Dinsmore Documentation  presents  Classics of American Colonial History

Author: Osgood, Herbert L.
Title: The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century.
Citation: New York: Columbia University Press, 1904.
Subdivision: Volume II. Part III. Chapter VII.
HTML by Dinsmore Documentation * Added December 2, 2003
← Vol. II, Pt. III, Ch. VI   Table of Contents   Vol. II, Pt. III, Ch. VIII →

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CHAPTER VII

THE BEGINNINGS OF A LEGISLATURE IN PROPRIETARY NEW YORK

This subject, as well as the early history of the executive in New York, cannot be properly understood without somewhat extended reference to the experience of the Dutch in New Netherland. The government of that province throughout its entire existence centred in the director and council. It was, at least in theory, a centralized and autocratic system. The council itself was a small body, filled mainly by the director’s appointees and subject to his control. The director himself received his authority from a mercantile company in the Netherlands; he naturally shared in its exclusive and monopolistic instincts, was its more or less faithful agent, and received its support in return. By directors and company alike, attempts of the colonists at large to influence or regulate the conduct of the government were resented; no place was made for this in the system of provincial government as originally planned. In the charter, as in those which were issued to early English trading companies, no provision was made for an assembly. As the West India company cared far less for the larger and more permanent interests of New Netherland than did the London company, when under the administration of Sandys and Southampton, for those of Virginia, the Dutch province was allowed to remain with a governmental system that was fit only for a trading post. Action on the part of the people beyond that of isolated petitions for favors was discouraged, and the organization of a legislature persistently opposed. Secretary Van Tienhoven expressed the truth when, in defending Stuyvesant and his policy against attack, he declared, “No one comes or is admitted into New Netherland

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except on this condition, not that he shall have anything to say, but that he shall acknowledge the sovereignty of their High Mightinesses, . . . and obey the Director and Council for the time being, as a good subject is bound to do.”1 And yet an opposition was formed, in which both Dutch and English shared, and by means of it efforts were made to limit the power of the director and council; but this did not result in the union of the localities into a permanent representative system. The origin and nature of this movement it is now necessary to explain.

It began amid the perplexities of an Indian war.2 By 1640 the extension of settlement had brought the colonists into closer contact with the natives. Isolated boweries and small groups of plantations had been settled at various points in the midst of the Indian country. At Pavonia and Achter Col, on Staten island, and on the upper part of Manhattan island, such outposts existed. As in Virginia before the massacre of 1622, the colonists lived on familiar terms with the Indians, taking them into their employ, even admitting them into their houses and to their tables. The lands of the settlers being, in many cases, unfenced, their cattle frequently broke into the cornfields of the Indians and did much damage. Guns and ammunition were sold, first, it is said, to the Mohawks about Fort Orange, and then to the river Indians to enable them to defend themselves against the Iroquois, who now, with the help of firearms, were better able than ever to assert their superiority over the river Indians. The sale of liquor followed.

The irritation of the natives was increased by a contribution of maize, furs, and wampum which Kieft, without the knowledge, as it was alleged, of the company, levied upon the river Indians. Petty outrages began to be committed by them. The whites retaliated, a considerable proportion of them, it seems, being in favor of exceedingly harsh measures toward the Indians. Director Kieft either approved of this policy from the outset, or yielded to it under pressure.

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 425.

2 The Journal of New Netherland, in N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 179 et seq.; De Vries, Voyages, in 2 Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc. III. 113.

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After the worst seemed to have been averted by a truce with the natives who lived immediately north of Manhattan island, the director assented to a proposal to massacre a large body of river Indians who had taken refuge, as they supposed, under Dutch protection from the assaults of the Iroquois. This outrage, in which about 110 of the savages were slain, was committed on the night of the 25th of February, 1643, at Pavonia and Corlaer’s Hook.

Though the earlier acts of the Dutch might bear favorable comparison with the raid of Endicott against Block island and into the Pequot country, the massacre of February, 1643, was madness itself. De Vries, whose settlement on Staten island had already been the scene of outrages by both parties, exclaimed to Kieft, “Stop this work; you wish to break the mouths of the Indians, but you will also murder our own nation, for there are none of the farmers who are aware of it. My own dwelling, my people, cattle, corn, and tobacco, will be lost.” But his protest was of no avail.1 The massacre set the province in a flame, and two years elapsed before peace was restored. Boweries and settlements throughout Manhattan island and the adjacent regions of the mainland and Long Island were destroyed, and the Indians advanced to the gates of New Amsterdam. The fort there was described at the time as being entirely “out of order” and “rather a mole-hill than a fort against an enemy.”2 The weak and poorly organized force of fifty or sixty Dutch militiamen was unable to hold them in check in the open country. But offensive operations were finally undertaken by the Dutch in cooperation with the English of western Long Island, and these culminated, in February, 1644, in the destruction of an Indian stronghold near Stamford, Connecticut, and the slaughter of possibly five hundred of the savages. This, as an achievement, ranks with the destruction of the Pequot fort in 1637 and the Swamp Fight of 1675. It was followed by the gradual cessation of hostilities and finally by peace. It was amid the agonies of this struggle that a political opposition in New Netherland was born.

In August, 1641, early in the conflict, Kieft called together

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. XIII. 10.

