not called together again for two years. Van Couwenhoven, its captain, was a leader of the opposition, and with Van der Donck and his associates went to The Hague to lay the complaints of the colonists before the States General. In response came an order for the formation of militia companies throughout the province,² while one hundred muskets, with a stand of colors, were sent over for the use of the burgher guard. Stuyvesant confiscated the guns and ignored orders concerning the inspection of arms and training of the guard. Martin Krygier soon took the place of Van Couwenhoven as its captain.

The suspension of military activity in New Amsterdam continued until the grant of municipal rights arrived from Holland, when the guardsmen were placed on duty as a city watch. Thenceforth they were a prominent institution of the city. When, in 1655, during the absence of the garrison on the expedition against the Swedes, the Indians raided Manhattan island and the surrounding country, the defence of the city fell wholly on the burgher guard. By 1658 the guard had increased to three companies, each with its distinct flag, its captain, lieutenant, ensign, and sergeant. In 1657 one of the companies was taken by the director to the Esopus for a brief campaign against the Indians. But on all occasions they were averse to service outside the city, and

389

could therefore never take the place of the regular soldiers who were maintained by the company.

When, in August, 1664, the report came that an English force destined for the occupation of New Netherland had arrived at Boston, the province was found to be very imperfectly protected.¹ On Staten island, opposite the Narrows, a small blockhouse had been built, in which a garrison of six or ten partially disabled soldiers² had been placed. In the hamlet of New Utrecht, back from the opposite shore and facing the bay to the south, a similar defence existed. Each of these blockhouses contained one or two small pieces of ordnance. Even as a protection against Indians these defences would be considered weak. The fort at the southern end of Manhattan island was a small earthwork, about a hundred and fifty feet square on the inside. Its wall was eight or ten feet high and three or four feet thick, and it was mounted with twenty-four small cannon. It contained no well or cistern. The rising ground which lay to the north, near the lower end of “The Heerewegh,” the modern Broadway, was high enough to enable an enemy from that point to command every part of the interior of the fort. The houses of the citizens were built close against the walls, and could be easily utilized by besiegers at once as a protection and as a means of approach. Under these conditions a siege of the fort would involve the ruin of a considerable part of the town. On the river banks the town was wholly unprotected, and its only defence, except the fort, was the stockade, supported in the rear by a low embankment of earth, which extended along the northern side of the city and was known as “The Wall.”

The garrison and its supplies were as inadequate as were the defences. Misled by reports from Holland that the action which had been taken by the English government was directed wholly against New England, Stuyvesant had recently visited the northern part of the province, and had left

390

at Esopus and Fort Orange a few soldiers as an additional protection against the Indians. The available regulars for the garrison were thus not more than a hundred and fifty. They had six hundred pounds of powder which was fit for use. An urgent call for aid was sent to the Dutch towns on Long Island, but they needed all their men for their own protection. A part of the militia of the English towns farther east were already in arms against the Dutch. Aid, whether in men or provisions, from all parts of the province outside of Manhattan was speedily cut off. Being thrown back mainly on their own resources, the burghers of New Amsterdam bestirred themselves for the defence of the city outside the limits of the fort.¹ The magistrates, when they heard that the English force which was sent against them had reached Boston, resolved that one-third of the inhabitants should be put to work with spades and wheelbarrows on the defences of the town. A special guard should be mounted and the militia companies of the city should be paraded. The director and council, at their request, loaned them six small pieces of ordnance, and a supply of powder and lead. The negroes who belonged to the company were also put to work on the defences of the city.

