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CHAPTER XV

THE REVOLT OF LEISLER IN NEW YORK. AN ASSEMBLY PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED IN THAT PROVINCE

The succession of events in time has been to an extent ignored in order that the transition in New England might be followed to its close. But New York, the other centre of the dominion, also reflected in characteristic fashion the effect of disturbances at Boston and in the parent country. The population of New York, whether French, Dutch, or English, was Protestant like that of New England; but its Protestantism was not distinctly hostile to that of the English Church. Except among the towns of eastern Long Island, the Anglicanism of the officials and of their co-religionists was viewed with comparative indifference, so long as they did not claim the extreme privileges of an establishment. As things then were, dissent in New York was less pronounced and was more consistent with loyalty to the crown than it was in New England.

Its spirit of loyalty, combined with a degree of religious indifference, was such that New York had tolerated without question the presence of a Catholic governor in the person of Thomas Dongan. A few Catholics had also been admitted to other and inferior offices: Matthew Plowman to that of collector of the customs at the port of New York, Major Jervis Baxter, commander of the fort at Albany, to a seat in the provincial council, while Bartholomew Russell held a post as ensign in the garrison at New York. A Jesuit father, John Smith, had quietly performed the services of his church under Dongan. But Dongan had given place to Andros in 1688, though the ex-governor was still residing in East Jersey or on his estate at Hempstead. At the time of the revolution in England the four inferior offices mentioned were the only ones which were held by Catholics in New York. To that extent the spirit of the

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test act had been violated, but no complaint had been uttered that the appointments were inconsistent with colonial law. Had it not been for the anti-popish excitement which developed in England and in other colonies, the few Catholics who held office in New York, with their sympathizers, would have been left undisturbed for years to come. But as soon as the effects of this frenzy began to be felt in the provinces, action was taken for the removal of the Catholics. Before the close of May, 1689, Baxter and Russell were suspended from their offices.

Plowman was allowed to continue in office about a month longer, when he was superseded by a board of Protestant commissioners which acted under the authority of the provincial council. By these acts the only cause for anxiety which might have its origin in the presence of Catholic office holders was removed.

But this, in the opinion of the highly sensitive, relieved the situation to only a slight extent. Francis Nicholson, the lieutenant governor, three years before, in the king’s camp on Hounslow Heath, had knelt when mass was celebrated, and had thus identified himself with the throng of easy conformists who, for the sake of rank and office, were suspected of being ready to jeopardize English Protestantism. It was easy to assert that among the merchants and leading families of New York were many others whose religion was so much a matter of indifference that they would easily follow such a course, or even now were in secret league with Catholics for the purpose. So long as Dongan remained in the province or in its neighborhood, his name could be conveniently cited as an indication of the centre about which such imaginary plots might gather. Tales were invented to this effect and were given as wide circulation as possible; while, as a plausible addition to them, it was suggested that Dongan and Andros were in communication, and that the escape of the latter to Rhode Island meant their active coöperation for the reëstablishment of King James’ government. It was indeed possible that if Andros had been able to escape from Boston before his arrest he would have gone to New York and have there continued to

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exercise his authority as governor general of the dominion. But of any purpose on his part, or that of Dongan, to unite in support of a Catholic reaction there is not the slightest evidence, or even the slightest ground of probability.

But, at least for purposes of agitation, some weight was given to these imaginings by the probability that the revolution in England would lead to a war with France. This, if it came, would involve Canada and its Indians in a struggle with the colonies. The feud between the Canadians and the Iroquois would be renewed, unless the influence of Jesuits—who were already laboring among them—and of French traders and officials should prove sufficient to change the violent hostility of the Indians into friendship. In any case the province of New York, because of its central position, would be peculiarly exposed to attack. If the fidelity of the Iroquois to the English, for which both Dongan and Andros had striven, should be continued, attacks from the north might be confined to the frontier. But if the French should win the cantons over to their alliance, no settlement in the province would be free from danger of Indian attack and massacre. Should the French send a fleet to colonial waters, what port lay more conveniently open to attack than that of New York? Some steps had been taken by Nicholson and his council, under orders from Andros, to repair the fort at the end of Manhattan¹ island, but nothing effective had been done. We are credibly informed that he left it much out of repair, with several of the cannon unfit for service and others without platforms on which to mount them. The supply of good powder was very small,² and even the best, with guns of the calibre which were then available, could not be relied on to carry a ball across the river. Owing to the extent of the harbor and the width of the estuary, the same difficulty existed at New York which had been felt at the mouth of the James. The garrisons also, both at New York and Albany, were small and weak, while in the fort at the latter place the men were not sure of a supply of drinking water. How slight was

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the prospect that the English could withstand an attack even of a small French squadron! Conditions had not essentially changed since Stuyvesant, in 1664, acknowledged the inadequacy of coast defence in the colonies to withstand an attack from the water. The situation, so far as it was understood, could not help producing disquiet and might thus prepare the minds of many for believing exaggerated stories of danger.

But had fear of Catholic plots and of French attacks been the only elements in the problem, the natural and almost inevitable action would have been the union of all groups of the population in a welcome to William and Mary and in their proclamation by the existing government of New York without delay. The Dutch could hardly have acted otherwise. There was no reason why the Protestant English should hesitate to loyally accept the decision which was actually reached in England; in fact their conduct, when fairly interpreted, reveals no other inclination. The other minor elements in the population were either of the same mind or were so few in number that their attitude may be neglected. But among the population of New York city and of the southern part of the province generally, there had always been a more or less widespread dissatisfaction with the form of government under which they lived. It reached a maximum among the towns of eastern Long Island, while because of their remoteness and character as small frontier and military outposts, it was least felt in Kingston and Albany. It was the feeling with which autocracy is always regarded by the common people, by those who bear the burdens of society, and have no share, or think they have none, in its benefits. The seaport towns, and especially those at or near the seat of government, abounded in people of this class. The farmer and tenant also naturally had such feelings, but his isolation and sluggishness of temper obscured or prevented their expression. The natural equality of men and the right of all to share in the exercise of political power was the thought which they cherished and which on occasion they would spontaneously express. It is but human to desire and claim some share in those activities by which

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human fortunes are mainly determined. We see this manifesting itself on occasion among the unenfranchised in all the colonies. In none was political life too sluggish or inarticulate to wholly exclude it. Indeed, the history of the nation at large consists to no small extent in the gradual awakening of that consciousness and the development of means for giving it expression.