2 Ibid. I. 190.

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the masters and heads of families who resided in New Amsterdam and its vicinity, and submitted to them the question, whether or not steps should be taken to avenge the recent murder of Claes Smits by the Indians, and what they should be. After presenting their reply, the commonalty chose twelve men1 to coöperate with the director in carrying out their suggestions. De Vries was named their president. The director considered that this board was called to advise him about the best way in which to attack the Indians, and for no other purpose. He did not regard them as a permanent body,2 or as a part of the council, or consider that they should thwart his plans. In order the better to assure himself of their assent to an immediate offensive war, he called the members of the board before him individually. But failing even then to secure the consent of the majority, he had to postpone action till winter. Then they as a body consented to an expedition, provided the company would furnish the ammunition and provisions, and the director would accompany it.3

But the Twelve were not content with this temporary function. Acting on the supposition that they were representatives of the commonalty for the purpose of securing reforms, they at once petitioned4 the director that annual musters should be held, that the membership of the council should be increased, that from the Twelve four should be appointed in rotation to represent before the council the interests of the commonalty, especially in the matter of taxation, freedom of trade with neighboring colonies, and a few other minor reforms. While assenting in general to these propositions, Kieft stated in his reply that he was not aware that the Twelve Men received fuller powers from the commonalty than simply to give their advice concerning the murder of Claes Smits. This clearly revealed his view of the power of the board and foreshadowed the end. About

1 2 Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc. III. 103; N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 183, 414; O’Callaghan, History of New Netherland, I. 241.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 304, Van der Donck’s Remonstrance of New Netherland.

3 Ibid. 415.

4 Ibid. 201.

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two weeks later—February 8, 1643—the director issued an order dissolving the Twelve, because their meetings tended to dangerous consequences and the weakening of authority. Further meetings were forbidden on pain of corporal punishment. It was shortly after this act that three members of the late board petitioned the director to order the massacre of the Indian refugees, a proposition to which he was only too willing to yield.1

The following September, owing to the pressure of the war, it became necessary to summon the commonalty again. They now chose a board of Eight Men to consider the propositions submitted by the director and council.2 The previous board had consisted entirely of Hollanders; upon this board two Englishmen had seats, Thomas Hall and Isaac Allerton of Plymouth fame; Joachim Pietersen Euyter, of the settlement that was to be New Haerlem, and Cornelis Melyn of Staten island were also members. Jan Jansen Dam, one of the Twelve who had counselled the massacre, they voted to exclude from membership. The Eight voted to meet weekly, and at once resolved that a larger body of men should be raised for the war. They also adopted regulations against taverns and drunkenness and in favor, for a time, of more religious services. These, however, were not put in execution. They also desired that all possible help should be procured from Europe, and that the crews on two of the company’s ships which had just arrived should be put into the service. To the latter proposal Kieft would not consent. As the Indians continued to spread destruction, slaying Mrs. Hutchinson and her family, and attacking Gravesend, petitions for aid were sent by the Eight to the States General and to the company. In these the sufferings of the colonists and the impotence of the government were clearly depicted as related phenomena. The appeal to the authorities at home, as well as the inclination of the board to interfere in affairs within the province, offended the director, and the Eight were not called together again on public business until June, 1644. In a subsequent letter to the Amsterdam chamber, they state that during the interval

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 193.

2 Ibid. 192, 139, 209, 212, 185.

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the director treated them with manifest disrespect.1 “No sooner did they open their mouths to propose anything tending in their judgment to the public good, than the director met them with sundry biting and scoffing taunts; and sometimes had them summoned without asking them a question, thus obliging them to return amidst jeers and sneers, as wise as they went.”

Finally, on June 18, 1644, the director summoned the Eight Men and told them that additional taxes must be laid or the English soldiers would have to be discharged. They declared in reply that the people were too much exhausted by the war to pay more, and besides they did not consider that their powers extended to the imposition of new taxes, a question which must first be decided by the company. At this the director became enraged, and asserted that his authority in the province exceeded that of the company, and he could do what he pleased. The Eight then agreed to his proposition, but suggested that it would be better to levy upon the profits of private traders to the province than upon the exhausted commonalty. But this he rejected, and the ordinance levying the first excise in New Netherland—on beer, wine, and beaver2—was issued. The excise was to continue until peace, or until aid should come from Holland. This latter condition was soon fulfilled by the arrival of 130 soldiers from Curaçoa, who had recently been sent thither from Brazil. But in order to provide clothing for them, Kieft and the council ordered an increase of the excise on beer,3 and also that the brewers should make return to the receiver of all the beer they had manufactured before any of it could be sold. This created strong opposition. Payment was refused, but the schout fiscal, after long trials, obtained judgments from the director and council against the offenders, and they were forced to submit. Feeling, however, was very bitter, and a faction of determined opponents to Kieft, at the head of which were Kuyter and Melyn, was formed. Remonstrances were addressed to the company and to the States General, setting

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 212, 206.

2 Ibid. 189; Laws and Ordinances, 39.

3 Laws and Ordinances, 49.

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forth the waste condition of the province and the evil policy of the director.1 The reports of the massacre and its disastrous results had already drawn from the States General an order to inquire into the condition of New Netherland. The Assembly of Nineteen ordered the temporary recall of Kieft to answer charges. The chamber of accounts of the company, to which the matter was referred, reported in favor not only of improved defence, the encouragement of emigration and of settlement in villages, freedom of trade with Brazil, and harmonious relations both with the Indians and the English, but that a permanent scheme should be devised for keeping the director and council in touch with the various colonies and sections of the province.2 Article 28 of the Freedoms and Exemptions of 1629 provided that the colonies of each section should delegate one or two persons annually to report their condition to the director and council. The chamber of accounts now recommended that such delegates should be summoned every six months for consultation with the director and council, concerning all matters which related to the welfare of the province. But this wise suggestion met with no response. Soon after the conclusion of permanent peace with the Indians, Kieft’s administration terminated, and Stuyvesant came to take up his quarrel and to assert to the utmost the autocratic power of the director.

Though the Eight Men had been able to put no direct check upon the doings of Kieft, their appeals to the authorities at home had arrested attention. Kuyter and Melyn, the leaders of the opposition, now petitioned Stuyvesant to investigate Kieft’s conduct and policy. Naturally Stuyvesant was opposed to this, and had no difficulty in persuading the council to share his opinion. By their decision not to attempt the investigation, Kieft, who was still in the province, was encouraged to demand3 that Kuyter and Melyn be prosecuted for libelling himself and the government in their petition of October 28, 1644, sent in the name of the Eight Men to the company in Holland. Stuyvesant took up the case, and

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 144, 148, 299.

