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CHAPTER XII

NEW YORK AS A ROYAL PROVINCE. THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNOR DONGAN

When, as the result of the accession of James, Duke of York, to the throne, New York became a royal province, a new commission, with accompanying instructions, was issued to Governor Dongan.¹ They bore dates in May and June, 1686. In general character they were the same as those which had recently been issued to the governors of Virginia and New Hampshire, except that no provision was made for an assembly. As we shall see, they were exactly reproduced in the commissions and instructions which were issued to Andros in 1686 and 1688 as governor general of the dominion of New England. This extension of this type of commission and instructions fully confirmed and established it as the one which was to be followed in the royal provinces throughout the eighteenth century. In these documents reasonably uniform principles of government were laid down and such as were in harmony with English sovereignty and law. A uniform administrative system in harmony with them was what the British officials sought to substitute for the variety and crudities which were so conspicuous among the chartered colonies. It is a suggestive fact that the royal system agreed better with conditions which existed in New York than with those of any other colony. Having regard both to the commission and the instructions, the following were the principles which they set forth—and with modifications to fit local and temporary differences the description will apply to all the provinces which passed under royal control.

In all possible ways the authority of the king was to be recognized; officials, from the governor down, held directly or indirectly by his appointment; if the governor suspended a councillor he should at once notify the king of the reasons;

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the oath of allegiance and appropriate official oaths were to be administered to all office holders; periodical reports were to be made by the governor to the lords of trade concerning all affairs of government, and minutes of the proceedings of the council were required to be sent to England; reports concerning matters of finance were to go with vouchers to the officers of the royal treasury; appropriations of revenue were always to be made to the king and all writs should run in his name; no fines or forfeitures amounting to more than £10, and no escheats, should be remitted till the lord high treasurer was notified and directions about the matter were given; no grant should be made or act done whereby the revenue was lessened without special permission; money should be paid out of the treasury only under the warrant of the governor; no new court or judicial office should be established without the king’s special order; alterations in the value of the coin were placed under the same restriction. These are typical of requirements which meet one at every step, and they were all intended as guaranties of English sovereignty.

Conformity with the law of England, so far as local conditions would permit, was equally prominent and was the chief kindred object that was sought. In a way this purpose was facilitated by concentrating authority in the hands of the executive and excluding an assembly from the system. The governor and council, however, were given the power to legislate, as well as to issue ordinances. The prior legislation of the colonies where royal government was established was considered as still in force, though it was subject to modification or repeal in parts by acts of the governor and council. In like manner existing revenue should be continued until new taxes were levied. The membership of the councils was often twelve, though it was considerably larger in the case of New England. They were selected from among the freeholders, thrifty men and well affected to the government. The quorum was usually five or seven. The possible number by whom the most important business was done was therefore small and necessarily subject to great influence by the governor. And yet the members were promised freedom of speaking and voting. The form

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of enactment was “by the governor and council.” In order to insure agreement with the laws of England, all acts, within three months after their passage, must be sent to England for approval or disallowance. In the instructions it was declared that no man’s life, freehold, or goods should be taken except according to law, but this was far from being an effective protection. The maintenance of the supremacy of English law was also sought through the system of appeals in civil suits, first to the governor and council, and finally, in cases involving more than £300, to the king in council in England. Security must be given to meet all charges which might accrue. The power of reprieve and pardon in criminal cases, subject when necessary to review by the home government, was reserved to the governor.

Military authority was bestowed on the governor, without express mention of the council. It included the power to levy, arm, muster, and command the entire militia of the province and all its force by sea and land. A system of training was to be maintained, and an inventory of arms and stores should annually be sent to England. The militia was to be used not simply within the province, but might also be sent to other colonies for their protection. By this provision, repeated as it was in later instructions, an important step was taken to overcome the particularism which appears in the laws of some of the chartered colonies and in the practice of nearly all of them. Authority was given to the governor to build and demolish forts, to furnish them with ordnance, and to execute martial law within the province. Vice admiralty powers were bestowed on the governor in great fulness, but they were not to extend to offences committed on the high seas or by persons serving on royal ships of war.

