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CHAPTER XIV

THE REVOLUTION IN NEW ENGLAND. THE PROVINCIAL CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS

The earliest direct information which reached Sir Edmund Andros and his associates of the intended invasion of England by William of Orange was in all likelihood contained in the circular letter of October 16, 1688,¹ in which James II urged his subjects to lay aside all animosities and unite in the defence of himself and their country. The letter reached Andros at Pemaquid, on January 10, 1689, and in accordance with the express command of the king he embodied the substance of it in a proclamation, strengthened by his own command to all subjects and officials to be careful in their own stations and to be ready to repel any foreign invasion should such be attempted. This was duly published, and by means of it Andros gave further evidence, if such were needed, of his fidelity as an official, of the military spirit by which he was dominated.

In February or early in March news also reached the governor through New York that William had landed in England. His movements were probably hastened by this report, for he returned to Boston the middle or latter part of March.² In this case, as in most others during the colonial period, authoritative advices from England reached America earliest by way of the island colonies. In February, 1689, copies of the declaration issued by the Prince of Orange on his landing in England reached the island of Nevis, and one or more of them came into the hands of a young resident of Boston, named John Winslow. He brought the paper to Boston, arriving there at the beginning of April.³ He did not carry a copy of it at once to the governor, but went to his own home. In view of the state of feeling which

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then existed in Massachusetts—with which young Winslow doubtless sympathized—Andros, when he learned what he had brought, naturally suspected that it would be used against the government. He therefore sent the sheriff to Winslow, who, without arresting him, brought him to the governor. When asked why he had not come and told the governor the news, Winslow excused himself on the ground that the captain of the vessel in which he came had already done so. Andros then asked him where the declarations were which he had brought. Winslow refused to tell, for the reason, as he stated, that the government would withhold from the people the news which they contained. Andros therefore told him that he was a saucy fellow, and bade the sheriff take him to the justices, by whom he was committed to prison. He, however, is said to have been discharged the next morning.¹

Though the information brought by the vessel from Nevis could not have been of sufficiently recent date to indicate decisively what success was to attend the expedition of the prince, it doubtless greatly stimulated rumor and the spirit of conspiracy and revolt. The clergy and former magistrates of Massachusetts, together with the body of church members and their sympathizers, heartily feared and hated the policy of which Andros and his group of officials were the exponents. Even in the council there were men who quietly shared in this feeling. The genuine New Englander always regarded the dissolution of the Massachusetts company as illegal and the entire regime which took the place of the company as unconstitutional. These events, though perfectly legal, were certainly in violent conflict with the past experience and the future aspirations of the people of New England. It is not probable that any course of conduct on the part of the governor or his subordinates would have reconciled the leaders and church members to the permanent continuance of this regime. New Englanders had always been accustomed, in a peculiarly intense and effective way, to manage their own affairs. Their spirit was the very opposite of that which submits quietly to autocratic rule, pays taxes which are

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imposed solely by the will of the executive, and obeys the commands of some remote power. Their ideal was the restoration of the old charter, and an outbreak having this as its purpose would probably have occurred, even had James II quietly retained the English throne. The cause of Andros and that of James are often considered to have been identical, and they were often so regarded by contemporaries. But in reality Andros had points of disagreement with James, as did the people of Massachusetts. Andros was loyal to the autocracy of James, but he was at heart opposed to his religious policy. The people of Massachusetts had fervently welcomed the declaration of indulgence, but they loathed autocratic government. Andros was to them the representative, not only of autocracy, but also of rigid Anglicanism. It is therefore conceivable that they might have conspired for his overthrow, while in general they remained faithful to the Stuart government in England. That in fact is what they were preparing to do in the early spring of 1689, before they knew what would be the issue of the crisis in England. On the other hand, had Andros been able to maintain himself in New England and James II in England until the latter felt that the time was ripe, with the aid of the French army and navy, to force Catholicism upon both England and the dominions, it is conceivable that Andros and the New Englanders would have been found in united opposition to the Stuart king. Their common Protestantism might have bound them together in this cause, as it did the Nonconformists and the Anglicans in England, and in the struggle it is quite likely that Andros would have become a defender of limited constitutional government.

But, as usual, the initiative was now taken by the people of eastern Massachusetts and their leaders. The object of their projected uprising was the overthrow of the Andros government and the undoing of the work of the hated Randolph, the arch-enemy of New England Puritanism.¹ On

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April 16 Andros wrote to Anthony Brockholls, “There’s a general buzzing among the people, great with expectation of their old charter, or they know not what;” and he expressed the hope that all magistrates would be careful in the performance of their duties and that the soldiers would be kept prepared for any emergency.¹ He himself took up his residence in the fort. Two days later, on the date of the mid-week lecture in the First Church in Boston, occurred the outbreak,² for which preparation had doubtless been making for some weeks before. Early in the morning the streets at both ends of the town were seen to be filled with boys and men, armed some with firearms and others with clubs and hurrying as if to some rendezvous. Captain George of the frigate happened to be found on shore, and he was seized and detained as a prisoner in a house at the North end. The rioters now beat drums through the town and set up an ensign at the beacon as a warning to the surrounding country. In quick succession Bullivant, Randolph, Foxcroft, and other leaders among the official clique were seized by small bands of insurgents and hurried to jail or places of detention. A few of the officials took refuge with Andros in the fort and so escaped immediate arrest. Dudley was at the time holding court on Long Island and was not arrested till some days later, when, on his return, he was found at the house of Major Smith in the Narragansett country. The feeling of contempt with which Dudley and Randolph were commonly regarded was

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expressed by their lodgment in the common jail. The other prisoners were spared that indignity.