2 Ibid. 154; Laws and Ordinances, 9.

3 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 203, 205.

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the accused, under an indictment prepared by the director and council themselves, were tried by the same body on the charge of læsa majestatis, or seditious attack on the government. They were found guilty, and Stuyvesant gave as his opinion that Melyn should be punished with death. But both of the accused were finally sentenced to fine and banishment.1 They immediately sailed for Europe on the same vessel with Kieft. The ship was wrecked off the Welsh coast and Kieft perished, but Kuyter and Melyn were saved. At once they repaired to the Netherlands and lodged an appeal with the States General against the judgment of the director and council in their case. The sentence against them was suspended,2 and Stuyvesant was ordered to appear in person or through an attorney at The Hague to defend the action of the court, and in the meantime to permit the accused the enjoyment of all their rights in New Netherland.

While these steps were being taken in Europe, Stuyvesant, as one of his many reform measures, undertook the repair of the fort at New Amsterdam. But the commonalty showed itself unwilling to bear the expense. In order the better to secure the money, the commonalty was ordered,3 in September, 1647, to choose eighteen men, from whom the director and council selected the Nine Men. This was the third body of its kind which the exigencies of defence and fiscal needs had brought into existence in New Netherland. The Nine Men, for the first year, were all Dutch in origin and were selected from the merchants, citizens, and farmers of Manhattan, Breuckelen, Amersfoort, and Pavonia. Augustine Heermans, Govert Loockermans, Jan Jansen Dam, Jacob Wolfertsen van Couwenhoven, and Jan Evertsen Bout were prominent among their number. Though the existence of this board was as dependent on the will of the director and council as that of its predecessors, a somewhat fuller description of its functions was expressed in the order which created it. Its members,

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 213, 349; the Breeden Raedt, or Broad Advice, 2 Colls. N. Y. Hist. Soc. III. 265 et seq.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 248 et seq.

3 O’Callaghan, History of New Netherland, II. 37; N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 309 et seq.; Laws and Ordinances, 75.

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as tribunes of the people, were to confer with the director and council about means for promoting the welfare of the community. Such advice they were to give only when regularly convened by the director and only upon matters brought before them by him and the council. At their meetings the director or his representative should be present, should support the proposals of the government, take the vote, and report to the council. When civil suits were on trial before the council, three of the Nine Men, selected monthly in rotation, might attend for the purpose of becoming acquainted with cases wherein they might be called upon to act as arbitrators. The director and council might abolish the board whenever they saw fit, and in the meantime vacancies should be filled by the joint action of the board and the director, without again calling the commonalty together.

It is impossible to state how long the board of Nine Men continued in existence. Traces of it appear in the records as late as April, 1652.1 It concerned itself somewhat with Stuyvesant’s plans of local improvement. At its first meeting it assumed the expense of building a church and starting a school, but it refused to repair the company’s fort. At a later time the board2 called the attention of the director to alleged evils of allowing such as were not permanent residents to trade freely in furs within the province. This led to the issue of regulations confining internal trade to permanent residents, save at the market in New Amsterdam on the weekly market days; and permitting the sale of imported goods from the decks of the vessels which had just brought them to port, provided all duties upon the goods had been paid. Hints appear of a few other acts of this board, of minor importance.

But the Nine Men are chiefly to be remembered for the share they took in the efforts to procure redress and assistance from the home government.3 In the winter of 1649

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. XIV. 112, 145, 155, 163, 177; ibid. I. 444-461.

2 O’Callaghan, History of New Netherland, II. 42, 59; Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland, 86.

3 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 258, 315 et seq.; Broad Advice, 2 N. Y. Hist. Colls. III. 268, 279.

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Melyn returned to New Amsterdam, bringing with him the mandamus which was to be served upon Stuyvesant. Much to the chagrin of the director, this was read in the church in the presence of the commonalty, and gave rise to a dramatic scene. The feud between Stuyvesant and Melyn now became more bitter than ever, and every effort was made to prevent Melyn from securing the rights guarantied to him by the States General, while his friends felt the vengeance of the government. Melyn returned to the Netherlands, while the director appointed Van Tienhoven to answer there for him.

Under these conditions there seemed to be no prospect of reform, or that the necessities of the province would be relieved. For this reason the Nine Men, among whom Adriaen van der Donck, formerly commissary of Rensselaerswyck and now patroon of Yonkers, was a member, resolved to send a delegation of their own to the Netherlands. Preparatory to this, they asked that they might consult the commonalty, but the director objected to this and insisted that they must act in conjunction with him. Members of the board now went from house to house to gather the sentiment of the community. Van der Donck, who, with Van Couwenhoven and Bout, was selected as delegate, drew off some rough notes which he intended to use in the preparation of a formal statement of the condition of the province. Stuyvesant was so enraged when he learned of the independent course which the delegates were taking that he seized Van der Donck’s papers, and had part of them read at the next meeting of the Nine Men. A violent debate followed, in which Van Dincklage, the vice-director, took part in opposition to Stuyvesant. Van der Donck, however, because of the alleged libellous statements which were found in his notes, was expelled from the board and imprisoned.