We have seen this feeling asserting itself from time to time in protests against the autocracy of Kieft and Stuyvesant in New Netherland, and in demands for a tax-granting assembly after the English conquest. But though such assemblies had been established in all the other colonies, efforts to secure one in New York had been followed by no permanent success. The narrow, though not especially corrupt or oppressive, official system which the Duke of York had established, still existed, and events of recent years seemed to threaten its indefinite continuance and extension. It was the desire to be rid of that, intensified by the personal jealousies which always form an element in social crises, that furnished the determining motive for the attempted revolution of 1689-1690 in New York. Rumors of a Catholic plot were circulated in order to furnish an additional incitement. Reports of conflicts in Europe which were likely to be extended to the colonies were utilized as a means of agitation. It was a blind and ill-considered movement, led by a fanatical German, and assumed at the outset the form of a mutiny among the train bands of New York. But in due time, as the insurgents gained the upper hand, they sought to legitimize their position by the forms of election and by various appeals to the people of the province. As a means of securing the acknowledgment of the accession of William and Mary—the ostensible object of the revolt—the movement was not needed. From beginning to end it had not a shadow of legality. It was also characterized by much that was crude and arbitrary, this being largely due to the inexperience of its leaders, to their varied nationality, and to the military character which always attached to the uprising. But it did restore to New York for a brief interval some semblance of representative institutions,

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and thus it holds its place in that series of events—mainly protests—which began with Kieft’s board of Nineteen and which finally resulted in the permanent grant of a legislature to New York in 1691. The efficient agent in the issue of that grant was the government of William and Mary in England, and it was made as a part of a settled policy, unaffected by the domestic broils within the province. And yet the so-called Leisler rebellion appears as an important phase in the transition from the dominion of New England and primitive New York, with their autocratic government, to the later constitutional system of the eighteenth century. It revealed the crude and heterogeneous materials from which, if ever, a constitutional opposition in New York must be developed; while for years after its dimly realized ideals furnished a rallying cry for the various elements of discontent and opposition which survived in that province.

It was by way of New York that Governor Andros first learned of the landing of William of Orange in England. The news was brought thither early in February, 1689, by a coasting vessel from Virginia.¹ Lieutenant Governor Nicholson at once despatched the information to his chief, who was then in the eastern parts, but tried to keep it secret in New York. About a week later Jacob Leisler also received a report of the event by way of Maryland. Leisler had come to New York as a German emigrant some thirty years before and had prospered financially as a merchant. His marriage had connected him with both the Bayard and Van Cortlandt families, but had not served to procure him an introduction into their social circle, because he was rough, unrefined, and uneducated. The envy and dislike toward them which was thus engendered was increased by lawsuits and probably by superciliousness on the one side and an ungovernable temper on the other. Thus originated the personal element which was to influence the approaching conflict, an element which has played so large a part in all later partisan struggles in New York. At the time of

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which we speak Stephen Van Cortlandt, Nicholas Bayard, and Frederick Phillipse were the resident councillors who were at hand to assist the lieutenant governor in the crisis. The other members of the council from New York were either with Andros in New England or in the remoter parts of the province. Of the resident councillors Van Cortlandt was mayor of the city of New York. He was also brother-in-law of Peter Schuyler, the mayor of Albany, and was one of the most prominent and wealthy men of the province. Nicholas Bayard was a nephew of the late Director Stuyvesant, an ex-mayor, and also a man of large wealth and experience. Both these men possessed energy and ability, and together they constituted the chief strength of the conservative group in the southern part of the colony. But the wealth of Phillipse was his sole title to office. In a fashion which was characteristic of New York, and of modern England as well, all three were interested in trade; but their wealth gained in that pursuit was being steadily invested in land, and two of their number founded families which were to stand at the very head of the local aristocracy.

The lieutenant governor and councillors do not seem to have been alarmed for the peace of the province until after news was received of the uprising of April 18 in Boston. A trustworthy report of this reached them on the 26th and was “a great surprizall.” Being but four in number, they resolved to invite the mayor, aldermen, and common council of the city to meet with them for joint advice and coöperation. With them were also associated the chief officers of the train bands of the city. This brought in such men as Francis Rombouts, Balthazar Bayard (a brother of Nicholas), Johannes Kip, Peter de la Noy, Gabriel Minvielle, Abraham De Peyster, Jacob Leisler, and Isaac de Rimer. All of these were prominent as merchants and officials in the little capital. Joint meetings of what were essentially the social and official leaders of New York city, men who also possessed an indefinite and varying influence through the province, were continued in this form until about the close of the first¹ week in June. On May 2, because of the difficulty

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which the officials of the city found in attending, a committee of two aldermen, two councilmen, and four military officers was chosen to represent them. The business which came before the joint meetings mainly concerned the defences of the city and the maintenance of order therein. It was voted to systematically fortify the town, laying out the defences according to its ancient bounds. Committees were appointed to estimate cost and the materials needed and to make provision for the same. As the garrison of the fort was weak, it was resolved that the train bands of the city should assist in keeping guard there, and Councillor Bayard, who was also colonel of the city militia, was requested to issue orders accordingly. It was felt that by this measure jealousies which were cherished by some persons concerning the control of the fort would be removed. As events were soon to show, this proved to be a fateful step. It furnished the immediate occasion and opportunity for the revolt.

On May 11¹ the joint meeting resolved that the several counties should be invited to send delegates “to joine with us in the Common Councill, and if anything of moment offers to render account to their severall counties as they think fitt.” But this suggestion, which might have opened the way to most important results, was not then to bear fruit. The lieutenant governor and council had continued to meet at intervals by themselves, and they naturally retained in their own hands the activities which concerned the province as a whole. It was far from their thought to allow political activity, especially at such a crisis, to pass beyond legally appointed officials. They had in fact anticipated such action as that just suggested by sending for the justices² of the peace, and military officers of Kings, Queens, Westchester, and Richmond counties, and of Bergen county in East Jersey, and also to Colonel Andrew Hamilton at Perth Amboy, in order to prompt them to their duty in maintaining the general peace and security. A part at least of the officials from each of the counties named duly appeared and promised to do all they could to keep the country quiet,

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while those adjacent to the sea coast agreed to keep watch against the possible approach of French or other enemies. Orders to preserve the peace were also sent to the magistrates of Ulster county and to the commander of the fort at Albany. Letters were sent to the royal councillors whose residence was in southern New England, but only a few replied.