While, on the 18th, the persons of the councillors and other officials were being seized, a militia company escorted Bradstreet, Danforth, and a number of the old magistrates to the council house on King Street. From a balcony at its eastern end about noon was read to the assembled people the “Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston and the counties adjacent.”¹ In this vigorous manifesto the chief features of the recent misgovernment were reviewed and denounced, and the supposed connection of the episode with an all-embracing popish plot, including an alliance with the French, was affirmed. After completing their powerful but extremely partisan indictment of the Andros government, the authors of the “Declaration” drew the practical conclusion,” We do therefore seize upon the Persons of those few ill men who have been (next to our Sins) the grand Authors of our Miseries; resolving to secure them for what Justice Orders from his Highness, with the English Parliament, shall direct, lest, ere we are aware, we find . . . ourselves to be by them given away to a Forreign Power, before such Orders can reach unto us; for which Orders we now humbly wait.” A chief share in the composition of this paper has with reason been attributed to Cotton Mather; though the degree to which in power and dignity it exceeds his customary style indicates that he had the assistance of other hands. Its style also clearly indicates that it was not hastily prepared, and hence the document itself becomes a weighty evidence in favor of the supposition that the uprising was the execution of a program which had been planned days or weeks before.

On this occasion, as on so many others in the history of the colonies, the weakness of an executive which has no support in popular favor was vividly illustrated. It did not receive even so clear an illustration in England in 1642 or 1688. At a single stroke Andros was deprived of his councillors, and, from his retreat in the fort, found his only reliance to be in a handful of soldiers and a single small

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frigate. Curiously he first appealed to the Boston ministers, who, the Thursday lecture having been suspended, were zealously supporting the insurrection, either at the town house or elsewhere. But to the governor’s appeal for a conference with them they returned a negative answer. By this time it was long past midday. The town was thoroughly aroused. Hundreds of armed militiamen had come in from the surrounding country, and hundreds more were ready to cross from Charlestown. The leaders at the town house, having this force at their command, sent a message to the governor,¹ warning him, for his own safety and the quiet of the colony, to surrender himself and the government, to be disposed of according to direction shortly expected from the crown of England.

For a brief period it seemed as if Andros might be rescued by the marines from the frigate, which was now under the command of the lieutenant. It put out its flags, opened its ports, and made ready for action, the lieutenant, in spite of a caution from the imprisoned captain, declaring that he would die rather than that the vessel should be taken. John Nelson, at the head of the militiamen, now started for the fort to present the summons to the governor. Just then a boat was sent from the frigate for the governor, but this was seized by the insurgents and the governor’s way of escape cut off. Nelson’s men quietly surrounded the fort on two sides, their superiority of numbers being so great as to make resistance on the part of the weak garrison. impossible. When the summons was first sent in to Andros, he refused to surrender until he had sent West, the deputy secretary who still remained with him, to the town house to consult with the leaders there. His appeal to them proved unsuccessful, and on West’s return the governor and those who still remained at his side “came forth from the fort and went disarmed to the town house, and from thence some to the close jail, and the governor under a guard to Mr. Usher’s house.” Randolph, it is said, was called upon to perform the ceremony, under the order of

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Andros, of the surrender of the fort. Thus ended the work of the first day of the revolt.

On the second day the insurgents directed their efforts against the frigate and the castle in the harbor. At first Andros refused to surrender the castle, but when he was told that if he did not yield to this demand he would be exposed to the rage of the people, he gave way. The surrender was then made to a body of colonial militia and the garrison of royal troops was brought away. On the return of the men from the castle, all the ordnance in the fort and on shipboard was directed upon the frigate and Captain George was told that he must surrender her or she would be destroyed. He at first protested, alleging that if he surrendered the crew would lose their wages, and declaring that “that devil Randolph,” with whom he had long been on bad terms, was responsible for all the trouble. He was therefore permitted to go on board, strike the topmast and bring the sails on shore, which he did. The frigate, thus dismantled, was no longer dangerous and the formality of a surrender was avoided. Toward night, at the demand of the country people, Andros was removed to the fort, where he was placed as a prisoner under the charge of Nelson. Several of the most offensive councillors—Graham, Palmer, and West from New York—were imprisoned in the castle. At later dates Andros made two efforts to escape, hoping to reach New York and thence procure conveyance to England; but in both instances he was unsuccessful, and after his second recapture he too was lodged in the castle.1

The third day of the uprising was devoted to the equally important work of providing a temporary government. In recent English history, to say nothing of New England itself, there were precedents which could be easily utilized for the purpose. The leaders who had been in counsel at the town house and who had addressed the summons to Andros called to their assistance twenty-two others, and these all associated themselves under the name of a “Council for the Safety

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and the Conservation of the Peace.” Bradstreet was chosen president of this body and Wait Winthrop was put in command of the militia. An order was at once issued for the recall of a part of the forces from the frontier and by this step an opportunity was found to remove more obnoxious officials.