At this juncture Stuyvesant was charged with being engaged in the sale of arms to the Indians, a form of traffic which he had rigorously prohibited by recent orders. This confirmed the desire of all to strengthen the appeal to the home government. The pressure became so strong that for once the director could not resist it. Van der Donck was

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set free, and in the summer of 1649 departed with his associates for the Netherlands. There the “Remonstrance of New Netherland,” containing an able arraignment of the province as a commercial enterprise, was laid before the States General. The argument of the opposition was here stated in full, and it amounted to this: New Netherland had only a small population, which in numbers and resources were unequal to its defence. Its government was autocratic. Its trade was burdened with excessive regulations. It needed many more Dutch colonists, freer trade, provincial and municipal institutions like those which existed at home. It would also be relieved from its greatest peril if the boundaries of the province could be definitely fixed and maintained. The administrations of both Kieft and Stuyvesant were reviewed at length, and the specific charges against them were brought out in full array.1

Both the directors of the West India company and Van Tienhoven, Stuyvesant’s agent, replied2 to these charges. They were able to show that many of them were exaggerated or based on misapprehension. We can now perceive that some of the most serious causes of weakness and disturbance lay in the very nature of things, and could not be removed without changes far more radical than any which even the opposition contemplated. It is not probable that any policy which the company could have pursued would have greatly stimulated the flow of Dutch population to New Netherland. The trade regulations do not seem to have been excessively severe for the times, especially when we consider the necessity of maintaining a staple port at New Amsterdam. The high prices which prevailed for European goods were due to the heavy cost and risk of their transport across the ocean and the correspondingly high rate of profit of the merchants. There is nothing to show that prices or the rate of profits were higher in New Netherland than in the neighboring English colonies. Van Tienhoven was able to show that New Englanders were taxed more heavily than were the Dutch.

Finally, it is now apparent that the boundary question—

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 295 et seq., 332 et seq.

2 Ibid. 338, 422.

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the most important problem of all—could not be answered, in a way which would satisfy the Dutch colonists in New Netherland. Had the Dutch government and the West India company, prior to 1650, been fighting England instead of Spain, had they centred their efforts on New Netherland instead of Brazil, a Dutch province might have been permanently established on the North American continent. But by 1650 the die had been cast, and the question was already receiving a different answer. The West India company had expended its resources on a grand but futile enterprise in South America. It was now bankrupt, and during what remained of its existence could only make a pretence of colonization. In the light of such considerations it is possible to see why the complaints of the Nine Men could not receive a favorable answer. The States General showed itself, as always, to be well disposed, but the Company conceded little, and that only after delay. It supported Stuyvesant, as in duty it was bound to do, for he was a faithful servant and exponent of the system which the company had established and was resolved to see maintained. Though, as the result of the efforts of Melyn, Van der Donck, and their associates, another order for Stuyvesant’s recall was sent out, it was soon revoked.1 A new set of Freedoms and Exemptions2 was issued by the company, which provided for a few changes in detail, but left the territorial system and trade regulations of the province substantially as they had been since 1640.

The views of the States General were set forth in a report of its committee on New Netherland affairs, issued in 1650, and known as the Provisional Order.3 Besides certain requirements for the better arming of the inhabitants and for the encouragement of agriculture, this document set forth the necessity of enlarging the provincial council by the addition of two councillors appointed for four years from a list presented by the patroons, or their agents, and the deputies of the commonalty. It was also proposed that the board of Nine Men should be continued in existence three years longer, and should be given jurisdiction as a

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 390, 471, 475.

2 Ibid. 491.

3 Ibid. 388.

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court over suits not involving more than fifty guilders, and for higher amounts under privilege of appeal. When the increase of population should justify it, a provincial court of justice, distinct from the director and council, should be established. The town of New Amsterdam should receive municipal rights.

These were wise measures, and they were referred to the various chambers of the company for their action. The Amsterdam directors received them with disfavor because of the source whence they came. The administration of the province had been committed to them by the Council of Nineteen, and they were jealous of interference by the States General. They regarded Melyn and the delegates from the board of Nine Men as restless agitators who were seeking personal advantage. This was the view which Stuyvesant held concerning them, and while Van der Donck was laboring in the fatherland for Stuyvesant’s recall, the director himself was jeering and scoffing at the members of the board, trying to punish them for their share in the “Remonstrance,” and substituting appointed selectmen for the original board.1 The company informed the director that the Provisional Order was not to be enforced. But, as the result of the persistence of Van der Donck, continued for a period of two years, views were elicited from the other chambers of the company which suggested the possibility of the withdrawal from the Amsterdam chamber of its exclusive control over the province.2 This convinced the Amsterdam directors, and Stuyvesant as well, that some concession must be made, and this took the form of a grant of municipal rights to New Amsterdam. But the prolonged efforts which were necessary before its advantages were fully secured have already been described.

With the outbreak of war between England and the Low Countries in 1652, and the resulting activity of the Indians and of freebooters on Long Island sound, the English of Long Island began to take a more active share in the politics

1 See extracts from letters of the Nine Men to Van der Donck during the years 1650 and 1651, ibid. 444 et seq.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 462-468.

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of New Netherland. Their object was to secure from the Dutch government protection for themselves, or, if that was impossible, to seek it elsewhere. The military weakness of the Dutch, as well as the lack of representative government in the province, and the extent to which the director and council ignored the expressions of local need, seemed to make such action necessary. But it was suggestive of sedition, and was sure to be unfavorably regarded by the director. At Flushing delegates assembled from that town, Hempstead, Middleburgh (Newtown), and Gravesend, and opened communication with the magistrates of New Amsterdam. This action led to a meeting at the city hall on November 26, 1653, which was attended by two delegates from each of the towns mentioned, as well as two from the burgomasters and schepens1 of New Amsterdam. George Baxter of Gravesend was credited with being the prime mover in the enterprise. Stuyvesant sent La Montagne and Werckhoven to attend on behalf of the council. When they attempted to guide proceedings, the English delegates refused even to recognize them as members of the convention. The same delegates then sent in writing to the director a statement that, as he would not protect them, they must provide for themselves. For this reason, while still professing allegiance to the States General and the company, they thought they were no longer under obligation to pay taxes to the provincial government. Not content with this declaration, and apparently with the intent of putting it at once into practice, they proposed a firm alliance with the magistrates of New Amsterdam. To this the delegates from New Amsterdam gave no answer, but reported what was said to the director. That drew from him the declaration that, though the burghers might still confer with the English, he would at the next election grant courts of justice to Breuckelen, Amersfoort, and Midwout, so that delegates from Dutch towns to future assemblies of this kind might outvote the English. This promise was reasonably well kept.2 In reply to the director’s further statement of his willingness

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. XIV. 223-240; O’Callaghan, II. 238.