Soon after the beginning of May reports came of disorders in Westchester, Queens, and Suffolk counties, which had resulted in the expulsion of the magistrates and military officers from their places and the election of others in their stead.¹ In Queens county and in New York city the militia who had served under Dongan at Albany demanded their arrears, and it became necessary to order their payment, that the effects of an armed demonstration might be averted. The towns of Southampton, Easthampton, and Huntington sent a delegation to New York to demand that the fort there be placed in the hands of men whom the country should choose. False rumors from Boston about the alleged collusion of Andros with the French and eastern Indians had tended to disturb the Five Nations and it was necessary to reassure them. These circumstances go to prove that there was genuine cause for anxiety concerning the peace of New York, and that the governor and councillors were aware of the fact. To that effect indeed they wrote, on May 15, to the secretary of state and the plantation committee, sending their message by John Riggs, a servant of Andros who had recently arrived from Boston.²

On May 30 and the day following, affairs came to a crisis at the fort in New York city. A difference arose between two subordinate officers, one of the militia and the other belonging to the regular soldiers of the garrison, respecting their right to station a sentinel at the sally port. Though in ordinary times an incident like this would have had little significance, it is likely that there had been signs of insubordination among the militia which gave a serious aspect to

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every deviation from routine. When the affair was reported to Nicholson, though he had first proposed that the garrison be reënforced by the train bands, he both spoke and acted as if he supposed the latter to be already on the verge of mutiny. With great vehemence he declared that he would rather see the town on fire than be commanded by them. When this utterance was made known through the town, it was at once magnified into a report that the governor had threatened to burn New York and even to massacre some of the inhabitants. With this was coupled the charge that Nicholson and his Dutch councillors were papists.¹

When the council met the next forenoon, Nicholson² stated that most of the city militia, incited by some of their officers, were in rebellion and would receive no commands either from him or from Colonel Bayard. He therefore requested the mayor to convene that afternoon at the city hall the officers of the city government and the militia officers to advise concerning what should be done. When they were met, Leisler not being present, Lieutenant Cuyler, the officer with whom the governor had had the encounter the previous evening, appeared and made his complaint. Nicholson denied the part which related to any alleged threat by him to burn the town. But high words following, he demanded Cuyler’s commission and removed him on the spot. As Cuyler affirmed that he had acted under the orders of his captain, Abraham De Peyster, that officer was now offended and left the town ball in anger. The governor sent for him to return, but in vain. Drums were at once beat. The people gathered tumultuously and under arms. Leisler’s company, led by his ensign, Joost Stoll, marched to the fort, where they were soon joined by their captain himself. Colonel Bayard was sent thither by the joint meeting in order, if possible, to bring the men to reason; but Stoll, who at the time was under the influence of liquor, replied that they disowned the authority of the government and would have the keys of the fort and the stores also.³

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As evening approached, Captain Lodwick and his men mounted guard, and an armed force under a lieutenant was sent to the city hall to demand the keys. At this point the weakness of the government was decisively shown. Nicholson asked the joint board of councillors what he should do. Their answer can best be given in the words of the original record: “This Board for to hinder and prevent bloodshed and further mischief and for endeavouring to quiet the minds of the people think it is best, considering they being forced to itt, to let them have the keys. His Honor proposing to this Board what way or whether any means may be found to reduce this people from their riseing or what other method maybe taken to bring them to their former obedience, This Board are of opinion that there is noe way to reduce them by force, but their advice is, since they are rise [n] on their own heads without any aid, that they be lett alone for some time.”

Nicholson immediately delivered the keys and did not visit the fort again. This was indeed an important decision, for it left the mutineers to their own course, men who were not simply civilians, but who were enrolled and in service as militia and were thus properly subject to military discipline. It sealed the fate of the Andros regime in New York as effectually as did the Boston uprising of April 19 in New England. In a contest with an armed faction of the people the New York executive found itself without available resource, for the handful of poorly equipped garrison troops counted for nothing in the crisis. Though the great majority of the inhabitants of the province were loyal to the government in a more or less quiescent way, they were unorganized and the officials were not able to make their support effective. So it was at similar junctures in all the colonies, and as a result the most assertive group among the inhabitants, whether larger or smaller, had its way. If correction of this came at all, it came tardily and usually in very imperfect degree, from the interposition of the home government.

The militia captains now agreed to keep possession of the fort until orders should be received from England, and they took their daily turns in actual command there. Before the

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close of the 31st they issued a declaration in which the keynote of the revolt was sounded. It was that they had long suffered under an arbitrary popish power, to which they were “Entirely and Openly Opposed”; they would now keep guard till a person of the Protestant faith, appointed by the newly installed Protestant government in England, should come to demand the surrender of their charge.¹ On the next day (June 1) Leisler comes more decisively to the front. As there were signs of a reaction² and some desired Bayard to resume command and act against the governor, Leisler and his immediate associates began to proclaim through the town by word of mouth and written “pamphlets” that not only the governor but all the members of the council were papists, rogues, and traitors, creatures of the late King James for whom they intended to secure the province. When it came Leisler’s turn to command in the fort, he urged that the inhabitants should be summoned and sign an agreement not to permit this. He also arranged for all the militia companies to come to the fort on a given signal and to disobey their officers if they should try to prevent them.

The next morning (June 3) a false alarm was raised that some French vessels were within Sandy Hook. Thereupon the train bands flocked to the parade ground and thence into the fort, shouting and huzzaing, and all the efforts which Bayard could make to prevent this were unavailing. Much the larger part of those who were concerned in this demonstration were Dutch and did not fully understand what they were doing. Some among them were made to believe that they would be wholly separated from England, would be restored to the condition they enjoyed in 1660, and would obey only the Prince of Orange. Leisler now had the six captains and four hundred of their men sign a statement, which was issued as a proclamation, in which the resolve was declared to hold the fort until orders should come from the Prince of Orange. This meant substantially the same

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as the previous declaration, but its interesting Dutch coloring was probably given to suit the needs of the moment.¹ That this is true was at once made evident. Leisler and his men saw to it that all messages of importance from abroad were first brought to the fort, and among these came news, proclaimed king and queen. In the name of the militia companies an address was sent to them fully acknowledging submission, and offering that, in harmony with the declaration of their Majesties and of the Lords and Commons, they were preserving the province from the chance of betrayal to a foreign enemy.