But all was to no purpose. Besides the soldiers of the garrison, there were in the city only 250 men who were capable of bearing arms. The farmers on the island, one-third of whom were called out, refused to serve. The resources and defences were so slight that, when the English appeared, no course was left except to surrender. The city was occupied by the enemy without a blow. The Dutch garrison marched out of the fort with the honors of war, and a part of the soldiers were sent back to the Netherlands. When, a month later, Sir Robert Carr, with two vessels, appeared² on the Delaware, he found at New Amstel a garrison of less than fifty men. But the director, Hinoyossa, resolved to defend the fort. A company of English was landed and, while they stormed the works, two broadsides were fired from the men-of-war. The Dutch replied

391

with musketry, but not with cannon. The English forced their way at once into the fort and plundered it. Three of the Dutch garrison were killed and two wounded. The English lost none. This event gave the settlement on the South river into their possession. Fort Orange was surrendered without resistance.

The force with which this result was accomplished consisted of three small war vessels and a transport. They carried, all together, less than one hundred guns, and had on board three companies of veteran troops—about 450 men. They were accompanied by one or more engineers, and were in all respects well equipped. The lesson which Stuyvesant drew from the event was this, “Whosoever, by ship or ships, is master on the river, will in a short time be master of the fort.”¹ As more fully expressed by the same official, this meant that the colonists, destitute as they were of a navy, of strong coast defences, and of adequate military force, without aid from Europe could not defend themselves against an attack by Europeans. The much earlier exploit of the Spanish at Port Royal, the descent of the English on Quebec in 1628, the later reoccupation of New Netherland by the Dutch, prove the truth of the assertion. The fate of New Netherland was no worse than that which under similar conditions might have befallen any of the English colonies. The defences of New Netherland and its militia system were superior to those of the settlements of northern New England, of Rhode Island, of the later provinces of North Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Had it been possible for the director to have commanded the services at this crisis of the entire population of New Netherland, he might have made, in proportion to his strength, as good a showing as any English colony. The success of the English in 1664, and its reversal in 1673, derive much of their significance from the light which they throw on the weakness of colonial defence. If left to their own resources, the colonies might fall a prey to any European state which took the trouble to attack them in earnest.

392

The most important result of the substitution of English for Dutch rule arose from the fact that the English could command to a degree the resources of all the Long Island towns. Their militia, which as a body had already been active under Captain John Scott, now became a part of the defensive system of New York. The Duke’s Laws contained systematic provisions concerning military affairs which were specially intended for the section of the province of which they were a part. The provisions, moreover, were borrowed from New England usage. They¹ made general and specific the requirements which the Dutch had enforced through special orders and local regulations. As was customary in the English colonies, the limits of military age were fixed at sixteen and sixty years. Physicians, schoolmasters, ministers, and various public officials were excused from service. The assize of arms was to be enforced, and the captains, or other military officers, were required to report annually to the governor the extent to which the inhabitants were provided with arms, that a proper supply might be ordered. Those who, upon the quarterly view of arms by the captain or lieutenant of the town, were found to be imperfectly furnished, should be reported to the constable and overseers and by them be fined.

Each town was required to hold a training four days in the year; once a year the companies of each riding should train together, and once every two years there should be a general muster of the militia of the three ridings. Absence from training for an entire day was punishable by a fine of 5s., while fines for other offences should be levied more or less at the discretion of the commanding officers. No fine in excess of 10s. should be imposed by a military officer, but they might inflict the usual military punishments or deliver offenders over to the civil officers for punishment by the courts. Provision was made for troops of horse and for their training with the infantry.

The higher military officers were appointed directly by the governor. The captains, lieutenants, and ensigns were commissioned from lists submitted by the militia companies

393

through the constables and overseers of the respective towns. Expeditions were called out by warrants from the governor and council to the sheriff, whose duty it was to summon both military and civil officers to appear at the time and place designated, with the quotas from the respective towns. It thus appears that the system of filling the lower militia offices by election, which the towns of eastern Long Island had inherited from New England, was preserved. When, in 1667, because of war in Europe, and of Courcelles’ invasion of the Iroquois country, it became necessary to embody the militia of those towns, Governor Nicolls ordered the troopers of each town to elect their captain, lieutenant, ensign, and corporal. One third of the men in each foot company were ordered to equip themselves as dragoons, and be ready for active service. The rest were to serve as home guards.¹

While these regulations were prescribed for the English section of the province, on Manhattan island and among the settlements in the Hudson valley reliance was placed for garrison duty on the regular troops which had accompanied Nicolls. With them, for the general purposes of defence, the militia of the Dutch settlements coöperated. Owing to the fact that English rule in New York originated in conquest, regular troops from England, or, as they were later called, independent companies, played from the outset a part in its system of defence. Brief articles of war² forbade them to do violence to any person who was not under arms, or to plunder his goods. If any were found committing the latter offence, or inciting to mutiny, they should suffer death.