2 Ordinances of New Netherland, 159.

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to protect his people, the delegates cited recent outrages by small bands of savages which had gone unpunished, as poor evidences of his ability in that direction. At the concluding session on the following day, when La Montagne am Werckhoven were not present, the delegates from New Amsterdam objected to forming an alliance with the English until the other Dutch towns, as well as the director and council and Amsterdam chamber, had been consulted. The Englishmen replied that if the city did not join them and the director protect them, they would form a union among themselves on Long Island. But in order the better to ascertain the sentiments of the Dutch on the subject, an adjournment was taken until the tenth of December.

The burgomasters and schepens of New Amsterdam nor requested the director to summon delegates from all the Dutch towns and settlements to the forthcoming convention that they might prepare such remonstrance to the Amsterdam chamber as seemed wise. This elicited from Stuyvesant and the council a long protest against false statement alleged to have been made by the English at the recent meeting, and on the peril of allowing subjects to form an offensive and defensive alliance without the knowledge and consent of the government. But they consented to the holding of the meeting. Four Dutch and four English towns met on December 10 and prepared their remonstrance.4 The contents of this remarkable document clearly reveal the influence of the English delegates who shared in its preparation. The argument begins with the claim that they had settled in New Netherland on a mutual covenant with the lords patroons, to which the natives from whom they had purchased the soil had assented. Being thus not a conquered or subjugated people, but such as had voluntarily put themselves under the protection of the laws of the province, they considered that they were entitled to privileges equal with those of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. After this introduction, which suggests the reasoning of a century later, the remonstrants state their charges against the government of New Netherland. The only

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. I. 550.

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important complaint was that its government was arbitrary, that is, absolute, in form and spirit; officers were appointed without nomination by the people; orders and proclamations were issued without the approval, and in many cases without the knowledge, of the people. “’Tis contrary to the first intentions and genuine principles of every well regulated government, that one or more men should arrogate to themselves the exclusive power to dispose, at will, of the life and property of any individual, and this by virtue or under pretence of a law or order he or they might enact, without the consent, knowledge or election of the whole Body, or its agents as representatives. Hence the enactment, except as aforesaid, of new laws or orders affecting the commonalty or the inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed to the granted Freedoms of the Dutch Government and odious to every freeborn man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a free state on newly settled lands, which might require new laws and orders, not transcending, but resembling as near as possible those of Netherland. We humbly submit that ’tis one of our privileges that our consent or that of our representatives is necessarily required in the enactment of such laws and orders.”

It was impossible that the sentiments expressed in this remonstrance could be other than irritating to Stuyvesant, for they proceeded from the supposition that by natural right the constitution of New Netherland should be other than it was; that it should possess a representative, tax-granting assembly. The director and council, on receiving the document, peremptorily ordered the convention to disperse. It was told not to meet again, or use the titles “general assembly” or “delegates of the land.” It was declared to be illegal, because it had not been called by the director and council. It was only a conventicle. To the statement that by nature all men had the right to assemble for the purpose of promoting the public welfare, Stuyvesant opposed the doctrine that only officials, not men in general, could do this. All political action which did not proceed with the knowledge and consent of the recognized authorities he repudiated. The director and council stood squarely

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on the authority of their commission and instructions, and refused to share in the doings of any “self-created unlawful gathering.” The town of Gravesend now laid its complaints before the Amsterdam chamber, while the magistrates of New Amsterdam sent a mild representation1 to the burgomasters of Amsterdam, in which they dwelt wholly on the right which the city claimed to share in the choice of its magistrates and to control the revenue from the excise on wine and beer consumed in the city. Thus ended the first effort, in which Englishmen prominently shared, to limit in some way the discretion of the executive in New Netherland. Like the earlier efforts, it resulted only in an empty protest.

Ten years now passed, during which the English from the north made great encroachments on the territory of New Netherland, and at the same time developed great political independence and activity on Long Island. In the Connecticut charter, which had recently been issued, the existence of New Netherland was entirely ignored. A troublesome Indian war also prevailed at intervals on the middle Hudson, while in 1655 the savages had done much damage on Manhattan itself and in its immediate vicinity. Stuyvesant had been able to destroy the power of the Swedes on the South river, but his energies and resources were wholly inadequate to the task of holding the English in check on Long Island and in Westchester. The Dutch had long since ceased to protest against his autocratic rule, because they now saw the necessity of union in the presence of a threatening rival. The authorities at home could be induced to do nothing for the province except to utter pious wishes for its welfare. Stuyvesant, with wholly inadequate military and financial resources, was left to fight the battle alone. He was incessantly active, showing much address in dealing with the English and not a little conciliation. But it was clearly a losing battle, and he was forced to yield point after point. During this crisis it was well that his discretion was unlimited. As the protagonist of the Dutch cause in North America during the years previous to its extinction, the figure of Peter Stuyvesant assumes something of the heroic.

1 O’Callaghan, II. 253; Records of New Amsterdam, I. 144.

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It was in the last stage of this struggle that, with the full consent of the director, another effort was made to secure joint action by the localities.

On November 1, 1663, the magistrates of New Amsterdam, Haerlem, Breuckelen, Midwout, Amersfoort, New Utrecht, Bushwick, and Bergen met and sent a remonstrance to the Amsterdam chamber.1 It was intended that magistrates from the settlements on the upper Hudson should be present, but the lateness of the season prevented this. The remonstrance set forth in strong language the dangers which threatened the province, and arraigned the Amsterdam directors for their failure to keep the promise made in the Freedoms and Exemptions to protect the colonists and their property against usurpation and force. But practical result it had none.