The real object of the moving spirits in the revolt had been to clear the ground for the reestablishment of government under the old charter. The sentiment throughout Massachusetts was strongly favorable to such a step. But Bradstreet was hesitating in disposition and far advanced in years. The council, moreover, did not feel justified in taking this step without a mandate from the people of the colony. Therefore they summoned a convention¹ to meet on May 9, and to consist of two delegates from each town, with two additional from Boston. This body at once interpreted the will of the people to be that the government which had been ousted on the arrival of Dudley’s commission in 1686 should be reinstated. But its members did not bring with them definite instructions from the freemen to that effect. Therefore, as the magistrates were unwilling to act without this, the council of safety continued to act till the expression of the will of the towns could be sought anew.

On May 22 the convention reassembled, with delegates from fifty-four towns.² Of these all but fourteen had instructed their delegates in favor of the resumption of the charter. The majority of the council, however, still appeared to be opposed to the step. But after a debate of two days the opinion of the delegates prevailed, and the magistrates who had been chosen at the last election under the old charter were again intrusted with the charge of the government. Those whom they had recently associated with themselves in the council of safety, at the instance of the delegates were compelled to retire from office. Almost immediately an order arrived from England for the proclamation of William and Mary, which was obeyed with the greatest public exhibitions of joy. More detailed information concerning events in

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England was brought by Sir William Phips, who arrived while the celebration was in progress. A new house of deputies for the general court was elected, and the entire body met for business on June 6. Two loyal addresses had already been sent to the king’ in which a claim to share in the expected general restoration of charters was expressed. At the suggestion of the council the deputies presented articles of impeachment against Andros, Dudley, Randolph, Palmer, West, Graham, Farwell, and Sherlock. The admission of the accused to bail, though applied for, was refused. Thus affairs stood until, as the result of petitions from the accused to the home government, a command came under the order in council of July 25, that they all should be sent for trial to England.² The other New England colonies immediately followed the example of Massachusetts, so far as their respective conditions necessitated. Before the middle of May the legislatures of Plymouth, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, by spontaneous act of their former leaders, had been again called into existence under the old³ forms. It was held that, as no decree had been issued against the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut, their authority would revive as soon as the former government had been removed. Plymouth had no charter. to either facilitate or hinder her course. The former executive officers, so far as they were willing to act, were therefore recalled and were confirmed in their places by new elections. In scarcely an instance among these colonies was it necessary to arrest any of Andros’s councillors or put them under bonds. The New York and British contingent in that body, who were such objects of distrust, were all caught by the uprising in Massachusetts and found their lodgment in her prisons. Thus quietly and promptly did affairs begin again to move in the old grooves. By all the colonies the king and queen were proclaimed and loyal addresses were sent. But the order that Andros and his fellow officials should be sent to England

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on the first ship and be well treated during the voyage insured a renewal of inquiries by the home government into New England conditions. This necessitates a return to somewhat earlier events, in order that we may trace the activity of Increase Mather as agent in England.

At not a few important crises had agents already been sent to London, not only from New England, but from the other colonies as well. Personalities of note had on several occasions been selected to fill these positions. The record of the appointment and work of agents has appeared in these pages, and when reviewed, it will show that the colonial agency had become an important institution. At times it had been found necessary to appoint them, and their services in negotiations with the home government had been found indispensable. To the colony which sent them their services were similar to those performed for the British government by royal commissioners. They brought the views of the colonists more directly to bear upon the king and the crown officials than otherwise would have been possible, while they procured more authentic and detailed information than could be obtained by correspondence. The time had not yet come when provision was regularly made by the colonies for resident agents, but events were tending that way. The creation of royal provinces was destined to promote such a result, while as colonial interests became more important the home government began to insist on a permanent provision of this sort. Edward Winslow, Roger Williams, John Clark, and the younger Winthrop had already performed distinguished service as agents of New England colonies, while the long controversy between Massachusetts and the crown had occasioned the appointment of a succession of agencies. In the provinces governors, and often proprietors themselves, had acted in this capacity. Berkeley and Moryson, to say nothing of earlier figures in Virginia history, had already marked out the function of agents in a royal province. The proprietors who were resident in Great Britain served necessarily as agents for their provinces, while Penn and Charles Calvert made long visits to England for this express purpose.

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Among those who acted as colonial agents in the seventeenth century Increase Mather holds a unique and prominent place. It is true that he was not the only clergyman who served in this capacity, but Roger Williams and John Clark possessed more of the lay, than of the distinctively clerical, spirit. Other clergymen who were drafted into this service were either totally unable to figure in a court or were not intrusted with duties which called for the exercise of high powers. Increase Mather was counted among the orthodox of his time as the leader, not only in the pulpit of New England, but in the administration of church affairs and the care of the interests of the college. His father and his son labored faithfully in the same calling, but they failed to reach the peculiar distinction to which he attained. Like men of his class in the earlier generation, he also shared in the political conflicts of his time. He was a learned man, with the gift of abundant and forcible speech and an impressive bearing. He was also ready with the pen, and showed decided talent as a pamphleteer. A prolonged residence abroad in early life had given him an acquaintance with the world beyond what was common among his class. This all gave him a certain fitness for the duties of agent at this crisis of Massachusetts history, while his zeal as an opponent of Randolph and Andros made him willing to undertake the task.