The news which had come into the possession of Leisler on June 3, came at the same time to the hand of the lieutenant governor.² It was a copy of the London Gazette of February 14, which contained the king’s proclamation continuing all Protestants in office in England. Nicholson might have acted on what this suggested and have proclaimed their Majesties in New York. This would have removed every shadow of justification from the plea of the insurgents. But again Nicholson chose the course of the weak man, and, after consulting his councillors, resolved to go to England and report.³ Within a week he sailed, taking with him in the form of letters all the information which at the time it was necessary to give. He had virtually deserted his post, for, though he left the three councillors in charge, they were even less able than Nicholson himself had been to resist the movement of which Leisler had now made himself the head, and they were soon driven from the city or lodged in prison. The revolutionary tendencies of the Leislerians now speedily became evident, and their methods were characterized largely by reckless denunciation and resort to physical force.

Communication having been opened with Connecticut, two emissaries were sent from that colony to the Leislerians. They brought with them a printed order to proclaim William

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and Mary. As soon as this fell into Leisler’s hands he proclaimed their Majesties in the fort. He then went to the city hall and there repeated the ceremony, using opprobrious language to Mayor Van Cortlandt and taking his honor, with some of the city officials, back to the fort to drink the king’s health. But a few days later a printed copy of the order of February 14, continuing all Protestants in their offices in the colonies, came into the mayor’s hands and he had it duly published. This angered Leisler, and he sought on all occasions to nullify its effect by denouncing all except his own associates as papists. A conspicuous instance of this soon occurred. The councillors and city magistrates suspended Plowman, the Catholic collector, from his office and appointed four commissioners, of whom Colonel Bayard was the head, in his place. But when they were proceeding to do business at the custom house, Leisler appeared at the head of a body of armed men, drove out the commissioners, and installed his chief lieutenant, Peter de la Noy, as collector. Such violence was on this occasion shown toward Bayard that he fled for safety to Albany, where of course his influence was used to strengthen the conservative spirit of the burghers. But his family and estate remained exposed to the outrages of the insurgents during his absence, and when later he ventured to return, he was thrust into prison, where he remained until the restoration of legal government. The mayor’s court adjourned for four weeks and seems not to have met again. Van Cortlandt remained in the city, but without influence, until autumn, when he too was forced to seek refuge in flight. With this the last vestige of government as organized in the dominion of New England vanished.¹

The various features of the revolutionary government now revealed themselves. Though the revolt had originated with the militia of the city, Leisler and his supporters saw the necessity, if possible, of controlling the whole province and of making their influence widely felt in the general affairs of the colonies. They began by returning to the forms of

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civil government. An invitation was issued to the counties and towns to choose delegates to a convention. The response to this came wholly from the southern part of the province, and even there Suffolk county and the larger part of Queens declined to take action. Delegates appeared from New York, Richmond, Westchester, and Orange, from Essex county in East Jersey, and from four towns at the western end of Long Island. We must suppose that, even in these communities, the majority of the population were indifferent or opposed to this novel appeal. The settlements of the middle and upper Hudson made no response whatever. The only information which we have concerning the opinions of the delegates chosen comes from John Tudor, an opponent. He wrote to Nicholson that they were “Oliverians,” and that some of them declared that there had been no legal king in England since the days of the Protector.¹

The convention met, on June 26, in the fort in New York city. Of its deliberations we have no knowledge. We know that, in probable imitation of procedure at Boston, it chose a committee of safety, and that it received some promises of assistance from agents of Connecticut. The committee, acting it is said under the influence of a threat from Leisler, designated him as captain of the fort, with authority to hold it till further orders from England. In his commission he was assured of assistance from city and country in repelling foreign enemies and suppressing internal disorders. A chest of money—the same apparently which Nicholson and the council had long before ordered Plowman to deposit in the fort—was now opened and used for the payment of charges. Leisler assumed authority to sign all passes for vessels. All incoming letters of importance were taken to the fort and opened. A permanent guard of fifty men was organized. The work of improving and extending the fortifications was begun and vigorously prosecuted.² The walls of the fort were completed, the powder house repaired, the well opened, platforms made and guns mounted, a semi-circular work known as the “half-moon” built behind the

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fort to the westward. Armed detachments were sent out to arrest so-called papists, and many such suspected persons were haled to prison. Alarms were utilized to facilitate this process. Correspondence was opened as widely as possible with the New England colonies and with the Coode faction in Maryland for the purpose of promoting general alertness against suspected Catholic and French sympathizers. In activity of this nature Leisler showed great vigor, and a degree of life was infused into measures of defence such as New York had never known before. War in Europe had already begun. It was imminent in the colonies. In the sphere of military preparations for this crisis Leisler did his best work, and he used the powers of a military dictator for the purpose. In the process the civil aspects of the government were largely obscured and its military and autocratic features prevailed. He practically assumed a dictatorship over the southern part of the province, and it was in recognition of that position that, at the middle of August, the committee of safety appointed him commander-in-chief, with full executive and military powers as well as discretion when, if ever, he should consult the civil authorities.¹

It was now that Jacob Milborne, who had recently returned from England, became Leisler’s chief adviser,² and later the husband of one of his daughters. Through his family Milborne was of Baptist connection, and years before he had had some differences with Andros. He now sought to justify the introduction of a system of elections for filling city and county offices in New York on the theory that William had been brought to the throne of England by the common voice of the people and was an elective king. But to this ultra-Whig theory could as well be opposed the view that William had won his crown by the sword and that this would justify a military despotism in New York.³ As Leisler for the time being held the power of the sword, he could well afford to institute elections which he was sure of being able to control, and the theory which

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best suited his purpose could at the proper time be mustered into service. Nothing is more common than to further revolutionary movements in this way. When, at Michaelmas, 1689, the time for the annual election in New York city came around, a mayor, sheriff, and town clerk were for the first time elected, though it is said that only seventy or eighty persons voted. The terms of the city charter were clearly violated by this act, but Peter de la Noy, one of Leisler’s chief supporters, was elected mayor, and another young but active friend, Abraham Governeur, was made clerk.

Albany had received a charter from Governor Dongan which was very similar in terms to that which he had granted to New York. Peter Schuyler was its mayor, Dirck Wessels, recorder, and Robert Livingston, clerk, all appointees of the governor. As in New York, the offices of aldermen and common councilmen were filled by election, and this was regularly held, as usual, in October. Leisler and Milborne now sought to obtain control of this city also, and with it of affairs in the northern part of the province. In view of the threatening activity of the French and Indians, the importance of this post was great, and the New Englanders, as well as Leisler, were eagerly watching the state of affairs there. Its inhabitants naturally welcomed the news of the expedition of their countrymen to England. They never ceased to express their loyalty to him and did not hesitate to take the oath of allegiance when it became known that he was king. On this score, then, there was no occasion for Leisler to be dissatisfied with their attitude.