As the prospect continually grew darker, on April 10, 1664, the first and only assembly of delegates from all the localities in the province was called at New Amsterdam.2 The summons was issued by the director at the request of the burgomasters and schepens, and two delegates were chosen from each of the towns. This was properly a representative body, a Landtdag. Jeremias Van Rensselaer was its president. The convention asked the government to protect the inhabitants against the Indians and the English. The director and council replied that, in their efforts to do this, they had already exceeded their powers. They called in turn on the assembly to furnish supplies for a regular force, or, if not, that every third man in the province should be called out. The assembly asked whether it should address the company or the States General. Stuyvesant insisted that the inhabitants had not contributed toward the defence of the province, while the company had expended upon it far more than the revenue amounted to. But the assembly declined to vote supplies, and adjourned without contributing anything of value toward the solution of the difficulties. With this event disappeared the last chance of the growth of representative institutions in New Netherland.

1 O’Callaghan, II. 490; N. Y. Col. Docs. II. 477.

2 O’Callaghan, II. 505.

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The position of the Dutch as a conquered people within the province of New York made it impossible for them, during more than a decade after the English occupation, to join in any movement favorable to the limitation of the power of the executive. Therefore such demands for reforms of this character as were made on the proprietary governors of New York came from the English settlers in the province. Long Island, with its New England inhabitants, traditions, and institutions, was the section where they originated. Protests against the autocracy of the Dutch government had been heard from that region. The advent of the English brought the towns of the east, as well as those of the west, end of the island under the control of government at New York and within reach of this question.

Governor Nicolls at once showed his appreciation of this fact by the efforts he made to conciliate the people of this section. In his earliest proclamation and letters not only were the privileges of English subjects promised to all who made due submission, but it was stated that deputies from the Long Island towns should in convenient time be summoned “to propose and give their advice in all matters tending to the peace and benefitt” of that section. “They may assure themselves,” wrote the governor on another occasion, “of equall if not greater, freedomes & Imunityes then any of his Majesty’s Colonyes in New England. . . .” These utterances naturally led those to whom they were addressed to believe that a representative, tax-granting assembly would be conceded.

This feeling was strengthened by the call for the meeting of March 1, 1665, at Hempstead.2 In this call the governor ordered that deputies should be chosen by the freeholders, Dutch and English, of the several towns on the island, to meet him at the designated time and place; and that the result should be a settlement of all controversies and the propagation of the true religion. The summons called for the presentation of such documents as would make

1 Bulletin N. Y. State Library, General Entries, 79, 100, 132; Journal of Legislative Council of New York, Introduction.

2 Bulletin, General Entries, 154; N. Y. Col. Docs. XIV. 564, 565.

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possible the settlement of boundary disputes between towns and the establishment of all important territorial rights. Beyond that it did not go. It made no general grant of legislative power. The “general meeting” which resulted was in no sense a legislative body. It listened to the promulgation of a code of laws, and, so far as the fragment of its records which has been preserved would indicate, took some steps toward the settlement of boundary controversies between the towns.1 It also sent to the duke a declaration of submission to his rule.2 The close of this meeting without further action was doubtless a disappointment to its members. As time passed and the duke himself, with the governor and council, continued to legislate for the province, and rates which the proprietor or his council really had determined were regularly assessed by the town overseers and collected by the constable under orders from the sheriff, it became evident that New York was existing under a system different from that of the New England colonies, Maryland, and Virginia. But Nicolls had no authority to change it, for the royal charter made no mention of an assembly, and his instructions, though now lost, must have been silent on this subject. The most he could do was to commend the autocratic system which he was sent to enforce by a just and mild administration, and this he accomplished to a very marked degree.

In 1669, however, soon after the accession to office of Governor Lovelace, petitions3 were presented by Hempstead, Oyster Bay, Flushing, Jamaica, Newtown, Gravesend, with Westchester and Eastchester, the two English towns on the mainland, craving a redress of several grievances. First among these was a demand that the promise which Nicolls and the other royal commissioners had made when English

1 Nicolls, in a letter to John Underhill dated May, 1666, implies that the meeting not only accepted the method of levying rates which was prescribed in the Duke’s Laws, but agreed that, if the sum mentioned would not satisfy the public charge, an additional rate should be levied and in the same way. In a report on the state of the province prepared in 1670, the statement is made that the rate of public charges was agreed to in a general assembly. N. Y. Col. Docs. XIV. 580; III. 188.

2 N. Y. Col Docs. III. 91.

3 Ibid. XIV. 681 et seq.

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sovereignty was established, namely, that the inhabitants of Long Island should enjoy such privileges as other English subjects in America enjoyed, should be fulfilled. These privileges the petitioners claimed to consist in the annual election, by the freeholders of the towns or parishes, of deputies who should cooperate with the governor and council in the passage of laws, and in the publication of those parts of the governor’s commission (and presumably also of his instructions) which directly concerned the colonists. The reply which these petitions elicited revealed the uselessness of pinning faith to vague and general statements. Colonel Nicolls, it was said, had not made the alleged promise, for he had been directed by his instructions to make no change in the system of government which had been agreed upon before his arrival. The supremacy of the executive and the binding force of the governor’s commission—which had often been read to them—was then asserted to the fullest extent. Nothing, it was said, was required but obedience and submission to the laws as they appeared in the duke’s commission.