When, in the spring of 1688, the issue of writs of intrusion seemed to have brought the autocratic rule of Andros to the point where it was no longer endurable, by general consent of the leaders who were watching for a way of relief it was agreed that Mather should go to England. None of this class were in office. There was no general court. As in the case of Weare, who went to England in the hope of ridding New Hampshire of the presence of Cranfield, it was impossible to furnish Mather with the credentials usually given to agents. But, none the less, he went as “ confessedly the representative of the hopes and wants of the greater portion of the citizens of Massachusetts.” He did not attempt unduly to conceal the fact of his going, though at the very last, in order to avoid the service of a writ in a suit for

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defamation which Randolph had brought against him, he escaped in disguise on board a ship which was just sailing for England.¹

Near the close² of May Mather arrived in London. Shortly thereafter occurred the birth of the prince—the heir of James II—and the trial and acquittal of the seven bishops. He found himself in the midst of the agitation which was occasioned by the determined efforts of the king to enforce the second declaration of indulgence. An appeal from a Nonconformist was therefore not altogether unwelcome to James, though it was directed against his favorite plan of colonial government. Almost immediately Mather twice gained access to the person of the king and met what seemed to be a favorable reception. In response to the thanks which the agent expressed for the declaration of indulgence James said that he hoped to obtain from parliament a “Magna Charta for Liberty of Conscience.” At the second audience, which was in the royal closet, Mather began his complaints against Andros, and the interview closed with a request from the king that the agent would submit his charges in writing. This led to the preparation of two statements of grievances, and a petition for relief signed by Mather, Nowell, and Hutchinson.³ These, with other documents, Mather presented on July 2. The king put the papers into his pocket with the statement that “he would take care about it.”

Meantime Mather had procured the assistance of Sir Henry Ashurst, a wealthy Nonconformist and member of parliament, who now began a career as agent for Massachusetts

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which was to last for several years. Mather also recommended himself favorably not only to William Penn, but to the Earl of Sunderland, the Earl of Melfort, Chief Justice Jeffries, and even to Father Petre. He began the issue of pamphlets in defence of New England and filled with severe criticism of the Andros regime. As the summer progressed Mather began to hope for the restoration of the charter, the confirmation of land titles, and an assembly. The Earl of Sunderland, however, expressly discountenanced the last named proposal. The agents of other colonies may also have joined with him in the effort to procure a restoration of their own charters. In September, and again in the middle of October, Mather was admitted to audiences with the king. On both occasions he received general assurances, but nothing more. Though on the last occasion there seemed some ground for hope, it speedily vanished. Difficulties were then thickening about the king which made it impossible for him to sanction reforms in the colonies, even if he had been so inclined. Mather at last realized that he was being put off with mere words and dropped his suit. James was soon overwhelmed by the Revolution, and when the case was taken up again it was with the Prince of Orange and a Protestant court.

Mather was of course closely identified with the Dissenters of England and their cause. This now confirmed his hold upon Ashurst and brought to his aid Philip Lord Wharton, who introduced him to the new king. Already, on January 9, 1689, more than a month before the coronation, Mather was introduced by Wharton to William and presented to him a petition.¹ He had never been able to bring the question of the restoration of the charter squarely before James. But, as the assault on the corporations had been denounced by William as one of the arbitrary measures of the Stuarts, the effects of which he proposed to remedy, Mather now made that the burden of his plea on behalf of New England. In his petition he affirmed that the charter had been ravished from them by judgment in the chancery without the accused

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being allowed to make the least defence, and that Andros had been sent over under an arbitrary and illegal commission, with power to raise money from the people without their consent. He therefore petitioned that the former charter of New England should be restored and the people there be again permitted to enjoy their ancient rights. The Prince replied that he would take the best care he could about it, but indicated his view of its comparative importance by referring Mather to an under-secretary named Jephson.

Fortunately Mather learned from Jephson that a circular letter was already prepared confirming the governors of all the colonies, New England included, in their places until further order. He at once remonstrated against this as likely to be ruinous to his cause. On its being brought to William’s notice, he ordered the letter to New England to be stopped, and thus a direct collision between the leaders of the uprising at Boston and the authorities in England was avoided.

On February 16, three days after the coronation, a new committee of the privy council for trade and plantations was appointed. Among its members were the Earls of Danby, Halifax, Shrewsbury, Nottingham, Viscount Mordaunt, Bishop Compton of London, Sir Henry Capel, Mr. Powle, and Mr. Russell. No modification was made in the powers of the committee, but only a change in its personnel corresponding to the reorganization of the privy council and the ministry. Among the items of business which were first transacted by this body was that occasioned by a petition from Mather and Sir William Phips similar in contents to the one just referred to. As the king also ordered that the circular letter to New England should not be sent until a report could be made concerning the revocation of the charter, Mather and Phips were called before the committee, and with them Sir Robert Sawyer. The agents were apparently unable to convince the committee that there was a flaw in the scire facias, and they agreed to report to the king that a provisional commission should be sent to New England to take the place of Andros, with an instruction not to levy any money on the vote of the governor and

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council alone. An order in council was accordingly proposed, fixing the number of commissioners at two, and referring back to the committee the subject of the draft of a new charter for New England, the provisions of which should be agreeable to the rights of the colonies and to the laws of England. The language of the committee’s report shows that their attitude toward the settlement of New England affairs was being determined by the necessity of defence against the French, a body of whom, they had learned, had already invaded the northern colonies.¹ The plan of continuing the dominion of New England, with its royal governor, was still cherished, and in fact was the only one which under the circumstances recommended itself to the English officials. It implied greater efficiency in all that pertained to colonial defence, and that to their minds was the dominant consideration.² But the privy council felt that the question of the right of the king to appoint a governor should be further considered, and therefore the whole matter was laid over.