The governor was required to promote trade, including that with the Indians; to check monopoly, but at the same time to enforce all the provisions of the acts of trade and prevent traffic with the territories of the Royal African company. Land in moderate quantities should be bought from the Indians. Treaties should be observed and special means taken to suppress pirates. The governor was also

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empowered to grant land at a moderate quit rent, to establish markets, fairs, and ports, and to cause the erection of custom houses and storehouses.

In provinces where, as in Virginia or New York, the Church of England was favored or established, the governor was commanded to foster its worship, cause parishes to be formed, uphold the jurisdiction which was becoming fixed in the hands of the bishop of London, collate to benefices, grant licenses for marriage and probate of wills, have a care for the orthodoxy of schoolmasters, uphold good morals and punish their opposite. In New York and New England the press, if there was one, was placed under a strict censorship. Intelligent conformity in all these details was sought, though by no means always attained, through regular correspondence with the officers in London.

Among the first matters of business which came before Dongan as royal governor was the duty of replying to the queries sent by the home government concerning the condition of the province.¹ His replies on many points were very detailed. He outlined the judicial system as regulated by the acts of assembly. The bills which had been passed during the last session he sent to England with his report on the state of the province. The defences of the province are described. But upon the revenues and expenditures the governor went into the greatest detail. In connection with this subject he urged the annexation of Connecticut and the Jerseys to New York, a subject to which he recurred in nearly every letter which he sent to England.

New York in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries ranked among the smaller colonies. It comprised, in addition to the three islands and the Westchester region in its southern part, only a narrow strip of settled country on either bank of the Hudson. Its form was unfortunate, while at the same time its central location made it a favorite object of attack both from the north and the south. Dongan never ceased to argue that the resources of New York as it was, with its sparse population, its limited area, its rocky soil

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and mountainous character, were inadequate to sustain the burdens which rested upon it. He perceived that it occupied the central position in the chain of English colonies which now extended along the coast. Upon it rested chiefly the task of maintaining Indian alliances and of regulating dealings with the French. Should war with Canada ever occur, New York would surely be a chief object of attack. Dongan was already seeking to establish trade relations with the Indians beyond Niagara, and thus to break up the monopoly of the French and thwart their plans of territorial expansion. To him the rivalry of the French and English for the possession of North America was a present fact. He thought and acted continentally. The possibility of a conflict he clearly perceived. To his mind New York seemed to be the pivot on which hung the fortunes of the English cause. He therefore deplored the fact that the ancient bounds of New Netherland had not been retained as the limits of New York. Dongan insisted upon the advantages of uniting Connecticut with New York, instead of with New England, as the changes which were in progress seemed almost to have assured. He dwelt upon the loss to the revenue of New York and its Indian trade which was caused by the independence of the Jerseys. Smuggling was facilitated, traders were attracted to the ports of the Jerseys, because there no customs duties were levied. He was not in favor of making Perth Amboy a port and stationing a customs officer there, for all the business, he thought, could better be done at New York.

Dongan deplored the establishment of Pennsylvania as a distinct province. He feared its influence on the peltry trade of New York. He could not believe that it ever could have been the king’s intention to grant away so much territory which had been a part of New Netherland. He desired that a strip of land between the Delaware and Susquehanna rivers, about twenty-five miles broad, might be taken from Pennsylvania and given to New York. In that region he also asked permission to erect two forts which he apparently considered almost as necessary to the preservation of the interest of New York in the fur trade as would be a fort at

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Niagara. He also suggested the importance of restoring the Delaware Lower Counties to New York, so that their tobacco might be brought to Manhattan without duty and thence shipped to Europe. Even after these territories had been separated from his province, Penn, it was conjectured, would have a larger area than all England. These arguments were quite in harmony with the plans which were already about matured in England to unite the northern Colonies into a great dominion of which New York must necessarily become the centre. Andros, during his administration, had cherished and expressed the same ideas, though perhaps in less detailed form.¹