Before a year had passed the towns had an opportunity to express their opinions still more pointedly. Through the justices in the courts of sessions the court of assizes ordered a levy for the repair of the palisade of Fort James, which had fallen into decay. Immediately the inhabitants of Southold, Easthampton, Southampton, Jamaica, Flushing, and Hempstead either protested against the demand as illegal, because it called for a grant without their consent, or expressed themselves as willing to pay the tax provided they might have such privileges as colonists in New England enjoyed. Though no seditious sentiments were directly expressed in these papers, both the court of sessions of the west riding and the governor and council pronounced them scandalous, illegal, and seditious, and the last-named ordered them to be publicly burned before the city hall in New York. Southampton and Southold, which had not yet taken out new patents for their land from the English authorities, now refused to do so. The court of assizes declared titles in Southampton to be invalid unless a patent was taken out within a

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specified time. Against this decree fifty of the inhabitants issued a remonstrance, complaining not only of the order of the court, but of the fact that they had no deputies. The governor appointed three of the councillors a committee to confer with the remonstrants,1 but no further steps were taken to enforce obedience. Here the discussion of the points at issue ceased until after the close of the Dutch reoccupation and the appearance of Edmund Andros as governor.

Andros was at once met with the demand for an assembly, and it came, as before, from the Long Island towns. The governor discouraged the movement, and for this action received the approval of the duke.2 The latter wrote on at least two occasions that he considered such bodies likely to prove dangerous, that they would assume many privileges and thus disturb the peace of the province. Neither did he believe an assembly to be necessary, because all grievances could be redressed by the courts or the governor in the province, or by appeal to himself. There the matter rested until 1680, when Andros was recalled to answer certain charges growing out of his administration of the revenue. Hitherto orders had regularly been issued once every three years for the collection of the duke’s customs. The last order for this had been issued in 1677.3 Before Andros sailed, while commanding that everything should remain “as then settled,” he neglected to expressly mention the customs. They therefore expired by limitation in November, 1680.

In the spring of 1681 certain merchants of the city of New York began to refuse the payment of customs on an incoming cargo. Brockholls, the commander-in-chief, at the time was in Albany; Dyer, the collector, was sick; Lewin was still in the province, pretending that he had found proof of the dishonesty of Andros. When, on Brockholls’s return, the question of the legality of the customs was submitted to the council, instead of ordering their collection until word

1 Ms. Records of Court of Assizes, II. 646, 653.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 230, 235.

3 Ibid. 246, 287-289, 292; ibid. XIII. 549; Commissions, Orders, Letters, etc., Ms. 43, 45, 53, 54.

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could be obtained from the duke, they decided that there was no authority to continue them without orders from his Royal Highness. If this is not to be considered as an actual breach of the law, it at least involved gross neglect of the interests which the councillors had sworn to uphold. Its effect was to encourage refusal to pay customs, and other taxes as well, throughout the province. Dyer, the collector, was sued for detaining goods for customs, and was finally brought before the court of assizes on the extravagant charge of treason against the fundamental laws of the realm as set forth in Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and other statutes. This was naturally too weighty a charge for the court to pass upon definitively; and since Dyer questioned its authority in the case, after the examination of witnesses it remanded him to England for trial before the privy council. The court also petitioned the duke that the province might in the future be ruled by a governor, council, and assembly to be elected by the freeholders, as was the custom in the other colonies. The court stated that the inhabitants of the province had “groaned” under the “inexpressible burdens” of “arbitrary and absolute power”; that, by means of revenue exacted against their wills, their trade had been burdened and their liberty destroyed, until they had become a “reproach” to their neighbors in the other colonies.

Brockholls meantime was seized with a panic. In July he wrote that not a penny of customs was paid in the province and that it was scarcely possible to keep the peace. There was a general demand for an assembly, and Brockholls was sure that quiet would not be restored until the government was greatly strengthened or changed to suit the popular will. Early in August a commission was received from Andros, specially empowering Brockholls to receive the duke’s revenue, and commanding all to obey him. Encouraged by this, Brockholls sent orders for the collection of the excise at Esopus and Albany. In his letter to the commissaries at Albany, however, he was not imperative, but threw doubt on the legality of the excise by referring to the fact that no provision for it could be found in any law book in New York; it rested on custom and the orders of a

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succession of governors. The consequence was that Brockholls’s orders met with little or no response. His subsequent letters to Andros show with the utmost clearness that authority had collapsed, that the judges and all other officials were scared. Disorderly meetings were held in various towns on Long Island. Disturbances were also reported at Esopus. Several magistrates from Long Island were summoned to appear on the charges of refusing to perform their duties, promoting sedition, and attacking the government. Josiah Hubbard of Easthampton, the high sheriff, to an extent justified such conduct on his own part, and was bound over for trial. For nearly a year the government showed itself to be weak, if not almost in collusion with its opponents. Dyer, of course, was exonerated1 as soon as he reached England, but the large reduction of the revenue brought the duke to terms. The English towns of Long Island had initiated the effort, and it was carried through to success by the action of the merchants of New York City.2

In the spring of 1682, on the duke’s return from Scotland, he wrote3 to Brockholls that it was his intention, through the calling of an assembly and other measures agreeable to the laws of England, to give to residents in New York and traders thither all the privileges which were enjoyed by the inhabitants of other American plantations. But he also warned Brockholls that he expected the colonists to support the government and to clear off the arrears which had accumulated since the obstruction to the collection of duties began. Preparatory to the execution of this measure, Colonel Thomas Dongan was appointed governor in the place of Andros, the latter receiving an appointment at court. Dongan’s instructions4 contained the duke’s plan of reform. In addition to the appointment of a council which should

1 N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 318-321.

2 General Entries, Ms. 1680-1682, contain Brockholls’s letters during this crisis, and much additional material. Some of the letters have been printed in N. Y. Col. Docs. XIII and XIV; Brodhead, II. 351 et seq.