At Albany all the lower officers were retained in their places, while a small garrison was left there under the command of Captain Manning. It was agreed³ that, at the charge of the town, the barracks in the fort should be fitted up for the accommodation of the soldiers during the ensuing winter, and that it should furnish them with blankets, candles, the value of 120 guilders per month in weapons,

394

and wagons in which to draw their wood. There is evidence that later soldiers were billeted on the inhabitants.¹ The chief officer at the fort and the magistrates were required on all occasions to coöperate in preserving the peace and good government. Manning was soon appointed schout, but before the close of 1665 was relieved of duty at Albany, and his successor retained only military authority. But occasionally thereafter a respected commander was elected schout.² The soldiers at first occasioned some trouble by stealing wampum from the inhabitants, but were promptly punished.

The friendliness which in general characterized the relations between the garrison and the people of Albany did not everywhere exist. Captain Daniel Brodhead, who was appointed commander of the garrison at Esopus, though ordered to pursue the most conciliatory course, was overbearing, and in the spring of 1667 he and his men became involved in an open conflict with the inhabitants.³ This grew out of arbitrary arrests by the captain and a succession of quarrels between the soldiers and the citizens. In the final disturbance one burgher was killed. Governor Nicolls sent a special commission to the place, which found four of the inhabitants guilty of riot. They were sent to New York for final sentence by Nicolls; by him three of them were condemned to temporary exclusion from Albany, Esopus, and New York, and one to banishment from the province for life. Brodhead, who admitted the truth of the charges which were made concerning his conduct, was suspended from command.

In the city of New York collisions sometimes occurred between soldiers and people in the street, but they never became serious, because the presence of the governor made the exemplary punishment of all offences a certainty.⁴ The chief difficulty which the city at this time experienced from

395

the presence of an English garrison arose from an attempt of Governor Nicolls, in the spring of 1665, to billet about one hundred soldiers on the citizens. This it was within his right to do under the articles of surrender, but it was attended with obvious difficulties. He stated to the burgomasters and schepens that, as the soldiers had not appliances with which to wash and cook for themselves, this course would be necessary. He offered to furnish weekly, for every soldier, a specified amount of meat and pease, while the city should pay two guilders lodging money for each per week. These payments should be made to the householders who would consent to receive the men. In return for its part of the expense the city should receive, in addition to the great excise, the income from the scales and the ferry. Any damage done by the soldiers should also be made good. But when the proposition was submitted to the citizens, nearly all excused themselves and some stayed away from the conference. One Andries Rees doubtless voiced the sentiments of the others, when he gave as his excuse the fear of being robbed. At a later meeting in the presence of the governor, the citizens adhered to their resolution, and said that they had rather contribute than lodge the soldiers. Nicolls, with the imperiousness of a military officer in the presence of a conquered people, left with the burgomasters and schepens a written order for a list of houses in which one hundred soldiers could be billeted, allowing not more than two to a house. The burghers now came to terms, and arrangements were made, though at an advance of two guilders per week, for the quartering of one hundred soldiers. The measure, however, was not to be put into execution until after the return of the governor from the visit to Massachusetts, in which the negotiations between the royal commissioners and that colony came to an unsuccessful end. In the meantime, the burghers were assessed toward the support of the soldiers. The records would indicate that after the return of the governor no further steps were taken until October, when, with the consent of the householders, the soldiers were quartered in