In his discussion of the revenue, Dongan began with an account of the customs and excise. Coming to the quit rents, after stating that in most of the patents which were granted by his predecessors either no quit rent or a very inconsiderable one had been reserved, he stated that he had secured the renewal of many grants with increased rent. “The methods that I took for the obliging them to this was finding several Tracts of Land in their Townshipps not purchased of the Indians and soe at his Majesty’s disposal. They were willing rather to submit to a greater Quit-Rent, than have that unpurchased land disposed of to others than themselves.”² “It is likewise true,” he again wrote, “that I have called in former Patents and still continue to doe soe, that I might see by what Tenure they hold their lands, which I find generally to bee by none, they paying no acknowledgment to the King. Whereupon being convinced of that defect by the resolution of ye Judges the people for their own ease and quiet and that of their Posterity which otherwise might have fallen under the lash of succeeding Governors, without the least murmuring have renewed their Patents, with a reservation of a certain Quit-Rent to the King to the noe small advancement of his Revenue, and this done with general satisfaction and of which none will in the least complain but on the contrary express themselves thankful for it.”³

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The receiver and collector during more than three years before the time when Dongan made his report, was Lucas Santen. He held office under a patent first from the duke and later from the king. He appears to have been an extremely inefficient officer, and Dongan was compelled to assume to an extent the direct management of the finances, in order to save them from the direst confusion. He tried to treat Santen kindly, but found him totally unfit for business and as dependent as a child upon the direction of others. The interference of the governor, however, deeply offended the collector, provoked him to outbursts of passion, and finally led him to submit a long series of charges against Dongan to the authorities in England. Dongan found no difficulty in answering the complaints, and in doing so he threw some light on certain phases of colonial administration.

Dongan found that collectors and receivers were appointed for Albany,¹ Esopus, Long Island, and the counties of Richmond, Westchester, Dukes, and Cornwall. These were appointed, in part at least, by the collector, but owing to Santen’s inefficiency the tendency was for the governor to assume the appointment of them all. Robert Livingston owed his appointment at Albany at this time to the governor. For three years the collector at Esopus had not accounted, and when he was forced to appear before the council, plead that his papers, together with much of the corn and peltry which he had received for the excise, customs, and quit rents, had been burned with his house. All that could be obtained from him was a bond for the payment of £200. From Richmond no account had been submitted. Santen had obtained two bonds from the collector of Westchester payable in March, 1687; but as the collector was so poor as to have “hardly bread to put into his mouth,” Dongan considered his bonds worthless and that the revenue from Westchester was a total loss. During the first year of his administration only £52 was reported as the yield of the excise on Long Island. As this was the most populous section of the province, where

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much rum was consumed, Dongan considered this sum to be absurdly small. He therefore appointed Nicolls and Vaughan collectors of this tax on Long Island, with the agreement that they should receive £40 and account for the remainder with Santen. Apparently this worked well as a temporary expedient, but for the next two years a collector was appointed on a salary. His accounts were submitted and duly audited. So were those from Dukes county and Cornwall.

The people at the east end of Long Island the governor found engaged in active trade with New England and unwilling to enter and clear at New York. The oil which they procured from the whale industry was sent to New England ports and exchanged for European goods. To check this evil Dongan caused the passage of an act imposing a duty of two per cent. on goods which were imported from any colony where they were not produced. Of the effect of this curious application of one of the principles embodied in the English navigation act we are not informed. But in pursuance of a concession to the towns, a port was established at the east end of the island and an officer was appointed to enter and clear vessels and collect duties.