But on August 1 the officials and commonalty of Albany, together with the justices of the peace and military officers of the city and county, formed a convention to secure the interests of their Majesties until further orders from England.¹ They met regularly under the presidency of the mayor and adopted all sorts of measures for the improvement of local defence. As Major Baxter had long since left the region, Lieutenant Thomas Sharpe, of the regulars, was designated

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to command at the fort, and all took the oath of fidelity to William and Mary. They forbade all persons who were fit to bear arms to leave the city without permission. They watched carefully the temper of the Indians and sought information respecting the plans of the French. At first they endeavored to meet the cost of their enterprise by private subscription, and later resorted to New England, especially to Connecticut, for aid. A promise was received from that colony that it would send a relief of eighty men. The authorities at Albany disliked the mutinous proceedings of New York, and, though they applied to him for aid, Leisler refused to give it unless they sent delegates to his committee of safety. He would tolerate no divided authority in the province. But Albany was pursuing a course quite as independent as that of Leisler, though without his arbitrariness and show of force, for the unanimity of feeling in the north made those unnecessary.

Toward the close of October the Leislerians resolved that Albany must be reduced, and prepared to send up a body of armed men under the command of Milborne for the purpose.¹ When this was known at Albany, a protest was sent down by Alderman Van Schaick and Lieutenant Staats. The latter the insurgents won over by a promise of the command of the fort at Albany in the place of Sharpe. But Van Schaick faithfully delivered his message, which was to the effect that troops would be received only on condition that they should obey the command of the convention. But Leisler met this in his usual manner by declaring that Lieutenant Sharpe and Sergeant Rodgers were papists, and that Albany should produce its charter if it had one. Milborne was accordingly sent thither with fifty men.

When the convention at Albany heard that Milborne was approaching, an alarm was given and the citizens were summoned to a general meeting. By this body resolutions were passed to the effect that they would not permit the men from New York to enter the city until they were assured that they came in good faith and would submit to the control of

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the local authority as established. The mayor, Peter Schuyler, was then appointed to the command of the fort, Sharpe being subordinated to him. The following day Milborne and his force appeared on the river below the city. He was admitted, but had to leave his men on the sloops which had brought them from New York. On being brought to the city hall, Milborne exhorted the burghers, in “a long oration with a high Stile and Language,” to free themselves from the yoke of arbitrary power which a popish king and governor had imposed upon them. But in this plea for release from despotism under one of its forms appears a suggestion the object of which was to open the way for the entrance of Leisler’s military government. It was that the city charter was void because granted by a popish governor. To this Recorder Wessels briefly replied, to the effect that arbitrary power did not exist in Albany, for they had taken the oath of allegiance and were acting, not in the name of King James, but of William and Mary. Milborne then delivered a letter of credence, signed by Leisler and twenty-three of his supporters.

On the following day, which was Sunday, Milborne was sent for to appear again before the convention. Recorder Wessels was now the chief speaker, and asked at whose cost and charge his soldiers had come. He replied, at the charge of the city of Albany. This the recorder showed was contrary to the terms which had originally been sent down to New York. And when the burghers were asked if they thought the county of Albany would be able to pay the charge, they unanimously answered, “No.” Milborne then sought to enforce his authority by showing a commission signed by the same men whose names appeared on the letter read the previous day. But to this the recorder made the conclusive reply, that such a commission granted by a company of private men was of no force in Albany, and that he could exercise no authority there unless he was able to show a commission from King William, whom they were willing to obey. Milborne then addressed himself to the common people and urged them to elect new magistrates, for all, be said, was null and void which had been done under authority

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from James. But he was told that a legal election had recently been held, and, if that which he said were true, land titles would be unsettled and they would indeed be in a desolate condition. But Milborne had made an impression, and the following day a large number came together again at the city hall—so that the convention was forced to meet at the recorder’s house—and were proceeding to choose Lieutenant Staats as captain of the company which had come from New York. In spite of a warning to disperse, about a hundred votes, mostly those of young men and non-freeholders, were cast for Staats, and he accepted the office. The entering wedge of a movement which was intended to divide Albany and in the end subject it to Leisler was thus driven.

Milborne now informed the convention that he was authorized by the committee at New York to “order the affairs at Albany”; but they firmly adhered to the position originally taken. All this time Schuyler had been personally in command at the fort. But on Thursday, the 4th of November, he came down to the convention at the city hall and explained the reasons which had moved him to seize and keep control of the fort. These were approved and the convention refused longer to parley with Milborne unless he would come fully to its terms. The following day¹ he marched to the fort with a body of armed men and demanded its surrender. Schuyler replied that he kept it in the names of their majesties and ordered the intruder away. But Milborne attempted to enter, when he was thrust out. He then retired within the town gates, where he raised the king’s jack, facing the fort, and, having charged his men to load their guns with bullets, came out and began reading a manifesto. A band of Mohawks who were standing on the hill within sight now caused word to be conveyed to Schuyler that, if the New Yorkers attacked the fort, they would fire upon them. The burghers also read a protest against the bloodshed which was likely to follow. When Milborne was told that, if he marched in hostile array toward the fort, the

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Indians would fire on him, he abandoned his effort and with drew his men. Leaving his company in charge of Staats, he returned to New York¹ to report. Though these men were not put under the control of the convention, Staats agreed to take no action against that body. Thus the two rival factions faced one another, neither being able to control the entire province of New York.

While these events were occurring in the colonies, Nichol son had arrived in England. To his report had been added the information which came through subsequent letters from the members of the council and their friends. In August Leisler had sent the redoubtable Ensign Stoll, accompanied by Matthew Clarkson, to England, with a letter and papers from himself. This evidence was intended to convey Leisler’s view of the imminent danger which had threatened New York from popish intriguers, the way in which it had been rescued by the revolt of the train bands, and what had been accomplished for the improvement of the defences of city and colony;² but no reference was made to his appointment as commander-in-chief of the province. It is needless to say that the representations of Stoll were not taken seriously by the British government, and no more were those presented from the same source by Benjamin Blagge several months later. Some two months before the arrival of Stoll Colonel Henry Sloughter had been appointed governor of New York, which was again reduced to its former boundaries.³ The new appointee was destitute of most of the qualifications needed for the office, but, in accordance with what was now to be the established practice, he was empowered to call an assembly. This of itself would effectually remove the occasion for such crises as that through which New York was now passing. Stoll’s companion, Clarkson, who had not been seriously involved with Leisler, secured the office of secretary under the new appointee. Nicholson, who was in reality better qualified for the post of governor than his successful rival, had incapacitated himself

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for further service in New York by his withdrawal, and, as we have seen, was transferred to Virginia.