Presently letters began to arrive from New England, and from these the government learned the details of the revolt, while charges and counter charges were made by the two parties to the dispute. Randolph wrote at length to the lords of trade, but his letter was more an argument than a narrative, its purpose being to show that the colonies had been united in order to their better protection against the French, that the peril from that quarter was steadily increasing, while the colonists were overthrowing their government in order that they might be free to harbor pirates and violate the acts of trade. He had heard of the solicitations of Mather and intended that this letter should serve as a brief against him. Captain George sent to Secretary Pepys of

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the admiralty an account of the uprising, so far chiefly as it affected himself and the frigate. A general narrative of the affair was brought by John Riggs, who was closely connected with Andros, possibly as secretary. He had sailed from New York, and submitted with his narrative a copy of the declaration of April 18, of the summons to Andros to surrender, of the declaration of the convention. on May 24, and the acceptance of the government by the former magistrates.¹ From the other side, and at equally early dates, came the addresses to the king and queen from the president and council of safety, and later an address from the governor, council, and convention.² The result of these communications was the issue, on July 25, of an order in council, directed to those who at present were administering the government in New England, to send Andros and his fellow prisoners to Europe by the first ship, and that they should be civilly treated on the passage.³ The commissioners of the customs asked also that Randolph’s books and papers, which had been taken from him, might be sealed up and forwarded to one of the secretaries of state, and that so. many of them as concerned the public revenues should be lodged with the commissioners in England until another revenue officer could be appointed to reside in Boston.

As the years 1689 and 1690 progressed, the war on the continent and in the British Isles absorbed the attention of the king. Months passed before it was possible for the government to take seriously in hand the internal affairs of New England. The aspect indeed of its affairs which most interested the crown officials was the war on the northern frontier.

The restoration of the former conditions in New England, together with the outbreak under Leisler in New York, greatly complicated the problem of defence in comparison to what it would have been had the government of the dominion been in full and active sway. The troops, on the removal of their officers, deserted or were withdrawn

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from the frontier posts in Maine, and the French and Indians in their early assaults found the settlements almost defenceless. In the despatch of expeditions the Massachusetts government was not especially prompt or efficient. A disposition even appeared to resist its orders. It was said that the first expedition of Phips would have been made more helpful if it had been sent to New Hampshire and Maine rather than to Port Royal. The failure and the cost of his expedition of the same year against Quebec were also emphasized. Indeed, the correspondents of the English officials—Bullivant, Rev. Samuel Myles, the Anglicans of Boston, Charlestown, Portsmouth, and other places, the frontiersmen of the eastern settlements—joined in a chorus of complaint and criticism.1 The faults of the restored government were thrown into clearest relief, while that of Andros—with which they compared it—had not been subjected to the strain of war. Even the accounts sent by Bradstreet and his councillors were discouraging enough. It was necessary to increase the country rates, much as had been done in Philip’s war, so that the taxes which Sir Edmund had imposed were almost forgotten in comparison. The general cry was for a settled government, for regulation and help from the king, so that the horrors of Indian massacre might be abated.

During the summer of 1689 Randolph, as usual, was pouring in letters to the lords of trade, the commissioners of the customs, the lord privy seal, the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of London, to Blathwayt and Povey, and to Francis Nicholson after the return of the latter from New York. He even prepared a statement for submission to parliament. His activity on this occasion was a repetition of the zeal which he had shown in connection with the recall of the Massachusetts charter. In strange contrast to it was the stolid silence of Andros. In his letters Randolph dwelt on the ravages of the Indians since the overthrow of the king’s government and on the recall of the troops; on the

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assertion that the colonists now thought only of the defence of their own homes and would not undertake large offensive operations, in short on the inefficiency of the entire militia system. The weakness of the restored charter government—a fact which, because of its more than doubtful legality, was admitted even by Bradstreet and his assistants—came in for its share of attention. Its officials were charged—and this also was true enough—with sharing the anti-monarchical views of Vane and Peters, while Venner’s name was introduced to give sharper point to the moral which Randolph sought to enforce. Violations of the acts of trade he naturally dwelt on at length, transmitting long lists of alleged cases which had arisen since the restraining hands of the king’s officials had been removed, and even repeating the claim that it was to secure license in these matters that the revolt had been planned. In his letters to the churchmen Randolph dwelt on the withholding of their due liberties from Anglicans; on the ill treatment to which Mr. Ratcliff had been subjected, which had now compelled him to return to England; on the bitter attacks upon Anglican practices and beliefs which emanated from press and pulpit, and the public contempt with which the rites of the church had been visited.