“The first year,”¹ wrote Dongan, “I left everything to the care of Mr. Santen and what officers bee thought fit to put in, but afterwards, finding things ill managed, I spoke to Mr. Santen several times, advising him as a friend to look better to the trust reposed in him. . . . After the expiration of the year I desired him to bring in his accounts that they might be audited, which hee promised me from time to time but in such manner as was not fit for him, for always when I spoke to him of monys and accompts, hee flew into a passion. Upon which I ordered him that since hee had no better Government of himself bee should refrain coming into my company. And after I frequently sent to him by the Secretary for his accts, who likewise met with the like dilatory answers. Upon which I had him brought before the Council 3 or 4 times, where he was often ordered to bring in his accts but

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all to noe purpose, for upwards of a year together, as your Lordships may see by the time of the Audit and by the several Orders of Council herewith sent.

“At last when his accts came I shewed them to the Council who were mightily surprised that for eighteen months; & upwards the Revenue should amount but to 3000 and odd pounds. Upon which I had them audited and thereby ii was found that a great many frauds had been done to the king as your Lordships may see by the said Audit & the charge brought in and proved at Mr. Santen.”

“After the Audit of his first accompts,” continues Dongan, “his others were demanded, and with the same deficiency as the former, obtained, as your Lordships may perceive by the said Minutes of Councils particularly the order of payment every Saturday, which was occasioned thus. The Council considering how dilatory Mr. Santen was & with what difficulty he would be brought to account, being satisfied that Mr. Santen was then behind hand in his payments and that in process of time he might bee yet more, so for the preventing of further imbezlement of his Majesty’s Revenue, they ordered him that every Saturday hee should accompt with & pay into mee what hee had received the proceeding week, which was a method taken in the time of Sir Edmund Andros with Captain Dyer the then collector on the like occasion, tho’ this had not the like effect through Mr. Santen’s disobedience, for as hee did with all other orders, hee did with this, hee took noe notice of it.”

The council also on other occasions repeatedly ordered Santen to have his accounts ready to send over audited to England by Mr. Spragg. But though Spragg delayed sailing for two months, Santen refused to submit his accounts to Dongan for audit, insisting that he had been instructed by the lord treasurer that it was not necessary, but that it would be sufficient if he left a duplicate of the accounts with the governor. The council, however, fell back on earlier instructions, which were to the contrary effect. But it was to no purpose; Santen would not obey their commands or correct the irregularities of his administration. With such audit as could be got it was found that he was more

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than £1700 behind. The poor man was subject to “hypocondriack fitts” and was “wholy unfit for business,” and had it not been for Dongan’s constant watchfulness, the revenue would have suffered much more than it did. But, as Santen was an appointee of the treasury, Dongan could not remove or apparently even suspend him. Therefore he turns to the king in despair, defending himself against Santen’s charges and insisting on the latter’s total incapacity. In 1687 Santen was removed and Matthew Plowman was appointed as his successor.

About the time when Dongan became a royal governor, the Marquis de Denonville was appointed governor of Canada. He was a man of large experience, especially in military affairs, alert, systematic, and enthusiastic in the service of the king. He was sent over to repair the damage which had come to French interests through the weakness and mismanagement of De la Bane. He was told in his instructions¹ that the pride of the Iroquois must be humbled, and that the Illinois and other allies of the French must receive support. He was informed that the governor of New York had undertaken to assist the Iroquois and to extend British dominion up to the banks of the Saint Lawrence and over the entire country of the Five Nations. At the same time M. Barillon, the French minister at the English court, was ordered by the king to complain that Governor Dongan was aiding the Iroquois, though they were subjects of France and their lands were a part of its territory. He was to demand that precise orders be sent requiring Dongan to confine himself within the limits of his government and to pursue a different line of conduct toward Denonville from that which he had followed toward his predecessor. By this act, as well as the attitude of Louis XIV and his ministers during his entire reign, Denonville felt assured of the support of his government if he pursued an aggressive policy. But, owing to the dissensions in England and the consequent dependence of James II on the French alliance, Dongan could not be sure of the support of his king.