The opposition which Leisler had met with at Albany necessitated further assertions of his power. He therefore called his partisans together from New York, Kings, and Bergen counties and told them¹ that Nicholson had turned a privateer and would never show his face in England, while Bayard with three hundred men would attempt to recapture the fort. In consequence the watch was strengthened and a new declaration of fidelity to the king and queen, to the committee of safety, and to Leisler as commander-in-chief, was signed under dire threatenings if obedience was refused. Military officers, especially of aristocratic connections, whose fidelity seemed in any way doubtful were removed, and others, preferably from the class of artisans, were appointed in their places. It was at this time that Van Cortlandt and Bayard were pursued with especial vigor, while Phillipse found it to his advantage to submit to Leisler. With a view to future contingencies the thrifty ex-mayor, though for the time humiliated, was writing to Andros to remember him to Blathwayt, “that I might get here the Collectors place or at least that [the] commission of auditor with a certain sallery may bee confirmed unto² mee.”

Soon after the arrival of Nicholson in England John Riggs was sent back with despatches from the king addressed to the lieutenant governor, “or in his absence, to such as for the time being take care to keep the peace and administer the laws” of New York.³ The expectation of the crown was that the despatches would be received and the commands they contained executed by the members of the council whom Nicholson had supposedly left in authority. In conformity with this, the only legal course, Riggs, on his arrival at New York in December, prepared to deliver the despatches to the council. But before it could meet, Leisler summoned him to the fort, assuming that he himself was the man for whom, in Nicholson’s absence, the packets were intended. Riggs, before delivering them, insisted that Phillipse

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and Van Cortlandt should be called. When they came, it was only to state that they themselves were the officials to whom it was the king’s intention that the packets should be delivered. At this Leisler burst into one of his many fits of passion, called them popish dogs and rogues, and ordered them out of the fort. Then the despatches were opened, and, on the strength of his interpretation of what the crown intended, Leisler assumed the title of lieutenant governor. William and Mary he now proclaimed anew and in stricter conformity with official forms. From the members of his committee of safety he had a council chosen, of which De la Noy, already mayor, was the leading member. Samuel Staats and Samuel Edsall were among its members. Milborne was soon appointed secretary of the province. Under the authority of an act of 1683 the collection of customs and excise was ordered, De la Noy being formally commissioned¹ as collector. Finding that taxes were not willingly paid, a so-called court of exchequer was later established, and punishments were inflicted to enforce payment. A court of oyer and terminer was opened in Queens county, De la Noy again appearing at the head of the commission. A new seal was struck for the province, and many of Leisler’s supporters were appointed to offices in the southern counties. As we enter the year 1690, business was increasing in volume and was all being transacted in the name of the lieutenant governor or of the lieutenant governor and council. So far as possible, all who dared to question Leisler’s usurped authority were silenced by imprisonment or other forms of intimidation.

In the view of Leisler one of the most important uses to which he could put his freshly usurped authority was to bring additional pressure to bear upon Albany. Captain Staats was accordingly ordered to take possession of Fort Orange, while to the officials of that locality he sent orders to hold elections for mayor and aldermen and to notify him of those whom they should choose for militia officers, so that he might send them commissions.² When the convention learned of this, they asked Staats if he could show them any

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direct authority through Leisler from the crown in support of his demand. This of course he was unable to do. The convention then formally voted not to recognize Leisler as lieutenant governor or obey his commands. An able manifesto was prepared, giving the reasons for their action, which was solemnly published at the fort,¹ January 13, 1690. But in little more than a month after this apparently decisive action was taken came the destruction of Schenectady by a force of French and Indians, an event that was even more dramatic in its completeness than others of a similar nature which had been occurring in northern New England, an impressive counter-stroke to the recent descent of the Iroquois on Lachine. This made it perfectly evident that New York, as well as the colonies to the eastward, had a war on its hands. Albany renewed its appeal to the New England colonies for aid, but Leisler urged the arrest of the envoys which it sent out. He at the time extended his negotiations with the colonies to the east and south with a view to organizing a joint movement against the enemy. Prosecutions against the remnant of the “popish” faction were redoubled. Milborne was again ordered to go to Albany, this time with two other commissioners, to take possession of the fort and assume the direction of all affairs there. Connecticut had already advised the magistrates at Albany to recognize the government at New York, in order that the province might present a united front to the enemy. That advice was now heeded. Milborne was admitted into the fort, while Schuyler and the other magistrates were recognized as legally in control of civil affairs² in the city. Ulster county was likewise brought into line.

It was in his tireless efforts to organize a joint expedition of the colonists against the French and Indians that Leisler appears at his best. His hatred of them was sincere and the expression of it in war was perfectly consistent with the half superstitious dread of their conspiracies which was one of the chief notions that led him to plunge into the revolt. It was the same spirit which in England had occasioned the

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tragedy of the Popish Plot. The history of his share in the prosecution of the war does not demand our attention here; it belongs in another connection. But it was the need of a larger and more permanent revenue, which was occasioned by the war, that led Leisler to issue writs in February, 1690, for the election of an assembly. It was in this measure that his effort to reach a stable form of government, where the civil power should resume its normal supremacy over the military, culminated. But here, as everywhere else, he was defeated by the repugnance which his own essentially military rule aroused. The response was so unsatisfactory that in March new writs had to be issued. Even then, as we are told by Van Cortlandt,¹ “Suffolk County would not meddle with it. From the other Counties came Representatives onely chosen by a few people off their side and, as I understand, very weak men.” In New York county only “some few, being all off his side appeared,” and they of course chose partisans of Leisler. As it was, New York, Westchester, Kings, Ulster, and Albany counties were nominally represented.