396

private houses for the winter. Respecting the regular troops during the administrations of Nicolls and Lovelace, we know nothing further. On the reoccupation of New York by the Dutch in 1673 they were all sent back to England.¹ When Edmund Andros was appointed governor in 1674, he was commissioned by the Duke of York to raise a company² of one hundred men in England, of which he should be captain. Anthony Brockholls and Christopher Billop were appointed lieutenants, and Cæsar Knapton ensign, of this company. It was brought to America by the governor, and remained thenceforth on garrison duty in New York. In 1678 Andros reported³ that one company of regular soldiers, with gunners and officers, was stationed in the forts at New York and Albany. The payment, in January, 1680, of £1000 out of the English exchequer, illustrates the method by which these troops were supported.⁴ The establishment was not increased while New York remained a proprietary province.

Of the two principal forts which were garrisoned by these troops, Andros reported in 1678 that the one at New York was square, with walls of stone and four regular bastions. It contained fifty-six mounted guns and a supply of military stores. The fort at Albany was a long stockaded affair with four bastions and twelve guns. In 1686 Governor Dongan reported that when he arrived he had found most of the guns at New York dismounted, but he had the wooden platforms on which they stood for the most part repaired. The walls and breastwork of the fort he also found it necessary to repair. Over the officers’ quarters and the gate he had placed a new roof. The two acres of ground on which the fort stood he had surrounded with a paling. “I am forc’t every day,” he writes, “by reason of the rotenness of the Timber & Boards to bee making reparation in the Soldiers

397

quarters or my own.” He recommended that the fort at Albany, which was wholly of wood and earth, should be built of stone, since the timber and boards which entered into the present construction must be renewed every six or seven years. Though the fort of New York, with its thirty-nine guns and two small mortars, was “inconsiderable,” Dongan wished there were more like it in the colonies.

We hear nothing of the burgher guard in New York until August, 1668, when Governor Nicolls was about to leave the province. Then, by the mayor’s court, a resolution was passed that the townsmen of New York should be listed and divided into two military bands, and that they should parade on the occasion of the departure of the governor. With the assent of the governor, Martin Krygier and Johannes van Brugh were chosen as captains, and with them were associated a lieutenant and an ensign for each company. In January, 1672, a third company was organized. We are informed that the officers of these companies were appointed by the governor from a list of double the number nominated by the burgher corps and transmitted to his Excellency by the mayor.¹ In 1671 Governor Lovelace proposed that a troop of horse should be raised on Manhattan island, but the plan was postponed for the time and was not taken up again.²

From the extant records of the time, fragmentary though they are, we can affirm that the military companies of the towns in Yorkshire, with their equipment and trainings as prescribed in the Duke’s Laws, were continued in active existence until New York became a royal province. The people, as well as the governors, were spurred to action in this matter, not only by the presence of Indians, but by the fear of attack from the Dutch during the two European wars of the period. Philip’s war in New England also occasioned some anxiety lest it might provoke an outbreak in New York.

When, in July, 1668, Governor Nicolls was inspecting the militia company of Flushing, some seditious words were uttered by one of the men. These seemed to indicate that a

398

feeling of discontent was widespread in the locality. Nicolls at once had a town meeting called, and, after administering a sharp rebuke, ordered the company to be disarmed, its colors returned, and none of its members to appear again without special warrant. Certain of the company were also forbidden during the period of three months to visit New York without reporting to the officer of the guard at Fort James. This prompt act of discipline quelled sedition, and before two months had passed, submission had been made and the company was in process of reorganization.¹