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The governor of New York, however, did not permit himself to be deterred by uncertainty concerning the attitude of his government from clearly asserting the claims of the English on the north and northwest. In doing this he assumed the lead among his own people. His claims and plans as yet interested but very few among them. The other colonies stood wholly aloof, and probably only the few officials who had occasion to attend Indian conferences at Albany were at all aware of the interests for which Dongan was striving. Consciousness upon these points was developed and extended only after a long conflict over the questions which Dongan first propounded. He claimed the entire Iroquois country as within the sphere of influence of the English. In consequence of that claim he considered invasions of that country by the French for the purpose of punishing the Iroquois as unwarranted and a menace to English interests. Of the presence of Jesuit missionaries among the Indians he was intensely suspicious, for he knew them to be most effective political emissaries as well, forerunners of French influence and rule. He desired that among the Iroquois their place might be taken by English missionaries. He longed to see an English commercial and military outpost established at Niagara. He was already sending English and Dutch traders to the Ottawas and other tribes of the Northwest for the purpose of diverting their trade from the French. He insisted that the Five Nations should bring their quarrels with the French to Albany for settlement. Through the English as their overlords disputes with all parties should as far as possible be adjusted.

That Denonville was keenly alive both to the realities and the possibilities of the Anglo-Indian alliance, is shown by his letters to the French ministers. In October, 1686, he wrote to Seignelay¹ that he was certain Dongan had called together the Iroquois at Fort Orange for the purpose of inciting them against the French. Arms and ammunition were being presented to them for use against the French. Efforts were being made to draw the Praying Indians of Montreal away

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from their allies. “Colonel Dongan’s letters,” continues the French governor, “will notify you sufficiently of his pretensions, which extend no less than from the lakes, inclusive, to the South Sea. Missilimackinac is theirs. They have taken its latitude; they have been to trade there with our Ottawas and Huron Indians, who received them cordially on account of the bargains they gave, by selling their merchandise for beaver which they purchased at a much higher rate than we. Unfortunately we had but very few Frenchmen at Missilimackinac at that time. M. de la Durantaye, on arriving there, wanted to pursue the English to pillage them. The Hurons were hastening to escort them after having expressed a great many impertinences against us. Sieur de la Durantaye did not overtake the Indians who met the English on their way to join and escort them through Lakes Erie and Ontario, until they should be beyond all danger of an attack from us. Thus you easily perceive, My Lord, that the English and the Senecas understand each other wonderfully well and are perfectly agreed.”

Similar claims were in every instance urged by the French. They claimed the Mohawk valley as their territory, and vast stretches of country beyond it as well. They cited, in support of the claim, dealings of their missionaries and traders and officials with the Iroquois since the time of Champlain,¹ including a series of treaties with them. La Salle had temporarily established a post at Niagara. The Iroquois had been required to treat only at Montreal or Quebec. Invasions subsequent to these events of the country south of Lake Ontario did not violate, they said, the rights of any foreign power. In dealings with the western Indians the French had anticipated the English by sixty years. “In respect to the pretensions which you say you bore to the lands of this country,” wrote Denonville, “certainly you are not well informed of all the acts of occupancy which have been performed in the name of the King my Master, and of the establishments of long standing which we have on the land and on the lakes.”² No overlapping of claims could be

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more complete than this, and no officials were ever more conscious of the fact and more determined, though both of the Catholic faith, to defend their pretensions by any means short of war. Both, of course, repeatedly declared that the final decision rested with their masters in Europe.

As the Senecas were rapidly destroying the Illinois, were disturbing the peace of other western tribes, and were trying to win them away from the French alliance, Denonville was determined from the first to make war upon them. They should be severely punished. Thus French influence, which had suffered greatly from De la Barre’s failure, would be strengthened throughout the region of the Great Lakes, and the way would be opened for the reëstablishment of the post at Niagara. But Denonville was aware that Dongan was supplying the Iroquois with all the arms and ammunition they wanted, and charged him with directly inciting them to attack the French. This, however, the English governor stoutly and repeatedly denied. Still, to counteract the intrigues of the English, Father Lamberville and other priests were employed to distribute presents among the Iroquois and the western tribes.