The assembly met for its first session in New York city on April 24, at the house of Robert Walters, a member from New York county, and a son-in-law of Leisler. John Spratt, another member from New York county, was chosen speaker. Two acts were passed, one for the levy of a tax of 3d. in the pound on real and personal property throughout the province, and another, the object of which was to take from the city of New York the monopoly of the bolting of flour which it had enjoyed since the administration of Andros and which the counties of Albany and Ulster in particular desired to share. But after the session had lasted a few days, because petitions were being presented for the release of prisoners and the redress of grievances, Leisler prorogued the assembly until September. Two months later Leisler himself was assaulted by rioters in the streets of New York, who took this means of demanding the release of political prisoners and of protesting against the payment of the taxes which he levied.²

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During the second session, which was held after the close of the unsuccessful campaign of the summer, an act was passed declaring that the courts should be kept open and accused persons should be assured a legal trial; but coupled with this was a requirement that those who had fled from the province should return within three weeks after the publication of the law, on pain of being treated as disobedient. Another act, the purpose of which was to overcome the general repugnance to holding office under the new government, provided for a levy of a fine of £75 on any person who should refuse to accept an office, civil or military. The same act also provided that any one who should leave the counties of Ulster or Albany without permission should be fined £100, and that all who had left those counties must return within fourteen days at their utmost peril. The sending of merchandise from those counties down the Hudson without the governor’s license, the act declared, would be followed by its confiscation. Provision was also made for the levy of another tax for the support of a garrison of two hundred men at the fort. It is clear that the object of these acts was largely military. They were war measures, and that character attached to all of Leisler’s acts, even in spite of himself. Though the courts were open, it was never certain that the summary methods of the soldier would not dominate their procedure. Milborne, if correctly reported, described the situation with accuracy. When asked, in connection with a hearing in reference to the imprisonment of Philip French, if the governor and council sat in a civil or military capacity, he answered, “Both.”¹ In October and November Milborne was busy under a commission to search houses and vessels and arrest delinquents in an effort to suppress incipient revolt in Queens county.² The fact is that the Leislerians were never able so far to escape from the character of mutineers, or to establish themselves so firmly in the seats of authority, as to show what they were capable of as civil rulers. The same was true of Bacon and

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his followers in Virginia. And, even had insurgents of their character decisively gained the upper hand, the shadow of the home government still rested upon them. Its power was slow in making itself felt, but in the end it was sufficient. The time was now approaching when Leisler must yield before an expression of its authority which he could not gainsay.

The omission of the name of Leisler or those of his supporters from the list of appointees to Governer Sloughter’s council, and the inclusion of Phillipse, Van Cortlandt, and Bayard among the number, clearly indicated the attitude which the home government had taken. Indeed, it had never shown the slightest tendency to recognize Leisler, and under the circumstances the attitude which it took was the only possible one. Among the other appointees were Gabriel Minvielle, William Nicolls (formerly secretary and imprisoned with Bayard), Chidley Brooke, Thomas Willett, and William Pinhorne. Brooke was also appointed collector and receiver. All the papers which had been received from Leisler and from those who with him had called themselves the council of New York, were delivered to Sloughter, with an instruction to strictly and impartially examine the allegations and return a true account of the state of the province. Two companies of troops were detached to accompany the new governor, one of which was placed under the command of Major Richard Ingoldesby, who had recently served under William in Ireland. Joseph Dudley returned to the colonies with Sloughter and Ingoldesby, though the three vessels which carried them did not leave England until December, 1690. Ingoldesby, with his soldiers, reached New York about the close of January, 1691. Sloughter, however, from whom he had been separated on the way over, did not arrive until nearly two months later.¹ It was the events of those two months which enabled Leisler’s enemies to fix upon him the charge of treason, for his previous conduct, though it was seditious, was not treasonable.

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Immediately upon his arrival Ingoldesby demanded possession of the fort.¹ For action of this kind, however, he had no express authority, though the fort was the place for the lodgment of the king’s troops and their stores. Had they been admitted there with their commander, Leisler’s authority would have been seriously compromised, if not destroyed. For Ingoldesby boldly declared that Leisler could derive no authority from the king’s letter to Nicholson and those who for the time held authority in New York. His own arrival, too, was the signal for renewed activity on the part of the council. Leisler at once learned, to his anger and dismay, that Phillipse, Van Cortlandt, and Bayard were named among the members of the new council. The delicate situation thus arose which was sure to result when Leisler was confronted with the authority of the king, backed by real force. But he doggedly adhered to the course which he had originally chosen and refused to recognize any authority that might imperil his own until the arrival of the royal governor. He offered Ingoldesby and his men accommodation in the town, but this was declined. Ingoldesby interpreted this course as involving direct opposition to the king’s commands, and issued a warrant calling for assistance from Long Island. Leisler replied with a protest and a proclamation calling out the militia, in order that they might be ready to repel by force any opposition to parleys or any attacks on the fort, city, or parts of the province.² However, on a declaration from Ingoldesby that he had no intention of molesting the people of New York, but rather that he desired to protect them in peace and quietness, Leisler, on February 3, ordered that the major and his troops should be received and lodged in the city, but he expressly refused to surrender to him the fort. Still, at the same time, he professed his willingness to yield it to Sloughter on his arrival, and later sent a letter to the governor to the same effect. It was under these conditions that Ingoldesby’s men were landed and lodged at the city hall, and those who

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were gathering in arms under Ingoldesby’s authority on Long Island were ordered to disperse.

But amid the bitter feelings which existed and with two rival military bodies in the little town, it was difficult to keep the peace. As the weeks passed relations became more strained. Dudley came on from Boston and the councillors who were at liberty attempted to prove that theirs was the only legitimate authority in the province. Appeal was made to Connecticut, first for advice and later for assistance. The councillors kept turning to Long Island for reënforcements against the “rebels.” Through their influence and that of Ingoldesby, Leisler’s authority outside the fort was being seriously curtailed. He complained that his efforts to collect the tax voted by the assembly at its last session were thwarted, to the great injury of the common service against the French. Friction between the troops in the town increased. Leisler, in order to protect himself, secured what stores and reënforcements he could. He turned the cannon in the fort toward the town, and took possession of neighboring blockhouses. This led to counter efforts on the part of Ingoldesby’s men. Two long protests were issued by Leisler against the conduct of his opponents,¹ one ending with a declaration that he would resist them to the utmost of his power if they did not disband their forces and assume a peaceful attitude. As this proclamation was of course not obeyed, on the next day (March 17) Leisler began firing on Ingoldesby’s force. The fire was returned, and by the shots two of the king’s soldiers were killed and several on that side were wounded.