Randolph was not slow to clear the fame of Andros from the slanders which had been published and to defend him against the charge of cruelty and undue oppression. Look, he said, not at words, but at acts; and the procedure in the courts, the form in which oaths were administered, the renewal of patents, would all be found to have been in accordance with well-established precedents. Mistakes might have been made, but the principle which was followed was correct. If the Ipswich men felt aggrieved, they had recourse to the courts. Just here, however, the weakness of Randolph’s argument appears. No precedents to which he could appeal would be satisfactory to the New Englander. Randolph’s precedents were borrowed from New York and from the island colonies, where direct and continuous control by the home government had been maintained. To these the New Englander had never been accustomed, and he desired above all to keep free from them. The degree of self government

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which he enjoyed had been so complete that officials appointed and instructed solely by the crown, even though they were Englishmen, seemed to him like foreigners. This feeling had its origin largely in his religious independency, and it had been confirmed by his entire experience as a colonist. Moreover, government in New England had rested on the general courts, and offices had been filled by means of a system of annual elections. It was by reference to this fact that Winthrop had sought to confirm his claim that government in Massachusetts was not arbitrary. But that feature had now almost entirely disappeared, and with it the assembly had also vanished. A revolution had indeed been wrought in New England government. The form which Andros had been sent to establish, though it was in harmony with many features of the British colonial system, and corresponded well with the official idea of what colonial government should be, was the almost direct antithesis of that which had grown up in New England; and, as New Englanders believed, it was equally opposed to the spirit of English institutions. In the case of Andros versus New England the colonial and the imperialist ideals had come into the most direct and violent conflict, more so than was possible in any of the provinces. Naturally, then, the arguments which were used by Randolph and Palmer in defence of the Andros regime seemed at best to be only palliations. They could not reconcile men to a policy which seemed to them wholly foreign and illegal.

The facts of the war, together with Randolph’s representations and those of other kindred spirits, could not have remained without an influence upon the minds of officials in England. There they struck responsive chords, for they dwelt upon considerations which were of weight to the official mind. After allowing for the exaggeration which they contained, these letters and arguments confirmed the opinion that, at the beginning of a great war with France, it would not do to allow New England to lapse into its old state of independency. The northern frontier was now becoming an object of interest to the home government, of interest which in time was to rival the importance of the

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Gulf and the Caribbean sea. In view of these facts, the king and those who were supporting him in the conflict must be impressed with arguments like those which Randolph used. In many cases the same men who were in office under James were in office now. Their views, except in reference to the continuance of assemblies in the colonies, had not materially changed. Military considerations were now more emphasized than ever, and with them the importance of control over trade was enhanced. To these men Randolph made his appeals direct, as he had done in his attack upon the Massachusetts charter. He helped to force the issue then; we cannot dismiss his arguments in 1689 as if they had no effect. Mather’s printed pamphlets were, in comparison, so many strokes in the air. They were not directed to those in whose hands lay the decision; they too contained many irrelevancies and exaggerations, while they failed to lay the necessary emphasis on the problem of defence. There was much in his defence of the old New England regime, or in any defence of it which could be made, that would not favorably impress William III and his privy councillors. The war, if nothing else, made it impossible for them to condemn Andros, or to consent to the restoration of the Massachusetts charter. As representations from the colony made the situation clearer, it became evident that the colonists themselves were not united in support of a restoration of the corporate system.¹

Toward the close of 1689 Mather resolved to ask the parliament to reverse the decree in chancery against the charter. If that were done, he proposed to petition the king for a modification of the clauses of the charter in such a way as would better adapt it to the needs of the present. The bill for the restoration of the charters both in the realm and in New England passed the Commons, and there seemed reason to expect that it would pass the Lords. But the parliament was prorogued near the close of January, 1690, and was ultimately dissolved before action was taken in the upper house. With this disappeared all hope of bringing the

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question to a settlement through the interposition of parliament.

In March Andros and his fellow officials who had been summoned from Boston arrived, and at about the same time came Elisha Cooke and Thomas Oakes, who had been appointed by the general court of Massachusetts to act with Mather and Ashurst as agents.¹ Among other things they were instructed to procure a restoration of the charter. A hearing before the committee of trade was now arranged, and after some delay three charges were submitted against Andros, Dudley, and the rest.² They were to the effect that Andros had attempted to conceal the news of the intended landing of the Prince of Orange and had required persons to oppose the same; that he had illegally and oppressively levied taxes, had denied that the colonists had property in their lands without patents from him, and had encouraged the Indians to make war upon the English; and that all the others who, with Andros, were the objects of these charges had been confederates with him in the effort to oppress the people of New England. To these Andros submitted replies to the effect that in all respects he had acted in accordance with his commission, which to him and his superiors was certainly the standard of legality. If left to themselves, the agents would have sought a thorough inquiry into the doings of Andros and his associates, but that would have raised some awkward questions for the government and for individual members of the council. If any party, moreover, had been guilty of illegal conduct, it was the English government itself, and not the officials whom it had commissioned to administer New England affairs. For this reason, on the advice of Sir John Somers, the agents refrained from signing the charges and they were not even read to their lordships. At the hearing, the fact was brought out that the uprising, as in England, had been the spontaneous act of the country and that the two events must be justified on the same

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ground; criticism of the colonists would seem like reflections on the leaders of the revolt in England. An order in council was at once issued for the release of Andros and his associates, and steps were soon taken for their continuance in the colonial service. Andros presented a formal defence of his conduct to the committee of trade, while Randolph and others continued through the summer the issue of attacks on Massachusetts and defences of the policy of Andros.¹ From America reports kept coming in of the disasters suffered by the English on the frontier and of the only partially successful efforts of Sir William Phips against the French.

As the disposition of the new parliament, owing to an accession of Tory strength, proved unfavorable, the agents made some moves toward obtaining a writ of error for calling the case relating to the charter from the Chancery before King’s Bench; but this effort naturally proved to be vain. Their hopes of securing a restoration of the old charter were then seen to be at an end. Their only reliance must now be placed on an application to the king for a new charter, though in this they must exceed the letter of their instructions. But the communication² from Bradstreet showed that the colonists were already becoming anxious to see some results.