Denonville found Canada in an almost defenceless condition. He saw that forts and blockhouses must be built. But he feared to build them, lest he should bring down the Iroquois upon him before he was in a condition to fight. In his perplexity he appealed to the French government for troops. “The principal affair at present,” he wrote to Seignelay, “is the security of this Colony, which is in evident danger of perishing if the Iroquois be let alone, and also if we make war and have not a decided advantage over them; and however decided our advantage may be, the people, separated as they are, will always be in danger. Yet, my Lord, if you aid us with troops, war will be the least inconvenience; for if we wage it not, I do not believe the next year will pass away without the whole trade being absolutely lost; our friendly Indians revolting against us and placing themselves at the mercy of the Iroquois, more powerful, perhaps better armed than any of them. The whole of the Hurons are awaiting only for the

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moment to do so. Had I not by Father de Lamberville’s care fortunately avoided war from the very beginning of this year, not a single canoe would have come down from the forests without being taken and plundered in the River of the Ottawas. We should have lost a great number of good men.”¹

Denonville received no assistance from home, but nevertheless continued preparations for war, opening meantime a correspondence with Dongan. This began with the customary civilities, Dongan writing in French, and referring briefly to his experience with De la Barre. Denonville replied, excusing De la Barre because he had to deal with the Senecas, a “people who have neither religion, nor honor, nor subordination.” They had falsified their pledges by the many acts of violence which they had committed against the Ottawas. Still, in spite of their evil conduct, the French king desired to win them over to Christianity, and therefore had sent missionaries among them to preach the gospel. He then adroitly urged upon Dongan the idea that they should unite in supporting the work of the Jesuits among the Iroquois. “Shall we, Sir, be so unfortunate as to refuse them our Master’s protection to sustain them and to contribute a little on our part to win poor souls to Jesus Christ, by aiding them to overcome the enemy of God who rules them? No, Sir, it is impossible for you but to groan when you perceive that so far from assisting those Apostles of the Gospel, we wage war against them, if we allow their enemies to obstruct their converting these poor people to the Faith.”²

But this appeal met with no response from Dongan except polite phrases. Catholic though he was, it was as far as possible from his intention to give the work of the Jesuits among the Iroquois any support. His attention was directed to the collection of military stores by the French at Cataraqui, and to the rumors that they intended to build a fort at Niagara. Reports of this had been brought to him by a French coureur de bois, who had deserted to Albany. “I know,” Dongan wrote, “you are a man of judgment, and that you

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will not attack the King of England’s subjects.” He also felt assured that Denonville, “for a little peltry,” would, not raise a disturbance among the Indians in that part of the world, who were dependent upon the two crowns. He professed that he was laboring to prevent the Five Nations going beyond the Great Lakes and attacking the French traders or their Indians. Everything could be settled by amicable correspondence, and by reference to the authorities at home. “If there be anything wrong, I doe assure you it shall not be my fault, tho we have suffered much, and doe dayly by your people’s trading within the King of England’s territoryes.”

Denonville denied, though not in precise terms, that he intended to build a fort at Niagara. He advised Dongan, if they were to live on good terms, not to protect deserters or believe the reports which they circulated. To this Dongan replied, “The strictest care should be taken concerning runaways from you, and those who are here, if you please to send for them, shall be all conveyed to you.”¹