On the day following this encounter Governor Sloughter arrived in the lower bay. When he was informed of the disordered condition of the town, he at once left his vessel and landed, March 19. Going at once to the city hall, his commission was read and several of the councillors were sworn into office. Ingoldesby was then sent to demand the surrender of the fort and the release of the two councillors who were imprisoned there. Obedience to these commands

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was refused, and orders were required under the king’s own hand, directed to Leisler himself. Stoll was also sent to ascertain if the new arrival was indeed Sloughter himself, whom he had known in England as the king’s appointee. After Stoll had satisfied himself on this point, a second demand for surrender was sent, but Leisler replied that the fort was not to be delivered on such easy terms, and sent Milborne and De la Noy to capitulate with the governor. Sloughter detained them as prisoners, and ordered the frigate in which he had come to anchor near by so that it could fire on the fort if refusal to surrender should be persisted in.

The next morning Leisler wrote to Sloughter, admitting that the latter was indeed the king’s appointee and asking him to send an order through Ingoldesby for the surrender of the fort, and that he (Leisler) might be treated as one who could give an exact account of all his conduct. Ingoldesby was now sent with his companies to demand surrender for the third time, and to order Leisler’s men to ground their arms. Many of them obeyed this order, and Leisler, with several of his council, was put under arrest. Bayard and Nicolls were released and took their seats in the council. A new city government was immediately organized for New York. Writs were issued for the election of an assembly, to meet April 9. Throughout the affair the representatives of the crown carefully avoided all acts which would imply that Leisler had any claim to the post or to the power which he had exercised.¹

In view of the events which had occurred since Ingoldesby’s arrival, the plan of a general inquiry by the governor into the disturbances in New York and a report to the king was now put one side. A criminal inquest took their place. After a preliminary examination of the prisoners by Dudley, Van Cortlandt, and Brooke, the governor issued a special commission of oyer and terminer. Joseph Dudley and Thomas Johnson (whom the governor also appointed judges of admiralty), Sir Robert Robinson, ex-governor of Bermuda, William Smith, Recorder Pinhorne, John Lawrence, Captain Jasper Hicks,

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of the frigate Archangel; Major Ingoldesby, John Young, and Isaac Arnold, or any six of them, of whom a judge was to be one, were named in this commission. They all were naturally opposed to Leisler, and were men before whom he and his associates could at least expect no favors. The trial was held before a jury and the case of the government was prepared with special care. The indictment was for holding the king’s fort by force against his governor, a course of action which had resulted in loss of life, and amounted to treason and murder. Of the ten prisoners who were brought to trial, two, De la Noy and Edsall, were acquitted; six were convicted by the jury upon evidence; while Leisler and Milborne were condemned as mutes. The reason for this action in the case of the two chief offenders was, that they insisted on the judges determining whether the authority under which they had acted in seizing and holding the fort was legal. They affirmed that this point was still sub judice, and until it was decided, they could not plead. The court refused to answer until they had pleaded. The question of course hinged on the interpretation of the king’s letter to Nicholson of July 30, 1689, and the judges finally obtained from Sloughter and his council an opinion that the letter was intended for the governor and his council, and not in any sense for Captain Leisler.¹ This the court announced as its decision. But still the two accused men refused to plead. They were brought in guilty with the rest and sentenced to death. The prisoners then petitioned the governor for a reprieve until the king’s pleasure could be known, and on the advice of the judges the prayer was granted. Letters were then sent home by Sloughter, in which pardon of all the accused except Leisler and Milborne was recommended. In the ordinary course of affairs proceedings would now have been suspended until orders were received from England.

But in April the assembly met. The feeling against the prisoners which prevailed among its members was strong. Bayard, Van Cortlandt, and their aristocratic friends were again in the saddle. They had been frightened and had

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suffered great humiliations during the past two years, and their spirit of vindictiveness was correspondingly aroused. The representatives passed resolutions strongly condemning the Leisler regime because of its illegality and oppression, even attributing to it the disaster at Schenectady. The Dutch preachers inveighed against Leisler. It was argued that the king’s power of pardon was in the governor. The strongest kind of pressure was brought to bear on Sloughter and his councillors to order the execution of the two leaders of the revolt,¹ even the wives of some of the principal men joining in the outcry. It was to be expected that the councillors would easily be convinced, for many of them had felt the tyranny and all shared in the feeling of exasperation which now swept through the province. The friends of Leisler presented counter appeals. Under such circumstances as these the governor alone could be depended upon to maintain an attitude of impartiality, and to see that the accused in a case of such importance as this were given the chance of a bearing before the privy council. Unlike Berkeley in Virginia, Sloughter had not been a participant in the troubles. Instead of his office and person being assailed, the insurgents in New York had scrupulously guarded him and his dignity from question. In the later stages of the controversy they had pleaded that it was their enemies within the province who were trying to lead them into a false position. In this there was much truth, for the struggle was really between two factions in New York, each of which was trying to outdo the other in professions of loyalty to William and Mary. Surely, if ever, it was incumbent upon an outsider, the appointee of those monarchs, to withstand factional violence, to rise above considerations of mere legality, and to insist that the penalty of treason should not be executed hastily and prematurely. It is possible that the decision of the privy council would have been in accordance with the recommendation of the governor, and that it would have sealed the doom of Leisler and Milborne. But in that case Governor Sloughter could not have been charged with

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sacrificing human life to a mere clamor and with cancelling a reprieve in order to do it. He, however, weakly yielded to pressure, and his consent was approved by the legislature.

On the morning of May 16, Leisler and Milborne were executed. In their speeches on the scaffold the object of their movement was clearly stated and with it the cause which had led to its perversion. “We had no other¹ [intent] than to maintains against popery or any Schism or heresy whatever the interest of our Sovereign Lord & Lady that now is & the reformed protestant Churches in those parts. . . .” But during their “unhappy abode in power” they had often longed to see the arrival of a royal governor, that an end might be put to “such distracted orders as then were raging . . . some [of which] we must Confess on our side hath been committed through Ignorance, some through a Jealous fear that disaffected persons would not be true to the present interest of the Crowne of England, some peradventure through misinformation and misconstruction of peoples’ intent and meaning, some through rashness by want of Consideration & then through passion, hate & anger.” For every such offence they begged pardon, first of God, and then of those whom they had offended, and prayed that in their graves all malice, hatred, and envy might be buried. Had this prayer been heeded, the history of New York during the next decades would have been far other than it was. The flame which Leisler had kindled burned and smouldered long before it was extinguished, and the agitation which it caused forced an examination of the case in England. This was followed by the release of the other condemned prisoners, and in the end by the reversal of the attainders of Leisler and Milborne and the restoration of their estates.

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