3 N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 317.

4 Ibid. 881.

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contain the most eminent men of the province, the governor was instructed to issue writs in the name of the proprietor for the election by the freeholders throughout the province of an assembly of not more than eighteen representatives. This body should enjoy freedom of debate and of voting on all matters respecting which legislation would be proper for New York and its dependencies. Its acts should be subject to the assent and dissent of both the governor and the proprietor. The right of summons, prorogation, and dissolution should rest wholly in the hands of the governor, though it might be exercised under instructions from the proprietor. No law for raising a revenue should be passed without an express mention of the fact that the grant was made to the proprietor; and no act reducing the revenue should be passed without the express prior consent of the duke. No public money should be paid out without warrant under the governor’s hand. The passage of temporary laws should, as far as possible, be avoided. In this body of instructions originated many of the most important features of the constitutional law of New York. They had the precision which characterized the later orders of the crown concerning the legislatures of the royal provinces, and in the case of New York were revived when, as a royal province, it came to have a permanent legislature.

As soon as possible after Governor Dongan’s arrival in the province, writs of election were issued,1 for each of the three ridings of Yorkshire, for the city of New York and Haerlem, for Esopus, for Albany and Rensselaerswyck, f or Schenectady and dependencies, for Pemaquid and dependencies, for Martha’s Vineyard, Nantucket, and the other neighboring islands. Thus not only was the province of New York itself, but all its dependencies, except that on the Delaware, to be represented. Three members were returned from each of the ridings of Yorkshire, four from the city of New York and Haerlem, two from Esopus, two from Albany and Rensselaerswyck, and one from each of the remaining groups of settlements. The general assembly met at Fort James in the city of New York on October 17, 1683, and remained in

1 Journal of Legislative Council, Introduction, ix.

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session for about three weeks. Of its members a majority were of Dutch descent.1

The journal of this assembly has been lost, but the fifteen acts which it passed have been preserved, and constitute the beginning of the statute law of New York.2 Those which are of greatest importance in this connection relate to the organization and powers of the general assembly and the guaranties of civil rights which it immediately sought to establish. The entire province and its dependencies were divided into counties, their names and boundaries remaining in most cases permanent. In the so-called “charter of liberties”—the first statute that was passed—provision was made for the representation of the freeholders of the province in the assembly by counties. The whole legislature was given a statutory basis, and provision was made that the assembly should meet at least once in three years. To the governor, council, and assembly should belong the supreme legislative power within the province. At the beginning of a series of clauses which were intended to secure to all inhabitants the jury trial and the civil rights which it had been the object of Magna Carta and the Petition of Right to guaranty, stood the declaration that no tax, custom, or assessment should be levied on any subject within the province without the consent of the governor, council, and representatives in general assembly met. In pursuance of this enactment a free and voluntary grant was made to the governor for one year of one penny in the pound on all real and personal estate in the province. Commissioners to make this levy in each county were designated in the act, and their duties were specified. By another act provision was made for a new tariff of customs duties and excise, at rates generally higher than those prescribed by the duke, and specific rather than ad valorem.3 Thus with a bold hand and according to the best English traditions this assembly assumed the full exercise of the taxing power, and that under the form

1 Brodhead, II. 382.

2 The Colonial Laws of New York, I. 111.

3 Compare N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 217, with Colonial Laws of New York, I. 117.

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of an annual grant of the internal or direct tax. It also provided for the establishment of county and local courts and began the work of defining their jurisdiction. By this act the legislature assumed to remodel the judicial system of the province and to give it also a statutory basis.

The important measures of this session received the approval of the governor and were sent to the proprietor. They were examined by him and his council in October, 1684. The so-called “charter of liberties,” and probably the other acts, was approved by the duke; his approval was countersigned by his secretary, Sir John Werden, and was sent to the duke’s auditor to be registered preparatory to its being despatched to New York.1 Meantime the approval of the governor brought the acts provisionally into operation. But before the duke’s approval reached New York, Charles II died and the duke became king. This closed the period of proprietary government in New York.

One of the first acts of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, after the accession of James II to the throne, was to examine2 the provisions of the so-called “charter of liberties” to ascertain whether they so far conformed with the privileges enjoyed by the plantations generally, and agreed with the purposes then entertained by the home government concerning the colonies, as to admit of its final confirmation. It was found to contain clauses which asserted too absolutely the legislative supremacy of the governor, council, and assembly, which insisted too strongly on triennial sessions, which referred to “the people” as the source whence the assembly sprang, and which seemed to imply that the governor could not act without the consent of the council. The powers thus asserted were believed to be greater than those generally enjoyed by colonial legislatures, and might be understood to imply a denial of the legislative supremacy of parliament. But, while these considerations of themselves might have seemed weighty enough to the

1 Brodhead, II. 416 n.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 354, 357. The paper entitled “Observations on the Charter of the Province of New York” errs in several particulars in its statements concerning the contents of the act.

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crown to induce it to disallow the act, the really decisive consideration must have been the resolve, which was then taking shape, that assemblies in all the colonies should be dispensed with. For this reason the acts of 1683 were not finally confirmed; neither were the thirty-one acts of a later session, and the six acts of a second assembly,1 which Dongan held before the transition to the consolidated royal province was completed. Finally, when, in 1686, Dongan was commissioned2 as royal governor, he was expressly empowered to exercise the full legislative, as well as executive, power, in conjunction with the council. Thus with the beginning of royal government New York, by action of the home government, was forced back into its original condition and remained without a representative assembly as long as James II occupied the throne.

New York consisted as yet of a number of loosely connected sections. The two components of its population—Dutch and English—had not yet grown together into a political whole. They spoke different languages. Many differing forms of religious faith existed within the province. The larger part of its people had long been accustomed to autocratic rule. The charter guarantied nothing different. Commercial interests predominated in the city, where, if anywhere, continued and successful opposition to autocratic government could be maintained. New York, moreover, formed the centre and starting-point of a great imperialist scheme of colonial union, and it was without power to resist. For these reasons the permanent establishment of representative institutions in that province was postponed until it could be achieved by a government in England which favored their maintenance in all the colonies. At that late period within this province began in permanent form the development of institutions through statutory enactment.

1 Laws of the Colony of New York, I. 142-178.

2 N. Y. Col. Docs. III. 378.

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