But no steps were taken to send the deserters back to Canada, while reports continued to be circulated that Dongan was urging the Iroquois to attack the French. This drew from Denonville a sharp letter of protest.² “You were so good, Sir,” he wrote, “as to tell me that you will give up all the deserters who, to escape the chastisement of their knavery, have fled to you; yet, Sir, you cannot but know those who are there. But as they are all for the most part bankrupts and thieves, I hope that they will finally give you cause to repent having afforded them shelter, and that your merchants who employ them will be punished for having confided in rogues who will not be more faithful to them than they have been to our people.” “You proposed, Sir,” he continued, “to submit everything to the decision of our masters, nevertheless your emissary to the Onnontagues [Onondagas] told all the Nations, in your name, to pillage and make war on us. It is a thing so notorious that it cannot be doubted, and will be affirmed in the presence of your emissary. Whether it was done by your order or

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through the influence of your merchants at Orange, it has been said and done, and you are not a stranger to the enterprise of your merchants against Michilimaquina Michilimackinac.”¹ He then denounced Dongan for furnishing the savages with liquor, which converted them into “demons and their cabins into counterparts of hell.”

In Dongan’s reply² he denied all the charges, and in regard to the liquor asserted that “our Rum doth as little hurt as your Brandy and in the opinion of Christians is much more wholesome.” But at the same time he was striving as hard as ever to checkmate the French. In 1685 Johannes Rooseboom of Albany had been sent at the head of a body of armed traders in eleven canoes to carry English goods to the upper lakes. The enterprise was successful and they were urged by the Indians to come every year. Denonville sent an officer to Detroit to stop them, but they returned in safety. But in June, 1686, Denonville sent an order to Du Lhut, who was at Michilimackinac, to occupy Detroit with fifty coureurs de bois. This was obeyed, and a stockade was built on the western side of the strait, near the outlet of Lake Huron. Thus Dongan’s plans respecting that strategic point were defeated.

In the autumn of 1686 Rooseboom was sent out again,³ this time with twenty or more canoes. He was instructed to winter among the Senecas. Major Patrick McGregory was then commissioned to leave Albany in the spring with a body of armed men. McGregory, it was arranged, should meet Rooseboom in the Senecas’ country, and the combined parties, accompanied by a number of Iroquois Indians, should visit the country of the Ottawas. Though they were ordered to return to Albany without disturbing the French, the evident purpose of the expedition was to establish permanent trade relations and alliances with tribes of the Northwest.

When news of this move reached him, Denonville wrote⁴ to Seignelay that he had a mind “to go straight to Albany, storm their fort and burn everything.” “The English stir

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up the Iroquois against us, and send parties to Michilimackinac to rob us of our trade. It would be better to declare war against them than to perish by their intrigues.” His protests to Dongan only drew from him the reply,¹ “Bee assured, Sir, that I have not solicited nor bribed the Indians to arme and make warr against you. . . . I have forbidden their joining (if they should bee entreated) with any others against you; neither have I ever allowed any plunder. I have only permitted several of Albany to trade amongst the remotest Indians with strict orders not to meddle with any of your people; and I hope they will finde the same civillity from you. It being so far from pillaging that I believe it is as lawfull for the English as French nations to trade there, we being nearer by many leagues than you are.” He wished to be furnished with the authority for the statement that he had ordered the Indians to plunder and fight the French. His disclaimer in the case was doubtless true, as was his profession that he did not understand the references to an English expedition to Michilimackinac. As to the deserters, Dongan knew not who they were, but, “Rascalls and Bank-routs” as they were said to be, upon a requisition from Canada he would be glad to send them home.

With the summer of 1687 this fruitless correspondence was interrupted by the expedition of Denonville, with a large force of French and Indians, into the country of the Senecas. The Indians retired before him, and all that be directly accomplished against them was the destruction of their harvest and some of their villages. Indirectly, however, the expedition had some important results. While the French were busy at Michilimackinac gathering their western allies for the war, the traders and Indians under Rooseboom approached. They were at once surrounded by a large body of French and Indians and forced to surrender. Their goods were seized and given to the Indians. Later, McGregory with his party, who had separated from Rooseboom, were captured between Detroit² and Niagara. All were taken to lower Canada as prisoners, while their capture

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caused a revulsion of feeling among the Indians in favor of the French. The western Indians now flocked to the standard of Denonville, and were present in large numbers with his expedition.