The three agents brought the matter first to the king’s attention through a petition, which by him was referred to the two chief justices and to the law officers of the crown. The heads of the old charter and of the one which had been granted to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, as well as the privileges which were now prayed for, were submitted. Several meetings were held, which the agents were permitted to attend. The proposals were then laid before the king by Chief Justice Holt, and at his command were reported to the privy

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council and by it referred to the lords of trade.¹ The king then departed on a winter visit to Holland. No decisive action could be taken till his return. But in the meantime Mather in particular strove to arouse interest among such privy councillors as he could reach, and obtained an interview with the queen.² On the king’s brief return in the spring Mather was granted two audiences, but found his Majesty non-committal. He could only say that, when the lords of trade should report, he would see what could be done. But the lords of trade already had before them an address to the king from sixty-two discontented³ inhabitants of Charlestown, Boston, and other adjacent places, in which, because of the disasters from which New England was suffering as the result of being again split up into so many small colonies, they asked to be taken under royal protection. The agents were at once called upon to give a statement in writing of the condition of the colony, and Sir William Phips and others were summoned to attend. Phips at-tended and gave an account of his expedition against Quebec, while the agents criticised sharply the statements in the hostile address as well as the character and standing of its authors. They denied that the colonies had been remiss in defence and declared that not a fourth part of the desolation had been wrought which was suffered in Philip’s war; so far as the colonists might have been blameworthy, they attributed it to the discouragement consequent on the despotism of Andros.

The lords of trade now submitted⁴ to the king the questions, whether he would prefer an appointed or an elected governor in New England, and whether or not the governor should have the right of veto. This implied that the assembly was to be restored. Upon receiving a statement from the chief justice that, as the Massachusetts charter stood vacated by a judgment against it, the king might put them under such a government as he saw fit, William replied that he believed it would be for the welfare of all concerned

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if he himself should have the appointment of the governor. But he would have the agents nominate a man who would be agreeable to the temper of the people there, though at the present crisis it must be a military man. The king thereupon departed for his first campaign on the continent, and an order in council was drawn that the government of Massachusetts should be settled after the model of that of Barbadoes, with a governor of the king’s appointment and with the full negative voice. Mather, however, was not willing to accept this as a correct statement of the intentions of the king; by soliciting certain members of the council he procured the despatch of a copy of the order to Lord Sidney, then secretary of state and with the king in Flanders, with the request that the king should be asked if it agreed with his purpose. No reply ever came.

During May Attorney General Treby prepared a draft of the proposed charter, which, on June 8, was submitted to the lords of trade.¹ This contained a provision for the election of the deputy governor and other officers by the freemen. For this reason it was unsatisfactory to the lords, and was referred back to the attorney general for the preparation of heads for a new draft. These,² when submitted, were agreed to and provided that both governor and deputy governor should be appointed by the king, that the assistants or council be chosen by the general court, that the governor with the advice of the council should appoint the judges, sheriffs, and justices of the peace; that the word “freeman” should be everywhere changed to freeholder. The agents, however, had already submitted proposals,³ among which were clauses calling for the election of the deputy governor by the council, for the election of the council by the freeholders and freemen without the governor’s veto; that the assembly should have authority to erect courts and choose judges, justices of the peace, and sheriffs, also without the governor’s veto; that the probating of wills should not be among the powers of the governor and council, and that the

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veto of the governor should extend to laws only and not to elections and other acts. Upon these points Mather in particular had set his heart, and when he saw how far the resolutions, as passed by the committee, departed from them, he and Ashurst visited the attorney general. Mather declared, as he afterwards confessed, perhaps “with a greater pathos” than he should have done, that he would sooner part with life than consent to the resolutions and to the infringement of the liberties of the colony which they implied. When he reported this to some of the ministers, he was coolly reminded that the consent of the agents was not expected or desired, for they did not think them plenipotentiaries from a sovereign state. If they would not submit to the king’s pleasure, he was resolved to settle the country, and they must take what would follow.¹

On July 9 further heads for the charter were agreed to² which conceded the point that the assembly should erect courts, but gave the probate of wills to the governor and council. They also extended the veto power of the governor to all acts of the assembly, and confirmed him in the right of appointing judges, sheriffs and justices. Mather and Ashurst protested that these provisions were not consistent with the promise that the chartered privileges of Massachusetts should be restored. They also cherished the hope that, if the king were in England and could be personally appealed to, a modification of the terms could be secured. The protests of the agents were sent over to him in Flanders, and an effort was made to secure delay until his return. But it was in vain. The king declared that he approved of the minutes as agreed to by the lords of trade, and did by no means approve of the objections which the agents made against them.

This reply from the king was decisive, and the agents now devoted their energies to the continuance of the union of Maine and Plymouth with Massachusetts and to the annexation of Nova Scotia. In these efforts they were successful. But they were unable to counteract the appeals of Samuel Allen and his supporters, the possessors of the Mason claims,

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for the establishment of a distinct government in New Hampshire. A clause was also added legalizing the judicial oath according to the form in which it was customarily administered in New England,¹ and another clause confirming land grants already made by the general court. On September 17 the order of the queen in council was issued that the charter should pass the great seal.