In the autumn of 1668, soon after Governor Lovelace took office, he appointed Captain Sylvester Salisbury commander of a troop of horse which he was authorized to raise by enlistment² within the north and west ridings of Yorkshire. Those who could not provide horse and equipment themselves were to be supplied by the governor. In 1670 the inhabitants were urged to coöperate with Captain John Young of Southold in organizing a similar troop in the east riding. In 1672 the troop was in existence, and its members were granted certain privileges by the governor. Towns, like Hempstead, which seem to have been backward in the organization of foot companies, were ordered to provide for such and to present lists of nominees from which the governor might appoint their officers. In July, 1672, in view of the disturbed condition of Europe, the militia officers of Long Island were ordered to make a list of all who were of military age and to view their arms. Companies should be trained and a watch set to give warning of any approaching vessels. But neither horse nor foot were to be called outside the east riding except in emergencies. When Governor Andros took office steps were duly taken for reorganizing the militia. A weakness of the system is illustrated by an order of 1678, the issue of which was occasioned by complaint from the militia officers, especially of the east riding, that constables and overseers of towns should no longer neglect to levy the fines due by law for absences from training or for other defaults connected therewith.³

399

We learn that at Esopus discipline among the garrison was not maintained; that the soldiers were accused from all quarters of immoral and violent conduct, of attempting to right their own wrongs, “and becoming more a nursery of Newgate than persons who have taken on them a settled and resolved life.” For this reason, in 1669, the garrison at that fort was disbanded and a militia force was organized for the defence of the three settlements which by that time had been founded in the region. A redoubt had been built at Kingston, and upon the inhabitants of that village its defence was imposed.¹

In accordance with the Concessions and Agreement² of 1665, the militia system of New Jersey rested from the first on statutes. That document provided that laws respecting militia companies, trainings, forts, officers, and defensive war and suppression of mutinies and rebellion should be passed by the assemblies. The governor, with the advice of the council, should appoint militia officers, designate soldiers and officers for militia and garrison service, muster and train the forces, and conduct war as well by sea as land. He should not organize a force in excess of the number designated by law, and, without the consent of the assembly, should not call out any except freeholders. In November, 1668, the first militia act which has been preserved was passed.³ It prescribed for all males between sixteen and sixty years of age, with the usual exceptions, four days of training annually, two being in the fall. The chief officer of any town who should neglect this should be fined 20s., and privates who, without good reason, neglected to attend should be fined at the rate of 5s. for every day’s absence. The fines should be collected by the clerk of the band, and those which came from the privates should be expended for the company, while those collected from the officers should go into the treasury of the province. The act was apparently borrowed from early New England legislation, and implied the assize of arms, though no provision was made for enforcing it. It also gave the clerk of the band the usual power to collect fines by distraint.

400

By the charters which were granted, not far from the time of this act, to Woodbridge and Bergen, and by the agreement with the settlers at Piscataway, the right to nominate their militia officers, subject to the governor’s approval, was granted to the localities. The relations in which all the towns stood to the proprietary government naturally left much room for independence of action in this, as in other matters. In 1670 we find the governor urging the appointment of a captain, a lieutenant and ensign in Woodbridge. The earliest entry in the Newark records which relates to training and a view of arms was in May, 1671.

The legislature of East Jersey, in its session of November, 1675, provided¹ by law for the taking of the assize of arms in each town at least once every quarter. It also required every town, at its own expense, to provide a fort with a garrison house therein, where the inhabitants, with a supply of provisions and ammunition, could be protected against Indian attack. Every town was also required to keep a stock of ammunition. Under the impulse given to affairs of this kind through the temporary occupation of the province by the Dutch, the towns seem to have taken some measures for self-defence. In July of the same year Elizabethtown had organized a militia company in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1669. Woodbridge began soon after to discuss the subject of a stockade, and town meetings held early in 1676 called for the powder and shot for the local magazine which were required by the recent act.² At Newark the militia officers were ordered “to consider about and contrive for the Fortifications belonging to our Town.” Somewhat later an order was issued for a small supply of powder and lead.^.3

In 1679, 1682, and 1693 militia laws were passed, but they were essentially repetitions of those which had been previously enacted. In West Jersey no order whatever was passed on the subject of war or a militia, except one to the effect that military forces should not be raised or war declared without the consent of the assembly.⁴