The apparent triumph of the French over the Senecas was also utilized for the purpose of establishing the claim of conquest over that country.¹ Proclamation of this was made by Denonville in the presence of his forces, and the arms of the king of France were ordered to be set up throughout the country. Permanent possession was also taken of Niagara, buildings were erected by the French near the mouth of the river and a small body of men was posted there. Thus the plans of Dongan were thwarted both at Detroit and Niagara.

Before the French governor set out upon his expedition into the Seneca country news had arrived of the conclusion at Whitehall of the treaty of neutrality of November, 1686,² between England and France. This was intended to secure peace between the subjects of both kings in America; even though war should break out between the two nations in Europe. It provided that neither party should assist the Indians with whom the other might be at war, that they should not fish or trade in each other’s territories, and that unlicensed privateers should be punished as pirates. Inasmuch as in the treaty no acknowledgment was obtained from France that the Iroquois were English subjects, the French must be considered to have secured the greatest advantages. But Dongan showed no immediate disposition to heed its requirements, for when the Senecas appealed to the authorities at Albany for aid, abundance of arms and ammunition were furnished them. These they used in their effort to withstand the French a few weeks later. Of this fact Denonville took due notice in his letters home.³

In August following the expedition of Denonville into the Seneca country, Dongan sent Captain John Palmer to England with despatches.⁴ In these he informed the government

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of what had occurred and also that the French were encroaching on the Five Nations as fast as they could. He insisted that forts should be built on Lake Champlain, at Salmon River, at Niagara, and similar posts between Schenectady and Lake Ontario. The northern boundary should be settled. English priests should be sent to live among the Five Nations. Immigrants from Ireland should be sent over to people the disputed country and thus secure it for the English. Various measures of defence were taken at the same time by the governor and council in New York,¹ while Dongan arranged to spend the winter of 1687-1688 in Albany.

When Palmer reached London, negotiations were in progress between French and English commissioners over the execution of the treaty of neutrality and the establishment of the boundaries.² The French repeated their complaints against Dongan and their demands that he be ordered to cease disturbing the French. Since Andros, in the spring of 1688, had captured Saint Castin’s post at Pentagoet, the request was made that the same command might be sent to him. But Dongan’s despatches revealed the danger which threatened English interests and led to a firm reply being made to French claims. The right of England to the Iroquois country was reasserted.

But it soon became evident that Dongan had acted in harmony with the real desires of his government. A warrant³ from the king was sent to Dongan, authorizing him to continue to protect the Five Nations. He was required to inform the governor of Canada that England owned the Five Nations to be its subjects and had resolved to protect them. In case the people of Canada should continue to annoy these Indians and invade the dominions of England, Dongan was empowered, if need be, to resist such invasion with all the military force of the province, and to pursue them as far as might be necessary. The first suggestion from the English government of its resolve, if it were necessary, to secure the

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coöperation of the other colonies in the defence of New York, appears in the authority which was given to Dongan by this , document to call on the governors for such aid. He was also empowered to build forts and other defences at all places where they seemed to be necessary.

After the return of the French from their expedition some more sharp but ineffective correspondence passed between Dongan and Denonville; McGregory and his associates were released and sent back to Albany. Two envoys were also sent thither by Denonville to negotiate concerning the questions in dispute. But all this was futile. The interviews merely served to relieve the monotony of Dongan’s winter sojourn at Albany. While they were in progress he held a friendly conference with representatives of the Five Nations. He also applied to Maryland for aid, presumably also to the other colonies as far south as Virginia. Dongan states that a force of six hundred men from New England had been promised; but Maryland replied that when she received an order direct from the king, it would be obeyed.¹ Neither party was inclined to recede. Thus affairs stood, so far as relations with Canada were concerned, when New York became a part of the great dominion which James II was forming.

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