The charter of 1691 may be considered from several points of view. Massachusetts, as defined by its terms, included much more than was bestowed in 1629 on Sir Henry Roswell and his associates. The incorporation of Maine gave the stamp of finality to the ursurpation of 1652-1653, it having in the meantime been confirmed by purchase and in a way recognized by three royal commissions to Dudley and Andros. The union of Plymouth with the bay colony was a natural consummation, helped on by the crown in its commissions to Dudley and Andros and now made permanent. The artificial connection between New York and the territory east of the Kennebec river was now severed, and Massachusetts became responsible for the security of Pemaquid and the other outposts in that region. Phips had visited England during the winter of 1690 in order to report upon his achievements at Port Royal and Quebec; his appointment as governor and the establishment of a loose connection between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts were consequences of these events. Had the province included New Hampshire, it would have insured the permanence of a goodly share of the dominion of New England and would have served the purposes of defence nearly as well as that was intended to do. But even as it was, with the appointment of the king’s representative at Boston as governor of New Hampshire, the practical effectiveness of the former dominion was conserved to a reasonable extent. And yet the governor of Massachusetts could not march its troops out of the province without their own consent or the consent of the general court; his discretion in that regard was less than that usually given to royal governors.

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The charter of 1691 also conveyed a much broader and more complete grant of powers than did the charter of 1629. It was such a charter as Virginia would have welcomed before Bacon’s rebellion. By it an express legal basis was first given to the legislature and the judiciary in Massachusetts. The right of the one to tax and of the other to issue judgments in civil and criminal eases was now fully recognized. To the general court also was given the right to erect all judicial tribunals. The former assistants now became the council and the upper house of the legislature, and were elected by the general court, subject to the governor’s veto. The old religious qualification for the suffrage was entirely abolished, and in its place appeared the requirement which was characteristic of England and the other colonies—the possession of property, real or personal. Thus the death blow was given to New England theocracy, for political privilege was henceforth to depend on wealth and not on church membership. As large a proportion of the inhabitants may have been excluded from the suffrage under the later conditions as under the former, but none could now reasonably question the authority of the colony to tax them, though such a course was possible for the non-freeman under the former charter.

But notwithstanding its superior written guaranties, the general court was no longer absolute, as it had been under the first charter. Its power was now limited by the veto of a governor, of one who was no longer an elected chairman, but an appointee of the king, commissioned and instructed as were other royal governors. In the case of his absence the same was true of the deputy governor; and by the side of the chief executive stood the royally appointed secretary. The veto power extended to all acts of the general court, applying thus to elections of councillors as well as to acts of legislation. The laws were also subject to royal examination and disallowance, and to that end must be sent to England, as was required by the instructions which were issued for all other royal provinces. In like fashion was the obligation of appeals to the king in council enforced, while the general obligations of the governor as an executive agent were prescribed

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in the commission and instructions. Without the governor’s warrant no money could be issued from the treasury. Judges, sheriffs, and justices of the peace were to be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council. Grants of land might be freely made by the governor and general court, and no reference to quit rents appears in the charter. Freedom of religion to all except papists was also guarantied. The supremacy of English law was secured by the customary oaths, as well as through the obligations to the crown which have already been mentioned. The admiralty jurisdiction was reserved for special grant from the lord high admiral.

The charter of 1691 may be called an octroi constitution without a bill of rights. In it the organs of government for the province were specified and powers were distributed among them. The advance in this respect upon the charter of 1629 was most marked. The chief distribution of powers was between the executive and the two houses of the legislature. As one of these departments derived its authority from the crown and the other mainly from the inhabitants of the colony, the division of power between them was a compromise. It expressed the truce which had been reached between the two parties or forces which had been contending for the mastery in Massachusetts ever since the Restoration. But even the compromise of the charter did not satisfy either party. For the purposes of the crown it did not go far enough; for the king and his advisers would have preferred a royal province pure and simple, while the Massachusetts of 1691 was still fundamentally a commonwealth with a provincial executive or superstructure. The majority of the colonists would have preferred the continuance of the old system with certain modifications, and this Mather found to his cost when he returned and undertook to defend the new charter as the best that was practicable. The charter of 1691 embodied or suggested many of the principles which appeared in the whole series of royal commissions and instructions which preceded it; but much was also there which came from the corporate colony. It was understood to be a fundamental law, to which every statute of the colony and, if

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possible, every royal instruction must conform. It was thus to enjoy a permanence which was never conceded to merely royal commissions and instructions. It really defined anew the conditions under which the perennial strife between people and crown, liberty and prerogative, was to be continued.

As in the system of government which William Penn first devised for Pennsylvania, so here, the weak point was the elective council. The course of colonial history shows that in the provinces an appointed council was necessary to give adequate strength to the executive and to act as a moderating influence between the governor and assembly in time of conflict. But in Massachusetts the council was exposed to serious attack from two quarters. Those of its members who dared to oppose the assembly would fail of reëlection; those who opposed the governor would be vetoed upon re-election. In quiet times resort to such tactics would not be necessary. But in storm and stress between the assaults of the assembly and of the governor the council was about sure to be reduced to a state of powerlessness. “We have sometimes seen,” wrote Massachusettensis nearly a century later, “half a dozen sail of tory navigation unable, on an election day, to pass the bar formed by the flux and reflux of the tides at the entrance of the harbour, and as many whiggish ones stranded the next morning on Governor’s Island.” But the final outcome would be favorable to the assembly, for it left the governor standing practically alone, without a permanent body upon the support of which he could depend in his struggle to maintain the prerogative.